Suchergebnisse

The introduction of the presidency is of great importance for the historical development of Ukraine as a sovereign, independent, democratic and legal state, as the consolidation of the President's position at the legislative level testifies to the international experience of democratic institutions, the main place among which is occupied by the presidency. The Constitution of Ukraine provided great opportunities for the President as a representative of the "interests of the whole people" to remain the dominant element of the political system of Ukraine. The powers of the President, in contrast to the powers of many other bodies and officials of the state, are provided exclusively at the level of the Constitution of Ukraine, and their expansion through ordinary laws is not allowed. The latter determine only the procedure for exercising a particular authority of the President of Ukraine in a particular sphere of public life. And this week it is very interesting to study a separate function of the President, namely the ability to act "in the spirit of the law (Constitution)" - discretionary powers. Many decisions and drafts of heads of state see discretionary powers, and this does not mean that there is an excess of power or even going beyond the law. After all, in the legal encyclopedia, dis-cretionary powers are defined as the right of the head of state, head of government, and other officials of public authorities to act under certain conditionsat their own discretion within the law. Discretion in a particular situation is indicated in the rule of law by such appeals as, for example, "may", "has the right", and not "should", "must". In the recent history of Ukraine, during the transformation of the institution of the presidency, we have already seen the exercise of their discretion by the heads of state. For the most part, we must mention the resonant decisions "in the spirit of the Constitution" of V. Yushchenko and P. Poroshenko. Thus, we will consider the poll of the President of Ukraine V. Zelensky, conducted on October 25, 2020, from the standpoint of his exercise of his discretion, namely the right to act based on his legal status, which is primarily defined in Article 102 of the Constitution of Ukraine, where it is written that "the President of Ukraine is the head of state and acts on its behalf." ; Введение института президентства имеет большое значение для исторического развития Украины как суверенного, независимого, демократического и правового государства, поскольку закрепление на законодательном уровне должности Президента свидетельствует об учете международного опыта функционирования демократических институтов, главное место среди которых занимает президентура. Конституция Украины предоставила большие возможности Президенту, как представителю "интересов всего народа", оставаться доминирующим элементом политической системы Украины. Полномочия Президента, в отличие от полномочий многих других органов и должностных лиц государства, предусматриваются исключительно на уровне самой Конституции Украины, и их расширение через обычные законы не допускается. Последние определяют только порядок реализации того или иного конкретного полномочия Президента Украины в определенной сфере общественной жизни. И в этом смысле очень интересным является исследование отдельной функции и Президента, а именно возможность действовать «. в духе закона (Конституции)» - дискреционные полномочия. Во многих решениях и проектах глав государства усматриваются именно дискреционные полномочия, и это не должно означать, что возникает превышение полномочий или даже выход за рамки законности. Ведь в юридической энциклопедии дискреционные полномочия определяются как право главы государства, главы правительства, других должностных лиц органов государственной власти действовать при определенных условиях по своему усмотрению в рамках закона. На наличие дискреции в отдельной ситуации в норме закона указывают такие обороты, как, например, «может», «имеет право», а не «должен», «обязан».В новейшей истории Украины, в ходе трансформации института президентства, мы уже видели применение главами государствасвоих дискреционных полномочий . В основном, должны вспомнить резонансные решения «в духе Конституции» В. Ющенко и П. Порошенко. Таким образом мы рассмотрим и опрос Президента Украины В. Зеленского, проведенный 25 октября 2020 года, именно с позиции применения им своих дискреционных полномочий: права действовать, исходя из правового статуса Президента Украины, который во многом определео в статье 102 Конституции Украины:"Президент Украины является главой государства и выступает от его имени". ; Запровадження інституту президентства має велике значення для історичного розвитку України як суверенної, незалежної, демократичної та правової держави, оскільки закріплення на законодавчому рівні посади Президента свідчить про врахування міжнародного досвіду функціонування демократичних інститутів, головне місце серед яких посідає президентура. Конституція України надала великі можливості Президенту, як представникові "інтересів всього народу", залишатися домінуючим елементом політичної системи України. Повноваження Президента, на відміну від повноважень багатьох інших органів і посадових осіб держави, передбачаються винятково на рівні самої Конституції України, і їх розширення через звичайні закони не допускається. Останні визначають лише порядок реалізації того чи іншого кон-кретного повноваження Президента України в певній сфері суспільного життя. І в цьому сенсі дуже цікавим є дослідження окремої функціїї Президента, а саме можливість діяти «… в дусі закону (Конституції)» - дискреційні повноваження. В багатьох рішеннях та проектах глав держави вбачаються саме дискреційні повноваження, і це не має означати, що виникає перевищення повноважень або навіть вихід за рамки законності. Адже в юридичній енциклопедії дискреційні повноваження визначаються як право глави держави, голови уряду, інших посадових осіб органів державної влади діяти за певних умов на власний розсуд у межах закону. На наявність дискреції в окремій ситуації в нормі закону вказують такі звороти, як, наприклад, «може», «має право», а не «повинен», «зобов'язаний». В новітній історії України, в ході трансформації інституту президентства, ми вже бачили застосування главами держави своїх дискреційних повноважень. Здебільшого, маємо згадати резонансні рішення «в дусі Конституції» В. Ющенка та П. Порошенка. Таким чином ми розглянемо і опитування Президента Укра-їни В. Зеленського, яке було проведене 25 жовтня 2020 року, саме з позиції застосування ним своїх дис-креційних повноважень: права діяти, виходячи з правового статусу Президента України, який передусім визначено в статті 102 Конституції України: "Президент України є главою держави і виступає від її імені".

Dottorato di ricerca in Diritto dei mercati europei e globali, crisi, diritti , regolazione ; Il presente lavoro è volto ad analizzare il riconoscimento del c.d. "right to know" negli ordinamenti sovranazionali e le sue implicazioni sulla riforma della trasparenza amministrativa in Italia. La tesi si struttura in cinque capitoli e tenta di armonizzare l'esame della giurisprudenza e della dottrina straniere con l'analisi delle problematiche di diritto sostanziale e processuale emerse nel nostro ordinamento a seguito dell'emanazione del Dec. Lgs. n. 97/2016. In tale ambito, si è evidenziata la rilevanza delle fonti sovranazionali nel definire e nel conformare il nucleo essenziale del diritto a conoscere e nel promuoverne il ruolo di diritto fondamentale nell'ambito dell'ordinamento italiano. A tal fine, si è svolto un approfondimento sulla giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo in materia di libertà d'espressione, nonché sul peculiare ruolo assunto dalla trasparenza nell'ambito dell'ordinamento dell'Unione Europa. Il terzo capitolo analizza il fondamento costituzionale dei principi di pubblicità e trasparenza e si focalizza sull'introduzione e sull'evoluzione dell'accesso documentale come strumento di realizzazione del c.d. "need to know", evidenziandone le differenze con l'istituto dell'accesso civico "rimediale", funzionale all'attuazione degli obblighi legali di pubblicazione. Viene poi esaminata approfonditamente la disciplina dell'accesso civico generalizzato e dei principali istituti connessi alla realizzazione di un regime F.O.I.A. nell'ambito del nostro ordinamento. In particolare, avvalendosi anche di sintetiche considerazioni di carattere comparatistico, si è esposto il concreto funzionamento della nuova regolamentazione, esaminando le problematiche emerse in sede attuativa e le prime reazioni ad essa manifestate dalla giurisprudenza e dai pubblici uffici. In tale sede, si sono altresì analizzate le critiche rivolte da parte della dottrina alle modalità di attuazione della riforma (specialmente in punto di governance) e alla gestione del delicato rapporto tra promozione della trasparenza e tutela della riservatezza. Il capitolo finale della tesi di dottorato mira a individuare i risultati ottenuti con gli interventi legislativi e amministrativi connessi alla realizzazione del F.O.I.A. italiano, evidenziandone contestualmente gli eventuali malfunzionamenti manifestatesi a distanza di due anni dalla sua attuazione. Nella prospettiva di dare piena e corretta attuazione al right to know, assumono particolare rilevanza le considerazioni che si possono svolgere paragonando il nostro attuale sistema al F.O.I.A. britannico o scozzese, per quanto riguarda, in particolare, la concreta operatività del regime delle eccezioni relative e il ruolo ivi attribuito all'Information Commissioner's Office. L'analisi svolta parte dall'assunto che lo sviluppo del right to know non ha una dimensione meramente individualistica, giacché la promozione della trasparenza diffusa reca preziosi benefici per l'intera collettività, incidendo direttamente sull'attuazione del principio di democraticità e su quei generali principi di imparzialità e di buon andamento cui deve risultare sempre improntata l'attività amministrativa. ; The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Italian Administrative Transparency Reform and the acknowledgement of the so called "right to know" in international and national laws. Administrative transparency improves legitimacy in the decision-making process and, consequently, promotes public trust and public support in modern democracies. Furthermore, it prevents the waste of public sources by allowing everyone to control the administrative activities. Unfortunately, the model of open administration has been unknown in Italy for a long time. In 1990, the Italian legislator introduced a particular form of access, aimed at fulfilling "the need to know" of the citizens involved in public administrative procedures. However, applicants had to demonstrate to have a direct, actual and concrete interest in obtaining the information requested, while the public offices, on the other hand, were not obliged to motivate their objections to the applications. Consequently, this kind of access to public documents did not allow a "quisque de populo" to ask public authorities relevant information just in order to check how they managed their performance. On the contrary, the new "civic universal access", introduced in the Transparency Consolidated Law in 2016, can be used by everyone in order to obtain any data from the public administrations. Public offices can deny access only through a motivated administrative act, which indicates how the data release could harm specific public or private interests. If this "substantial prejudice test" fails, the access to the requested data is to be allowed. Alas, some jurisdictional decisions and administrative practices tend to deny the access even in further cases not provided for by the law. Even though the legal regulation has deeply changed, the Italian administrative culture seems to be still very far from the Freedom of Information model existing in the U.S.A. and U.K. One of the main causes of this trend may be rely in the current connection between this innovative form of access and the anti-corruption legislation: pursuant to art. 5 of the Italian Transparency Consolidated Law, this kind of access should be used to guarantee a widespread control over public administration activities. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the applications must be rejected if the applicants pursue different scopes. International conventions and national constitutions tend to qualify the so called "right to know" as a fundamental right whose limitation should consequently be interpreted restrictively. Any information contact with public bodies should in fact be considered as a chance to strengthen the fiduciary relationship between citizens and government. Moreover, the proportionality principle may be invoked to introduce the so called "public interest test": this means that, whenever an access application may cause a substantial prejudice to one or more of the interests protected by the law, the access could still be allowed if the public interest to disclosure seems to be prevailing. In other words, the demonstration of the substantial prejudice may not be considered sufficient to deny the disclosure. The paper analyses the relationship between "the right to know" and personal privacy throughout the abovementioned transparency reform legislation, underlining the importance of a cultural as well as legislative innovation. In the Conclusions, some general considerations are made regarding the role and the perspectives of the so called "civic universal access" in the Italian legal system.

Зазначено, що створення конкурентоспроможного агропродовольчого виробництва неможливо без посилення ролі держави та підтримки аграрного сектора економіки України. Визначено, що необхідність забезпечення продовольчої безпеки, низька конкурентоспроможність і продуктивність галузі, низький рівень оплати праці працівників села тощо є основними причинами держрегулювання сільського господарства. Описано, що нині є виправданим посилення регулюючого впливу з боку держави на розвиток сільської економіки, якнайшвидше впровадження відповідної програми державного регулювання і підтримки цієї важливої галузі. Зауважено, що існує необхідність істотної зміни стратегії і тактики реформ загалом, аграрної реформи зокрема, що пов'язано з посиленням державного регулювання продовольчого ринку, переорієнтацією капіталу з торгових і фінансових галузей на вкладення у виробничу сферу в АПК і залучення іноземних інвестицій. Підсумовано, що у сучасних умовах чітко простежується прагнення законодавця посилити економічні та соціальні функції державного регулювання продовольчого ринку як керованого і регульованого механізму вільного руху сільськогосподарської продукції і товарів, функціонування якого забезпечується єдиними нормами і правилами, які регулюють підприємницьку діяльність суб'єктів продовольчого ринку. ; Problem setting. Problems of state regulation of the agrarian sector in Ukraine are important in connection with the transition to the market. As you know, agriculture is a special industry whose incomes, based on its no monopoly nature, are always lagging behind other industries. In almost all countries, agriculture is one of the most state-supported industries.State regulation is a system of standard measures of legislative, executive and supervisory nature, carried out by authorized state bodies in order to stabilize and adapt the existing socio-economic system to changing conditions.According to experts, stabilization of agriculture in itself cannot occur by itself. Agriculture is able to revive only with active state support. The most widely practiced in the world measures of state support for the ago-industrial complex, grouped according to the target.Recent research and publications analysis. Тhe problem of research on state support for agricultural production involves many scientists, in particular: V. Andrich, V. Boyce, P. Godowsky, B. Krasnik, Y. Luzon, V. Messel-Visalia, O. Mogilny, A. Stelmashchuk, P. Sabluk, G. Cherkovsky and others, who in their works substantiated the need for state support to the agrarian sector, and also proposed ways to improve the system of budget financing of agriculture.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite an active study of this problem, it is expedient to justify the need for state support to agriculture, as well as proposals for improving its budget financing system. Theoretical and methodical aspects of the problem of forming the mechanism of state support of the agrarian sphere remain inadequately investigated and require further in-depth study.Paper main body. An important task of state regulation should be to assist agricultural producers in adapting to market conditions, which should be pursued in two main directions:1) assistance in restructuring the production and assisting commodity producers in entering the market; developing a system of social insurance in the countryside and forming innovative business directions;2) improvement of the skills of employees, creation of advisory services.In the first direction, the state, based on the analysis of the market situation, has either to promote, or, conversely, to hold the formation of individual industries. In addition, it is possible to re-profile the enterprises that produce unpredictable (non-profitable) goods in a competitive manner, while compensations may be paid through reduced production volumes. In subsidized regions where surplus production is produced by objective factors, it is necessary to provide subsidies to commodity producers that compensate for the decrease in profits.It is necessary to stimulate the formation of folk crafts, subsidiary farms, the development of tourism, to contribute to the study of unique resources that are in this area. The state is called on to promote the development of market infrastructure necessary for the existence of a market structure, to support the formation of independent intermediary structures, the organization of wholesale trade, in particular the wholesale food markets, the creation of guarantee service systems that operate on market principles, and improve the information infrastructure of the market.Creating an information system is in fact considered a privilege of the state. It is necessary to improve the state financial and analytical service in the agroindustrial complex, which would allow the economic actors of the industry to function most effectively, orienting themselves in the market situation, and as a result – reasonably and thoughtfully act in modern conditions.Regarding the regulation of foreign economic policy it is necessary to increase the number and variety of tariffs, while taking into account the seasonality of production in improving import duties; it is necessary to use special and mixed duties, as well as to raise the level of tariff policy by types of agricultural products and foodstuffs; to establish the import of a sufficient quantity of products that meets the needs of the population; develop a concept and model of a long-term food program; it is necessary to develop state and local programs that will expand the export of agricultural products and agriculture as an important source of investments, which include the system of state support, that is, the system of export credits and subsidies.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Almost all publications devoted to the problems of agrarian and industrial complex, shows a lot of facts that indicate the regression observed in the industry, the lack of financial resources to solve the problems faced by the ago-industry complex, the almost universal ubiquity of agricultural production, etc.Almost all economists are talking about the earliest need for stabilization of the food situation, and start solving this issue is necessary with the lifting of the ago-industrial complex.However, most of the farms and the state practically do not have the means to solve this problem. Thus, state regulation of the economy in the agricultural sector is understood as a system for collecting economic information and a mechanism for making economic decisions on the basis of its analysis, which includes a mechanism for resolving acute contradictions, the use of public procurement (government procurement), the impact of emissions and various methods lending, planning (certain types of economic activity) and conducting foreign economic policy, social support.

Зазначено, що створення конкурентоспроможного агропродовольчого виробництва неможливо без посилення ролі держави та підтримки аграрного сектора економіки України. Визначено, що необхідність забезпечення продовольчої безпеки, низька конкурентоспроможність і продуктивність галузі, низький рівень оплати праці працівників села тощо є основними причинами держрегулювання сільського господарства. Описано, що нині є виправданим посилення регулюючого впливу з боку держави на розвиток сільської економіки, якнайшвидше впровадження відповідної програми державного регулювання і підтримки цієї важливої галузі. Зауважено, що існує необхідність істотної зміни стратегії і тактики реформ загалом, аграрної реформи зокрема, що пов'язано з посиленням державного регулювання продовольчого ринку, переорієнтацією капіталу з торгових і фінансових галузей на вкладення у виробничу сферу в АПК і залучення іноземних інвестицій. Підсумовано, що у сучасних умовах чітко простежується прагнення законодавця посилити економічні та соціальні функції державного регулювання продовольчого ринку як керованого і регульованого механізму вільного руху сільськогосподарської продукції і товарів, функціонування якого забезпечується єдиними нормами і правилами, які регулюють підприємницьку діяльність суб'єктів продовольчого ринку. ; Problem setting. Problems of state regulation of the agrarian sector in Ukraine are important in connection with the transition to the market. As you know, agriculture is a special industry whose incomes, based on its no monopoly nature, are always lagging behind other industries. In almost all countries, agriculture is one of the most state-supported industries.State regulation is a system of standard measures of legislative, executive and supervisory nature, carried out by authorized state bodies in order to stabilize and adapt the existing socio-economic system to changing conditions.According to experts, stabilization of agriculture in itself cannot occur by itself. Agriculture is able to revive only with active state support. The most widely practiced in the world measures of state support for the ago-industrial complex, grouped according to the target.Recent research and publications analysis. Тhe problem of research on state support for agricultural production involves many scientists, in particular: V. Andrich, V. Boyce, P. Godowsky, B. Krasnik, Y. Luzon, V. Messel-Visalia, O. Mogilny, A. Stelmashchuk, P. Sabluk, G. Cherkovsky and others, who in their works substantiated the need for state support to the agrarian sector, and also proposed ways to improve the system of budget financing of agriculture.Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. Despite an active study of this problem, it is expedient to justify the need for state support to agriculture, as well as proposals for improving its budget financing system. Theoretical and methodical aspects of the problem of forming the mechanism of state support of the agrarian sphere remain inadequately investigated and require further in-depth study.Paper main body. An important task of state regulation should be to assist agricultural producers in adapting to market conditions, which should be pursued in two main directions:1) assistance in restructuring the production and assisting commodity producers in entering the market; developing a system of social insurance in the countryside and forming innovative business directions;2) improvement of the skills of employees, creation of advisory services.In the first direction, the state, based on the analysis of the market situation, has either to promote, or, conversely, to hold the formation of individual industries. In addition, it is possible to re-profile the enterprises that produce unpredictable (non-profitable) goods in a competitive manner, while compensations may be paid through reduced production volumes. In subsidized regions where surplus production is produced by objective factors, it is necessary to provide subsidies to commodity producers that compensate for the decrease in profits.It is necessary to stimulate the formation of folk crafts, subsidiary farms, the development of tourism, to contribute to the study of unique resources that are in this area. The state is called on to promote the development of market infrastructure necessary for the existence of a market structure, to support the formation of independent intermediary structures, the organization of wholesale trade, in particular the wholesale food markets, the creation of guarantee service systems that operate on market principles, and improve the information infrastructure of the market.Creating an information system is in fact considered a privilege of the state. It is necessary to improve the state financial and analytical service in the agroindustrial complex, which would allow the economic actors of the industry to function most effectively, orienting themselves in the market situation, and as a result – reasonably and thoughtfully act in modern conditions.Regarding the regulation of foreign economic policy it is necessary to increase the number and variety of tariffs, while taking into account the seasonality of production in improving import duties; it is necessary to use special and mixed duties, as well as to raise the level of tariff policy by types of agricultural products and foodstuffs; to establish the import of a sufficient quantity of products that meets the needs of the population; develop a concept and model of a long-term food program; it is necessary to develop state and local programs that will expand the export of agricultural products and agriculture as an important source of investments, which include the system of state support, that is, the system of export credits and subsidies.Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Almost all publications devoted to the problems of agrarian and industrial complex, shows a lot of facts that indicate the regression observed in the industry, the lack of financial resources to solve the problems faced by the ago-industry complex, the almost universal ubiquity of agricultural production, etc.Almost all economists are talking about the earliest need for stabilization of the food situation, and start solving this issue is necessary with the lifting of the ago-industrial complex.However, most of the farms and the state practically do not have the means to solve this problem. Thus, state regulation of the economy in the agricultural sector is understood as a system for collecting economic information and a mechanism for making economic decisions on the basis of its analysis, which includes a mechanism for resolving acute contradictions, the use of public procurement (government procurement), the impact of emissions and various methods lending, planning (certain types of economic activity) and conducting foreign economic policy, social support.

Ten years after the Budapest Open Access Initiative, we have examined the current situation of Open Access in France via the two open access (OA) roads: the Green (self-archiving) and the Gold (OA publishing). HAL, a central multidisciplinary French archive launched in 2002, is recognized for its technical quality, but 10 years after its creation it only includes 10 to 15% of the annual French scientific output. This figure is similar to other repositories worldwide for which there is no mandatory policy (no mandate). On the other hand, archives such as that of Liège University which has a mandate, achieved an 80% deposit rate within two years. Other than HAL, a number of institutional archives are being developed in France, with Archimer and OATAO being two successful examples, thanks to dedicated library staff. In order to support the editorial offer in open access the Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) recently launched the Open Edition Freemium. This initiative should favor the development of OA periodicals. However, the study based on the list of qualifying periodicals in Human and Social Sciences, shows that researchers are not encouraged to publish in these periodicals by national assessment bodies; very few French open access periodicals are on the different qualifying lists of the agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES - French research and higher education assessment agency). In addition, a wide disparity can be observed between disciplines. Different examples of strong policies in favor of OA are given: at the university level, as at Liège university, at the level of foundations, as at FRS-FNRS in Belgium, at the level of the Europe or at the legislative level, as attempted in the USA or Brazil or Argentina. In France the two roads are supported by interesting initiatives and these should be accompanied by strong French government policy to enable the benefits of open access to be rapidly reaped. ; Pour faire l'état des lieux du libre accès (LA) en France en 2012, dix ans après la Budapest Open Access Initiative, nous avons examiné les deux voies : la voie verte (l'auto-archivage) et la voie dorée (publications dans les revues en LA). L'archive centrale multidisciplinaire HAL, créée en 2002 pour recevoir les publications scientifiques au niveau national, est reconnue pour sa qualité technique, mais elle ne propose que 10% à 15 % de la production scientifique annuelle française. Ce chiffre est à l'image de ce qu'offrent toutes les autres archives dans le monde où il n'y a pas d'obligation de déposer (pas de mandat). Les archives qui ont un mandat comme celle de l'université de Liège, ont atteint un taux de 80% en deux ans. Quelques archives institutionnelles se sont développées en France parallèlement à HAL, et deux d'entre elles (Archimer and OATAO) ont un bon taux de remplissage, grâce à l'implication d'un personnel dédié. Pour soutenir les offres éditoriales en libre accès le Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) a récemment mis en place OpenEdition Freemium. Cette initiative pourrait favoriser le développement des revues en LA. Cependant, l'étude faite à partir des revues qualifiantes en Sciences Humaines et Sociales montre que les chercheurs sont peu encouragés à publier dans ces revues par les instances d'évaluation : peu de revues en libre accès françaises sont présentes dans les listes des revues qualifiantes de l'agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES). On note aussi une forte disparité entre les disciplines. Différents exemples de politique en faveur du libre accès sont donnés : un politique forte peut être menée par des universités, comme à l'université de Liège, ou par des bailleurs de fonds, comme le FRS-FNRS en Belgique ou par l'Europe. Elle peut être entreprise au niveau législatif comme aux USA, au Brésil ou en Argentine. En France les deux voies du libre accès sont tracées par des initiatives intéressantes. Le gouvernement français devrait accompagner ces initiatives et devrait s'investir dans une politique forte pour recevoir rapidement les bénéfices du libre accès. ; Para verificar como está o Acesso Livre (AL) na França em 2012, dez anos após a Budapest Open Access Initiative, foram examinadas as duas vias: a via verde (auto-arquivamento) e a dourada (publicação em periódicos em AL). O arquivo central multidisciplinar HAL, criado em 2002 para receber publicações científicas em nível nacional, é reconhecido por sua qualidade técnica, mas ele apresenta apenas 10% a 15% da produção científica francesa anual. Este número espelha o que oferecem todos os outros arquivos no mundo em que não há obrigação de depósito (ou seja, não há mandato). Os arquivos com mandato, como o da Universidade de Liège, chegaram a uma taxa de 80% em dois anos. Alguns arquivos institucionais desenvolveram-se paralelamente ao HAL, e dois deles (Archimer et OATAO) mostram um bom índice de preenchimento, graças à dedicação das pessoas envolvidas. Para sustentar a oferta editorial em acesso livre, o Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) implementou recentemente o OpenEdition Freemium. Essa iniciativa poderia favorecer o desenvolvimento dos periódicos em AL. No entanto, o estudo feito com os periódicos qualificados em Ciências Humanas e Sociais mostra que os pesquisadores são pouco estimulados a publicar nauqueles periódicos pelas instâncias avaliadoras: poucos periódicos franceses em acesso livre estão presentes nas listas de periódicos qualificados da agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES)[1]. Nota-se também uma grande disparidade entre as disciplinas. São fornecidos diversos exemplos de políticas de certos países em prol do acesso livre: uma política robusta pode ser impolementada pelas universidades, como na Universidade de Liège, pelas agências de fomento, como o FRS-FNRS na Bélgica e os Research Councils na Grã Bretanha, e também pode ser empreendida no nível legislativo, como nos Estados Unidos, no Brasil ou na Argentina. Na França, as duas vias do acesso livre são traçadas por iniciativas interessantes. O governo francês deveria acompanhar essas iniciativas e desenvolver uma política forte para obter rapidamente os benefícios do acesso livre.

Ten years after the Budapest Open Access Initiative, we have examined the current situation of Open Access in France via the two open access (OA) roads: the Green (self-archiving) and the Gold (OA publishing). HAL, a central multidisciplinary French archive launched in 2002, is recognized for its technical quality, but 10 years after its creation it only includes 10 to 15% of the annual French scientific output. This figure is similar to other repositories worldwide for which there is no mandatory policy (no mandate). On the other hand, archives such as that of Liège University which has a mandate, achieved an 80% deposit rate within two years. Other than HAL, a number of institutional archives are being developed in France, with Archimer and OATAO being two successful examples, thanks to dedicated library staff. In order to support the editorial offer in open access the Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) recently launched the Open Edition Freemium. This initiative should favor the development of OA periodicals. However, the study based on the list of qualifying periodicals in Human and Social Sciences, shows that researchers are not encouraged to publish in these periodicals by national assessment bodies; very few French open access periodicals are on the different qualifying lists of the agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES - French research and higher education assessment agency). In addition, a wide disparity can be observed between disciplines. Different examples of strong policies in favor of OA are given: at the university level, as at Liège university, at the level of foundations, as at FRS-FNRS in Belgium, at the level of the Europe or at the legislative level, as attempted in the USA or Brazil or Argentina. In France the two roads are supported by interesting initiatives and these should be accompanied by strong French government policy to enable the benefits of open access to be rapidly reaped. ; Pour faire l'état des lieux du libre accès (LA) en France en 2012, dix ans après la Budapest Open Access Initiative, nous avons examiné les deux voies : la voie verte (l'auto-archivage) et la voie dorée (publications dans les revues en LA). L'archive centrale multidisciplinaire HAL, créée en 2002 pour recevoir les publications scientifiques au niveau national, est reconnue pour sa qualité technique, mais elle ne propose que 10% à 15 % de la production scientifique annuelle française. Ce chiffre est à l'image de ce qu'offrent toutes les autres archives dans le monde où il n'y a pas d'obligation de déposer (pas de mandat). Les archives qui ont un mandat comme celle de l'université de Liège, ont atteint un taux de 80% en deux ans. Quelques archives institutionnelles se sont développées en France parallèlement à HAL, et deux d'entre elles (Archimer and OATAO) ont un bon taux de remplissage, grâce à l'implication d'un personnel dédié. Pour soutenir les offres éditoriales en libre accès le Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) a récemment mis en place OpenEdition Freemium. Cette initiative pourrait favoriser le développement des revues en LA. Cependant, l'étude faite à partir des revues qualifiantes en Sciences Humaines et Sociales montre que les chercheurs sont peu encouragés à publier dans ces revues par les instances d'évaluation : peu de revues en libre accès françaises sont présentes dans les listes des revues qualifiantes de l'agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES). On note aussi une forte disparité entre les disciplines. Différents exemples de politique en faveur du libre accès sont donnés : un politique forte peut être menée par des universités, comme à l'université de Liège, ou par des bailleurs de fonds, comme le FRS-FNRS en Belgique ou par l'Europe. Elle peut être entreprise au niveau législatif comme aux USA, au Brésil ou en Argentine. En France les deux voies du libre accès sont tracées par des initiatives intéressantes. Le gouvernement français devrait accompagner ces initiatives et devrait s'investir dans une politique forte pour recevoir rapidement les bénéfices du libre accès. ; Para verificar como está o Acesso Livre (AL) na França em 2012, dez anos após a Budapest Open Access Initiative, foram examinadas as duas vias: a via verde (auto-arquivamento) e a dourada (publicação em periódicos em AL). O arquivo central multidisciplinar HAL, criado em 2002 para receber publicações científicas em nível nacional, é reconhecido por sua qualidade técnica, mas ele apresenta apenas 10% a 15% da produção científica francesa anual. Este número espelha o que oferecem todos os outros arquivos no mundo em que não há obrigação de depósito (ou seja, não há mandato). Os arquivos com mandato, como o da Universidade de Liège, chegaram a uma taxa de 80% em dois anos. Alguns arquivos institucionais desenvolveram-se paralelamente ao HAL, e dois deles (Archimer et OATAO) mostram um bom índice de preenchimento, graças à dedicação das pessoas envolvidas. Para sustentar a oferta editorial em acesso livre, o Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) implementou recentemente o OpenEdition Freemium. Essa iniciativa poderia favorecer o desenvolvimento dos periódicos em AL. No entanto, o estudo feito com os periódicos qualificados em Ciências Humanas e Sociais mostra que os pesquisadores são pouco estimulados a publicar nauqueles periódicos pelas instâncias avaliadoras: poucos periódicos franceses em acesso livre estão presentes nas listas de periódicos qualificados da agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES)[1]. Nota-se também uma grande disparidade entre as disciplinas. São fornecidos diversos exemplos de políticas de certos países em prol do acesso livre: uma política robusta pode ser impolementada pelas universidades, como na Universidade de Liège, pelas agências de fomento, como o FRS-FNRS na Bélgica e os Research Councils na Grã Bretanha, e também pode ser empreendida no nível legislativo, como nos Estados Unidos, no Brasil ou na Argentina. Na França, as duas vias do acesso livre são traçadas por iniciativas interessantes. O governo francês deveria acompanhar essas iniciativas e desenvolver uma política forte para obter rapidamente os benefícios do acesso livre.

Ten years after the Budapest Open Access Initiative, we have examined the current situation of Open Access in France via the two open access (OA) roads: the Green (self-archiving) and the Gold (OA publishing). HAL, a central multidisciplinary French archive launched in 2002, is recognized for its technical quality, but 10 years after its creation it only includes 10 to 15% of the annual French scientific output. This figure is similar to other repositories worldwide for which there is no mandatory policy (no mandate). On the other hand, archives such as that of Liège University which has a mandate, achieved an 80% deposit rate within two years. Other than HAL, a number of institutional archives are being developed in France, with Archimer and OATAO being two successful examples, thanks to dedicated library staff. In order to support the editorial offer in open access the Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) recently launched the Open Edition Freemium. This initiative should favor the development of OA periodicals. However, the study based on the list of qualifying periodicals in Human and Social Sciences, shows that researchers are not encouraged to publish in these periodicals by national assessment bodies; very few French open access periodicals are on the different qualifying lists of the agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES - French research and higher education assessment agency). In addition, a wide disparity can be observed between disciplines. Different examples of strong policies in favor of OA are given: at the university level, as at Liège university, at the level of foundations, as at FRS-FNRS in Belgium, at the level of the Europe or at the legislative level, as attempted in the USA or Brazil or Argentina. In France the two roads are supported by interesting initiatives and these should be accompanied by strong French government policy to enable the benefits of open access to be rapidly reaped. ; Pour faire l'état des lieux du libre accès (LA) en France en 2012, dix ans après la Budapest Open Access Initiative, nous avons examiné les deux voies : la voie verte (l'auto-archivage) et la voie dorée (publications dans les revues en LA). L'archive centrale multidisciplinaire HAL, créée en 2002 pour recevoir les publications scientifiques au niveau national, est reconnue pour sa qualité technique, mais elle ne propose que 10% à 15 % de la production scientifique annuelle française. Ce chiffre est à l'image de ce qu'offrent toutes les autres archives dans le monde où il n'y a pas d'obligation de déposer (pas de mandat). Les archives qui ont un mandat comme celle de l'université de Liège, ont atteint un taux de 80% en deux ans. Quelques archives institutionnelles se sont développées en France parallèlement à HAL, et deux d'entre elles (Archimer and OATAO) ont un bon taux de remplissage, grâce à l'implication d'un personnel dédié. Pour soutenir les offres éditoriales en libre accès le Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) a récemment mis en place OpenEdition Freemium. Cette initiative pourrait favoriser le développement des revues en LA. Cependant, l'étude faite à partir des revues qualifiantes en Sciences Humaines et Sociales montre que les chercheurs sont peu encouragés à publier dans ces revues par les instances d'évaluation : peu de revues en libre accès françaises sont présentes dans les listes des revues qualifiantes de l'agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES). On note aussi une forte disparité entre les disciplines. Différents exemples de politique en faveur du libre accès sont donnés : un politique forte peut être menée par des universités, comme à l'université de Liège, ou par des bailleurs de fonds, comme le FRS-FNRS en Belgique ou par l'Europe. Elle peut être entreprise au niveau législatif comme aux USA, au Brésil ou en Argentine. En France les deux voies du libre accès sont tracées par des initiatives intéressantes. Le gouvernement français devrait accompagner ces initiatives et devrait s'investir dans une politique forte pour recevoir rapidement les bénéfices du libre accès. ; Para verificar como está o Acesso Livre (AL) na França em 2012, dez anos após a Budapest Open Access Initiative, foram examinadas as duas vias: a via verde (auto-arquivamento) e a dourada (publicação em periódicos em AL). O arquivo central multidisciplinar HAL, criado em 2002 para receber publicações científicas em nível nacional, é reconhecido por sua qualidade técnica, mas ele apresenta apenas 10% a 15% da produção científica francesa anual. Este número espelha o que oferecem todos os outros arquivos no mundo em que não há obrigação de depósito (ou seja, não há mandato). Os arquivos com mandato, como o da Universidade de Liège, chegaram a uma taxa de 80% em dois anos. Alguns arquivos institucionais desenvolveram-se paralelamente ao HAL, e dois deles (Archimer et OATAO) mostram um bom índice de preenchimento, graças à dedicação das pessoas envolvidas. Para sustentar a oferta editorial em acesso livre, o Centre pour l'Édition électronique Ouverte (CLEO) implementou recentemente o OpenEdition Freemium. Essa iniciativa poderia favorecer o desenvolvimento dos periódicos em AL. No entanto, o estudo feito com os periódicos qualificados em Ciências Humanas e Sociais mostra que os pesquisadores são pouco estimulados a publicar nauqueles periódicos pelas instâncias avaliadoras: poucos periódicos franceses em acesso livre estão presentes nas listas de periódicos qualificados da agence d'évaluation de la recherche et de l'enseignement supérieur (AERES)[1]. Nota-se também uma grande disparidade entre as disciplinas. São fornecidos diversos exemplos de políticas de certos países em prol do acesso livre: uma política robusta pode ser impolementada pelas universidades, como na Universidade de Liège, pelas agências de fomento, como o FRS-FNRS na Bélgica e os Research Councils na Grã Bretanha, e também pode ser empreendida no nível legislativo, como nos Estados Unidos, no Brasil ou na Argentina. Na França, as duas vias do acesso livre são traçadas por iniciativas interessantes. O governo francês deveria acompanhar essas iniciativas e desenvolver uma política forte para obter rapidamente os benefícios do acesso livre.

International audience ; A (German) lady vanishes: The silent and somewhat restless disappearance of the GDR Police after 1989 Introduction What was at stake in the German process of reforming its socialist police after 1989? Of course, some of the problems of the German transformation are common to other former socialist countries, i.e., the integration of former agents, reform of former organisations and bureaucracies, the formulation and implementation of new legislation, etc. Yet, many factors separate Germany from its eastern neighbours. In terms of constitutional law, the transformation occurred simply with the integration of the administrative regions (known as the " neue Bundesländer " " or NBL) into the constitutional and administrative order of the German Federal Republic (Article 23 of the West German Constitution). There was no constitutional reform, merely a " Unification Treaty " (" Einigunsvertrag ") between the two German states, which was signed in 1990 (Glaeβner and Wallace, 1992, Maier, 1997, and for the full Unification Treaty, see Hancock and Welsh (eds.), 1994, p. 353-63). The method of transformation of the administrative structures that existed in East Germany largely resembled a " flash of lightning ". On the day of unification, 3 October 1990, there became one sole political regime, which was that of Federal Republic of Germany, with sixteen autonomous administrative regions, referred to as the " Länder " (or States), and thus sixteen police forces and two federal-level police forces (one, the " Bundeskriminalamt " or BKA) similar to the FBI, and the other being the border and transport police, i.e. the " Bundesgrenzschutz polizei " (BGS) – (for details on the German police see Busch et al, 1998; and Rupprecht, 1995). Which lessons can this " German approach " provide in terms of transforming law enforcement or policing institutions? In answering this question, one ought to consider whether the uniqueness of the German political transition, based on the integral expansion of state structures from the FRG towards former GDR territories, can impart any lessons in police transformation for other states. Given the normative nature of this book (see the Introduction in Caparini and Marenin, 2003), which attempts to gain a better understanding of what a democratic police force actually is and ought to be, we shall, in particular, endeavour to understand how the authoritarian regime that existed in East Germany could have led to the introduction and success of reforms, or, to put it terms of " transitology " , to the transition and subsequent democratic consolidation of the police (See Stark and Bruszt, 1998 and Dobry (ed.) 2000, and also see Hancock and Welsh (eds.), 1994 and Offe, 1996 on the transition process in Germany). Before being able understand this issue, it is appropriate to include a few words about the GDR police prior to 1989 (for information on the GDR itself, see the Introduction in Fulbrooke, 1995; and for an extensive analysis of the GDR police, see Lindenberger, 1998). The police (" Volkspolizei " , or DVP), which consisted of approximately 120,000 officers, 1 was one of the pillars of national defence and was placed under the authority of the Secretary-General of the Communist Party. The DVP, which was organised on a military basis, found itself having to submit to oversight bodies and those conducting political investigations, most notably to the " Staatssichereit " or " Stasi " (information on the Stasi is provided in Fulbrooke, 1995). The Stasi, or " political police " viewed the DVP " Volkspolizei " , or regular police, as being poorly equipped, especially for dealing with criminal matters. The Vokspolizei were primarily responsible for public security and surveillance of local social activities. We will turn first to examine the " absorption " process, and then address the effects of this very particular feature on the transformation and democratisation of the police. The process of absorption (1989-90) 1 This number is as high as that of the French national police at present, for a population that is about 3.5 times smaller. 2 The FRG Police: The only possible standard for police forces From a constitutional and political point of view, and in particular after the legislative elections of 18 February 1990 in the GDR, which saw the victory of Chancellor Kohl " s party, the West German Government sought unification between the two States to be achieved as quickly as possible, which avoided any institutional changes in West Germany (Glaeβner, 1994; and Maier, 1997). Whether the matter is considered from a monetary or administrative point of view, the only acceptable standards had to be those of the FRG, which were simply exported. The transformation was to be based on the " transplant " method. The most crucial feature of the transformation was that of the West German constitutional procedure known as " administrative mutual assistance " (" Amshilfe "), in which one Lander lends its help to another Lander; thus each state in West Germay had to provide assistance and share its experience with another state in the Eastern part (Bavaria and Bade-Wurttemburg towards Saxony, Northern Westphalia towards Brandenburg, Schleswig-Holstein towards Mecklenburg, etc.). Standards and values of the FRG police In West Germany, the responsibility for policing lies with each state. Hence, one finds as many police forces as states, as well as the two federal forces, i.e., the BKA and BGS. These police forces, which are placed under the increasingly lenient control of the paired state authorities, are subject to the same rules on penal procedures, but have their own capacities in terms of police administration and public security (" Polizeirecht "). The increasing centralisation of the FRG (German Federal Republic) since the time of Chancelor Willy Brandt (1969-74), the fight against internal terrorism (since 1972), and the increased professionalisation of police forces, encouraged a growing alignment of practices and structures from the 1970s. This was particularly encouraged through the device of the " Conferences of the Interior Ministers of the Lands (IMK) " , held under the authority of the Federal Minister, which brought about de facto a form of growing centralisation of the West German police forces, a process which continues even today. Moreover, since the early 1990s, these police forces have been involved in programmes promoting community policing and creating urban partnerships with municipal and local associations (Aden, 2002).

International audience ; A (German) lady vanishes: The silent and somewhat restless disappearance of the GDR Police after 1989 Introduction What was at stake in the German process of reforming its socialist police after 1989? Of course, some of the problems of the German transformation are common to other former socialist countries, i.e., the integration of former agents, reform of former organisations and bureaucracies, the formulation and implementation of new legislation, etc. Yet, many factors separate Germany from its eastern neighbours. In terms of constitutional law, the transformation occurred simply with the integration of the administrative regions (known as the " neue Bundesländer " " or NBL) into the constitutional and administrative order of the German Federal Republic (Article 23 of the West German Constitution). There was no constitutional reform, merely a " Unification Treaty " (" Einigunsvertrag ") between the two German states, which was signed in 1990 (Glaeβner and Wallace, 1992, Maier, 1997, and for the full Unification Treaty, see Hancock and Welsh (eds.), 1994, p. 353-63). The method of transformation of the administrative structures that existed in East Germany largely resembled a " flash of lightning ". On the day of unification, 3 October 1990, there became one sole political regime, which was that of Federal Republic of Germany, with sixteen autonomous administrative regions, referred to as the " Länder " (or States), and thus sixteen police forces and two federal-level police forces (one, the " Bundeskriminalamt " or BKA) similar to the FBI, and the other being the border and transport police, i.e. the " Bundesgrenzschutz polizei " (BGS) – (for details on the German police see Busch et al, 1998; and Rupprecht, 1995). Which lessons can this " German approach " provide in terms of transforming law enforcement or policing institutions? In answering this question, one ought to consider whether the uniqueness of the German political transition, based on the integral expansion of state structures from the FRG towards former GDR territories, can impart any lessons in police transformation for other states. Given the normative nature of this book (see the Introduction in Caparini and Marenin, 2003), which attempts to gain a better understanding of what a democratic police force actually is and ought to be, we shall, in particular, endeavour to understand how the authoritarian regime that existed in East Germany could have led to the introduction and success of reforms, or, to put it terms of " transitology " , to the transition and subsequent democratic consolidation of the police (See Stark and Bruszt, 1998 and Dobry (ed.) 2000, and also see Hancock and Welsh (eds.), 1994 and Offe, 1996 on the transition process in Germany). Before being able understand this issue, it is appropriate to include a few words about the GDR police prior to 1989 (for information on the GDR itself, see the Introduction in Fulbrooke, 1995; and for an extensive analysis of the GDR police, see Lindenberger, 1998). The police (" Volkspolizei " , or DVP), which consisted of approximately 120,000 officers, 1 was one of the pillars of national defence and was placed under the authority of the Secretary-General of the Communist Party. The DVP, which was organised on a military basis, found itself having to submit to oversight bodies and those conducting political investigations, most notably to the " Staatssichereit " or " Stasi " (information on the Stasi is provided in Fulbrooke, 1995). The Stasi, or " political police " viewed the DVP " Volkspolizei " , or regular police, as being poorly equipped, especially for dealing with criminal matters. The Vokspolizei were primarily responsible for public security and surveillance of local social activities. We will turn first to examine the " absorption " process, and then address the effects of this very particular feature on the transformation and democratisation of the police. The process of absorption (1989-90) 1 This number is as high as that of the French national police at present, for a population that is about 3.5 times smaller. 2 The FRG Police: The only possible standard for police forces From a constitutional and political point of view, and in particular after the legislative elections of 18 February 1990 in the GDR, which saw the victory of Chancellor Kohl " s party, the West German Government sought unification between the two States to be achieved as quickly as possible, which avoided any institutional changes in West Germany (Glaeβner, 1994; and Maier, 1997). Whether the matter is considered from a monetary or administrative point of view, the only acceptable standards had to be those of the FRG, which were simply exported. The transformation was to be based on the " transplant " method. The most crucial feature of the transformation was that of the West German constitutional procedure known as " administrative mutual assistance " (" Amshilfe "), in which one Lander lends its help to another Lander; thus each state in West Germay had to provide assistance and share its experience with another state in the Eastern part (Bavaria and Bade-Wurttemburg towards Saxony, Northern Westphalia towards Brandenburg, Schleswig-Holstein towards Mecklenburg, etc.). Standards and values of the FRG police In West Germany, the responsibility for policing lies with each state. Hence, one finds as many police forces as states, as well as the two federal forces, i.e., the BKA and BGS. These police forces, which are placed under the increasingly lenient control of the paired state authorities, are subject to the same rules on penal procedures, but have their own capacities in terms of police administration and public security (" Polizeirecht "). The increasing centralisation of the FRG (German Federal Republic) since the time of Chancelor Willy Brandt (1969-74), the fight against internal terrorism (since 1972), and the increased professionalisation of police forces, encouraged a growing alignment of practices and structures from the 1970s. This was particularly encouraged through the device of the " Conferences of the Interior Ministers of the Lands (IMK) " , held under the authority of the Federal Minister, which brought about de facto a form of growing centralisation of the West German police forces, a process which continues even today. Moreover, since the early 1990s, these police forces have been involved in programmes promoting community policing and creating urban partnerships with municipal and local associations (Aden, 2002).

The territory of the country measures 25,713 km2. In the north it borders Serbia and Kosovo, in the west Albania, in the south Greece and in the east Bulgaria. It is situated between 40o 51' and 42o 22' north latitude and 20o 27' and 23o 05' east longitude. The population that permanently resides in this territory, according to the last census is 2,022,547 inhabitants from diverse ethnic groups. The Macedonian population prevails with approximately 64% of the total number, but multi-ethnicity represents a solid basis for a rich ethnographic capacity which is included in the tourism offer of the Republic of Macedonia (Marinoski, 2008a). The city population is 59.78% of the total population. The economy experienced a radical change in its conditions. The most significant structural change in the economic system was the transition from socialist self-governing to capitalism, which led to a change of ownership from social to private and a clear determining of the title of ownership. Economic processes emphasised privatisation as the basis of the transition process. Unfortunately, the transition was implemented in a way that many companies and economic systems from the real sector were made bankrupt and liquidated and the overall economic conditions instead of being promoted, demonstrated a remarkable reduction in their development. The downturn of the economy meant that tourism development could not be supported. The decline of the population's standard of living affected the mobility of domestic tourists and the decline of the domestic tourism market. Furthermore, it is a fact that these processes of liquidation contributed in the Republic of Macedonia to the increase in unemployment. A large number of employees in the industry lost their jobs so they were forced to be engaged in other activities. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is an important indicator of the economy of the Republic of Macedonia. According to data of the State Statistical Office derived from the annual accounts from business entities and other sources, the gross domestic product in 2014 amounted to 525,620 million denars or 9,727 million US $ while compared to 2013 it increased by 4.7%. The real growth rate of GDP, compared to 2013 was 3.5%. The final expenditure in 2014, compared to 2013, increased by 1.9% and in the structure of GDP it accounted for 86.8%. The share of exports of goods and services in GDP in 2014 was 47.8% (State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, n.d.a). Tourism resources of a natural and cultural character are abundant in the region. The natural values have basic, complex and complementary features. Mountains represent exceptionally significant tourist potential. The hilly to mountainous area accounts for 92.2% of the country's surface area. The average height of the country is 1,404 m above sea level. The country is mountainous with the highest peak measuring 2,764 m. There are 34 mountains on which there are 6 major winter sports centres. Equally attractive are the 14 larger gorges and canyons. As well as inactive volcanic landscapes there is one active solfatara. The climate is generally continental, whereas in the mountains it is a mountain climate and towards the open space of the Aegean and Adriatic Seas the climate is Mediterranean. The Republic of Macedonia is landlocked, but there are tectonic, glacial and artificial lakes. The river network consists of three major river basins whereas thermo-mineral springs represent the basis for locating 8 spa centres. There are plant species that are characteristic for the Mediterranean and the Euro-Siberian regions. Forest areas and forest land form a total of 1,288,915 hectares, or 50% of the country's complete territory. The most significant protected areas are the 3 national parks. The wildlife which forms the base for hunting activities is represented by mammals (mammalia) and birds (aves). There are a total of 47 registered hunting associations, which have their own hunting areas. Nine major fishing centres are located by the rivers as well as on the shores of tectonic and artificial lakes (Zikov & Vasil, 1997). Cultural tourism resources are represented by a rare abundance of archaeological sites that date back to the Palaeolithic, Neolithic, Eneolithic, Bronze and Iron Ages, as well as to the period of ancient Roman culture, to the early Christian period and to the Middle Ages. Churches and monasteries are a real treasure and an important destination for visitors. They date back to the IX and XIX centuries. Mosques date back to the XIV and XIX centuries. Secular architecture is represented by the built fortified cities, towers, bridges, bazaars, inns, baths and palaces, cultural monuments in the form of urban architecture and distinguished urban settlements and individual houses, monuments and memorials – landmarks from recent history, museums and cultural centres, theatres, universities and major libraries, cultural or sports halls and archives. Ethnographic values and traditions include architecture, traditional economic activities, crafts, food, folkloric clothing as well as folk songs and dances. The most important events are the cultural, entertainment, sports, economic and scientific events. The political structure of the Republic of Macedonia has undergone significant changes. The country went through different political systems. After the Second World War, it was a part of the Yugoslavian federation, so the policies were mainly made at the central level whereby the republics aligned their decisions to the federation and suggested their own individual policies to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and to the bodies of the federation. The political system was characterised by statist and socialist characteristics although the beginnings of the self-governing system were introduced in 1953. Significant changes occurred in 1974 when the self-governing system adopted a greater decentralisation and increase of the individual powers of the republics. During this period the Republic of Macedonia gained more autonomy. There was an improved decentralisation of power towards the local level so that the municipalities also became a significant political structure within the country. Starting from 1980, the Republic of Macedonia entered a transition period which resulted from the breakup of Yugoslavia. It was the only Yugoslavian republic that peacefully gained its independence. Since 1991, the country has been an internationally recognised state and a member of the United Nations (UN). In 2001, a military conflict occurred that was relatively quickly resolved by the signing of the Ohrid agreement. This agreement, among other solutions, allowed minority communities to participate according to the representation of the overall population in the state administration. The administrative-territorial structure of the state underwent significant changes which were in line with the autonomy and transition of the self-governing system towards the capitalist system. The separation of the legislature from the executive and the judicial authority was guaranteed by the constitution. The single party system transformed into a multi-party system and the rule of law was established. State governing was a parliamentary democracy. The highest legislative authority was the Parliament in which representatives were elected by parliamentary elections. It elects the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The President of the country is elected by direct elections, leads foreign policy and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Ministries, besides participating in the decision-making of the government through its ministers, also have regional and local departments in major community centres through which operationally they implement state policies. The local departments for self-government in the country have an important place in the economic and social development of the country. They decide on the local infrastructure and its improvement as well as on the adoption of spatial and urban solutions that are of great importance for the development of tourism. The bodies of local self-government are managed by the mayor who is elected through local elections. The mayor presents his plans and their implementation to the Council which adopts these documents. The council members are also elected through local elections. In a political sense the local departments for self-government are autonomous in their decision-making. At state level, they are organised into the Association of Local Government Units – ZELS, which plays a significant role in inter-municipal cooperation as well as presenting to state institutions when they have common interests. At regional level, regions exist in which all municipalities are grouped. They are managed by Centres whose executives are elected by representatives of the units for local self-governance. They also enable the balanced economic development of the Republic of Macedonia and they do not have executive authority. In a political sense, numerous changes have taken place in the Republic of Macedonia. The country went from a socialist to a capitalist system, public ownership changed into private ownership, and the federal structure transformed into a unitary state. The country also had many turbulent periods of gaining independence and military conflict in order to establish a multi-party system and a general policy towards Euro-Atlantic integration processes. The legislature is separated from the executive and judicial autonomy. Representatives are elected through parliamentary elections as members of the Council which is appointed by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. The President is also elected through presidential elections. Regions are established as functional territorial administrative units. The decentralisation processes in an administrative sense, are realised by the Mayor and the Council for local governance who are also elected through local elections.

As much as COVID-19 is a health and economic crisis, at its core, it is also a governance crisis.

NDI President Derek Mitchell and new Director of Democratic Governance Kristen Sample delve into ways governments and the international community have risen (or not) to meet the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Derek Mitchell: As we all continue to shelter in place and respond to the colossal health and economic crisis that is COVID-19, we must not forget that at its core, pandemics are as much a result of governance failure as any failure of healthcare or health system.
Since working to support democratic processes, institutions and governance around the world is what NDI does for a living, we thought it useful to delve into the role governance has played in the COVID-19 pandemic with NDI's experience in more than 50 countries around the world serving as a guide. Welcome to DemWorks. My name is Derek Mitchell, president of the National Democratic Institute.
To discuss all this with me in this podcast, I'm joined by NDI's new director of democratic governance, Kristen Sample.
Kristen Sample: Thank you so much Derek.
DM: Kristen just joined us on March 1. She brings more than 20 years of democratic governance experience with her to NBI having advised and evaluated programs at UN Women, UN Democracy Fund, the Open Society Foundation, Global Partners, Governance and International IDEA. Kristen is an expert on countering corruption, legislative strengthening in the nexus of gender and politics and she has led projects focused on the impact of democratic reform on economic development and citizen security. At a moment when the global crisis in governance is at the center of international conversation, at least before the pandemic push pause, we are thrilled to have Kristen aboard to look at that issue with fresh creativity here at NBI. So welcome Kristen to your very first DemWorks podcast.
KS: I'm really pleased to have the opportunity to speak with you today on such important issues.
DM: So we'll speak about the crisis of governance but also the pandemic factor as well. But I do want to start with this global governance crisis that has sort of preceded this. This is a broader overhang. We've seen all over the world popular demonstrations over the past year and more and everywhere from Moscow to Managua, to Hong Kong, to Khartoum, to Algeria, to Istanbul, to Paris. You can go on and on. And what it represents is a frustration with the quality of governance. Democracy somehow is not delivering for people. And I want to hear your thoughts on that. It's a moment of turmoil certainly. People will look at this and say, "Well, democracy is failing," but it's more than democracy that this is happening. It's a general quality of governance question that I think actually provides an opportunity. So let me just ask your thoughts on that first off, Kristen.
KS: Yeah. Thanks so much for that question, Derek. I think that NDI, since we have officers or programs spanning every region of the world basically in more than 50 countries, we're in a very good position to be able to take the pulse of what's happening in the different countries. In fact, we have been conducting surveys every two weeks of our country programs to get a sense of what's happening on the ground and we've received some very interesting signals that I'm really happy to be able to share with you today.
On the one side, we are saying that in many countries governments are responding very seriously, in very concerted ways to the health crisis. I mean in more than two thirds of the countries. The governments in the countries where we work are closing nonessential businesses in over 60%, they are communicating in ways, having very intensive communication campaigns that really are reaching all citizens. But when it comes to the democracy side, when it comes to implementing that response and pursuing a response that's consistent with democratic principles and norms and values and institutions, we are seeing some troubling developments at the same time.
For instance, the number of governments by our account, over 40% of the governments in the countries where we work are declaring emergency powers and it's clear that this is an extraordinary situation that requires extraordinary measures, but in many cases these emergency powers are inconsistent with democratic principles. They are not linked to the crisis. There is no provision for legislative oversight or in many cases, these have no sunset class, so there's no time limit and these are simply open-ended.
And link to that and linked in many cases to these emergency powers, emergency decrees, we're seeing an uptick also in threats to fundamental freedoms. For instance, nearly half of our countries are reporting that there are measures in place where governments are repressing non-state media who are critical of the government's response to the pandemic and that in some cases, again, almost 50% of our countries, there are measures in place where governments are limiting space for civil society to engage in political actions.
Another factor that I'd like to highlight too is while we're all distracted by the pandemic and while people are at home and perhaps with less access to information and less direct contact with government, there are also signals that many governments are using this as an opportunity to diminish anti-corruption controls. So that means that in some cases economic response packages or healthcare delivery is taking place with less transparency and less openness, which as you can imagine is a risk in terms of making sure that those resources are actually getting where they need to be.
And all of this, all of the stresses, the frustration and these concerns of course also have impacts when it comes to citizen trust, interpersonal trust citizen trust of the government and also we're seeing greater potential for civic unrest and a deteriorating security environment.
So all together, I hate to start with such a pessimistic view, but I think it is important again, through the networks that we have, the relationships that we have with political and civic actors on the ground, to convey the seriousness of the situation and to make sure that we're always communicating that well, this response requires really drastic measures. These measures need to be consonant of course, with the principles of democratic governance.
DM: Right. It fits into this broader competition of narratives that occurred even before the pandemic began, where China or Russia saying, "Look, authoritarian governments are more efficient in providing services. We do this stuff better. Democracy is messy." And they're able, as you say, to take advantage of this moment when people are looking for strong central control to make that case and to both do that rhetorically but also through provision of services.
And then it's not just those major countries. You'll have folks whether it's Hungary or Poland or you just go around the world, they're postponing elections. They are shutting down civil society, they're settling scores with adversaries. They're constraining public debate, saying that those things are luxuries during a time of crisis and that gives them an opportunity then as you said, for not just power grabs, but resource grabs and money grabs and they say, "Look, these are extraordinary times. They require extraordinary measures." And the concern is that these extraordinary measures will be permanent, that they'll say you need us to be surveilling people.
So this is a challenge for certainly those who do democracy work and for folks inside these countries. But I think the broader question of security, we'll talk about that maybe a little bit later, but it's interesting what we're seeing on the ground as you say.
You do a lot of work in the legislative sphere, you have a lot of background on that. How legislatures are particularly important. Civil society is too, but just focusing on legislature's role as a check and balance against executive overreach, can you talk about from the NDI experience or your other observation, how legislatures are being challenged, how they're dealing with this moment, how they're adapting to deal with the COVID-19 moment.
KS: Yeah, absolutely. So I'm so glad you brought this point up. The first challenge that I'd highlight is this risk that the legislative branch is getting sidelined. In a crisis like this, the executive branch is generally front and center. Their role is clearly understood by citizens. Head of state might be the one out there doing daily press briefings or a health minister communicating medical reports. And there's this sense of emergency that as I sort of alluding to before, it seems to empower the executive branch. And unfortunately that seems to be, in many cases, at the expense of the legislative power.
And additionally, another challenge and another reason that legislatures are perhaps getting crowded out or sidelined is simply that, the coronavirus, by it's dynamic, it's not socially compatible. And since parliaments are these multi-member bodies that have more diffuse operations, more diffuse leadership and that involve hundreds of different people, it's simply just a challenge to assemble a large group of people together, bring them together and keep them front and center in this crisis.
So if that first challenge is making sure that people just keep in mind that legislatures matter and the legislatures are able to exert their rights and their authority, I'd say that the second challenge of course is just how do parliaments, legislatures operate in a virtual world. Politicians are by nature, they like to shake hands, they like to get out on the street, they need to be in touch with their constituents. And there are so many challenge involved in this current world that we have where we should all be social distancing.
So looking across the world where we work, their parliaments are adopting different measures. Some of them are using social distancing restrictions like reducing the number of MPs in sessions. Others are moving to remote voting, remote deliberations. And then others are not meeting at all, which of course is quite terrible. And in those cases where legislatures have been dissolved or have been suspended for long periods of time.
We are working too, as you were saying, as NDI closely with parliaments in a number of countries to try to do those adaptations to the rules of procedures so that they're able to continue meeting in session and continue deliberating and continuing exercising oversight. For instance, we have connected parliamentarians in Colombia with parliamentarians in Ecuador. We have virtual sessions to learn from Ecuador's experience in adopting a regulation for the implementation of virtual session and teleworking.
So we are trying to connect parliamentarians across countries to understand how some parliaments have been moving forward in terms of remote procedures and how that's going for them. And two more challenges. One I'd highlight is that oversight role that we've been talking about. And from the same survey that we conducted with our country programs, we found that in 59% of the countries, checks and balances have been weakened, have deteriorated under the pandemic.
And this is happening at such an unfortunate time when there's so many policy measures that need to be approved and put in place. If we just take the issue of debt policy for instance, I saw a statistic from the Westminster Foundation that more than 80 countries have already requested emergency aid from the IMF. I mean these countries are struggling of course to meet different types of fiscal obligations and they are desperate for cash in order to ramp up health services and put in place economic measures.
And so these governments are taking on debt obligations, debt burns that are going to have far reaching impacts and long lasting impacts that should really be approved by the legislative branch and include monitoring and reporting. And that's not always the case in most of these instances.
DM: So you just say it's a very dangerous time and folks are adapting procedurally, but there are really implications to this longterm, including for security. And I think we'll get to that after the break.
For more than 35 years, NDI has been honored to work with courageous and committed pro-democracy activists and leaders around the world to help countries develop the institutions, practices and skills necessary for democracy's success.
KS: Welcome back. Derek, I've heard you speak to the issue of authoritarian systems and how they're operating in this crisis and that the authoritarian nature in itself makes health crises more likely. And you've also said in some of your speeches and some of the conversations we've had that it's not a coincidence that the pandemic started in China and I'd really like to hear from your expertise, your deep background on China specifically. Can you explain to listeners why that is? Why there is that connection?
DM: Well, as I said at the top, this is not just a health crisis, it's a governance crisis. It's a factor of governance both in the prevention of the pandemic and the response to it. We talked so far mostly about the response, how we're responding to the pandemic, but the core of the pandemic is a failure of governance. The difference between a local health crisis that is contained and a pandemic lies in the ability of a political system to respond to that early challenge quickly and effectively. And that requires both government and civic action. And if you're going to deal with this crisis early, it requires both. To do that, you have to act swiftly. You have to have widespread testing and contact tracing. You need critical support from citizens. In order to do all that and to ensure that that happens, you have to have basic civic trust.
Closed societies routinely fail that test of having that civic trust and that rapid action for some very practical reasons. When a government suppresses a free flow of information, when it fails to empower independent civic institutions, when it's too insecure to convey bad news candidly, doesn't feel that it has a political legitimacy, therefore, it's insecure to convey bad news. When its data can't be trusted because it's opaque, when its officials are afraid to speak truth to power or communicate inconvenient truths to their superiors or act decisively, absent waiting for some strict orders from the very center and they can't move quickly, the result can be deadly.
It turns what is a local health issue into a pandemic so it crosses borders. It becomes not just a problem for one country but for all others. So democratic governance is very, very practical and once again in this regard, transparent, accountable, inclusive, responsive, open governments is essential to crisis response but it's also essential to prevent the crisis from emerging to begin with.
And it is a matter of national security. This highlights frankly what many of us have known all along, that this is not just nice but has very practical national security effects. And as we just talked earlier, the irony is that just as the world needs more open democratic societies to prevent future crises and deal with the current one, there are opportunistic politicians who are closing political and civic space. That I think is a very practical reason why that closed societies cause these pandemics.
KS: I think that all of those points that you've been raising in terms of the threats and the vulnerabilities are so important for us to keep front and center. At the same time, here in NDI, as you know, is we're very keen to make sure that there are also opportunities to elevate the many examples around the world where governments are acting democratically and effectively in response to the crisis and they're framing and working with citizens in ways that are absolutely consistent with democratic values and principles. And so I do want to showcase some of those.
I think it's received a lot of press around the world how New Zealand, for instance has reacted, and I read this week that New Zealand is perhaps one of the very first countries to have been able to successfully eliminate COVID. They have no new COVID cases. And it's a case that really stands out for the way that the prime minister has been able to deliver information in a very clear, compassionate, inclusive way, a way that's very grounded in science of course, and transparent.
And at the same time where the legislature has had an important role developing a parliamentary select committee that's providing scrutiny of the government's response. The government has also been very affirmative there I think, in terms of issues of freedom of information and media freedom and has said that they would not slow down, for instance, their commitment to responding to requests for information during the crisis. So there's certainly the case of New Zealand, which is so interesting and it's shown such early success, but there are other places around the world too where specific measures taken by the government I think have been so positive and far reaching.
Uruguay comes to mind for instance. We see so many cases where authoritarian leaders are using this crisis to be able to settle scores as you were saying, or to act in a very partisan fashion. But in Uruguay, the president convened all of the former presidential candidates to give a joint press conference to send a powerful message of unity and to show that across the party divide, they were working together to develop responses.
Taiwan also really stands out for its cross party coordination, the transparent communications they've had, the very creative efforts that the government has put in place there, I think they've called it humor, not rumor. A campaign to share facts in real time to counter disinformation, to manage fear. So there aren't many cases out there as I was saying, of governments that are responding effectively and in ways that are building that citizen trust that you were mentioning.
DM: Yes. And then a further one, another democracy that's a leading democracy, probably the first out of the gate is South Korea. They did exactly what was necessary. People are looking at that example, a democratic example. They didn't sacrifice rights at all. They obviously had very strong controls at times of the society, but it took very swift action. They did widespread testing, contact tracing and they worked with civil society and is shown over and over that civil society is probably one of the most important factors. It's not simply a government driven thing that makes a response success. Civil society serves as a very efficient force multiplier for government. We saw that in Katrina, hurricane Katrina. We see it's proved over and over that it really is effective in getting the word out and messaging.
Ensuring is like in Taiwan through their civic tech community, they're sort of hackers. They're young citizens, who themselves in a voluntary fashion, formed a community. They were viewed as allies and partners not alienated from the government. And that partnership has been a success in Taiwan, has been a success in South Korea and is essential for a success. And that means that governments need to be open, need to be transparent, they need to see society as partners. So this is absolutely critical.
KS: Yeah. And I just want to add on the South Korea example. I'm so glad you brought that up because South Korea held elections during the pandemic on April 15, they had national assembly lessons and they were actually able to organize those elections in a way that was seen as very transparent, that was very consistent with electoral integrity and they had higher levels of turnout than in previous elections, which is pretty amazing. And there's so many countries around the world that are facing elections in 2020. I think the way that South Korea was able to do it with a very intensive communication campaign as you were speaking again to their transparency of communication, they had expanded early voting measures in place. They had home voting, they had very comprehensive safeguards for people to be able to vote in person. So even organizing an election in a time that seems so difficult and so challenging, I think that as you were saying, democracies like South Korea are showing that there is a way forward.
DM: Right. And I think we can learn some lessons from that as well. There are groups, including NDI has been at the center of this, of putting together documents that say here are the election integrity guidelines for this moment, that democracy should not be sacrificed at the alter of crisis response, that elections need to move forward if they can be done in the right way and if they need to be postponed, it's postponed within a certain timeframe and only during a period of high crisis. So there are principles here where democracy can continue to move forward. It makes the society stronger, it builds that civic trust that's important for crisis response. But we need to... You can walk and chew gum at the same time at this moment. So I'm glad we were able to talk about some of these democratic examples.
KS: Absolutely. And I will be right back after this quick message.
You can hear more from other democracy heroes by listening to our DemWorks podcast available on iTunes and SoundCloud.
DM: Welcome back with Kristen Sample. Of course you're new to NDI, but you know NDI very well and it's a fundamental principle everywhere that nations will only succeed when societies are fully inclusive, where they don't leave anybody behind. They enable all to contribute equally. That means women, that means young people, that means traditionally marginalized groups, LGBT communities, et cetera. It's just plain logic that if you leave anybody behind, that you're not going to get the most out of your citizen when you're going to hold your country back, and yet we are witnessing negative impacts toward these populations during this COVID-19 moment. Kristen, can you speak to this, explain what's going on here and why it matters?
KS: Sure, absolutely. I mean obviously this crisis isn't occurring in a vacuum. It's occurring in a context where across the world, across all countries, there are already this array of existing intersecting inequalities where some people were coming into this crisis already in a disadvantaged place. And then the pandemic itself has differentiated impacts that affect women and other marginalized groups disproportionately. I'll just give a few examples.
I mean lockdown for women who are living in relationships of power imbalance and of abuse perhaps, lockdown for them means locked in, with an abusive partner. And for instance our survey of country offices that I was referring to previously, in 66% of our countries, there seems to be an increase in sexual and gender based violence since the pandemic. In 15% of those countries, it's a significant increase. Of course these women might be locked in in vulnerable situations and then at the same time have less access to government resources, government support. So that's one example.
Others, people with disabilities for instance, who have always struggled to access health services, transportation in an equitable fashion, you can imagine that that lack of access and the differentiated impact of the pandemic on them is life threatening in some cases.
There are digital divide concerns, people in rural areas or women, other marginalized groups who may have less access to information, to resources. There are real concerns also and cases around the world where this pandemic is being exploited by anti migrant hate groups for instance, who try to link movement and migration to the origin of the virus. Or in some cases, for instance in Africa and some of the countries where we work, media outlets are perpetuating stereotypes against people with albinism for instance, and placing the blame for the virus on them.
So there are so many challenges around making sure that people have access to resources, people are safe and that we are able to convey and support a message of social cohesion and solidarity instead of the divisions that we're seeing pop up around the world. I think that in our case, for instance in Indiana, what we're trying to do is reinforce the need for inclusive decision-making, making sure for instance, that women are involved in decision making and other marginalized groups are involved in decision making and representation and in these deliberation bodies, making sure that the policymaking is taking into account these vulnerabilities and these different differentiated needs. And also the government messaging is inclusive, getting to everybody and it's supporting the social cohesion messaging and solidarity messages.
DM: And again, this is critical for the crisis response, pandemic response. I mean COVID-19 doesn't discriminate. Whoever has it, whoever is vulnerable or subject will get it and it will spread to the society writ large. So if you're not inclusive, if you're excluding folks, if politicians then see that there is an opportunity here as some politicians will to divide and conquer, to play on fear. Or spoilers from the outside may see that there are opportunities if they're divided societies, to create tensions that then require or enable them to negotiate the deal that you want to make or promote corruption within the society.
There are all kinds of ways this makes societies less stable, less secure, and affects the development and certainly the response to crises. So this is not just a nice thing, it's not just a human rights thing. This is fundamentally important to national security, international security and to everything that we're seeking to achieve through democracy.
KS: Absolutely. And I think along the things I'd really like to hear from you too, Derek, in terms of how you see along the lines of this being an international crisis that includes the whole world, that joins us all although we are in very different places. How you see role NDI's role in supporting that cross border cooperation and solidarity and having the international community come together?
DM: Given that authoritarians are claiming their model is unique for this moment, we have to be out there making our case. But in terms of our specific adaptations that we are doing, we are working in places like Ethiopia to ensure that the public opinion surveys are necessary invents of their postponed elections or continue forward, but can be done virtually. That we can adapt legislative rules of procedure in places that need it to allow for remote voting and continue the legislative process to ensure that election integrity is maintained.
As I mentioned earlier, there are certain principles and established accepted international principles for when and how to postpone elections, how to hold them during moments of crisis. And we put together crisis response kits that can be used. It's called the practical toolkit for politicians during a pandemic that can help political parties figure out how to do crisis management or help the government put together crisis communication.
So a lot of things that can be done internally and done across different countries that ensure the solidarity is still there, the momentum for democracy is still there. The expectation that democratic norms are sustained in this moment so that the headlines are not simply roll back authoritarian opportunism, that massive surveillance, all the things that people may succumb to because of fear during crisis, that there is an alternative voice and it says it doesn't have to be like that. Or if it does have to be like that now, it doesn't have to continue to be like that indefinitely and that there are some standards by which these things are being imposed.
So that international norm setting at this moment, it's probably more important than ever to do and we are trying to do at national level. We're trying to do it across different countries to ensure that there is not a vacuum to which the authoritarian voice moves and has free open season for its own values. It goes across, I think, a lot of different countries. And Kristen, I'd be interested in your thoughts from your perspective of governance, how that's working.
KS: I think that there's a real role for the international community to play. And I wanted to highlight that too in what you're saying because these challenges are so vast that clearly we have to work together on people to people exchanges and supporting lesson sharing. And so I do think that there's an absolute role for the international community playing in terms of getting out the messages of that democracy is not a luxury, it's not something that could be put into a coma or put on hold while we're all sheltering, that it's something that has to be reaffirmed on a daily basis.
And so I do think that countries also have to, in addition to standing firm, standing on their own ground on democratic principles, they also have to be willing to promote and expand those democratic principles across borders, especially to counter those liberal influences that you were referring to earlier, that in some cases are, really transmitted and increased through disinformation campaigns or phony PR campaigns that need to be called out of course by all actors.
DM: Thanks again, Kristen for joining me in conversation about how democracies can best meet the challenges of COVID and how NDI with its global partners are meeting the moment.
KS: Thank you, Derek.
DM: I'd also like to say thank you to our listeners. To learn more about NDI or to listen to other DemWorks podcasts, please visit our website at www.ndi.org. Thanks very much.


World map of Coronavirus (Covid-19)



19. Governance is Key During COVID-19? (w/ Kristen Sample) Posted 6 days ago

Democracy (General), COVID-19 Podcast NDI Listen democracy

Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report examines the institutional set-up for and use of regulatory policy instruments in Kenya. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania). The report is based on a review of public documents prepared by the government, donors, and the private sector, and on a limited number of interviews with key institutions and individuals.

In August 2023, the U.S. State Department published an integrated strategy for Ukraine. This highly structured, systematic document defines the key goals and objectives of the U.S. government and its diplomats. Apart from objectives aimed at securing Ukraine's victory in the war, the document summarizes the goals and requirements that have been in place for different Ukrainian administrations for a decade. These goals include fighting corruption, deoligarchization, continuing with judicial reforms, the introduction of corporate governance, and so on. The overarching question lingering behind the document's cited goals is why, despite Ukraine's considerable efforts, achieving these goals has remained elusive.The State of the ReformsIn 2024 Ukraine will mark the ten-year anniversary of the launch of its most ambitious anti-corruption reform program. On October 14, 2014, legislation was passed to start the process of establishing various anti-corruption agencies, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAPC), and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP). Later, the High Anti-Corruption Court was added. Further reforms included new methods to promote transparency in the selection of judges, prosecutorial reforms, reform of the police service on a new footing, and reform of the public electronic procurement system, ProZorro.At first glance, it might seem that Ukraine decided to become a champion in the fight against corruption, but despite the large number of criminal cases brought against officials for alleged corruption, no top officials or oligarchs have received real sentences. At the same time, Ukraine's huge anti-corruption efforts have moved the country's ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index only a trifle, from 144th in 2013 to 122nd in 2021. In addition, the anti-corruption bodies are viewed with a high degree of distrust by Ukrainians. In a survey conducted in July and August 2021 by the Razumkov Center, an independent pollster, distrust was expressed by 69–70 percent of respondents.The Economy Is AffectedSuch desultory results are not limited to the fight against corruption. A significant achievement of Ukraine was the Association Agreement with the EU. The agreement was intended to stimulate economic growth and bring Ukrainian standards in line with European ones. In 2021, Ukrainian authorities reported that the agreement was 60 percent implemented. More precisely, this meant that necessary changes in line with the agreement had been adopted at the legislative level. At the same time, Ukraine was ranked 127th on the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index, which considers such measures as the rule of law, governmental integrity, judicial integrity, the tax burden, business freedom, and property rights. That appears to be a dubious achievement with such a significant percentage of the Association Agreement having been implemented. Every year, Ukraine prepares numerous presentations about progress on reforms, intended to attract investment. However, none of this reform talk ever results in real change. So let's call a spade a spade: Ukraine is a paper Leviathan, a country where there is a gap between the adoption of laws and their implementation. This stark fact means that the focus of Ukraine's reform strategy should shift from passing laws to building the capacity to implement the necessary changes.A Different StrategyWe propose a new strategy of "integration before membership." Essentially, this means Ukraine should start integrating with the West on a practical level today. It is not a novel strategy; this is exactly what happened with the integration of the post-Soviet countries into the EU and NATO. Before becoming part of the West, a country must understand what the West is. In addition to the requirement to adopt the relevant standards and amendments to legislation, most future EU members were given the opportunity to integrate into the EU in a practical way. Their citizens could travel, study, and trade with European countries without hindrance. The authorities of the future members received tremendous intellectual support in reforms, and their officials were trained by and constantly interacted with partners. The EU Structural Funds helped to transform future member countries by working directly in these countries, not just sending aid. The opening of the College of Europe campus in Poland in 1992 is a noteworthy example, helping to forge future European leaders.A similar approach should be applied in Ukraine. Here are some suggestions as to what practical integration might look like in Ukraine's case.First and most important is reform of the civil service. Ukraine needs new government officials trained in Western ways. A system for training and retraining of civil servants should be developed, from which new government agencies could be created later. Ukraine already has a successful example in the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Created de novo, this ministry has excelled in implementing changes.Second is the integration of education. Ukrainians should be able to study at Western universities, including in Ukraine. The upcoming reconstruction will require specialists in new professions, and the opening of campuses of Western universities in Ukraine is particularly important.Third, Ukrainian businesses need access to capital markets, in particular access to European loans and grants. This issue is especially acute for Ukrainian businesses during the war, when domestic resources are concentrated elsewhere.Fourth is the development of cooperation between the civil societies of different countries. Ukrainian civic and volunteer organizations should be able to work cooperatively with similar Western organizations and actively participate in various transborder associations. This would help Ukrainian civil groups adopt best practices and develop in the same direction as their European counterparts.Fifth, renewable funds should be available for on-the-ground, local efforts. Western aid should be channeled not only through the Ukrainian budget, which is still important, but also directly, to support grassroots efforts at the local and regional levels. Decentralization has been one of Ukraine's few reform successes, so some part of the needed structure and mindset is already in place. Other countries have had success using recovery aid sent directly to communities when the senders worked closely with and in the communities to help them transform in accordance with Western standards.The war will end someday. And Ukraine will need a serious recovery and reconstruction effort. The urgent task today is to build the capacity to do so. The paper Leviathan must die and be replaced by an effective structure for implementing the commitments made. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

In August 2023, the U.S. State Department published an integrated strategy for Ukraine. This highly structured, systematic document defines the key goals and objectives of the U.S. government and its diplomats. Apart from objectives aimed at securing Ukraine's victory in the war, the document summarizes the goals and requirements that have been in place for different Ukrainian administrations for a decade. These goals include fighting corruption, deoligarchization, continuing with judicial reforms, the introduction of corporate governance, and so on. The overarching question lingering behind the document's cited goals is why, despite Ukraine's considerable efforts, achieving these goals has remained elusive.The State of the ReformsIn 2024 Ukraine will mark the ten-year anniversary of the launch of its most ambitious anti-corruption reform program. On October 14, 2014, legislation was passed to start the process of establishing various anti-corruption agencies, including the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAPC), and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP). Later, the High Anti-Corruption Court was added. Further reforms included new methods to promote transparency in the selection of judges, prosecutorial reforms, reform of the police service on a new footing, and reform of the public electronic procurement system, ProZorro.At first glance, it might seem that Ukraine decided to become a champion in the fight against corruption, but despite the large number of criminal cases brought against officials for alleged corruption, no top officials or oligarchs have received real sentences. At the same time, Ukraine's huge anti-corruption efforts have moved the country's ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index only a trifle, from 144th in 2013 to 122nd in 2021. In addition, the anti-corruption bodies are viewed with a high degree of distrust by Ukrainians. In a survey conducted in July and August 2021 by the Razumkov Center, an independent pollster, distrust was expressed by 69–70 percent of respondents.The Economy Is AffectedSuch desultory results are not limited to the fight against corruption. A significant achievement of Ukraine was the Association Agreement with the EU. The agreement was intended to stimulate economic growth and bring Ukrainian standards in line with European ones. In 2021, Ukrainian authorities reported that the agreement was 60 percent implemented. More precisely, this meant that necessary changes in line with the agreement had been adopted at the legislative level. At the same time, Ukraine was ranked 127th on the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index, which considers such measures as the rule of law, governmental integrity, judicial integrity, the tax burden, business freedom, and property rights. That appears to be a dubious achievement with such a significant percentage of the Association Agreement having been implemented. Every year, Ukraine prepares numerous presentations about progress on reforms, intended to attract investment. However, none of this reform talk ever results in real change. So let's call a spade a spade: Ukraine is a paper Leviathan, a country where there is a gap between the adoption of laws and their implementation. This stark fact means that the focus of Ukraine's reform strategy should shift from passing laws to building the capacity to implement the necessary changes.A Different StrategyWe propose a new strategy of "integration before membership." Essentially, this means Ukraine should start integrating with the West on a practical level today. It is not a novel strategy; this is exactly what happened with the integration of the post-Soviet countries into the EU and NATO. Before becoming part of the West, a country must understand what the West is. In addition to the requirement to adopt the relevant standards and amendments to legislation, most future EU members were given the opportunity to integrate into the EU in a practical way. Their citizens could travel, study, and trade with European countries without hindrance. The authorities of the future members received tremendous intellectual support in reforms, and their officials were trained by and constantly interacted with partners. The EU Structural Funds helped to transform future member countries by working directly in these countries, not just sending aid. The opening of the College of Europe campus in Poland in 1992 is a noteworthy example, helping to forge future European leaders.A similar approach should be applied in Ukraine. Here are some suggestions as to what practical integration might look like in Ukraine's case.First and most important is reform of the civil service. Ukraine needs new government officials trained in Western ways. A system for training and retraining of civil servants should be developed, from which new government agencies could be created later. Ukraine already has a successful example in the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Created de novo, this ministry has excelled in implementing changes.Second is the integration of education. Ukrainians should be able to study at Western universities, including in Ukraine. The upcoming reconstruction will require specialists in new professions, and the opening of campuses of Western universities in Ukraine is particularly important.Third, Ukrainian businesses need access to capital markets, in particular access to European loans and grants. This issue is especially acute for Ukrainian businesses during the war, when domestic resources are concentrated elsewhere.Fourth is the development of cooperation between the civil societies of different countries. Ukrainian civic and volunteer organizations should be able to work cooperatively with similar Western organizations and actively participate in various transborder associations. This would help Ukrainian civil groups adopt best practices and develop in the same direction as their European counterparts.Fifth, renewable funds should be available for on-the-ground, local efforts. Western aid should be channeled not only through the Ukrainian budget, which is still important, but also directly, to support grassroots efforts at the local and regional levels. Decentralization has been one of Ukraine's few reform successes, so some part of the needed structure and mindset is already in place. Other countries have had success using recovery aid sent directly to communities when the senders worked closely with and in the communities to help them transform in accordance with Western standards.The war will end someday. And Ukraine will need a serious recovery and reconstruction effort. The urgent task today is to build the capacity to do so. The paper Leviathan must die and be replaced by an effective structure for implementing the commitments made. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute

Problem setting. One of the most important tasks of modern science of public management and administration is the further improvement of management technologies, management decisions in banking in particular and the increase of their efficiency and effectiveness. Accordingly, the scientific interest is not only in the study and the analysis of banking legislation of certain countries, but in the adaptation of national legislation to the directives of the European Union. The urgency of improving the mechanism of state regulation of the market for the provision of services for the collection of funds and transportation of currency valuables in the banking system of Ukraine is undeniable, the implementation of which should include the mandatory establishment of real requirements and measures of responsibility of managers of both individual financial institutions and regulatory bodies. Recent research and publications analysis. The organization of central banks of the world, their legal status, main functions, comparative aspects, regulatory activities in the field of the organization of cash circulation and cash collection were studied in the works of L. Voronova, D. Hetmantsev, V. Krotyuk, S. Yehorychev, M. Starynsky, P. Melnyk, S. Laptev, I. Zaverukha. Legal problems of legalization of firearms circulation in Ukraine were studied by А.Kolosok, P. Mitrukhov, P. Fries, S. Shumilenko and others. The works of V.Baranyak, V. Меzhyvy, М. Pinchuk, T. Pryhodko, V.Rybachuk, В.Tychyi, etc. are devoted to the study of legal problems of illegal handling of weapons. However, these works do not reflect the peculiarities of the use of firearms in subdivisions of collection of funds. Native and foreign scholars generally have not paid due attention to the study and the analysis of the existing model of cash circulation in Ukraine, its advantages, risks and disadvantages as well as the effective functioning of the market of collection of funds and transportation of currency valuables in the banking system of Ukraine. Highlighting previously unsettled parts of the general problem. The purpose of this article is to analyze the innovative foreign experience of state regulation of the market of collection of funds and transportation of currency valuables in the banking system of Ukraine (hereinafter – collection of funds) and to justify the need for its implementation in Ukraine. Another important problem in collection activities is the lack of legislative regulation of firearms trafficking as there is no law on weapons in Ukraine, there are only regulations of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, which greatly complicates its regulation by the state according to P. Fries. Paper main body. The market of collection of funds and transportation of currency valuables (hereinafter – the market of collection) is one of the most closed segments of the banking system of any country as a whole. The most popular way to pay for services and goods during the last few years, according to annual surveys conducted by the Swiss central bank, is cash. The important factor is that even with the spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic, the demand for cash and cash flow has increased significantly. The National Bank of Ukraine carries out regulatory activities in accordance with the requirements of the Law of Ukraine "On Principles of State Regulatory Policy in the Field of Economic Activity". Collection of funds has never been a particularly profitable activity, for the subdivisions of collection of any country along with the staff and transportation costs, that is why to ensure the proper security of cash transportation is a very costly item of the estimate. In this regard, there is an urgent need for the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On collection of funds and transportation of currency valuables" and "On firearms", which would define the basic foundations, principles, forms of activities in the field of collection services, rights, duties and responsibilities of all participants in the collection market, in order to increase their reliability, safety and efficiency. In the countries of the European Union (EU), services for the collection and transportation of currency valuables are provided by public and private enterprises. In many EU countries there is no legal definition of the concept 'collection'. In most cases, collection falls under the general legislation on the basics of security, except for Austria and Germany, which regulate such activities through professional organizations, insurance and collective agreements. Today, five foreign global CIT companies account for almost 60% of the global CIT market for cash collection and cash handling services. They are: –Brinks (USA) – 23%; –G4S (England) – 15%; –Loomis (Sweden) – 12%; –Prosegur (Spain) – 7%; –Garda (Canada) – 4%; –GSLS – 0.01%; –Other regional independent companies – 39%. In six EU countries (Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Sweden, Great Britain and the Netherlands) the presence of firearms during collection of funds is prohibited. In Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, the presence of a weapon in the performance of professional collection duties is mandatory. Safe collection of funds largely depends on the fast, without delays, safe travel by road. Ukraine needs to reform its transport system to gain access to the European Union's rail, road, river and air transport markets and to financial resources for building safe infrastructure of high quality. Conclusions of the research and prospects for further studies. Unfortunately, there are no well-known world CIT collection companies in the Ukrainian market of collection services and therefore Ukrainian banks and legal entities have to deal with local CIT companies, the authorized capital of which in some cases may be significantly less than the amount of the collected cash. In accordance with the mentioned above, for the effective functioning of the Ukrainian market of collection of funds and a balanced regulatory policy of the state, we suggest making appropriate changes and additions to the Laws of Ukraine on "Banks and Banking", "National Bank of Ukraine". To initiate the development and adoption of the Laws of Ukraine "On Collection and Transportation of Currency Valuables" and "On Firearms" which will ensure equal competitive conditions in the collection market for all its participants, reliable labor protection, social guarantees and rights of employees of collection divisions. ; Розглянуто основні аспекти здійснення операцій з інкасації коштів та перевезення валютних цінностей в Україні та закордоном, а також проведено їх порівняльний аналіз. Виокремлено проблеми, які заважають інкасаційним компаніям ефективно працювати у сфері надання послуг із інкасації коштів та перевезень валютних цінностей. Обґрунтовано необхідність удосконалення механізмів державного регулювання ринку з надання послуг із інкасації коштів та перевезень валютних цінностей в Україні, зокрема з урахуванням інноваційного закордонного досвіду.