Article(electronic)2007

Why feed the Leviathan?

In: Public choice, Volume 130, Issue 1-2, p. 115-128

Guillen, Pablo; Schwieren, Christiane; Staffiero, Gianandrea

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Abstract

This is a study about the possibility of self-governance. We designed two versions of a step-level public good game, with or without a centralized sanctioning mechanism (CSM). In a baseline treatment participants play 14 rounds of the non-CSM game. In an automatic removal (AR) treatment participants play 7 rounds with CSM plus 7 rounds without CSM. In voted removal (VR) participants play 7 rounds with CSM followed by a voting stage to decide whether to keep CSM. All VR groups removed CSM. Contributions in AR and VR after CSM removal are dramatically higher than in the baseline. Most groups with a CSM history managed to cooperate until the last round. We do not find more cooperation in VR than in AR. Adapted from the source document.

Subjects

CooperationPublic GoodsGovernanceVotingTrust

Languages

English

Publisher

Springer, Dordrecht The Netherlands

ISSN: 1573-7101

DOI

10.1007/s11127-006-9075-3

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