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Welfare programs are often implemented in-kind to promote outcomes that might not be realized under cash transfers. This paper uses a randomized controlled trial of a governmental food assistance program to test whether this form of paternalism is necessary, comparing precisely measured consumption and health outcomes under both in-kind food and cash transfers. Importantly, households do not indulge in the consumption of vices when handed cash. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the in-kind food transfer induced more food to be consumed than did an equal-valued cash transfer. This result is partly explained by the fact that the in-kind transfer was infra-marginal in terms of total food. However, the in-kind basket contained 10 individual items, and these transfers indeed altered the types of food consumed for some households. While this distorting effect of in-kind transfers must be a motivation for paternalism, households receiving cash consumed different, but equally nutritious foods. Finally, there were few differences in child nutritional intakes, and no differences in child height, weight, sickness, or anemia prevalence. While other justifications for in-kind transfers may certainly apply, there is minimal evidence supporting the paternalistic one in this context.

This paper examines how workplace goals affect the quality of worker output. The context is the recruiting command of the U.S. Navy, one of the largest recruiting organizations in the world with approximately 4,000 recruiters recruiting 36,000 recruits per year. Navy recruiting stations and recruiters are assigned monthly goals for the quantity of new recruits, which may set a perverse incentive to sacrifice quality, especially towards the end of the month when an unfulfilled quantity goal looms large. Using data on the universe of Navy recruits from FY1998 to 2010, we find significant reductions in the quality of recruits towards the end of the contracting month, both in terms of pre-existing quality of recruits and in medium-term outcomes that reflect the quality of the job match. These effects are present even in the presence of quality goals the Navy has implemented to ensure a minimum quality of the fleet.

SSRN-id2383874 ; We study a choice made by over 20,000 U.S. military personnel annually between the High-3 and Redux retirement plans. Compared to High-3, Redux offers a $30,000 current lump sum payment in exchange for lower future annuity payments. Despite break-even discount rates between 10% and 25%, about 40% of individuals chose Redux. The likelihood of choosing Redux is decreasing with the break-even discount rate and is related to individual demographics. The implied personal discount rates from this choice are around 9.2%, much lower than found previously. Offering this choice has already saved the government over $2 billion in future retirement payments.

The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12105 ; We explore the effects of competitive and cooperative motivations on contributions in a field experiment. A total of 10,000 potential political donors received solicitations referencing past contribution behavior of members of the competing party (competition treatment), the same party (cooperative treatment), or no past contribution information (control). We first theoretically analyze the effect of these treatments on the contribution behavior of agents with different social preferences in a modified intergroup public good (IPG) game. Then, we report the empirical results: Contribution rates in the competitive, cooperative, and control treatments were 1.45%, 1.08%, and 0.78%, respectively. With the exception of one large contribution, the distribution of contributions in the compet- itive treatment first order stochastically dominates that of the cooperative treatment. Qualitatively, it appears that the cooperative treatment induced more contributions around the common monetary reference point, while the competitive treatment led to more contributions at twice this amount. These results suggest that eliciting competitive rather than cooperative motivations can lead to higher contributions in IPG settings. ; George P. Shultz Fund and the B.F. Haley and E.S. Shaw Fellowship

We study a choice made by over 20,000 U.S. military personnel annually between the High-3 and Redux retirement plans. Compared to High-3, Redux offers a $30,000 current lump sum payment in exchange for lower future annuity payments. Despite break-even discount rates between 10% and 25%, about 40% of individuals chose Redux. The likelihood of choosing Redux is decreasing with the break-even discount rate and is related to individual demographics. The implied personal discount rates from this choice are around 9.2%, much lower than found previously. Offering this choice has already saved the government over $2 billion in future retirement payments. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2167-0374.1000161 ; In 2018, the USA military will introduce a new retirement system that reduces the value of the traditional 20 years-of-service cliff-vesting pension and introduces a defined contribution for all service members. The personnel planning and budgetary consequences of this change depend crucially on how it will impact service member's retention decisions. Survey results from USA military personnel suggest there will be a small increase in retention of enlisted

Economic theory suggests that the use of flat-rate compensation for military recruiters is sub-optimal. We elicited the preferences of U.S. Navy recruiters for a piece-rate compensation scheme, and find many would prefer a modest decrease in fixed salary in exchange for the opportunity to receive a small monetary bonus per high-quality recruit. Under such a bonus scheme, the Navy could hire fewer recruiters and thus lower recruiter personnel expenses by 14.7 percent per year (over $40 million) while maintaining quality standards. Furthermore, survey evidence suggests the current policy of awarding non-monetary compensation for job performance provides minimal incentive to increase output.

We study the impact of legal access to alcohol on a range of behavioral and physical outcomes of U.S. Army soldiers in a regression discontinuity design. The wealth of novel data collected by the military on cognitive ability, psychological health, and family history allows us to explore how impacts vary with risk factors for alcohol consumption. Overall, we observe a large and significant increase in drinking after the 21st birthday, but the increases are largest amongst those who were depressed, had a family history of mental health problems, had better coping ability, and had higher cognitive ability. Despite the large increase in consumption, we do not find any meaningful impacts of legal access to alcohol - overall or in any sub-group - on any of the short-term outcomes we observe, including suicidal tendencies, depression, tobacco use, physical fitness, psychological health, deployability, smoking, and job-related infractions. Acknowledging the limitations for extrapolation out of sample, we discuss the policy implications of our results.

Governments are often reluctant to make welfare payments to poor households in the form of unrestricted cash transfers, favouring instead in-kind transfers of goods or services, such as food aid or public housing. One rationale for making in-kind transfers is that they encourage consumption of the 'right' things, such as healthy food. On the flipside, cash transfers are typically less expensive to administer, and cash can provide recipients with greater freedom over purchasing choices. Another important but often overlooked aspect of this policy trade-off is that transfer programmes can affect local prices. Both cash and in-kind transfers make recipients better off, which can increase their demand for goods and, in turn, has an effect on prices. However, in-kind transfers also increase the local supply of goods, which can drive prices down. We have recently empirically measured the differential price effects of cash and in-kind transfers, and have demonstrated how they affect the recipient communities (Cunha, De Giorgi and Jayachandran, 2012).