Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action

In: Public choice, Band 117, Heft 3-4, S. 295-314

Abstract

In recent years, scholars have turned to alternative representations of utility to capture motivational heterogeneity across individuals. In the research reported here, we examine two models of heterogeneous utility -- linear-altruism & inequity-aversion -- in the context of two-person, social dilemma games. Empirical tests are conducted drawing on data from experiments & surveys. We find that the model of inequity-aversion accounts for a substantial proportion of the preference types & behavior that are not explained by the standard model of self-interested preferences. In contrast, the altruism model does not provide a significant increase in explanatory power over the inequity-aversion model. 6 Tables, 8 Figures, 15 References. Adapted from the source document.