Suchergebnisse

This study projects different dependency ratios under various scenarios of future fertility and tertiary education in Finland to assess how the economic consequences of population aging depend on these trends. Applying a multidimensional demographic approach through a discrete-time microsimulation model, we project the newly introduced productivity-weighted labour force dependency ratio for Finnish scenarios until 2060 and compared it with the labour force dependency ratio and the traditional age dependency ratio. Results show that population aging looks less daunting when considering labour force dependency ratios as compared to purely age-based ratios, yet all measures and scenarios show a deterioration of the dependency ratio. While the old age dependency ratio is projected to increase by 73 per cent, the labour force dependency ratio would increase by 32 per cent, and the productivity weighted labour force dependency ratio by 28 per cent. Provided a more rapid increase in educational attainment, the last indicator is expected to increase less, with 21 per cent until 2060. Should the stalled trend in educational achievement of the 2010s continue, there would be very modest future gains in the productivity-weighted ratio. In other words, the consequences of population ageing look less dramatic for economic productivity, were Finnish men to become as educated as Finnish women. Of the three fertility scenarios considered, a total fertility rate of 2.0 is most advantageous and a low fertility of 1.2 least optimal for adult dependency ratios, but only after 2050. Interestingly, a combination of recovered fertility to 1.6 with a more rapid educational expansion would be better for productivity than only raising fertility to 2.0. Boosting educational levels would hence mitigate the negative effects of a shrinking labour force more than increasing fertility within reasonable bounds. Our results suggest that implementation of the current government goals for educational expansion, combined with a not unrealistic ...

This study projects different dependency ratios under various scenarios of future fertility and tertiary education in Finland to assess how the economic consequences of population aging depend on these trends. Applying a multidimensional demographic approach through a discrete-time microsimulation model, we project the newly introduced productivity-weighted labour force dependency ratio for Finnish scenarios until 2060 and compared it with the labour force dependency ratio and the traditional age dependency ratio. Results show that population aging looks less daunting when considering labour force dependency ratios as compared to purely age-based ratios, yet all measures and scenarios show a deterioration of the dependency ratio. While the old age dependency ratio is projected to increase by 73 per cent, the labour force dependency ratio would increase by 32 per cent, and the productivity weighted labour force dependency ratio by 28 per cent. Provided a more rapid increase in educational attainment, the last indicator is expected to increase less, with 21 per cent until 2060. Should the stalled trend in educational achievement of the 2010s continue, there would be very modest future gains in the productivity-weighted ratio. In other words, the consequences of population ageing look less dramatic for economic productivity, were Finnish men to become as educated as Finnish women. Of the three fertility scenarios considered, a total fertility rate of 2.0 is most advantageous and a low fertility of 1.2 least optimal for adult dependency ratios, but only after 2050. Interestingly, a combination of recovered fertility to 1.6 with a more rapid educational expansion would be better for productivity than only raising fertility to 2.0. Boosting educational levels would hence mitigate the negative effects of a shrinking labour force more than increasing fertility within reasonable bounds. Our results suggest that implementation of the current government goals for educational expansion, combined with a not unrealistic recovery of total fertility rates to around 1.6, would both clearly alleviate the worsening dependency ratio. We conclude that although there is no quick fix to the economic effects of population ageing, these can be proactively mitigated with different and complementing policies, and taking into account multidimensional population trends.

Changes in the gendered divisions of domestic work are often assumed to influence couples' childbearing behaviour, but existing evidence is mixed and mostly limited to cross-sectional data. We study how the amount and division of housework and childcare predict subsequent childbearing among Finnish couples using Finnish Time Use Survey 1999–2000 (FTUS1999) time diary data linked with register data on subsequent births. Results show that women's housework hours were negatively associated with the likelihood of having children at all parities. Men's contribution to domestic tasks, measured in relative terms, had no impact on childbearing. However, a higher male share of childcare time slightly increased the couple's likelihood of having a second child. Results are markedly robust to the inclusion of socioeconomic factors. We conclude that while women's excessive domestic work in itself may decrease fertility, men's housework share is not associated with continued childbearing.

This article analyses the new demographic programme that was announced by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in 2006. The main goal of this programme is to encourage fertility, especially the birth of a second child. New benefits should elevate the status of wome taking maternity leave, who might otherwise suffer from discrimination in the family. The housewife is considered to be dependent and `degraded'. We argue that this demographic politics recalls continuity with soviet gender politics centred on the support of wage-earning working mothers. The programme provokes different critiques. Liberal critics argue that the programme is a populist one and it may have undesired economic and social consequences. Conservative critics want to encourage more traditional `woman' and `family' roles in society. Feminist critics argue that this politcs would reinforce both the inferior position of women on the labour market and gender imbalances on the symbolic level.

International audience ; This article analyses the new demographic programme that was announced by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in 2006. The main goal of this programme is to encourage fertility, especially the birth of a second child. New benefits should elevate the status of wome taking maternity leave, who might otherwise suffer from discrimination in the family. The housewife is considered to be dependent and `degraded'. We argue that this demographic politics recalls continuity with soviet gender politics centred on the support of wage-earning working mothers. The programme provokes different critiques. Liberal critics argue that the programme is a populist one and it may have undesired economic and social consequences. Conservative critics want to encourage more traditional `woman' and `family' roles in society. Feminist critics argue that this politcs would reinforce both the inferior position of women on the labour market and gender imbalances on the symbolic level.

This article analyses the new demographic programme that was announced by the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, in 2006. The main goal of this programme is to encourage fertility, especially the birth of a second child. New benefits should elevate the status of wome taking maternity leave, who might otherwise suffer from discrimination in the family. The housewife is considered to be dependent and `degraded'. We argue that this demographic politics recalls continuity with soviet gender politics centred on the support of wage-earning working mothers. The programme provokes different critiques. Liberal critics argue that the programme is a populist one and it may have undesired economic and social consequences. Conservative critics want to encourage more traditional `woman' and `family' roles in society. Feminist critics argue that this politcs would reinforce both the inferior position of women on the labour market and gender imbalances on the symbolic level.

The first Generations and Gender Survey in Finland was collected in 2021/2022 as a web-based survey. In addition to the standard GGS-questionnaire, the Finnish survey included two new modules: the Miller Instrument, which captures childbearing motivations, and Global uncertainties, which enquires about perceptions of future threats. To further advance research on family dynamics, data from GGS Finland is linked to administrative records. This allows researchers to explore employment and family trajectories until 2026. Analyses of core socio-demographic characteristics and well-established fertility indicators reveal that the sample, by and large, represents the target population.

Abstract
This paper investigates the association between accumulated experiences in the working and parenting spheres and retirement timing among Spanish women, utilizing data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). The study examines whether labor market attachment or cumulative disadvantage characterizes women's retirement and how these factors relate with the number of children. Firstly, multichannel sequence analysis and cluster analysis were employed to identify distinct work–family life courses from ages 20 to 50. Seven clusters were identified: "Full-time work with 2+ children," "Out of the labour force and 2+ children," "Mid-life discontinuity and 2+ children," "Full-time work and 1 child," "Full-time work and childless," "Part-time work and 2+ children," and "Part-time work or out of the labor force and 1 child." Secondly, the study examines the association between these identified groups and retirement timing. The results indicate that Spanish women who have experienced more unstable careers characterized by extended periods of inactivity or part-time work, particularly in combination with having 2 or more children, are more likely to retire at a later age compared with women with continuous careers, with or without children. These findings underscore the ongoing challenges of balancing unpaid care work and wage work in Spain, while also revealing notable variations among women.

During the last decade Russian politics have aimed at stimulating the birth rate, most famously by the maternity capital program. This article provides results from the first extensive study of citizen use and attitudes to this benefit and concludes that Russian women and families harbor a deep distrust of the program and Russian social policy, as it sends contradictory messages combining paternalistic and liberal trends. Many eligible mothers have not activated their capital due to various bureaucratic obstacles they encounter. Contrary to the expectations of economists and sociologists, the results indicate that middle-class families have more resources to use their capital.

SummarySibling relations are by nature ambivalent with high levels of both altruistic helping and competition. Higher relatedness is often assumed to reduce the occurrence of conflicts between siblings, but evidence of this has been scarce and mixed. Siblings typically compete over resources and parental attention, and parental constellations vary with sibship types. Since full-siblings compete over the same two biological parents, while half-siblings have only one shared biological parent and often a higher number of parents overall, it is hypothesized that conflicts are more common between full- than half-siblings. This study tested this assumption using the British Millennium Cohort Study (n=7527 children at age 11). Conflicts were measured as children's reports of how much siblings picked on and hurt each other. Households with full-siblings only, maternal half-siblings only, and both full- and maternal half-siblings were compared. The results show that children who were living with only their full-siblings were more likely to experience sibling conflicts compared with children living with their maternal half-siblings only. This was the case also after controlling for several potentially confounding variables. The results suggest that differential access to parental resources of available biological and step-parents may explain the higher amount of sibling conflict between full- compared with maternal half-siblings.

This study explores the associations between receiving social support from network members other than individuals' parents and fertility intentions in Finland. It additionally examines whether support from others can compensate for the lack of parental support or complement their support. Using logistic regression models applied to Generations and Gender Survey (GGS) data on individuals aged 18–45 years enriched with administrative registers, we found that Finns who received instrumental support from others were more likely to intend to have a child. Support from others did not compensate for, nor complement, a lack of parental support or parental geographic remoteness. However, among men with at least one parent deceased or unknown, those receiving emotional support from others were more likely to intend to have a child within three years (and as likely as individuals with both parents alive) than those not receiving this support, suggesting a compensatory mechanism.

Understanding how refugees integrate into host societies has broad implications for researchers interested in intergroup conflict and for governments concerned with promoting social cohesion. Using detailed records tracking the movements and life histories of Finnish evacuees during World War II, we find that evacuees who intermarry are more likely to be educated, work in professional occupations, marry someone higher in social status and remain in the host community. Evacuees who intermarry before the war have fewer children, whereas those who marry into their host community after the war have more children. These results indicate that life-history and assimilation outcomes depend on key differences between pre-war environments—when migrants are living in their own communities—and post-war environments—when migrants are living in the host community. Overall, this suggests that integration involves a trade-off between reproduction and status such that evacuees who integrate gain social status, whereas those who maintain stronger bonds with their natal communities have higher fertility. We discuss these results within the framework of social capital, intergroup conflict and life-history theory and suggest how they can inform our understanding of evolutionary adaptations that affect tribalism. ; Peer reviewed

Takes a comparative perspective on family life and childhood in the past half century in Russia and Eastern Europe, highlighting similarities and differences. Focuses on the problematic domains of the institutions and laws devised to cope with family difficulties, and discusses the social strains created by the transition from communist to post-communist national systems. In addition to the substantial historic analysis, actual challenges are also discussed. The essays examine the changing gender roles, alterations in legal systems, the burdens faced by married and unmarried women who are mothers, the contrasts between government rhteoric and the implementation of policies toward marriage, children and parenthood. By addressing the specifics of welfare politics under the Communist rule and the directions of their transformation in 1990–2000s, this book contributes to the understanding of social institutions and family policies in these countries and the problems of dealing with the socialist past that this region face