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By skipping managers and appealing directly to politicians, whistleblowers can play a critical role in revealing organizational information. However, the protection of whistleblowers can affect managers' abilities to provide employees with incentives to exert effort. This paper explores this tradeoff with a model of agency decision-making under incomplete information. In the game, an employee's effort determines a project's quality, and a manager chooses whether to approve the project and discipline the employee. The employee and politician wish for only "good" projects to be approved. By whistleblowing, an employee reveals the quality to a politician outside of the organization, who may override the manager's decision. A key finding is that from the politician's perspective, the benefits of whistleblower protections depend on the preferences of the manager. If the manager is inclined toward approving projects, then the costs of lower employee effort may outweigh the informational benefits of whistleblowing. The optimal policy may then be to ban whistleblowing. By contrast, when the manager is inclined toward rejecting projects, whistleblower protections prevent him or her from suppressing effort and are unambiguously beneficial.

Blowing the Whistle: Barriers to Federal Employees Making Disclosures -- Agency Transmittal Letter from the Chairman -- Credits -- Table of Contents -- Executive Summary -- Findings and Recommendations -- Introduction -- Purpose -- Survey Methodology -- Wrongdoing,Whistleblowing, andRetaliation Over Time -- Wrongdoing -- Whistleblowing -- Retaliation -- Barriers andMotivators forWhistleblowing -- Consequences of the Wrongdoing -- Management Reaction to the Report -- Current Perceptions of Agency Culture -- Whom to Tell About Wrongdoing and Preserving Anonymity -- Whom to Tell -- Preserving Anonymity -- Disclosures Matter -- Conclusion -- Appendix: 1992 and2010 MPS Data forWhistleblowing

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally. ; The research has been sponsored by the European Union through the TMR research network ENDEAR and through the Swedish Competition Authority.

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

This is a research-based book on whistle-blowing in organizations. The three noted authors describe studies on this important topic and the implications of the research and theory for organizational behavior, managerial practice, and public policy. In the past few years there have been critical developments, including corporate scandals, which have called public attention to whistle-blowing and have led to the first comprehensive federal legislation to protect private sector whistle-blowers (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). This book is the first to integrate these new developments in an analytic and

Coulter reviews 'World in Crisis: The politics of survival at the end of the 20th century' by Medecins Sans Frontieres.

Whistle-blowing is usually regarded as a way to identify abuse and wrongdoing on the part of governments and corporations. In this paper we show how, at a micro level, whistle-blowing can be used as a designer tool to prevent opportunistic behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on a three layered principal-supervisor-agent structure and show how the principal can use whistle-blowing as a way to prevent the supervisor and the agent from colluding to the detriment of the principal. To understand our mechanism we need to explicitly define the penalty a party has to incur for walking away from a collusive agreement. Rewarding whistle-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion took place. This threat clearly reduces the informed party's incentive to participate in side deals. It also serves as a potential blackmail threat between the colluding parties. However, careful use of whistle-blowing allows the principal to eliminate opportunities for blackmail.