Suchergebnisse

Gegenstand der vorliegenden Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Arbeit und Sozialordnung sind die Auswirkungen der geplanten EU-Osterweiterung auf die Arbeitsmärkte und die öffentlichen Finanzen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Zur Abschätzung des Migrationspotentials nach der EU-Erweiterung werden ökonometrisch fundierte Simulationsrechnungen angestellt, die sich auf die fünf bevölkerungsstärksten Beitrittsländer beziehen.

Private recruitment agents have been a major concern of policy makers in international labour migration. The agents are seen to undermine state authority, the market order, and migrant rights. It is commonly suggested that their role can be curtailed or even eliminated if administrative red tape of migration control is cut down (a liberal approach), or regulation on the intermediary business is tightened up (an interventionist approach). The Chinese government has done both in different times since the 1980s, but only to make the process of recruitment more complicated and private agents more powerful. This paper explains why. Based on seven years' field research and documentary study, the article provides an ethnographic account of the change of the practice of international labor recruitment in China, especially in relation to systemic reforms, between 1980 and 2008. The centralized state in a liberalizing economy seems to need private agents in order to render individual mobility governable, migrants protectable, and agents themselves "blamable" and punishable. If limited centralization of state power gave rise to the earlier forms of intermediary (e.g. tax farming), intermediary agents today result from governmental practices of the highly centralized state. As such, private agents should not be construed as autonomous entities located between demand and supply, or between migrants and states, they are instead an integral part of a complex structure of governance. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

At a time when many states are increasing restrictions on immigration, others are using formal agreements on international economic migration to open their borders. The use of international agreements on migration presents a puzzle, as most states can open their borders to migrants unilaterally. I argue that, when states cannot generate large enough flows of migrants or the right type of migrants to fill open positions in the labor market, they turn to the sending state to help them. States that need migrants can negotiate a bilateral labor agreement with a sending state, which then acts as a recruiter, helping to channel labor to the receiving state. This article details the conditions under which immigrant-receiving countries use these treaties and tests the implications of the argument on a new dataset on migration treaties.