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Conflicts between the interests of biodiversity conservation and other human activities pose a major threat to natural ecosystems and human well-being, yet few methods exist to quantify their intensity and model their dynamics. We develop a categorization of conflict intensity based on the curve of conflict, a model originally used to track the escalation and deescalation of armed conflicts. Our categorization assigns six intensity levels reflecting the discourse and actions of stakeholders involved in a given conflict, from coexistence or collaboration to physical violence. Using a range of case studies, we demonstrate the value of our approach in quantifying conflict trends, estimating transition probabilities between conflict stages, and modeling conflict intensity as a function of relevant covariates. By taking an evidence-based approach to quantifying stakeholder behavior, the proposed framework allows for a better understanding of the drivers of conservation conflict development across a diverse range of socioecological scenarios. ; JJC and NB were supported by funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's H2020/ERC grant agreement no. 679651 (ConFooBio). HH was supported by ERC grant no. 694640 (ViEWS), ZBH by the UK Natural Environment Research Council (NE/L002558/1), and SCT by scholarships from CONACYT and the Foley-Béjar fund at Balliol College. ; Peer reviewed

Growth rates of per capita GDP are depressed by civil conflict to a degree that reflects its severity. Only the more severe conflicts - ones that affect at least half of the country by land area and/or cause more than 1,000 fatalities in at least one year - have a significant negative growth effect. Post-conflict recovery of output is enhanced by aid flows but this finding may be subject to endogeneity bias.

Background: In the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), access to maternal and child healthcare (MCH) services are constrained due to the prolonged Israeli military occupation, the Separation Wall, army checkpoints, and restrictions on the movement of people and goods. This study assesses the relationship between conflict intensity and access to Maternal and Child Health care in occupied Palestinian territory (oPt). To the best of our knowledge, the impact of conflict on access to health care has not been measured due to the lack of data. Methods: We analyse pooled data from household surveys covering a fifteen-year period (2000-2014) of children (n=16,793) and women (n=8,477) in five regions of the oPt. Conflict intensity was used as a continuous variable defined as the square root of non-combatant conflict mortality taken from monthly death rates of non-combatants by region. We use multilevel logistic models to explain four outputs: child vaccination schedules, antenatal care, caesarean sections, and complications during pregnancy. Results: Locality is important with results showing the negative impact of conflict intensity on access to care, especially in the South West Bank for maternal health services and Central West Bank for vaccination (B -0.161 p=0.000 for DPT). Wealth is only significant for DPT vaccinations with poorest (B -0.098 p=0.005) and poor (B -0.148 p=0.002) individuals less likely to access services. Otherwise conflict does not show a differential effect across socio-economic conditions. Conclusions: This study shows how locality is the strongest factor when looking at the impact of conflict in the oPt. Preventative services (ANC and vaccinations) are the most affected by conflict. We recommend a greater use of community health care to improve access to maternal and child care when barriers impede access to health facilities during times of conflict.

PurposeThis paper aims to add to the current knowledge about conflict management by examining the relationships between conflict type, conflict expression intensity and the use of the conflict management approach.Design/methodology/approachThe authors test theory-based hypotheses using a field study of new product development teams in an interdisciplinary Masters program (Study 1) and an experimental vignette study (Study 2).FindingsResults show that people are more likely to respond to task conflict and conflicts expressed with less intensity using collectivistic conflict management approaches (i.e. problem-solving, compromising and yielding), and to relationship conflicts and conflicts expressed with higher intensity through forcing, an individualistic conflict management approach. Information acquisition and negative emotions experienced by team members mediate these relationships.Practical implicationsKnowing how the characteristics of the conflict (type and expression intensity) affect conflict management, managers can counteract the tendency to use dysfunctional, forcing conflict management approaches in response to high intensity conflicts, as well as to relationship conflicts and support the tendency to use collectivistic conflict management approaches in response to low intensity conflict, as well as task conflicts.Originality/valueThe authors examine an alternative to the prevailing view that conflict management serves as a moderator of the relationship between conflict and team outcomes. The research shows that conflict type and intensity of conflict expression influence the conflict management approach as a result of the information and emotion they evoke. The authors open avenues for future research on the complex and intriguing relationships between conflict characteristics and the conflict management approach.

There is a tremendous amount of variation in conflict intensity both across and within civil conflicts. Some conflicts result in huge numbers of battle deaths, while others do not. Conflict intensity is also dynamic. Conflict intensity escalates, de-escalates, and persists. What explains this variation? We take one of the most prominent explanations for the onset and occurrence of civil conflict—variation in economic conditions—and apply it to the intensity and dynamics of civil conflict. Using an instrumental variables strategy and a rich set of empirical models, we find that the intensity of conflict is negatively related to per capita income. We also find that economic conditions affect conflict dynamics, as poorer countries are likely to experience longer and more intense spells of fighting after the onset of conflict.

LIMITED WAR IS OFTEN DESCRIBED AS BEING HIGH OR LOW INTENSITY. THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS THE NEW CENTER OF GRAVITY IN MILITARY ACTION, THE IMPACT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY, CONFLICT SHORT OF WAR, AND, LIMITED WAR. THE ARTICLE PREDICTS THAT ARMIES INCREASINGLY WILL BECOME CLEAN-UP AND OCCUPATION FORCES, AND THAT AIR FORCES, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT, NAVIES WILL PROVIDE THE CUTTING EDGE FOR COMBAT.

Despite the frequent use of economic and military-specific sanctions against countries affected by civil conflicts, little is known about the possible impact that these coercive tools have on conflict dynamics. This article examines how threats and imposition of international sanctions affect the intensity of civil conflict violence. We formulate and test two competing views on the possible effect of economic and military-specific sanctions on conflict dynamics by combining data on fatalities in battle-related violence in all internal armed conflicts in Africa from 1989 to 2005 with data on economic sanctions and arms embargoes. The results indicate that threats of economic sanction and arms embargo are likely to increase the intensity of conflict violence. Similarly, imposed economic sanctions are likely to contribute to the escalation of conflict violence. Imposed arms embargoes, on the other hand, are likely to reduce conflict violence. We conclude that international sanctions appear to be counterproductive policy tools in mitigating the human cost of civil conflicts unless they are in the form of imposed arms embargoes attempting to limit the military capacity of the warring parties.

This article examines the perception of power, threat, and conflict intensity in an asymmetric intergroup conflict. About 900 Arab and 900 Jewish high school and university students in Israel were surveyed on their sense of threat and security, the intensity of the conflict between their communities, and power relations between Arabs and Jews who both are citizens of Israel. Scales were developed to measure all three concepts in that setting. Factor analysis of the power scale shows that the two groups distinguish between two dimensions of power. Both sides agree that the Jewish population asymmetrically controls more institutional power and to a lesser extent social-integrational power. The two groups distinguish between two dimensions of threat, but what threatens one group evokes either security or no threat in the other. Perceived power, threat, and intensity of conflict are best predicted by political affiliation, although other social and political predictors were also found. A profile of the right wing in the Israeli sample emerged, which resembled, but did not mirror, the profile of the left wing in the Arab sample.

This paper investigates the impact of land inequality on conflict intensity. A fundamental distinction with the existing literature lies in the nature of inequality under consideration. We investigate how land inequality across landlords only influences the intensity of the fight against a rebel group comprised of landless individuals. We show that conflict intensity is non-monotonic in land inequality. In particular, the most severe conflicts occur for intermediate land inequality levels. Moreover, a Pareto improving-and thus voluntary-transfer of land from the smaller to the larger landlord may exist. Adapted from the source document.