Suchergebnisse

PurposeThis study investigates the effect of multilateral trade liberalization on services export diversification with a view to complementing the recently published work on the effect of multilateral trade liberalization on export product diversification.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical exercise been performed using a panel dataset of 133 countries over the period 1995–2014.FindingsThe findings show that multilateral trade liberalization is associated with greater services export diversification in both developed and developing countries alike. This is particularly the case in countries with a high reliance on manufactured goods exports or those that enjoy greater export product diversification. Interestingly, multilateral trade liberalization enhances services export diversification in countries that experience higher foreign direct investment inflows.Research limitations/implicationsThese findings highlight the importance of multilateral trade liberalization for services export diversification. The study has considered explicitly supply-side factors that could affect services export diversification. This is because the indicator of multilateral trade liberalization is highly correlated with some demand-side factors, such as the world demand for services exports. Therefore, another avenue for future research could involve looking at the demand side factors that could influence services export diversification, and whether the degree of multilateral trade liberalization matters for the influence of these demand factors on services export diversification.Practical implicationsThe current study through its positive effect on both export product diversification and services export diversification, greater cooperation among World Trade Organization (WTO) Members on trade matters could help revive economic growth, particularly in the current COVID-19 pandemic that has significantly plummeted it.Originality/valueTo the best of our knowledge, this is first study that has investigated this issue.

Abstract
This special issue of International Negotiation explores from different perspectives how multilateral trade negotiations, primarily within the World Trade Organization (WTO), can become more effective. The challenges associated with this task have grown, as the parties and issues involved in such talks have increased in number and diversity. The specific topics addressed include the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and domestic-level factors, agenda management, legitimacy and procedural issues, turning points, the challenge posed by the pursuit of bilateral and regional alternatives, and the question of gains to be had from multilateralism. The conclusions drawn from these studies are wide-ranging and relevant for multilateral negotiations generally. They highlight, among other matters, the significance of decision-making procedures used in the negotiation process.

Abstract. In this paper we find that the estimates of Armington elasticities (the elasticity of substitution between groups of products identified by country of origin) obtained from multilateral trade data can differ from those obtained from bilateral trade data. In particular, the former tends to be higher than the latter when trade consists largely of intermediate inputs. Given that the variety of intermediate inputs traded across borders is increasing rapidly and that the effect of this increase is not adequately captured in multilateral trade data, the evidence shows that the employment of multilateral trade data to estimate Armington elasticities needs caution. JEL classification: F14, C51

In the first part of the paper the author deals with some general aspects of the very complex process of trade negotiations. He explains that trade negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, are the basis for establishment of the international trade regime. In order to understand multilateral trade negotiations one should be familiar with its basis, which is composed of rules and procedures. Also, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that these rules and procedures have not emerged at once but have been introduced in the process of adjustment to the needs of negotiators. In the second part of the paper the author considers the procedures in multilateral trade negotiations within the GATT/WTO international trade system.

Cet article examine l'impact de la libéralisation commerciale multilatérale (et non de la libéralisation commerciale nationale, largement explorée dans la littérature) sur l'ampleur de la diversification des recettes fiscales. Cette dernière est approximée par le ratio des recettes fiscales commerciales sur le ratio des recettes fiscales non-commerciales. L'analyse utilise principalement l'estimateur des effets fixes, sur un panel déséquilibré de 145 pays, couvrant la période 1995-2015. Les résultats montrent que la libéralisation commerciale multilatérale promeut la diversification des recettes fiscales, c'est-à-dire, qu'elle réduit le ratio des recettes fiscales commerciales aux recettes fiscales non-commerciales. En outre, les pays les moins avancés bénéficient plus que les pays relativement plus avancés de cet impact positif de la libéralisation commerciale multilatérale sur l'ampleur de la diversification des recettes fiscales. Par ailleurs, les pays fortement dépendant du secteur agricole enregistrent un effet plus important de la libéralisation commerciale multilatérale sur la diversification des recettes fiscales que les pays dont les économies sont moins dépendantes du secteur agricole. Ces résultats suggèrent donc qu'une réduction plus importante des barrières commerciales à l'échelle mondiale, notamment à travers une plus grande coopération entre les Membres de l'OMC pour promouvoir la libéralisation commerciale multilatérale, contribuerait à renforcer la diversification des recettes fiscales.

In multilateral trade negotiations, trade-offs usually are made within the issue-areas that are on the agenda. In the absence of cross-issue trade-offs (linkages), agreement may not be possible. To maximize both the potential gains from trade and the scope for agreement, negotiators need to be willing and able to consider the feasibility of issue linkages. This raises the practical problem of determining when such trade-offs are likely to be necessary. Although quantitative methods of policy analysis have been developed, they have not been widely used by policymakers, in part owing to the fact that negotiations focus largely on nontariff measures. This article proposes a qualitative approach to the problem and applies it to the Tokyo and Uruguay Round negotiations on safeguards to protect domestic industries from problems related to increases in imports.

AbstractThe paper considers trade between identical countries with imperfectly competitive markets, and compares the impacts of regional and multilateral tariff reduction on strategic environmental taxation and welfare. While both forms of trade liberalization increase production and consumption in tariff‐reducing countries, regionalism also reduces production in a non‐participating country and may decrease its consumption. Consequently, regionalism and multilateralism change pollution tax and welfare in the tariff‐reducing countries in similar ways when pollution is local, but in dissimilar ways for global pollution. When pollution is global, regionalism is likely to be preferred to multilateralism for the establishment of free trade among countries.

Using the influence-driven approach to endogenous trade-policy determination, we show how a free-trade agreement (FTA) with rules of origin can work as a device to compensate losers from trade liberalization. The FTA constructed in this paper is characterized by external tariff structures that are negatively correlated across member countries, ensuring efficiency gains and, through reduced average protection, compatibility with the multilateral trading system's requirements. It is also politically viable, and we demonstrate that, in the countries concerned, governments are willing to include its formation in the political agenda in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, political contributions from producer lobbies decline after the agreement.