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This article argues that until recent times, the Estonian media policy has mainly been interpreted as an economic issue and it did not account for the strategic need to build a comprehensive media field to serve all groups in society. This has
happened despite the fact the Estonian media policy is in line with the European Union (EU) media policy, which should ensure freedom of information, diversity of opinion and media pluralism. Findings of the Estonian case study show that despite these noble aims, Estonia has two radically different information fields: one for Estonian speaking audiences and one for Russian speakers. Events in Ukraine have added to the democratic media policy paradigm a question of national security. Now it is a challenge for the policy makers to unite polarised media fields and how to minimise the impact of Russian propaganda. On the EU level, one supportive measure could be a revision of the Audiovisual Media Service
Directive. (author's abstract)

Im Mai 2013 feierte der Kirchnerismo zehn Jahre an der Macht. 2003 wurde Néstor Kirchner Präsident Argentiniens, 2007 übernahm seine Ehefrau (und heutige Witwe) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner das Amt. In dieser Dekade, besonders während der letzten Amtszeit, verstärkten sich die Machtkonzentration im Präsidentenamt, die Parteipolitisierung des Staates, die Kooptation zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen und Institutionen sowie die von oben geförderte Polarisierung in Politik und Gesellschaft. Gelegentlich sprechen sich Mitglieder von Kabinett und Regierungspartei für eine dritte Amtszeit der Präsidentin aus, obwohl die derzeitige Verfassung dies nicht zulässt. Ein wichtiges Element von Kirchners Hegemonieprojekt, die Reform des Richterrates, wurde im Juni allerdings vom Obersten Gerichtshof für verfassungswidrig erklärt. Dies bedeutete einen Rückschlag für die Regierung, trug zugleich aber zur Verschärfung der Fronten bei. (Autorenreferat)

From data in the form of a two-way contingency table "Regions × Sectors", the concepts of specialization and concentration, built from the analysis of conditional distributions or profiles, is based on discrepancies among distributions: between profiles and a uniform distribution for absolute concepts; between profiles and the corresponding marginal distribution for the relative concepts; or between the joint distribution and the product of the marginal distributions for the global concept. This paper provides an extensive numerical analysis of measures derived from this approach and from other approaches used in the literature and shows that while the different measures under consideration display rather similar numerical behaviours, differences of ranking call for a particular care when interpreting the numerical results.

"Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung ist von einem kleinräumigen Nebeneinander von Wachstum und Schrumpfung geprägt. Unklar ist, ob dieses Nebeneinander Folge einer heterogeneren demographischen Entwicklung ist. Auf teilräumlich gegensätzliche Trends kann in den oft langfristig orientierten Planungsinstrumenten kaum reagiert werden. Kleinräumlich und zeitlich schwankende Einwohnerentwicklungen führen jedoch zu schwankenden Auslastungen der Infrastruktur und haben damit auch finanzielle Auswirkungen auf die öffentliche Hand und die privaten Haushalte. Der Beitrag untersucht räumliche Entwicklungsdivergenzen anhand der Wohnungsmarktregionen Bielefeld und Münster. Durch eine differenzierte Betrachtung von natürlicher Bevölkerungsbewegung und verschiedenen Wanderungstypen werden Ursachen und Strukturen intraregionaler Divergenzen aufgezeigt. Daneben wird auch die zeitliche Dynamik analysiert, um zu Aussagen über eine mögliche Homogenisierung oder Heterogenisierung der Raumentwicklung zu kommen." (Autorenreferat)

Im Jahr 2009 hat Albanien sein Beitrittsgesuch bei der Europäischen Union (EU) eingereicht. Unterstützt von der breiten Bevölkerungsmehrheit deklarieren alle politisch bedeutsamen Kräfte des Landes den EU-Beitritt als oberstes Politikziel. Dennoch macht Albanien nur geringe Fortschritte in Richtung einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung und Konsolidierung seiner Demokratie. Eine der wichtigsten Ursachen hierfür ist die starke Polarisierung zwischen den beiden großen Parteien, der Demokratischen Partei (DP) und der Sozialistischen Partei (SP), und die stark personalisierte Fehde ihrer beiden Vorsitzenden, Salih Berisha und Edi Rama. Das bipolare politische System behindert ein kooperatives Miteinander und somit ein rasches Fortkommen im Reformprozess. Der Konflikt reicht weit in die Gesellschaft hinein. Die Medien sind eingebunden in die politische Auseinandersetzung und vertreten mehr oder weniger offen entweder die Interessen der DP oder der SP. Auch die Zivilgesellschaft ist gespalten. Nur wenige Organisationen agieren politisch unabhängig. Die Ursachen für die starke Polarisierung in Albanien liegen vor allem in der politischen Kultur des Landes, das in seiner Geschichte kaum Erfahrungen mit Demokratie gemacht hat. Der ehemalige albanische Diktator Enver Hoxha hatte ab 1944 ein stalinistisch geprägtes, kommunistisches System der totalen Kontrolle und Abschottung nach außen installiert. Die Nachwirkungen dieser Zeit sind bis heute spürbar. In Albanien hat nach 1990 weder ein umfassender Austausch der Elite noch eine ehrliche Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit stattgefunden. Neben der extremen politischen Polarisierung sind mangelnde Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Korruption, organisierte Kriminalität und ein im europäischen Vergleich kaum konkurrenzfähiges Wirtschaftssystem weitere Hürden Albaniens auf dem Weg in die EU. Die Europäische Kommission hat im Sinne ihres Konditionalitätsansatzes 2010 zwölf Prioritäten benannt, die Albanien vor der Verleihung des Kandidatenstatus bearbeiten soll. Bislang hat es hierbei jedoch kaum Fortschritte gegeben. Für nachhaltigen Wandel ist der politische Wille der albanischen Elite entscheidend; sie muss ihre Machttaktierereien den dringenden Reformen unterordnen. Langfristig kann nur eine europäisch sozialisierte Generation das Land grundlegend reformieren.

Belgien und Bosnien können als Staaten mit einem 'geteilten Haus' bezeichnet werden, bestehend aus etwa zwei gleich starken Bevölkerungsgruppierungen mit unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen über die politische Verfassung ihres Gemeinwesens. Das Beispiel Belgiens zeigt jedoch, dass selbst bei einem Dissens über die staatliche Struktur Formen einer relativ stabilen Autonomie der Bevölkerungsgruppen bei 'friedlicher Koexistenz' entwickelt und institutionalisiert werden können. Belgien löst dieses Problem auf zwei Wegen: (1) nicht-territoriale autonome Einheiten in der Form von Sprachgemeinschaften und (2) exklusive Kompetenzen für die Einheiten innerhalb des diversifizierten belgischen Staats. Der Artikel zeigt nun, dass diese Konstruktion auch für das bosnische Minoritätenproblem von Nutzen sein kann. Ähnlich wie in Belgien, sollten die nicht-territorialen Einheiten exklusive Kompetenzen in bildungspolitischer, linguistischer, kultureller und religiöser Hinsicht erhalten. Der Autor empfiehlt weiterhin auch andere Länder mit ähnlich gespaltenen Populationen hinsichtlich ihrer Vorbildfunktion für Bosnien zu prüfen. (ICAÜbers)

 This is a follow-up to my post arguing that American political institutions, which were traditionally held to reduce polarization (and probably did), promote it given the conditions that prevail today (viz., parties that are  distinguished by ideology).  A new book by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt that makes the same general argument has been getting attention, so I thought I should say how my view differs from theirs.  Levitsky and Ziblatt say that the main problem is institutions that work against majority rule, like the Senate, the Electoral College, and gerrymandered congressional districts.  As Michelle Goldberg summarizes it "The Constitution's countermajoritarian provisions, combined with profound geographic polarization, have locked us into a crisis of minority rule."  However, in recent years the institutions that are more majoritarian have been more of a problem.  For example, most of the Republican members of the House of Representatives voted against "certifying" the 2020 election, but only a few of the Republican members of the Senate did.  It's the House, not the Senate, that has tried to use the debt ceiling as a political weapon.  Judges, including judges appointed by Trump, almost unanimously rejected Trump's attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election.  Since the election, Republican-controlled state legislatures have made efforts to change electoral rules to benefit Republicans.  I think that the difference between the Senate and the House and state legislatures arises because Senators have a higher profile--someone who goes against the party may be able to survive, and even to benefit.  But Representatives and members of the state legislature are unknown to many of their constituents.  So the logic of trying to appeal to the "median voter" doesn't hold for them--the median voter probably won't even know what they've done, and will treat them like any other Democrat or Republican.  But party activists will know, and may support a primary challenge or withhold financial support.  I also want to elaborate on my point about the complexity of the American political system, especially the electoral system.  That provides opportunities to take advantage of the system--figuring out some angle you can use to get your way.  Of course, if you do that, the other party is likely to retaliate, and the possibility of retaliation can be an effective deterrent.   But the complexity of the system also means that there's room for disagreement about whether an action is out of bounds, or how severe an infraction it is.  So the other side commits some offense, you retaliate in what you regard as a reasonable and proportionate manner, and then they are indignant about what they regard as a grossly excessive reaction.  It's even possible to take offense at things that haven't happened, but that you think might happen.  For example, a Washington Post column by Jason Willick discussing the argument that Trump is ineligible to run for president:  "What is sure to be a well-funded and well-coordinated campaign to disqualify Trump from office has begun.... Champions of 'automatic' disqualification have one pragmatic objective in mind: Eliminating Trump from U.S. politics. So what if they turn the 14th Amendment's Section 3 into a Red Scare instrument in the process? ...  populists will someday have another chance in government. At that point, liberals might come to regret having legitimated the 14th Amendment as a quasi-authoritarian tool for purging political opposition."  During the 2020 election campaign, the Claremont Review talked about how Democrats would try to overturn a Trump victory.  And if the hypothetical action you became indignant about doesn't happen, you don't have to conclude that you were wrong--you can conclude that they surely would have done it if we hadn't called them out.   And finally, some data.  In 2016, a CNN/ORC poll asked people if they thought Trump would concede if he lost the election and then asked the same question about Hillary Clinton.  About 65% said that Trump would not concede, and 25% said Clinton would not.   Answers were strongly related to who you favored--Trump supporters were more likely to say that he would concede and less likely to say that Clinton would, and Clinton supporters were more likely to say that she would concede and Trump wouldn't.  But that wasn't the only thing that made a difference:  more educated people were more likely to say that both would concede.  The percent expecting each to concede, by candidate preference and education:Not college grad                  Trump                ClintonTrump supporter                     52%                    57%Clinton supporter                    19%                    92%Neither/DK                              22%                    63%College grad                        Trump                ClintonTrump supporter                     67%                    70%Clinton supporter                    26%                    95%Neither/DK                              30%                    77%Similar questions were asked in 2020, with similar overall results, although I can't get the breakdowns.  The point is that some Trump supporters could justify his refusal to concede by a belief that the Democrat wouldn't have conceded either.  [Data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research]

This article attempts to analyze the phenomenon of «modern populism» from the position of theoretical pluralism of scientific researches of modern Western and Ukrainian political science. Challenges for the modern liberal-democratic tradition of the 21st century were socio-political phenomena – Brexit (UK), D. Trump (USA), «Yellow Vest Movement» (France), «Five Star Movement» (Italy), «Podemos» (Spain) ), Syriza (Greece), J. Haider (Austria), G. Wilders (Netherlands), V. Orban (Hungary), P. Genson (Australia), R. Erdogan (Turkey) and many other versions of modern populism. What used to be seen as a marginalphenomenonandisinherentinothererasoronlyastosomepartsoftheworld, it has to day become the basis of modern politics of the world. The 21st Century is the source of unique «research material» for contemporary political science. Political forces that have been on the back yards of political life for a longtime, using populist rhetoric on globalization, the financial and economic crisis, migration and social policy, corruption and social policy, authorities, multiculturalism, etc., to become real political players, with the support of voters, to gain access to government institutions, thus, having come to the front of the big politics.The author traces the evolution of populist discourse in science community, within which an attempt is being made to approach the categorical and conceptual definiteness of the phenomenon of «modern populism». Depending on the unique combination of specific features, it can act as an ideology, a method of political struggle, social and political movement, manipulative technology, way of political behavior, etc. Ital so makes an attempt to determine the «unified» determinants of «modern populism» such as «accumulation of discontent», «play one motions», «polarization of society», «democracy», «politics of simulacra», «national authenticity». Despite the plurality of theoretical structures presented, the undeniable quality and depth of research projects of modern scientists, in our opinion, in the recent political science space there is a short age of prognostic studies capable of simulating and calculating the consequences of the phenomenon of «modern populism» for the future, both as individual states / societies and as a whole, for the world political order; therefore, it is advisable to justify the prospect of continuing theoretical exploration and involving a broad range of contemporary humanities experts in active political science discussion.Key words: populism, modern populism, globalization, globalization challenges, anti-globalist sentiment, socio-political crisis, liberal-democratic values, democratic risks. ; В статі здійснюється спроба аналізу феномену «сучасного популізму» в ракурсі теоретичного плюралізму наукових розвідок сучасної західної та української політологічної науки. Автор простежує еволюцію популістського дискурсу в академічних колах, в рамках якого відбувається спроба наблизитись до категоріальної та концептуальної визначеності феномена «сучасний популізм». Спираючись на новітні західні та вітчизняні теоретичні конструкції автор статті пропонує власну дефініцію «сучасного популізму» – як політичного поліваріативного феномену, який в залежності від унікальної комбінації специфічних рис, може виступати в якості ідеології, методу політичної боротьби, суспільно-політичного руху, маніпулятивної технології, стилю політичної поведінки тощо, та робить спробу визначити «універсальні» детермінуючі чинники «сучасного популізму» – «акумуляція незадоволення», «гра на емоціях», «поляризація суспільства», «народовладдя», «політика симулякрів», «національна автентичність».Ключові слова: популізм, сучасний популізм, глобалізація, глобалізаційні виклики, антиглобалізм, суспільно-політична криза, ліберально-демократичні цінності, демократичні ризики. В статье осуществляется попытка анализа феномена «современный популизм» в ракурсе теоретического плюрализма новейших разведок современной западной и украинской политологической науки. Автор прослеживает эволюцию популистического дискурса в академических кругах, в рамках которого осуществляет попытку приблизиться к категориальной и концептуальной определённости феномена «современный популизм». Опираясь на новейшие западные и отечественные теоретические конструкции автор статьи предлагает собственную дефиницию «современного популизма» – как политического поливариативного феномена, который в зависимости от уникальных комбинаций специфических черт, может выступать в качестве идеологии, метода политической борьбы, общественно-политического движения, манипулятивной технологи, стиля политического поведения и т.д., – и делает попытку определения «универсальных» детерминирующих факторов «современного популизма» – «аккумуляция недовольства», «игра на эмоциях», «поляризация общества», «народовластие», «политика симулякров», «национальная аутентичность».Ключевые слова: популизм, современный популизм, глобализация, глобализационные вызовы, антиглобализм, общественно-политический кризис, либерально-демократические ценности, демократические риски. This article attempts to analyze the phenomenon of «modern populism» from the position of theoretical pluralism of scientific researches of modern Western and Ukrainian political science. Challenges for the modern liberal-democratic tradition of the 21st century were socio-political phenomena – Brexit (UK), D. Trump (USA), «Yellow Vest Movement» (France), «Five Star Movement» (Italy), «Podemos» (Spain) ), Syriza (Greece), J. Haider (Austria), G. Wilders (Netherlands), V. Orban (Hungary), P. Genson (Australia), R. Erdogan (Turkey) and many other versions of modern populism. What used to be seen as a marginalphenomenonandisinherentinothererasoronlyastosomepartsoftheworld, it has to day become the basis of modern politics of the world. The 21st Century is the source of unique «research material» for contemporary political science. Political forces that have been on the back yards of political life for a longtime, using populist rhetoric on globalization, the financial and economic crisis, migration and social policy, corruption and social policy, authorities, multiculturalism, etc., to become real political players, with the support of voters, to gain access to government institutions, thus, having come to the front of the big politics.The author traces the evolution of populist discourse in science community, within which an attempt is being made to approach the categorical and conceptual definiteness of the phenomenon of «modern populism». Depending on the unique combination of specific features, it can act as an ideology, a method of political struggle, social and political movement, manipulative technology, way of political behavior, etc. Ital so makes an attempt to determine the «unified» determinants of «modern populism» such as «accumulation of discontent», «play one motions», «polarization of society», «democracy», «politics of simulacra», «national authenticity». Despite the plurality of theoretical structures presented, the undeniable quality and depth of research projects of modern scientists, in our opinion, in the recent political science space there is a short age of prognostic studies capable of simulating and calculating the consequences of the phenomenon of «modern populism» for the future, both as individual states / societies and as a whole, for the world political order; therefore, it is advisable to justify the prospect of continuing theoretical exploration and involving a broad range of contemporary humanities experts in active political science discussion.Key words: populism, modern populism, globalization, globalization challenges, anti-globalist sentiment, socio-political crisis, liberal-democratic values, democratic risks.