Suchergebnisse

Intro -- MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA -- MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS∗ -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- Overview of Disputes -- Maritime Territorial Disputes -- Dispute Regarding China's Rights Within Its EEZ -- Relationship of Maritime Territorial Disputes to EEZ Dispute -- Negotiations Between China and ASEAN on SCS Code of Conduct -- China's Approach to Territorial Disputes -- Some Key Elements -- Map of the Nine Dashed Lines -- Motivations for Claims -- Strategy of Incremental Actions -- Use of Law Enforcement Agency Ships and Fishing Vessels -- Law Enforcement Agency Ships: Overview -- Law Enforcement Agency Ships: Coordination Among Agencies -- Fishing Vessels -- U.S. Position on These Issues -- Some Key Elements -- Position Regarding Territorial Disputes in SCS -- Position Regarding Coastal State's Rights in Its EEZ -- Broader Regional Context -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- Risk of United States Being Drawn Into a Crisis or Conflict -- U.S.-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security -- U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty51 -- Potential Oversight Questions for Congress -- Risk of U.S.-China Incidents in China's EEZ -- Option of Reducing U.S. Survey and Surveillance Activities in China's EEZ -- Option of Entering Into a U.S.-China Incidents-at-Sea (INCSEA) Agreement -- Potential Oversight Questions for Congress -- Whether United States Should Ratify United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) -- U.S. Arms Sales and Transfers to Philippines or Other Countries -- U.S. Military Forces -- Stationing and Operations of U.S. Forces in the Region -- U.S. Weapon Acquisition Programs -- Potential Oversight Questions for Congress

Intro -- EAST ASIA'S MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: CLAIMS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES -- EAST ASIA'S MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES: CLAIMS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 MARITIME TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- OVERVIEW -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- BACKGROUND: WHO CLAIMS WHAT? -- SOUTH CHINA SEA CLAIMS -- People's Republic of China -- Taiwan -- Southeast Asian Countries -- EAST CHINA SEA CLAIMS -- Competing Territorial Claims -- The Maritime Sovereignty Dispute -- Recent Tensions -- OTHER DISPUTED AREAS -- Sea of Japan -- Yellow Sea -- DRIVERS OF COMPETITION -- Resources as a Driver of Competition -- Energy Resources -- Fishery Resources -- China's Rise and Evolving Regional Dynamics -- Taiwan's Role in the East China Sea -- THE ROLE OF ASEAN -- POLICY ISSUES -- Statements and Resolutions -- Treaty Obligations -- Bilateral Diplomatic Approaches -- Multilateral Diplomatic Approaches -- The Role of UNCLOS -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- BACKGROUND -- Overview of Disputes -- Dispute Regarding China's Rights Within Its EEZ -- Relationship of Maritime Territorial Disputes to EEZ Dispute -- Negotiations between China and ASEAN on SCS Code of Conduct -- CHINA'S APPROACH TO TERRITORIAL DISPUTES -- Some Key Elements -- Map of the Nine Dashed Lines -- Motivations for Claims -- Strategy of Incremental Actions -- Use of Law Enforcement Agency Ships and Fishing Vessels -- Law Enforcement Agency Ships: Overview -- U.S. POSITION ON THESE ISSUES -- Some Key Elements -- Position Regarding Territorial Disputes in SCS -- Position Regarding Coastal State's Rights in Its EEZ -- Broader Regional Context -- ISSUES FOR CONGRESS

AbstractCan territorial disputes within countries be a basis for affective polarization? If so, how does it vary across territories? A burgeoning literature on affective polarization has largely focused on partisan divisions; we argue that contentious political issues such as those relating to territorial integrity can also be a basis for such affective polarization, where citizens feel concord with those sharing such policy preferences and animus for those who do not. We specify hypotheses about territorial‐policy‐based affective polarization and bring comparative survey evidence from three European regions with salient and contentious territorial claims: Scotland, Catalonia and Northern Ireland. While these three cases encompass different outcomes of territorial disputes, our results show strikingly similar levels of affective polarization.

This article examines whether rogue states are more aggressive in challenging other states' claims to territory in comparison with non-rogue states. Rogue states are defined as those which systematically violate accepted international human rights norms of gender and ethnic nondiscrimination and protection from state repression. Hypotheses suggest that states that regularly violate international human rights norms are more likely to challenge other states' territorial claims and that dyads with rogue states are more likely to experience territorial claims. Empirical analyses of data from two datasets on territorial claims provide support to the theory. Territorial claims are more likely In politically relevant dyads as the potential challenger's rogue state score increases. Territorial claims are also more likely to emerge as the minimum rogue state score in a dyad increases. The substantive effect of rogue status is sizable, increasing the chances for a territorial claim by as much as 500%. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

This article examines whether rogue states are more aggressive in challenging other states' claims to territory in comparison with non-rogue states. Rogue states are defined as those which systematically violate accepted international human rights norms of gender and ethnic nondiscrimination and protection from state repression. Hypotheses suggest that states that regularly violate international human rights norms are more likely to challenge other states' territorial claims and that dyads with rogue states are more likely to experience territorial claims. Empirical analyses of data from two datasets on territorial claims provide support to the theory. Territorial claims are more likely in politically relevant dyads as the potential challenger's rogue state score increases. Territorial claims are also more likely to emerge as the minimum rogue state score in a dyad increases. The substantive effect of rogue status is sizable, increasing the chances for a territorial claim by as much as 500%.