Economic growth and endogenous authoritarian institutions in post-reform China

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Puzzle -- 1.2 Previewing the Argument -- 1.2.1 Dictator's Growth Curse -- 1.2.2 Taming the Curse: Authoritarian Institutional Change -- 1.3 Plan of the Book -- Bibliography -- Part I: A Theory of Authoritarian Institutional Change -- Chapter 2: Why? A Dynamic Theory of Power and Plenty under Dictatorships -- 2.1 Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Self-enforcing Nature of Authoritarian Institutions -- 2.2 Introducing Dynamic Inconsistency -- 2.3 Authoritarian Weighted Voting and Dictator's Growth Curse -- 2.4 Concluding Remarks -- Appendix: Derivations -- Deriving Time-Separable Payoffs -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: How? The Dictator's Divide-and-Rule Strategy -- 3.1 (Un)committable Divide-and-Rule Strategy -- 3.1.1 Benchmark -- 3.1.1.1 Elite's First Best Effort -- 3.1.1.2 Elite's Problem -- 3.1.1.3 Elite's Participation Constraint -- 3.1.1.4 Dictator's Contract Design -- 3.1.2 Pure Explicit Scheme: -- 3.1.3 Pure Implicit Scheme: -- 3.1.4 Commitment Problem and Choice between Explicit and Implicit Schemes -- 3.1.4.1 Commitment Constraint -- Stage: Reneging Constraint -- Stage: Effort -- Stage: Scheme Design -- 3.1.4.2 Commitment Problem and Political Discounting -- 3.1.4.3 Full Commitment Ability () -- 3.1.4.4 When the Commitment Constraint Binds () -- 3.2 Taming the Curse -- 3.3 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Part II: The Era of Institutionalized Authoritarian Rule and Dictator's Growth Curse: A Case Study on China's Trade Policymaking -- Chapter 4: Authoritarian Institutions, China Style -- 4.1 Two Perceptions of China -- 4.2 Reciprocal Accountability and China's Authoritarian Institutions -- 4.3 Incentive Structure I: Bureaucrats -- 4.3.1 Career Path for China's Political Elite in China's Political Pyramid.