Abstract Currently, the community of states is taking an autocratic turn, and the question arises how this process will affect the international law system. In order to measure a possible autocratization of international law, the article proposes, for the first time, an abstract and normative definition of authoritarian international law norms.
In: Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht: ZaöRV = Heidelberg journal of international law : HJIL, Band 83, Heft 4, S. 741-760
This article deals with the constitutional limits of interpretations of the German Basic Law in the light of public international law. To this end, it first presents the jurisprudence of the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court that has developed constitutional limits for the accommodation of public international law within the interpretation of the German Constitution. The central assumption here is, that openness to international law can only be effective within the framework of the democratic and constitutional system of the Basic Law. However, two recent decisions of the First Senate call this approach into question. The triage decision of the First Senate of 16 December 2021, and the climate decision of 24 March 2021, point to a more creative and less restrictive approach to the use of international law when interpret the German Basic law. Finally, it is argued that it is absolutely necessary to adhere to the constitutional limits established by the Second Senate, especially because of the danger of a possible autocratisation of international law. The openness of the Basic Law towards international law is not arbitrary, but in the words of the German Constitutional Court connected to "an international legal order that preserves freedom and peace".
Abstract Whether national (constitutional) courts are entitled to exercise ultra-vires review of the decisions of the European Court of Justice is not only a controversial question, but also one of the most emotive issues in European and constitutional law. This article questions firstly the general and often emotional criticism of national ultra-vires review in general and answers the fundamental question whether national ultra-vires review represents a threat or rather an asset to the rule of law at a national, European and international level. It argues that a national ultra-vires review is an important instrument to supervise the international judiciary provided that it is not abusive of the law. Secondly, the article analyses the PSPP Judgment and the Polish ultra-vires decision of October 21, 2021. It concludes that only the ultra-vires review of the German Constitutional Court meets the requirements for a rule of law based control. The final argument is that a rule of law based ultra-vires review should be seen as a crucial piece of the puzzle in the current process of delimiting vertical authority.
One fascinating aspect of the Indian basic-structure doctrine for a German lawyer is that its origin and development were influenced by the German scholar, Dietrich Conrad. This paper therefore focuses on Conrad's work and his French and German sources for the argument that there are implied limits on the amending power. It describes the journey of this idea to India and specifies which parts of these prior theoretical works were lost in time and space, which survived, and which were developed further.Finally, there is acomparison between the justification for the basic-structure in the Kesavanada judgment and the earlier German and French theoretical works. The main thesis is that the Indian basic-structure doctrine is a powerful example of how to justify implied limits on constitutional amendment based on a rule-of-law approach that is firmly rooted in the idea of a democratic and constitutional state.
In: Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht: ZaöRV = Heidelberg journal of international law : HJIL, Band 78, Heft 3, S. 635-669
Das Konzept der Verfassungsidentität ist seit dem Lissabon-Urteil und der nachfolgenden Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts derzeit (wieder) in aller Munde. Das Besondere daran ist, dass dieses Konzept im Grundgesetz nicht ausdrücklich geregelt ist und es sich gerade verselbstständigt. Es stellen sich daher die grundlegenden Fragen, ob und inwieweit das Grundgesetz überhaupt ein rechtlich relevantes Konzept der Verfassungsidentität vorsieht, und ob die Verwendung des Begriffs der Verfassungsidentität im Rahmen des Grundgesetzes angemessen ist. Diesen Kernfragen geht Monika Polzin nach. Sie untersucht zunächst die verfassungshistorische Herkunft des Konzepts der Verfassungsidentität und überprüft dann seine Validität in verfassungstheoretischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Hinsicht. Das Ergebnis ist eine Entmystifizierung der Verfassungsidentität und der zentrale Befund, dass es sich nicht um ein normatives Konzept des Grundgesetzes handelt.
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