Successive welfare-maximizing governments must decide whether to implement an affirmative action policy. This affirmative action policy is purported to improve the performance distribution of a targeted group (minority or otherwise), although this improvement becomes trivial when the policy is implemented over a long period of time. Employers pay workers according to their expected productivity, but without (perfectly) observing whether they benefited from affirmative action or not. This has a depressing effect on the wages of non-beneficiaries (whether or not they belong to the targeted group), leading in turn to a feeling of injustice. We find that governments perpetually choose to implement an affirmative action policy, even though the overall feeling of injustice is worse than the purported beneficial effect on the performance of the targeted group (which becomes marginal over time). The explanation we propose is based on a novel moral hazard argument: Each government's actual policy decision is not (perfectly) observed by market participants and thus has no direct effect on wages. Governments therefore do not internalize the depressing effect of an affirmative action policy on wages when choosing to implement it. This outcome is in contrast with a first-best, welfare-maximizing policy plan, in which governments choose to end affirmative action after a certain number of periods, when the purported improvement in the performance distribution of the targeted group becomes small enough.
Successive welfare-maximizing governments must decide whether to implement an affirmative action policy. This affirmative action policy is purported to improve the performance distribution of a targeted group (minority or otherwise), although this improvement becomes trivial when the policy is implemented over a long period of time. Employers pay workers according to their expected productivity, but without (perfectly) observing whether they benefited from affirmative action or not. This has a depressing effect on the wages of non-beneficiaries (whether or not they belong to the targeted group), leading in turn to a feeling of injustice. We find that governments perpetually choose to implement an affirmative action policy, even though the overall feeling of injustice is worse than the purported beneficial effect on the performance of the targeted group (which becomes marginal over time). The explanation we propose is based on a novel moral hazard argument: Each government's actual policy decision is not (perfectly) observed by market participants and thus has no direct effect on wages. Governments therefore do not internalize the depressing effect of an affirmative action policy on wages when choosing to implement it. This outcome is in contrast with a first-best, welfare-maximizing policy plan, in which governments choose to end affirmative action after a certain number of periods, when the purported improvement in the performance distribution of the targeted group becomes small enough.
Successive welfare-maximizing governments must decide whether to implement an affirmative action policy. This affirmative action policy is purported to improve the performance distribution of a targeted group (minority or otherwise), although this improvement becomes trivial when the policy is implemented over a long period of time. Employers pay workers according to their expected productivity, but without (perfectly) observing whether they benefited from affirmative action or not. This has a depressing effect on the wages of non-beneficiaries (whether or not they belong to the targeted group), leading in turn to a feeling of injustice. We find that governments perpetually choose to implement an affirmative action policy, even though the overall feeling of injustice is worse than the purported beneficial effect on the performance of the targeted group (which becomes marginal over time). The explanation we propose is based on a novel moral hazard argument: Each government's actual policy decision is not (perfectly) observed by market participants and thus has no direct effect on wages. Governments therefore do not internalize the depressing effect of an affirmative action policy on wages when choosing to implement it. This outcome is in contrast with a first-best, welfare-maximizing policy plan, in which governments choose to end affirmative action after a certain number of periods, when the purported improvement in the performance distribution of the targeted group becomes small enough.
Successive welfare-maximizing governments must decide whether to implement an affirmative action policy. This affirmative action policy is purported to improve the performance distribution of a targeted group (minority or otherwise), although this improvement becomes trivial when the policy is implemented over a long period of time. Employers pay workers according to their expected productivity, but without (perfectly) observing whether they benefited from affirmative action or not. This has a depressing effect on the wages of non-beneficiaries (whether or not they belong to the targeted group), leading in turn to a feeling of injustice. We find that governments perpetually choose to implement an affirmative action policy, even though the overall feeling of injustice is worse than the purported beneficial effect on the performance of the targeted group (which becomes marginal over time). The explanation we propose is based on a novel moral hazard argument: Each government's actual policy decision is not (perfectly) observed by market participants and thus has no direct effect on wages. Governments therefore do not internalize the depressing effect of an affirmative action policy on wages when choosing to implement it. This outcome is in contrast with a first-best, welfare-maximizing policy plan, in which governments choose to end affirmative action after a certain number of periods, when the purported improvement in the performance distribution of the targeted group becomes small enough.
This study is aimed at identifying several problems while analyzing the determinants of population service policies in Lirung sub-district, Talaud archipelago district, North Sulawesi province, Indonesia. This study uses qualitative research methods, the data collection methods used in this study are as follows: interviews with employees and the people served, field observations, literature studies. Population services policy is optimal because it gets political support from the central government and local governments. Local governments often communicate to the public about population service policies. Resources for the implementation of policies and programs, policies and policy formats, and there need to be a real improvement, these factors have not been able to optimize service policies. This work has never been achieved and is the result of our research so that it can guarantee its authenticity. JEL Clasification: D78, I28, L88 ; Дослідження спрямоване на виявлення кількох проблем під час аналізу детермінант політики обслуговування населення в підрайоні Лірунг, район архіпелагу Талауд, провінція Північний Сулавесі, Індонезія. У цьому дослідженні використовуються якісні методи дослідження, методами збору даних, які використовуються в цьому дослідженні, є такі: інтерв'ю з працівниками та людьми, які обслуговуються, польові спостереження, дослідження літератури. Політика обслуговування населення є оптимальною, оскільки отримує політичну підтримку з боку центрального уряду та місцевих органів влади. Органи місцевого самоврядування часто інформують громадськість про політику обслуговування населення. Ресурси для реалізації політики і програм, політики і формати політики, а також необхідно реальне поліпшення, ці фактори не змогли оптимізувати політику обслуговування. Результати цього дослідження можуть допомогти регіональному уряду провінції Північний Сулавесі, а також урядам Індонезії та всього світу краще зрозуміти значення та мету детермінант політики обслуговування населення в підрайоні Лірунг, найвіддаленішому острові. JEL Clasification: D78, I28, L88 ; Исследование направлено на выявление нескольких проблем при анализе определяющих факторов политики обслуживания населения в подрайоне Лирунг, округ архипелага Талауд, провинция Северный Сулавеси, Индонезия. В этом исследовании используются качественные методы исследования, методы сбора данных, используемые в этом исследовании, следующие: интервью с сотрудниками и обслуживаемыми людьми, полевые наблюдения, литературные исследования. Политика в области народонаселения является оптимальной, поскольку получает политическую поддержку со стороны центрального правительства и местных органов власти. Органы местного самоуправления часто сообщают общественности о политике обслуживания населения. Ресурсы для реализации политик и программ, политик и форматов политик, и должно быть реальное улучшение, эти факторы не смогли оптимизировать политику обслуживания. Результаты этого исследования могут помочь региональному правительству провинции Северный Сулавеси, а также правительствам Индонезии и всего мира лучше понять значение и цель детерминант политики обслуживания населения в подрайоне Лирунг, самом удаленном острове. JEL Clasification: D78, I28, L88
