Deutschland und seine Nachbarn Polen und Tschechien
In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ, Band 49, Heft 3-4, S. 43-54
ISSN: 0479-611X
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In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ, Band 49, Heft 3-4, S. 43-54
ISSN: 0479-611X
World Affairs Online
In: Osteuropa, Band 49, Heft 3, S. 231-240
ISSN: 0030-6428
World Affairs Online
In: Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik: ZRP, Band 32, Heft 6, S. 227-230
ISSN: 0514-6496
World Affairs Online
In: Osteuropa, Band 48, Heft 8/9, S. 938-953
ISSN: 0030-6428
World Affairs Online
In: Leviathan: Berliner Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Band 25, Heft 4, S. 480-500
ISSN: 0340-0425
World Affairs Online
In: Osteuropa, Band 47, Heft 1, S. 63-70
ISSN: 0030-6428
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of international law, Band 89, S. 554-577
ISSN: 0002-9300
World Affairs Online
In: China aktuell: journal of current Chinese affairs, Band 22, Heft 9, S. 906-917
ISSN: 0341-6631
World Affairs Online
In: Der Überblick: Zeitschrift für ökumenische Begegnung und internationale Zusammenarbeit ; Quartalsschrift des Kirchlichen Entwicklungsdienstes, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 25-28
ISSN: 0343-0553
World Affairs Online
In: Europa-Archiv / Beiträge und Berichte, Band 47, Heft 17, S. 491-500
World Affairs Online
Das International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) ist ein länderübergreifendes, fortlaufendes Umfrageprogramm, das jährlich Erhebungen zu Themen durchführt, die für die Sozialwissenschaften wichtig sind. Das Programm begann 1984 mit vier Gründungsmitgliedern - Australien, Deutschland, Großbritannien und den Vereinigten Staaten - und ist inzwischen auf fast 50 Mitgliedsländer aus aller Welt angewachsen. Da die Umfragen auf Replikationen ausgelegt sind, können die Daten sowohl für länder- als auch für zeitübergreifende Vergleiche genutzt werden. Jedes ISSP-Modul konzentriert sich auf ein bestimmtes Thema, das in regelmäßigen Zeitabständen wiederholt wird. Details zur Durchführung der nationalen ISSP-Umfragen entnehmen Sie bitte der Dokumentation. Die vorliegende Studie konzentriert sich auf Fragen zu politischen Einstellungen und der Rolle der Regierung.
GESIS
In: Asian survey: a bimonthly review of contemporary Asian affairs, Band 29, Heft 4, S. 401-415
ISSN: 0004-4687
World Affairs Online
In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: APuZ, Band 35, S. 35-46
ISSN: 0479-611X
World Affairs Online
In: Krstevska, Katerina (2015) THE OPINION OF THE MACEDONIAN CITIZENS ABOUT THE CORRUPTION, WITH A SPECIAL NOTE TO THE PREPAREDNESS AND DETERMINATION TO FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND THE SYSTEM'S DEVELOPMENT TO FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION. Thematic proceedings of the Scientific and professional conference with international participation "Countering Contemporary Forms of Crime - Analysis of the Current Situation, European Standards and Measures for Improvement", II. pp. 171-184. ISSN ISBN 978-86-7020-323-5
In the 2013 Progress Report on Republic of Macedonia, in which the European Commission presents its assessment of what the country has achieved over the last year, it was stressed that the corruption in the Republic of Macedonia remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious problem, indicating that the implementation of existing legislation has yet to make a concrete impact and the effectiveness of existing measures has to be improved. This comment was followed with a note that the country needs to demonstrate tangible results in the reduction and deterrence of corruption in practice. One year later, European Commission indicated that claims of selective enforcement and political influence in this area persist, and a more proactive stance is needed to eliminate these serious concerns. Also, the public trust in anti-corruption bodies remains low. Having in mind the above remarks, as well as the determination of the Republic of Macedonia to become an EU member, the Faculty of Security – Skopje established a Research team which goal was to organize a field Survey concerning the opinion (assessment) of the Macedonian citizens about the corruption. The aim of the survey was to give a scientific description of the citizens' opinion about the characteristics and consequences of the corruption, and also about the corrupt activities in the country. Despite the fact that the Survey was systematized in several chapters, the paper shall give a special attention to Chapter V "Preparedness and determination to fight against corruption" and Chapter VI "Development of the system to fight against corruption". Although the Survey was conducted in 2013, 2014 and 2015, the paper shall present and analyze the collected data in 2013 and 2014, since the data collected in 2015 are still being processed.
BASE
"To these people who say democracy is being dismantled, my answer is yes, we are not dismantling it, we are eliminating it, we are replacing it with something new," Félix Ulloa, the vice president of El Salvador, told The New York Times earlier this month, days before El Salvador's presidential election.Two days after Ulloa's blunt declaration regarding the direction of President Nayib Bukele's administration, the candidate amended his running mate's statement, insisting he was constructing El Salvador's first "true" democracy, discarding a broken system that failed the population and served the interests of only a corrupt few. Bukele's determination to remake the Salvadoran state is clear. His political party, after all, is named Nuevas Ideas. However, the "something new" promised by Ulloa looks suspiciously like something old, one-man rule. Even so, Bukele's popularity is complicating efforts to counter his corrosive effect on democracy, with implications beyond El Salvador. The 'something new' promised by Ulloa looks suspiciously like something old, one-man rule. Even so, Bukele's popularity is complicating efforts to counter his corrosive effect on democracy."That is troubling. In the United States, Latin America experts argue that democracy matters more in this hemisphere than in other regions for reasons of geography and cultural proximity. Undoubtedly, the US record defending democracy in the region is mixed, blemished by a history of interventions against elected governments and support for authoritarian right-wing governments during the Cold War. Still, beginning in the late 1970s, the United States has largely supported democrats against threats to democracy from the right and left. That policy is based on the idea that democracy is more likely to produce sustainable social, political, and economic gains to satisfy popular aspirations and undermine the logic of revolutionary change. This argument is not only heard in Washington; on September 11, 2001, 34 countries in the region signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter, pledging to "promote and defend" representative democracy.Nevertheless, more than 20 years later, democracy is under strain in many parts of the region and the Inter-American Democratic Charter feels more like a high point than a turning point. In that context, the Biden administration has viewed Bukele with wariness. His storming of the Salvadoran Congress in 2020, alongside soldiers and police, to pressure lawmakers over a budgetary dispute raised alarm bells. So did his tendency to use state instruments to persecute critics; the presence of corrupt figures in his inner circle; his hostility to independent journalists; and his disregard for constitutional constraints on his power. Bukele's economic mismanagement, including his bet on Bitcoin to spur growth, elevated concerns that an economic failure there could add vast numbers of Salvadoran migrants to the 20 million people already on the move across the Americas.For now, El Salvador is not Nicaragua, where the regime imprisoned all major opposition candidates before the last election. But nor can it be called a constitutional republic, given the circumstances of its February 4 elections. Bukele held the election under a state of emergency and won a second term despite a constitutional ban on reelection.That poses a challenge for US policymakers because Bukele's successes, especially in fighting criminal gangs, and his popularity tend to overshadow his authoritarian behavior and stand in contrast to the inability of many democratic governments to address violent crime. That is not a minor issue. Latin America and the Caribbean is among the most violent regions in the world, accounting for around one-third of all murders though it is home to just 8% of the world's population, according to the International Crisis Group.El Salvador is not Nicaragua, where the regime imprisoned all major opposition candidates before the last election. But nor can it be called a constitutional republic, given the circumstances of its February 4 elections."El Salvador was long among the most violent countries in this violent region, with a history of failed negotiations between governments and gang leaders that allegedly continued into the Bukele administration. That changed in 2022 following the announcement of a state of exception that suspended civil liberties and led to the arrest of 75,000 people suspected of gang affiliation. Salvadorans, at least those who have avoided arbitrary detention, are generally, and understandably, relieved by the suppression of gang violence. The vastly improved security climate, and Bukele's sleek public messaging, have restored a sense of national pride. In a region that features mass migration, stagnant economies, and increasingly powerful organized crime groups, El Salvador sometimes feels more like a success than a crisis to many observers outside the country.The problem is that the policies that brought Bukele quick success carry the seeds for long-term failure. The concentration of power in the hands of a single individual intolerant of competition is a common pattern in Latin America–one that almost always leads to policy errors and democratic decline. There is a reason the most autocratic nations in the hemisphere are also its largest sources of migrants. In El Salvador, for example, the same opaque decision-making apparatus that brought the gangs to heel also led to the failed Bitcoin experiment and has discouraged domestic and foreign investors.As a result, the United States faces the awkward challenge of dealing with a popular, twice elected leader, unfettered by constitutional guidelines. Public criticism by the US government of Bukele's subversion of democratic institutions seems to have migrated to private channels, and demonstrations of public engagement with Bukele are now common. Even so, in congratulating Bukele on his controversial reelection, Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasized the importance of "fair trial guarantees and human rights." But Bukele seems impervious to international pressure, public or private. In hisvictory speech, he assailed foreign critics, asking, "Why do they want to see the blood of Salvadorans?" That dynamic of intolerance for even mild critiques seems likely to continue. That approach might be effective, especially where US goals do not run counter to core interests of the Salvadoran government, such as cooperation to improve El Salvador's economic performance. It will be less effective when Salvadorans interpret the lack of public US criticism of Bukele's undemocratic behavior as tacit approval of such actions. More distressingly, US silence in the face of human rights abuses signals to others in the Americas that patience and popularity are the recipe for swatting away criticism from Washington and undermining the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
SWP