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"The Politics of the Eurogroup provides an intriguing look inside the euro crisis and the secretive forum of finance ministers that came to dominate it. The history of the European Union is a history of crises and the leaps of integration they triggered. As the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and global power competition are clouding the prospects of the European economies, the member states are looking for solutions. Yet they find their options highly constrained by the economic and political realities created in the decade of the euro crisis. This book fuses a critical political economy perspective on structural relations within the Economic and Monetary Union with a power-based approach to its institutions. It explains why a political project of European austerity emerged from the Eurogroup and side-lined alternative policies, with repercussions still felt today. The author introduces a series of interviews with key decision-makers - ministers, central bankers, EU officials - as well as leaked audio recordings from Eurogroup meetings to give an authentic report of the power struggles between finance ministers. The book retraces how the Eurogroup rose to prominence in the crisis and how a few northern countries - led by the German and Dutch finance ministries - were able to exploit the group's informal processes to shape the Economic and Monetary Union to their advantage. With its interdisciplinary and investigative approach, this book will be of great interest for scholars and students concerned with European integration, international political economy, economics, institutionalism, and governance. It will also be of value for policy makers in the fields of European politics and economic governance"--

Privately owned infrastructures play a central role in the unfolding of geopolitical conflicts. While academic contributions generally support this argument, businesses are mostly treated as enablers or spoilers of state action rather than actors in their own right. This article develops a theoretical framework around the relationship of state and transnational corporations in times of intense global competition, combining it with a political–economic perspective on how private ownership of transnational infrastructures shifts this relationship. It argues that private businesses develop and operate infrastructures for profit-seeking purposes, but that this logic can be amended by preferences for political outcomes. The article undertakes an analysis of the role of Starlink, the world's largest satellite constellation owned by US-based company SpaceX, in the events following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It reconstructs SpaceX's initial decision to enable Starlink in Ukraine and its ensuing strategic readjustment that limited Ukraine's abilities to retake Russian-occupied areas. The findings support the relevance of both profit-seeking and political motives for explaining businesses' decision-making, with substantial implications for contemporary state–business relations. SpaceX viewed the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to secure capital and contracts, largely from the United States; at the same time, it sought to appease other states on which it depends, most centrally China. The findings furthermore demonstrate that states will seek to reestablish independence from private infrastructure where other forms of hedging fail. While China and the European Union opted to build their own satellite constellations, the United States relied on its economic pull to ensure SpaceX's cooperation.

AbstractThe European Union's (EU's) response to the pandemic has been accompanied by reconfigurations in its institutional hierarchy, affecting the sites where institutional reforms are prepared and implemented. Whereas the Eurogroup drove reform during the euro crisis, the Commission had a more pronounced role in the development and implementation of pandemic instruments. This article ties in with failing‐forward arguments that view European integration as cyclical, arguing that this cyclicality also concerns the institutional dynamics in European economic governance. Based on expert interviews, official documents and reports, the analysis reconstructs and compares the institutional configurations during the euro crisis and the pandemic. Its findings suggest three modifications to 'failing forward': first, incomplete intergovernmental decisions are often the result of dominant particular interests rather than 'lowest common denominator' solutions; second, supranational bodies can exploit the delegitimization of intergovernmental solutions; and third, ad hoc measures can prolong the failing‐forward cycle and displace lasting integration steps.

AbstractFollowing the pandemic, the EU has responded to the threat of a euro crisis flare-up by deactivating its fiscal framework and establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility, drawing on joint European bonds to finance national investments. This paper seeks to explain these modifications to fiscal governance and asks whether they are an indication of European austerity making way for an alternative fiscal paradigm. Based on a neo-Gramscian approach, it discusses the policies as parts of competing political projects that are promoted or hindered by certain framework conditions. The paper undertakes a structured comparison of these framework conditions during the euro crisis and the current crisis. It finds that geoeconomic competition increases the demand for a more active fiscal policy, while political preferences and structural relations remained remarkably stable. As the current crisis is marked by high inflation, economic conditions are adverse to a fiscally expansive agenda. The findings do not suggest a lasting reorientation of European fiscal governance. Instead, the measures taken during the pandemic are interpreted as expressions of 'passive revolution' in which the EMU adapts elements of a fiscal integrative agenda to provide necessary fixes to its economic order while keeping its underlying fiscally restrictive features intact.

"The Politics of the Eurogroup provides an intriguing look inside the euro crisis and the secretive forum of finance ministers that came to dominate it. The history of the European Union is a history of crises and the leaps of integration they triggered. As the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and global power competition are clouding the prospects of the European economies, the member states are looking for solutions. Yet they find their options highly constrained by the economic and political realities created in the decade of the euro crisis. This book fuses a critical political economy perspective on structural relations within the Economic and Monetary Union with a power-based approach to its institutions. It explains why a political project of European austerity emerged from the Eurogroup and side-lined alternative policies, with repercussions still felt today. The author introduces a series of interviews with key decision-makers - ministers, central bankers, EU officials - as well as leaked audio recordings from Eurogroup meetings to give an authentic report of the power struggles between finance ministers. The book retraces how the Eurogroup rose to prominence in the crisis and how a few northern countries - led by the German and Dutch finance ministries - were able to exploit the group's informal processes to shape the Economic and Monetary Union to their advantage. With its interdisciplinary and investigative approach, this book will be of great interest for scholars and students concerned with European integration, international political economy, economics, institutionalism, and governance. It will also be of value for policy makers in the fields of European politics and economic governance"--

Die Politik der sogenannten Eurogruppe hatte polit-ökonomischen Folgen für die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (WWU). Die Gruppe war ein Hauptprofiteur der Umverteilung von Kompetenzen im Feld des gouvernement économique, die ihren Einfluss in den Bereichen fiskalische Überwachung, Politikgestaltung, institutionelle Reform sowie Bereitstellung von Hilfskrediten ausbaute. Diese Weiterentwicklung muss einerseits vor dem institutionellen Hintergrund verstanden werden, der sich aus der Flexibilität der Gruppe und ihrer Fähigkeit, Entscheidungsfindung aus dem demokratischen Prozess zu entheben, ergibt. Vor allem aber bemühten sich die nationalen Regierungen, wirtschaftspolitische Entscheidungen nicht zu verlieren. In diesem Zuge wird die Eurogruppe als intergouvernementales Verhandlungsforum charakterisiert, in dem sich die asymmetrischen Machtverhältnisse während der Krise in eine austeritätspolitische Agenda übersetzt haben, die vor allem von den nordeuropäischen Finanzministerien befürwortet wurde.

In recent years, the EU has increasingly applied state-interventionist practices to initiate and implement infrastructure policy projects. This stands in stark contrast to a phase of liberalization of infrastructure networks and services accompanying European integration and fiscal consolidation and infrastructure decay during the euro crisis. This article argues that the new state interventionism is strongly driven by the changing global constellation of a "new triad competition" where the EU is increasingly competing over infrastructures with the US and China. As a consequence, EU infrastructure policy undergoes a geoeconomic turn that aims to control transnational value chains and related political-economic spaces. Drawing on concepts of critical geography and international political economy, the article outlines the core features of this geoeconomic design logic of infrastructures and contrasts it with complementary or competing ones. The article substantiates these arguments by analyzing EU decision-making on two cases of high-tech infrastructure in the fields of communication and energy: the federated data infrastructure Gaia-X and the Hydrogen Strategy. Both cases provide evidence for the geoeconomic turn in EU infrastructure policy. Yet, the analysis also highlights that the turn is at times supported but also hampered by a capitalist logic that is reflected in the positioning of European and non-European businesses, as well as the EU's reliance on private action. Furthermore, it illustrates that an ecological and a social-integrative design logic to key infrastructures are largely subordinated. The conclusions reflect on the discrepancy between the EU's geoeconomic agenda and its less far-reaching implementation.

Die Aufwertung von Industrie- und Infrastrukturpolitik in der EU verdichtet sich aktuell zu einer »staatsinterventionistischen Wende«. Es kommt zur Mobilisierung zusätzlicher gemeinschaftlicher Instrumente und finanzieller Ressourcen und zum Bruch mit einigen Aspekten des marktliberalen Paradigmas, das die europäische Integration lange Zeit prägte. Wir zeigen, mit welchen polit-ökonomischen Konzeptionen sich diese Wende analysieren lässt, und stellen die These auf, dass vor allem geoökonomische Erwägungen die industrie- und infrastrukturpolitische Neuausrichtung vorantreiben und andere Gestaltungslogiken überlagern.

"The Politics of the Eurogroup provides an intriguing look inside the euro crisis and the secretive forum of finance ministers that came to dominate it. The history of the European Union is a history of crises and the leaps of integration they triggered. As the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and global power competition are clouding the prospects of the European economies, the member states are looking for solutions. Yet they find their options highly constrained by the economic and political realities created in the decade of the euro crisis. This book fuses a critical political economy perspective on structural relations within the Economic and Monetary Union with a power-based approach to its institutions. It explains why a political project of European austerity emerged from the Eurogroup and side-lined alternative policies, with repercussions still felt today. The author introduces a series of interviews with key decision-makers - ministers, central bankers, EU officials - as well as leaked audio recordings from Eurogroup meetings to give an authentic report of the power struggles between finance ministers. The book retraces how the Eurogroup rose to prominence in the crisis and how a few northern countries - led by the German and Dutch finance ministries - were able to exploit the group's informal processes to shape the Economic and Monetary Union to their advantage. With its interdisciplinary and investigative approach, this book will be of great interest for scholars and students concerned with European integration, international political economy, economics, institutionalism, and governance. It will also be of value for policy makers in the fields of European politics and economic governance"--