Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Title Page -- Colophon -- Content -- KNIFE AND FORK -- THE TOP-ECONOMISTS' STUPID QUESTIONS -- FROM ICE AGE TO WELFARE -- THE HIT PARADE OF TRUST -- THE BUMBLEBEE -- THE ROOTS OF TRUST -- CORRUPTION -- TRUST IS ELEMENTARY -- THANKS TO THE WILD VIKINGS -- TRUST OR CONTROL

This study assesses the relative importance of administrators' trust in citizens, trust in participation institutions, and propensity to trust in explaining their willingness to involve more citizens in public decision making. The results show that administrators' trust in participation institutions is a mediator between trust in citizens and administrators' promotion of participation activities. Propensity to trust has a positive impact on administrators' trust in citizens, but it does not directly contribute to trust in participation institutions or promotion of participation activities. The results imply that trust in institutional arrangements is at least as important as trust in citizens in explaining administrative behaviors.

In their October 2011 ASR article, "How General Is Trust in 'Most People'? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem," Delhey, Newton, and Welzel pioneer the measurement of trust radius, defined as the width of the circle of people among whom a certain trust level exists. One key finding of their study is that trust radius correlates so strongly with out-group trust level that the two are essentially identical constructs; this clashes with standard theory's finding that trust level and trust radius are distinct trust constructs. This result proves to be erroneous, however, due to a mistaken label. I seek to correct this labeling error and find that trust radius is, in fact, a separate trust construct. Trust radius differs from established trust level constructs such as level of trust in most people and level of out-group trust, not only theoretically but empirically as well.

Contents -- Contributors -- Trust in Society / Karen S. Cook -- Part I. Conceptions of Trust -- Chapter 1. Conceptions and Explanations of Trust / Russell Hardin -- Chapter 2. Solving the Problem of Trust / Carol A. Heimer -- Chapter 3. Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality / David M. Messick and Roderick M. Kramer -- Part II. Trust: Social Bases and Social Consequences -- Chapter 4. Trust as a Form of Social Intelligence / Toshio Yamagishi -- Chapter 5. Trust in Signs / Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta -- Chapter 6. Reputations, Trust, and the Principal Agent Problem / Jean Ensminger

At head of title: Political economy. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.