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Since 2001's 9/11 attacks, Americans have had to live with the increased threat of terrorism. But how can governments reassure their citizens who may be understandably anxious about potential terrorist attacks? In new research, Aaron M. Hoffman finds that while being reminded about terrorism makes people more anxious, they can be reassured when shown evidence of their government's effective counterterrorism policies.

Terrorism is designed to draw attention to particular issues and causes. Yet, the incidence of credit-taking (announcing one's responsibility for acts of terror) varies even though anonymity can undermine the clarity of the intended messages. This article offers an explanation of the variation in credit-taking that emphasizes how the competitive context in which groups operate shapes terrorists groups' need to cultivate support for their activities. Increasing numbers of terrorist organizations make it difficult for the supporters of terrorism to reward the perpetrators of particular attacks with their backing. Since such support is critical to the proper functioning of terrorist organizations, groups use claims of responsibility to distinguish themselves from those that had no hand in the violence. Consequently, variation in the probability of credit-taking fluctuates as a function of the number of active terrorist groups in a given theater of operations. This argument is contrasted with theories that suggest credit-taking is influenced by: the ideological mix of terrorist organizations; the willingness of governments to respond to terrorism using military force; state sponsorship; the depth of communal grievances; and the use of suicide attacks. The results, based on an analysis of transnational terrorism events conducted in the Israeli theater of operations between 1968 and 2004, suggest that competitive context is a consistently strong predictor of credit-taking. By implication, the results point to the utility of counter-terrorism strategies that interfere with the transmission of information between terrorist organizations and their supporters.

This article provides a conceptualization of trust in interstate relations in terms amenable to research. In the field of International Relations trust is often equated with the willingness to take risks on the behavior of others. However, this approach is problematic because it does not provide a basis for distinguishing between trusting and non-trusting relationships. In contrast, I propose that trust implies a willingness to take risks on the behavior of others based on the belief that potential trustees will `do what is right'. Recognizing that trust involves particular beliefs about the motivations of others distinguishes it from the broader category of risk and enables trusting relationships to be identified more precisely. After elaborating my definitional approach, I discuss indicators designed to gauge the presence of trusting interstate relations in empirical settings.

Exposure to a single report about terrorism in the mass media can trigger a range of emotional and political reactions. The consequences of exposure to several terrorism reports in row, however, are a matter of controversy. We examine the effects of prolonged terrorism coverage using an experimental design that combines self-report measures of emotions and political attitudes with instantaneous biometric data on emotions. Consistent with research on nonassociational learning, we find that exposure to multiple videos habituates people to depictions of terrorism: the longer people watch terrorism coverage, the less intense their reactions are to the images of terrorism they see. Some images and videos, however, contribute to this result more than others. This suggests that the ultimate effects of terrorism coverage depend on the interplay between the quantity and quality of reporting, not the quantity alone.

We investigate how effective counterterrorism influences (1) confidence in government efforts to deal with terrorism and (2) the sense of insecurity from attacks. Research on "heuristic judgments" implies information about counterterrorism undercuts people's perceived security from terrorism. Across three experiments, however, we find that people who are exposed to information about effective counterterrorism express more confidence in governments to protect citizens from future attacks and prevent future violence than those who did not receive these treatments. People who receive information about effective counterterrorism also show greater willingness to travel to locations where the risk of terrorism is prominent than those who are only exposed to material about terrorism. Finally, we find that counterterrorism information does not inevitably undermine government efforts to reassure people about their security. On the contrary, information about effective counterterrorism erased the effects of exposure to information about terrorism in one study.