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This paper studies the difference between public production and public finance of public goods in a dynamic general equilibrium setup. By public finance, we mean that the public good is produced by private providers with the government financing their costs. When the model is calibrated to match fiscal data from the UK economy, the main result is that, ceteris paribus, a switch from public production to public finance can have substantial aggregate and distributional implications. Public providers cannot beat private providers in terms of aggregate efficiency. We finally design a transfer scheme that can make a switch to private provision welfare improving for all agents including public employees.

We study the differences between public production and public finance of public goods in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Under public production, public goods are produced by the government. Under public finance, the same amount of public goods is produced by cost-minimizing private providers with the government financing their costs. When the model is solved numerically using fiscal data from the UK, a switch from public production to public finance has substantial aggregate and distributional implications. Public providers cannot beat private providers, in terms of productive efficiency, even if they both act as cost minimizers. The following mix of reforms is found to be Pareto improving: (i) a transition to cost-minimizing private providers that allows the government to achieve efficiency savings, (ii) a reduction in distorting income taxes made affordable by these efficiency savings, and (iii) a mechanism to compensate the ex public employees. All these results hold if private producers use a more capital intensive production technology than public producers, or, even in the case in which they use the same technology, if capital is a relatively important productive factor quantitatively. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information does not exist yet. This raises two questions. First, how much resources should be devoted to the production of information? Second, should information be produced by a profit- maximizing firm (a private consultant) or by someone who has an interest in policy outcomes (a political adviser)? This paper shows that policy makers may prefer hiring a political adviser for two reasons. First, in contrast to a private consultant, a political adviser need not be fully compensated for exerting effort. Second, a political adviser with moderate preferences produces information of a higher expected quality than a private consultant is induced to do by the optimal monetary incentive scheme. The cost of hiring a political adviser is that she may distort policy decisions by manipulating information. As long as a political adviser is not too biassed, the policy maker prefers consulting a political adviser to consulting a private consultant, even if a political adviser and a private consultant are equally costly. Competition among political advisers is shown to reduce the willingness of political advisers to produce information.

This paper studies the selection of information collecting agents by policy makers in the light of two agency problems. First, it is often hard to ascertain how much effort agents have put in acquiring information. Second, when agents have an interest in the policy outcome, they may manipulate information. We show that unbiased advisers put highest effort in collecting information. Eliminating manipulation of information, however, requires that the preferences of the policy maker and the adviser be aligned. Therefore, policy makers appoint advisers with preferences that are less extreme than their own.

We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.

We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.

© 2015 The Comparative Legislative Research Center of The University of Iowa. We study how policymakers play public goods games, and how their behavior compares to the typical subjects we study, by conducting parallel experiments on college undergraduates and American state legislators. We find that the legislators play public goods games more cooperatively and more consistently than the undergraduates. Legislators are also less responsive to treatments that involve social elements but are more likely to respond to additional information that they receive. Further, legislators' fixed characteristics explain much of the variation in how legislators play the game. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding how institutions affect the provision of public goods.

INTRODUCTION: Understanding the cost of care associated with different kinds of healthcare providers is necessary for informing the policy debates in mixed health-systems like India's. Existing studies reporting Out of Pocket Expenditure (OOPE) per episode of outpatient care in public and private providers in India do not provide a fair comparison because they have not taken into account the government subsidies received by public facilities. Public and private health insurance in India do not cover outpatient care and for-profit providers have to meet all their costs out of the payments they take from patients. METHODS: The average direct cost per acute episode of outpatient care was compared for public providers, for-profit formal providers and informal private providers in Chhattisgarh state of India. For public facilities, government subsidies for various inputs were taken into account. Resources used were apportioned using Activity Based Costing. Land provided free to public facilities was counted at market prices. The study used two datasets: a) household survey on outpatient utilisation and OOPE b) facility survey of public providers to find the input costs borne by government per outpatient-episode. RESULTS: The average cost per episode of outpatient care was Indian Rupees (INR) 400 for public providers, INR 586 for informal private providers and INR 2643 for formal for-profit providers and they managed 39.3, 37.9 and 22.9% of episodes respectively. The average cost for government and households put together was greater for using formal for-profit providers than the public providers. The disease profile of care handled by different types of providers was similar. Volume of patients and human-resources were key cost drivers in public facilities. Close to community providers involved less cost than others. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The findings have implications for the desired mix of public and private providers in India's health-system. Poor regulation of for-profit providers was an important ...

Public services are increasingly delivered through many forms of 'external' service-provision such as contracting, partnering and regulation. This new text assesses when and how public sector organizations might better draw on the work of these external parties and examines the wider implications for public leadership and management.

Abstract
The case for competition in health-care markets rests on economic models in which providers seek to maximize profits. However, little is known regarding how public health-care providers, who might not have a profit motive, react to increased competition from private providers. This study considers the heterogeneous effects of a primary health-care reform in a Swedish region that considerably loosened entry restrictions and increased patients' freedom of choice, thus enabling increased competition. Our difference-in-differences analysis contrasts local markets that were affected by both entry and choice with local monopoly markets, which were unaffected by the reforms. Using detailed administrative data on all visits to public health centers in 2008–2011, we find that providers in markets with increasing competition registered more diagnoses in an administrative database, thus increasing their reimbursement per patient. Although the economic significance of the effect is small, the result suggests that public providers are indeed sensitive to competition.

This article discusses the challenges for providers of local public services to adapt to increasing marketization and competition in the public sector. Based on some empirical evidence from local government in Germany, the article describes different adaptive measures in the past and shows the legal restrictions to strengthening performance and particularly competitiveness. Furthermore, the article presents some findings from good practice cases of local service providers in Germany who have successfully exposed themselves to market mechanisms. Finally, the article discusses observed results of increased competitiveness in the local government sector, with special regard to quality, efficiency and public employment. The article concludes with describing necessary elements of a competitive regime for public services and with some general reflections about the role of competition in the public sector.

The issue to be discussed in this article is to what extent does ICT create new challenges for the relationship between public service providers and users? It is important to recognize the concept of social capital because the concept is vital to the understanding of access to the information society and efficient functioning of government in its service to citizens. In this way we see social capital as a mediating "institution" between public authorities and the citizens (users).

Today's internet service providers mediate communication, control data flow, and influence everyday online interactions. In other words, they have become ideal agents of public policy and instruments of governance. In Telecom Tensions Mike Zajko considers the tensions inherent to this role - between private profits and the public good, competition and cooperation, neutrality and discrimination, surveillance and security - and asks what consequences arise from them.