TY  - GEN
TI  - Performance Based Incentives for Military Recruiters: Evidence from the U.S. Navy
AU  - Arkes, Jeremy
AU  - Cunha, Jesse M
AU  - Myung, Noah
PY  - 2017
LA  - eng
KW  - Defense Economics
KW  - Compensation
KW  - Contract Design
KW  - Recruiting
KW  - Cost-Benefit Analysis|Survey Design
AB  - Economic theory suggests that the use of flat-rate compensation for military recruiters is sub-optimal. We elicited the preferences of U.S. Navy recruiters for a piece-rate compensation scheme, and find many would prefer a modest decrease in fixed salary in exchange for the opportunity to receive a small monetary bonus per high-quality recruit. Under such a bonus scheme, the Navy could hire fewer recruiters and thus lower recruiter personnel expenses by 14.7 percent per year (over $40 million) while maintaining quality standards. Furthermore, survey evidence suggests the current policy of awarding non-monetary compensation for job performance provides minimal incentive to increase output.
UR  - http://hdl.handle.net/10945/65136
UR  - https://www.pollux-fid.de/r/base-ftnavalpschool:oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/65136
H1  - Pollux (Fachinformationsdienst Politikwissenschaft)
ER  -