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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- List of contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Aim and scope -- Plan of the book -- References -- Part I: Agriculture -- Chapter 1: Risk and risk management in agriculture -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Nature and source of risks in agriculture -- 1.2.1 Nature of risk -- 1.2.2 Sources of farm revenue risk -- 1.3 Models of decision-making under risk -- 1.3.1 Expected utility theory -- 1.3.2 Non-expected utility theory-rank dependent utility theory and cumulative prospect theory -- 1.3.3 Models based on securebased on security principle - safety principle, safety first, safety fixed and maximin -- 1.4 Risk and technology adoption -- 1.5 Risk management and its efficacy -- 1.5.1 Informal risk management strategies of farmers in rain-fed regions -- 1.5.2 Formal risk management strategies of farmers in rainfed regions -- 1.6 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: Assessment of water footprint under wheat cultivation in Uttar Pradesh -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Defining Water Footprint -- 2.3 Methods and methodology -- 2.4 Results and discussion -- 2.5 Conclusion -- Note -- References -- Chapter 3: Productive efficiency of agricultural sector in Uttar Pradesh -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Agriculture in Uttar Pradesh: Past and present -- 3.3 Methodology -- 3.4 Empirical analyses and findings -- 3.5 Concluding remarks -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: Agricultural productivity in Bihar and its determinants: A district-level analysis -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Literature on agricultural productivity in various parts of India -- 4.3 Total factor productivity: An index-based approach -- 4.4 Empirical work -- 4.5 Results -- 4.6 Conclusion -- Acknowledgment -- References -- Part II: Energy and climate change.

With much of the world's population facing restricted access to adequate medical care, how to allocate scarce health-care resources is a pressing question for governments, hospitals, and individuals. How do we decide where funding for health-care programs should go? Tannsjo here approaches the subject from a philosophical perspective, balancing theoretical treatments of distributive ethics with real-world examples of how health-care is administered around the world today. Tannsjo begins by laying out several popular ethical theories-utilitarianism, which recommends maximizing the best overall outcome; egalitarianism, which recommends smoothing out the differences between people as much as possible; and the maximin/leximin theory, which urges people to give absolute priority to those who are worst off. Tannsjo shows how, in abstract thought experiments, these theories come into conflict with each other and reveal puzzling implications. He goes on to argue, however, that when we consider health-care in the real-world, these theories all agree on a central point: in a well-ordered welfare state, more resources should be directed to the care and cure of people suffering from mental illness, and less to the marginal life extension of elderly patients. Tannsjo's book thus recommends a shift in spending to increase fairness and overall utility-while also recognizing that this kind of dispassionate suggestion, with its purely economic foundation, is unlikely to take hold in policy. Tannsjo's analysis is a case study in how ethical theories can sometimes lead to rational conclusions and recommendations that we are not prepared to accept

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- A Note to Students and Instructors -- 1. Introduction to Game Theory -- Introduction -- A Short History of Game Theory -- Strategic Behavior -- Case Study 1.1: Glaxo and Zantac -- What Is Game Theory? -- The Prisoner's Dilemma -- Shortcut for Finding Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria -- Appendix: Mathematics Review -- 2. Noncooperative, One-Time, Static Games with Complete Information -- Introduction -- Strictly Dominant Strategies -- Application 2.1: Run with the Pitch -- Application 2.2: Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade -- Application 2.3: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly -- Nash Equilibrium -- Strictly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium -- Weakly Dominant Strategies -- Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies -- Three-Player Games -- Nondominant Strategies -- Application 2.4: A Beautiful Mind -- Maximin Decision Rule -- Minimax Regret Decision Rule -- 3. Focal-Point and Evolutionary Equilibria -- Introduction -- Multiple Nash Equilibria -- Focal-Point Equilibrium -- Developing a Theory of Focal-Point Equilibria -- Framing -- Case Study 3.1: AZT Versus Videx -- Evolutionary Game Theory -- Case Study 3.2: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Broadband Technology? -- 4. Infinitely Repeated, Static Games with Complete Information -- Introduction -- Case Study 4.1: Extra-Credit Game Part I -- Collusion -- The Prisoner's Dilemma Revisited -- Trigger Strategies -- Evaluating Payoffs in Infinitely Repeated Games -- Cheating Rule for Infinitely Repeated Games -- Making Threats Credible -- Application 4.1: The Hunt for Red October -- Application 4.2: Fail-Safe -- Determinants of Business Collusion -- 5. Finitely Repeated, Static Games with Complete Information -- Introduction -- Finitely Repeated Games with a Certain End -- End-of-Game Problem -- Case Study 5.1: Extra-Credit Game Part II

Historical notes and references for the Foreword and Introduction -- 1 Noncooperative games -- 1 Noncooperative games and their components -- 2 Optimality principles in noncooperative games -- 3 Realizability of A-optimality principles -- 4 Realizability of A-principles in metastrategies -- 5 Realizability of equilibrium situations in mixed strategies -- 6 Natural topology in games -- Notes and references for Chapter 1 -- 2 Finite noncooperative games -- 1 Finite noncooperative games -- 2 Dyadic games -- 3 Solution of general finite noncooperative games -- 4 On the structure of the set of equilibria in finite noncooperative games -- 5 The complexity of solution of finite noncooperative games -- 6 Reduction to three-person games -- Notes and references for Chapter 3 -- 3 Two-person zero-sum games -- 1 Optimality in two-person zero-sum games -- 2 Basis of the maximin principle -- 3 Minimax theorems -- 4 Finitely additive strategies -- 5 Analytic games on the unit square -- 6 Separable games -- 7 Convex games -- 8 Games with a simple payoff function -- 9 Games of timing -- Notes and references for Chapter 3 -- 4 Matrix games -- 1 Basic concepts and propositions -- 2 Solution of matrix games of small format -- 3 Matrix games and linear programming -- 4 Description of all equilibrium situations in matrix and bimatrix games -- 5 Solution of matrix games with matrix payoffs of a special form -- 6 Approximate methods for solving matrix games -- 7 Structure of the set of a matrix game -- Notes and references for Chapter 4 -- References -- Collections -- List of Joint Authors -- Index of Notations.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contributors -- PART 1 COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS -- 1 Microeconomic Categories in Different Economic Systems: The Firm -- 2 The Theory of the Firm Under Capitalism and Socialism -- PART 2 OPTIMIZATION IN PLANNING -- 3 Bargaining and Search in Imperfect Markets: A Centrally Planned Economy -- 4 Producers' Criteria in a Centrally Planned Economy -- 5 The Enterprise and the Economic Center: Control and Cooperation -- 6 Output Targets, Input Rationing and Inventories -- 7 Behavior of the Socialist Firm Under Indirect Control -- 8 On the Dynamics of a Participatory Firm: A Model of Employer-Worker Bargaining -- PART 3 OPTIMIZATION IN MARKETS -- 9 Does Increased Efficiency Require Tighter Control? -- 10 Optimal Auctions and Market Structure -- 11 Increasing Returns and Selling Expenses -- 12 Product Variety: The Performing Arts Market -- 13 Prices Before and After Vertical Mergers of Firms -- 14 Optimal Production and Inventory Policies: The Incentive Effects of Taxation -- PART 4 COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND POWER SHARING -- 15 Positionalist Aggregation Functions and Distributive Justice -- 16 Decentralization and Pressure-Group Activities -- PART 5 DEMAND, EXPECTATIONS AND DISEQUILIBRIUM -- 17 The Form of Expected Demand in Hungary: A Mills-type Model -- 18 Expectations of Demand by Firms and Their Effect on Disequilibrium -- 19 The Rationality of Adjustment Behavior in a Model of Monopolistic Competition -- PART 6 STRATEGIES AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM -- 20 Maximin vs. Nash Equilibrium: Theoretical Results and Empirical Evidence -- 21 The Valuation of Economic Information -- 22 Equilibrium with Nonstandard Prices in Exchange Economies -- 23 Rationing Schemes and Markets -- 24 The Edgeworth Conjecture for a Production Economy Without Ordered Preferences.

AbstractIn this article, we define two different workforce leveling objectives for serial transfer lines. Each job is to be processed on each transfer station for c time periods (e.g., hours). We assume that the number of workers needed to complete each operation of a job in precisely c periods is given. Jobs transfer forward synchronously after every production cycle (i.e., c periods). We study two leveling objectives: maximin workforce size
() and min range (R). Leveling objectives produce schedules where the cumulative number of workers needed in all stations of a transfer line does not experience dramatic changes from one production cycle to the next. For and a two‐station system, we develop a fast polynomial algorithm. The range problem is known to be NP‐complete. For the two‐station system, we develop a very fast optimal algorithm that uses a tight lower bound and an efficient procedure for finding complementary Hamiltonian cycles in bipartite graphs. Via a computational experiment, we demonstrate that range schedules are superior because not only do they limit the workforce fluctuations from one production cycle to the next, but they also do so with a minor increase in the total workforce size. We extend our results to the m‐station system and develop heuristic algorithms. We find that these heuristics work poorly for min range (R), which indicates that special structural properties of the m‐station problem need to be identified before we can develop efficient algorithms. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 577–590, 2016

Intro -- Contents -- 1. Biography -- 1.1 Family and Schooling -- 1.2 College and War -- 1.3 Academic Career -- 1.4 The Turbulent Decade 1962-1971 -- 1.5 After A Theory of Justice -- 1.6 The Meaning of Rawls's Project -- 2. The Focus on the Basic Structure -- 2.1 The Origin of the Theory -- 2.2 The Complexity of Modern Societies -- 2.3 The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus -- 2.4 The Scope of the Theory -- 3. A Top-Tier Criterion of Justice -- 3.1 Purely Recipient-Oriented Criteria of Justice -- 3.2 The Anonymity Condition -- 3.3 Fundamental Interests versus Happiness -- 4. The Basic Idea: Justice as Fairness -- 4.1 The Original Position -- 4.2 Maximin versus Average -- 4.3 Primary Goods -- 4.4 The Lexical Priority of the Basic Liberties -- 5. The First Principle of Justice -- 5.1 The Structure of a Basic Right -- 5.2 Formulating the Required Scheme of Basic Rights and Liberties -- 5.3 The Fair Value of the Basic Political Liberties -- 5.4 Permissible Reductions of Basic Liberties -- 5.5 Impermissible Reductions of Basic Liberties -- 6. The Second Principle of Justice -- 6.1 The Difference Principle in First Approximation -- 6.2 The Difference Principle in Detail -- 6.3 Advocating the Difference Principle in the Original Position -- 6.4 The Opportunity Principle -- 6.5 Advocating the Opportunity Principle in the Original Position -- 6.6 A Property-Owning Democracy -- 7. A Rawlsian Society -- 7.1 A Well-Ordered Society -- 7.2 A Political Conception of Justice -- 7.3 Political versus Comprehensive Liberalisms -- 7.4 An Egalitarian Liberal Conception of Justice -- 7.5 A Society Well-Ordered by Rawls's Conception -- 7.6 A More Realistic Vision -- 8. On Justification -- 8.1 Reflective Equilibrium -- 8.2 Fundamental Ideas -- 8.3 Truth and Reasonableness -- 9. The Reception of Justice as Fairness -- 9.1 Rawls and Libertarianism.

In this study, we present a modified Hartwick rule encompassing the dynamics of pandemic, such as COVID-19. In our setting, the labor productivity gradually improves after the pandemic shock and may even go beyond its pre-pandemic level due to the remote work and digitalization as also suggested by the empirical evidence. We demonstrate that a gradual labor productivity increase helps to conserve natural resources. We provide a theoretical foundation for a"sooner-the-better" strategy to control a pandemic, and we show that policy maker should implement a "whatever it costs" response to ensure that the transmission rate of the virus is below the recovery rate from the very beginning of the pandemic. Otherwise, the economy cannot have a sustained utility. We also analyze the implications of an "uncertain" pandemic on the intertemporal dynamics of natural resource and capital accumulation under the maximin criterion. Another important finding is that there exists a new economic and public health trade-off since a strong prevention policy is shown to decrease capital accumulation. ; Dans cette étude, nous présentons une règle de Hartwick modifiée englobant la dynamique de la pandémie, telle que COVID-19. Dans notre cadre, la productivité du travail s'améliore progressivement après le choc de la pandémie et peut même dépasser son niveau pré-pandémique en raison du travail à distance et de la numérisation, comme le suggèrent également les données empiriques. Nous démontrons qu'une augmentation progressive de la productivité du travail permet de préserver les ressources naturelles. Nous fournissons une base théorique pour une stratégie "du plus tôt au mieux" pour contrôler une pandémie, et nous montrons que les décideurs politiques devraient mettre en œuvre une réponse "coûte que coûte" pour s'assurer que le taux de transmission du virus est inférieur au taux de récupération dès le début de la pandémie. Sinon, l'économie ne peut pas avoir une utilité durable. Nous analysons également les implications d'une pandémie ...

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Editor's Foreword -- Preface -- Part I: Fundamental Ideas -- 1. Four Roles of Political Philosophy -- 2. Society as a Fair System of Cooperation -- 3. The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society -- 4. The Idea of the Basic Structure -- 5. Limits to Our Inquiry -- 6. The Idea of the Original Position -- 7. The Idea of Free and Equal Persons -- 8. Relations between the Fundamental Ideas -- 9. The Idea of Public Justification -- 10. The Idea of Reflective Equilibrium -- 11. The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus -- Part II: Principles of Justice -- 12. Three Basic Points -- 13. Two Principles of Justice -- 14. The Problem of Distributive Justice -- 15. The Basic Structure as Subject: First Kind of Reason -- 16. The Basic Structure as Subject: Second Kind of Reason -- 17. Who Are the Least Advantaged? -- 18. The Difference Principle: Its Meaning -- 19. Objections via Counterexamples -- 20. Legitimate Expectations, Entitlement, and Desert -- 21. On Viewing Native Endowments as a Common Asset -- 22. Summary Comments on Distributive Justice and Desert -- Part III: The Argument from the Original Position -- 23. The Original Position: The Set-Up -- 24. The Circumstances of Justice -- 25. Formal Constraints and the Veil of Ignorance -- 26. The Idea of Public Reason -- 27. First Fundamental Comparison -- 28. The Structure of the Argument and the Maximin Rule -- 29. The Argument Stressing the Third Condition -- 30. The Priority of the Basic Liberties -- 31. An Objection about Aversion to Uncertainty -- 32. The Equal Basic Liberties Revisited -- 33. The Argument Stressing the Second Condition -- 34. Second Fundamental Comparison: Introduction -- 35. Grounds Falling under Publicity -- 36. Grounds Falling under Reciprocity -- 37. Grounds Falling under Stability.

AbstractThe potential for artificial intelligence algorithms and game theory concepts to offer prescriptive and decision-making capability for humankind is increasingly recognized. This derives from the increasing availability of granular, multivariable, well-curated data offering analytical insights for necessarily complex human behaviors and activities. Of the multitude of situations that this decision-making aptitude presents, the application to governmental policy offers a commanding case. This would allow decisions to be made for the benefit of societies and citizens based on rigorous objective information devoid of the traditional approach of choosing policies and societal values based on the opinion of a handful of selected representatives who may be exposed to a lack of comprehensive data analysis capacity and subject to personal biases. There would need to be a critical requirement of wider socially responsible data practices here, beyond those of technical considerations and the incorporation of wider societal fairness approaches. Amongst the schools of political thought particularly acquiescent to the application by this approach would be the egalitarian approach of John Rawls. Here an Original Position's pre-determination tool of Veil of Ignorance and ensuing Difference Principal presents a method of distributive justice that can be clearly mathematically defined in economics theory through Wald's Maximin principle. This offers an opportunity to apply algorithmic game theory and artificial intelligence computational approaches to implement Rawlsian distributive justice that are presented and discussed. The outputs from the algorithmic acquaintance of Rawlsian egalitarianism with applicable state data, protected with appropriate privacy, security, legal, ethical and social governance could in turn lead to automated direct governmental choices and an objective Social Contract for citizens of digitally literate nations.

Abstract. Relevance.The article describes approach for formation of portfolio of intra organization projects (commercial or governmental). Required steps are provided which allow obtain balanced in resources portfolio of projects at the outcome of theprocess. Within project management, this process is main and in majority of cases is the prerequisite for corporate system of project management (CSPM). Goal.Approbation of analysis methodology of appropriateness of project portfolio to organization strategy. Methods.The systematic approach considers the organization as a set of interrelated elements. People, goals, structure, tasks, technology are the variables of the internal environment of the organization. The factors of the external environment which influence the organization include: the laws and regulations of state regulation, the state of the economy; technological advances; part of disposable income; cultural and political changes; the impact of interest group of suppliers; and others. All changes always start from outside of the organization (in the externalenvironment), that's why the organization's management must be able to identify significant factors in the environment that affect the organization and through effective implementation of available recourses. The methodology is presented as a pattern of model game where a separate participant presents each aspect of uncertainty: business aspect (opportunities related to environment), technical aspect (innovational aspect ofthe enterprise) and management aspect (competence level of the organization). Results. Developed technique allows analyze the appropriateness of portfolio of organization strategy projects at the stage of its formation according to three variants of the choice (maximin, minimax and super proposition). Scientific novelty and practical significance.Analysis methodology of appropriateness of project portfolio to organization strategy is proposed, which is based on analysis of market position of the enterprise and which allow at the ...

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) and agri-environmental schemes (AES) are often introduced with the goal to counteract overexploitation of natural habitats and biodiversity loss in forests and agricultural landscapes. Their ecological effectiveness and cost-effectiveness have been, however, repeatedly questioned in the literature. One way of increasing the cost-effectiveness of such schemes is spatial differentiation of payments, which reflects regional differences in conservation benefits and costs and thus maximizes the ecological effect achieved with available financial resources. Another major critique for PES and AES is that they often pursue poverty alleviation and rural development objectives, which can compromise their cost-effectiveness. As the Tinbergen rule in economic theory suggests, each policy goal requires a separate policy instrument. However, as other policy instruments, PES and AES have distributional effects. Especially in developing countries, where governments are often weak and less able to successfully implement multiple policies, the distributional effects might not be adequately addressed. The distributional implications of PES and AES could even have an adverse effect on the cost-effectiveness of the schemes, if due to low acceptance among the potential ecosystem service (ES) providers, participation rates in these voluntary schemes are lower than optimal or if transaction costs are affected. From an economic perspective, if distributional goals are important for the design of PES and AES, the fairness preferences of potential ES buyers should be considered. This thesis uses three case studies to address selected aspects of distribution and fairness in PES and AES from different perspectives. It provides insights into the preferences of potential ES buyers in Germany for distribution and other fairness aspects in PES and AES using two choice experiments and analyses possible distributional effects of cost-effective homogeneous and regionalized payments in AES. The surveys among potential ES buyers suggest preferences for maximin and equal distribution of payments, and preferences for animal welfare and biodiversity conservation (for local as well as for distant biodiversity), which could be directions for improvement of AES and PES. Regarding distributional impacts of AES, a trade-off between equality and cost-effectiveness is confirmed. Equity generally increases with improved cost-effectiveness of homogeneous payments. Spatially differentiated payments improve the cost-effectiveness substantially, by aligning the payments to the regional costs and the measures to the regional specifics and potential ecological benefits. However, they have substantial redistribution effects, poorer regions are adversely affected. This shows the importance of analyzing the distributional implications of cost-effective AES and PES on different spatial levels and calls for a holistic approach in policy evaluation and implementation. ; Zahlungen für Ökosystemleistungen (PES) und Agrarumweltprogramme (AUP) sollen der Übernutzung natürlicher Lebensräume und dem Biodiversitätsverlust in Wäldern und Agrarlandschaften entgegenwirken. Ihre ökologische Wirksamkeit und Kosteneffektivität werden jedoch in der Literatur wiederholt in Frage gestellt. Ein Weg zu mehr Kosteneffektivität ist die räumliche Differenzierung der Zahlungen, welche regionale Unterschiede in Nutzen und Kosten der Maßnahmen widerspiegelt und so den mit den verfügbaren Finanzmitteln erzielten ökologischen Effekt maximiert. Eine weitere Kritik an PES und AUP ist, dass sie häufig auch Armutsbekämpfung und ländliche Entwicklung als Ziele verfolgen, was zu weniger Kosteneffektivität führt. Wie die ökonomische Tinbergen-Regel vorschlägt, erfordern unterschiedliche politische Ziele unterschiedliche politische Instrumente. Wie andere politische Instrumente haben auch PES und AUP jedoch Verteilungswirkungen. Insbesondere in Entwicklungsländern, wo Regierungen häufig schwach und oft nicht in der Lage sind, mehrere politische Instrumente erfolgreich umzusetzen, werden die Verteilungseffekte möglicherweise nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. Die Verteilungswirkungen können sich auch negativ auf die Kosteneffektivität auswirken, wenn aufgrund geringer Akzeptanz der potenziellen Anbieter von Ökosystemdienstleistungen (ES) die Beteiligung an diesen freiwilligen Systemen gering ist. Wenn Verteilungsziele für das Design von PES und AUP wichtig sind, sollten aus ökonomischer Sicht die Fairnesspräferenzen potenzieller ES-Käufer berücksichtigt werden. Diese Arbeit untersucht, anhand drei Fallstudien, ausgewählte Aspekte der Verteilung und Fairness in PES und AUP aus verschiedenen Perspektiven. Sie bietet Einblicke in die Präferenzen potenzieller ES-Käufer in Deutschland für Verteilungs- und andere Fairnessaspekte in PES und AUP anhand von zwei Choice-Experimenten und analysiert mögliche Verteilungswirkungen kosteneffektiver homogener und regional-differenzierter Zahlungen in AUP. Die Analyse unter potenziellen ES-Käufern legt Präferenzen für eine maximin Verteilung und Gleichverteilung der Zahlungen, sowie für den Tierschutz und den Erhalt der Biodiversität. In diese Richtungen könnten AUP und PES weiterentwickelt werden. In Bezug auf Verteilungseffekte von AUP wird ein Trade-off zwischen Gleichheit und Kostenwirkeffektivität bestätigt. Gerechtigkeit anhand der Verteilung der Produzentenrente steigt im Allgemeinen mit verbesserter Kosteneffektivität homogener Zahlungen. Räumlich differenzierte Zahlungen steigern die Kosteneffektivität erheblich, durch Anpassung der Zahlungen an den regionalen Kosten, und der Maßnahmen an den spezifischen regionalen Gegebenheiten, haben jedoch erhebliche Umverteilungseffekte - ärmere Regionen werden beeinträchtigt. Dies zeigt, wie wichtig ein ganzheitlicher Ansatz bei der Bewertung und Umsetzung dieser Instrumente ist, der auch Verteilungswirkungen auf verschiedenen räumlichen Ebenen berücksichtigt.

In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters' well-being. The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.

International audience ; La réflexion de Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) sur la justice sociale est très riche. Un point bien connu concerne sa critique du constructivisme rawlsien, qui a le tort de briser le cercle de la démonstration par la règle du maximin. La justice, pour Ricoeur, se situe entre le légal et le bon, et exige de concilier les approches téléologique et déontologique. Pour définir ce qui est juste, il faut partir de notre sens éthique de la justice, puis s'engager dans un processus délibératif pour dépasser – du moins surmonter de manière temporaire, les décisions restant toujours sujettes à discussion – le conflit qui existe entre les convictions bien pesées de chacun, par l'adoption de principes communs de justice. La justice sociale a un sens large chez Ricoeur. Elle concerne le problème de la distribution qui ne se réduit pas à sa dimension économique, « dans la mesure où c'est la fonction de toute institution de distribuer des droits et des devoirs, des bénéfices et des charges, bref des avantages et des désavantages » (RICOEUR P., Lectures 1. Autour du politique, Paris, Seuil, « La couleur des idées », 1991, p. 205). Elle est indissociable de l'ipséité, avec pour enjeux le respect et l'estime de soi pour parvenir à une juste reconnaissance de soi-même, dans le cadre d'une visée de la vie bonne avec et pour autrui dans des institutions justes. D'où son lien, également, avec la politique, un arbitrage étant nécessaire pour décider d'une répartition équitable des biens. Ricoeur, sur ce point, n'a pas seulement discuté les thèses de Rawls, mais aussi celles, entre autres, de Michael Walzer, Luc Boltanski et de Laurent Thévenot.Notre intention, ici, est de nous concentrer sur la lecture ricoeurienne de la pensée honnethienne dans Parcours de la reconnaissance. Cette analyse est intéressante à plus d'un titre : elle permet de montrer l'importance de l'Anerkennung dans la conception ricoeurienne de la justice sociale, ainsi que le rôle attribué à l'agapè dans les luttes pour la reconnaissance, que nous interrogerons brièvement pour finir.

International audience ; La réflexion de Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) sur la justice sociale est très riche. Un point bien connu concerne sa critique du constructivisme rawlsien, qui a le tort de briser le cercle de la démonstration par la règle du maximin. La justice, pour Ricoeur, se situe entre le légal et le bon, et exige de concilier les approches téléologique et déontologique. Pour définir ce qui est juste, il faut partir de notre sens éthique de la justice, puis s'engager dans un processus délibératif pour dépasser – du moins surmonter de manière temporaire, les décisions restant toujours sujettes à discussion – le conflit qui existe entre les convictions bien pesées de chacun, par l'adoption de principes communs de justice. La justice sociale a un sens large chez Ricoeur. Elle concerne le problème de la distribution qui ne se réduit pas à sa dimension économique, « dans la mesure où c'est la fonction de toute institution de distribuer des droits et des devoirs, des bénéfices et des charges, bref des avantages et des désavantages » (RICOEUR P., Lectures 1. Autour du politique, Paris, Seuil, « La couleur des idées », 1991, p. 205). Elle est indissociable de l'ipséité, avec pour enjeux le respect et l'estime de soi pour parvenir à une juste reconnaissance de soi-même, dans le cadre d'une visée de la vie bonne avec et pour autrui dans des institutions justes. D'où son lien, également, avec la politique, un arbitrage étant nécessaire pour décider d'une répartition équitable des biens. Ricoeur, sur ce point, n'a pas seulement discuté les thèses de Rawls, mais aussi celles, entre autres, de Michael Walzer, Luc Boltanski et de Laurent Thévenot.Notre intention, ici, est de nous concentrer sur la lecture ricoeurienne de la pensée honnethienne dans Parcours de la reconnaissance. Cette analyse est intéressante à plus d'un titre : elle permet de montrer l'importance de l'Anerkennung dans la conception ricoeurienne de la justice sociale, ainsi que le rôle attribué à l'agapè dans les luttes pour la reconnaissance, que nous interrogerons brièvement pour finir.