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The authors thank the editor and anonymous referees for their valuable comments and insightful recommendations, and thank Prof. Yucheng Dong for the helpful suggestions. This research was supported in part by grants from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (#71874023, #U1811462, #71725001, #71771037, #71971042, #71910107002) and Major project of the National Social Science Foundation of China (#19ZDA092). Enrique Herrera-Viedma is supported by the FEDER funds in the project TIN2016-75850-R. ; Non-cooperative behavior is a common situation in large-scale group decision-making (LSGDM) problems. In addition, decision makers in LSGDM often use different preference formats to express their opinions, due to their educational backgrounds, knowledge, and experiences. Heterogeneous preference information and non-cooperative behaviors bring challenges to LSGDM. This study develops a consensus reaching model to address heterogeneous LSGDM with non-cooperative behaviors and discuss its application in financial inclusion. Specifically, the cosine similarity degree is introduced to build a distance measure for different preference structures. Clustering analysis is employed to divide large-scale groups and handle non-cooperative behaviors in LSGDM. A consensus degree and a weighting process are proposed to decrease the influence of non-cooperative behaviors and facilitate the consensus reaching process. The convergence of the proposed approach is proven by theoretical and simulation analyses. Experimental studies are carried out to compare the performances of the proposed approach with existing methods. Finally, a real-life example from the "targeted poverty reduction project" in China is presented to validate the proposed approach. The selection of beneficiaries in finance inclusion is difficult due to the lack of credit history, the large number of participants, and the conflicting views of participants. The results showed that the proposed consensus model can integrate opinions of participants using diverse preference formats and reach an agreement efficiently. ; National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) 71874023 U1811462 71725001 71771037 71971042 71910107002 ; Major project of the National Social Science Foundation of China 19ZDA092 ; European Union (EU) TIN2016-75850-R

In recent years, scholars have turned to alternative representations of utility to capture motivational heterogeneity across individuals. In the research reported here, we examine two models of heterogeneous utility -- linear-altruism & inequity-aversion -- in the context of two-person, social dilemma games. Empirical tests are conducted drawing on data from experiments & surveys. We find that the model of inequity-aversion accounts for a substantial proportion of the preference types & behavior that are not explained by the standard model of self-interested preferences. In contrast, the altruism model does not provide a significant increase in explanatory power over the inequity-aversion model. 6 Tables, 8 Figures, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.

"Optimal policy rules--including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities--are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Abstract
Optimal policy rules—including those regarding income taxation, commodity taxation, public goods, and externalities—are typically derived in models with homogeneous preferences. This article reconsiders many central results for the case in which preferences for commodities, public goods, and externalities are heterogeneous. When preference differences are observable, standard second-best results in basic settings are unaffected, except those for the optimal income tax. Optimal levels of income taxation may be higher, the same, or lower on types who derive more utility from various goods, depending on the nature of preference differences and the concavity of the social welfare function. When preference differences are unobservable, all policy rules may change. The determinants of even the direction of optimal rule adjustments are many and subtle.

Informational committees are groups of people who are designated to gather information. This article develops a simple model of committee size based on costly participation and preference heterogeneity. In a setting in which the information structure and policy preferences are both represented by normal random variables, I characterize an equilibrium under the mean decision rule and derive the optimal committee size. I show that when effort costs are sufficiently high, preference heterogeneity can provide members additional incentives to gather information, and thus the optimal committee size and the principal's expected payoff can increase in the heterogeneity of committee members' policy preferences.