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To what extent do lower court judges follow Supreme Court plurality opinions? By examining treatments of Supreme Court cases from the 1976-1986 terms by the Circuit Courts of Appeals from 1976 to 2005, this article addresses the consequences of the Supreme Court's failure to reach a clear majority decision. I find evidence that lower courts are less likely to follow plurality opinions than majority opinions. These findings have implications regarding the authority of the Supreme Court, compliance, and institutional legitimacy.

We compare the patterns of adjustment of government policy to changes in public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries are similar in many ways, except that the United Kingdom has plurality elections and single-party government, while the Netherlands has proportional representation (PR) and coalition government. This provides the first application of the Macro Polity approach to a country with PR elections. We find that government policy in the Netherlands is highly responsive to public opinion. This cannot be the result of alternation of government, but instead must be the result of some other process, such as coalition bargaining. In the United Kingdom, however, the dynamic of adjustment is far more complex. Alternation of government does not produce responsiveness, but rather seems to get in the way of it. This leads to an over-correction dynamic in which policy can be out of line with public opinion for long periods of time.

We compare the patterns of adjustment of government policy to changes in public opinion in the Netherlands and the UK. These countries are similar in many ways, except that the UK has plurality elections and single-party government, while the Netherlands has proportional representation and coalition government. This provides the first application of the Macro Polity approach (Erikson et al., 2002) to a country with PR elections. We find that government policy in the Netherlands is highly responsive to public opinion. This cannot be the result of alternation of government, but instead must be the result of some other process, such as coalition bargaining. In the UK, however, the dynamic of adjustment is far more complex. Alternation of government does not produce responsiveness, but rather seems to get in the way of it. This leads to an over-correction dynamic in which policy can be out of line with public opinion for long periods of time.

AbstractWe compare the patterns of adjustment of government policy to changes in public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries are similar in many ways, except that the United Kingdom has plurality elections and single‐party government, while the Netherlands has proportional representation (PR) and coalition government. This provides the first application of the Macro Polity approach to a country with PR elections. We find that government policy in the Netherlands is highly responsive to public opinion. This cannot be the result of alternation of government, but instead must be the result of some other process, such as coalition bargaining. In the United Kingdom, however, the dynamic of adjustment is far more complex. Alternation of government does not produce responsiveness, but rather seems to get in the way of it. This leads to an over‐correction dynamic in which policy can be out of line with public opinion for long periods of time.

We compare the patterns of adjustment of government policy to changes in public opinion in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries are similar in many ways, except that the United Kingdom has plurality elections and single‐party government, while the Netherlands has proportional representation (PR) and coalition government. This provides the first application of the Macro Polity approach to a country with PR elections. We find that government policy in the Netherlands is highly responsive to public opinion. This cannot be the result of alternation of government, but instead must be the result of some other process, such as coalition bargaining. In the United Kingdom, however, the dynamic of adjustment is far more complex. Alternation of government does not produce responsiveness, but rather seems to get in the way of it. This leads to an over‐correction dynamic in which policy can be out of line with public opinion for long periods of time.

"March 15, 1988." ; Shipping list no.: 89-301-P. ; Cover title: Report to the Attorney General, a new look at plurality decisions. ; Bibliography: p. 65-86. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Treball fi de màster de: Master's Degree in Specialized Economic Analysis ; Director: Anna Merino ; This paper investigates whether news broadcaster mergers can lead to reduction the plurality of viewpoints offered in the market. The existing academic literature downplays this risk by demonstrating that the incentive to reduce plurality is independent of market structure. We investigate this claim by taking aim at a pivotal, yet overlooked, assumption in the literature of media markets: that news broadcasters are "opinion-takers". We find that when news broadcasters have opinion-setting power, such as the ability to influence to political ideologies of their audiences, a horizontally adjacent broadcasting merger may create economic incentives to reduce the plurality of viewpoints offered to the market. ; Aquest treball investiga si les fusions de mitjans de comunicació poden comportar una reducció de la pluralitat d'opinions que s'ofereixen al mercat. La literatura acadèmica existent al respecte minimitza aquest risc, demostrant que l'incentiu per reduir la pluralitat és independent de l'estructura de mercat. Nosaltres investiguem aquesta afirmació tot apuntant a una fonamental, malgrat que ignorada, suposició en la literatura del mercat de mitjans: que les cadenes de notícies són "prenedors d'opinions". Trobem que, quan les cadenes de notícies tenen el poder d'establir opinió, com ara, la capacitat d'influenciar ideologies polítiques en les seves audiències, una fusió horitzontal adjacent pot crear incentius econòmics per tal de reduir la pluralitat d'opinions que s'ofereixen al mercat.

Abstract
The central objective in addressing media plurality is to ensure that no single body or person exercises an undue degree of influence over the flow of information and the formation of political opinion in the United Kingdom. David Elstein examines the media market in the United Kingdom and finds it lacks plurality and diversity since it is dominated by one actor, namely the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation).

The article describes what primary employment is, according to the labour law system of Russian Federation. It reveals that there is no definition of such concept and tries to derive it through the legal history. A workbook was the unique and remains one of the main characteristics of the primary employment, so the paper discusses, is it possible to combine legally two or more primary employers having more workbooks. The judicial opinion is analysed and there are shown different approaches that result from the lack of legal definition of primary employment in the Labour Code of Russian Federation. The author's approach based on the law branch principle of combining state and contractual regulation of labor relations and on the primacy of the labour contract proves that one could have more primary employments. The type of employment is one of the terms of labour contract. Multiple primary employment is not prohibited, so the author concludes, that such employment is legal, but the main point is not regulated because of the lack of legal definition what primary employment is. This causes ill effects for the worker, because he's not protected as well. Therefore a primary employment is without specifying that it is offtime job.

Experiments designed as an election simulation involve participants
in an investigation of strategic voting. Participants assigned
political preferences and informed of candidate/party positions on
an ideological dimension respond to and learn the results of two
public opinion polls before voting. When given two alternatives, the
participants vote sincerely. Confronted with three or more
alternatives, participants make tactical decisions to narrow the
field. Strategic behavior quickly reduces the number of alternatives
to two. Consistent with Duverger's law, candidate/party viability
encourages strategic voting and the development of a two-party
system. The election simulation serves as a useful tool to teach
about electoral behavior and to explore topics such as strategic
voting.

Is Turkish nationality one singular identity that does not permit ethnic modifiers? Or can it be understood as pluralistic, with identities nested — "hyphenated" — with Turkishness? Then, are Turkish and Kurdish identities necessarily mutually exclusive? Such questions over the boundaries of Turkishness have long been framed in the civic versus ethnic dichotomy — an approach that does not ask whether Turkish nationhood is monolithic or pluralistic. In response, this article aims to advance the public and scholarly debates over nationhood in Turkey by turning to the question of ways in which Turkishness can be hyphenated with other identity categories in Turkey, most particularly Kurdishness. First, we reframe the debate over identity by using the combinatorial approach to ethnicity to outline how Turkishness and Kurdishness can be overlapping and nested, or a hyphenated identity. Second, we draw on public opinion data to show that such a hyphenated identity is both theoretically possible and potentially salient in Turkey today. Together, these steps deconstruct the primordialist understandings of Turkishness and Kurdishness, on the one hand, and the taken-for-granted civic claims of Turkishness, on the other.