Suchergebnisse

While the effect of prepaid, overpromised monetary incentives appear stronger, not all research situations allow prepayment of cash inducements. The results are reported of a study that tested the promised incentive rates of $1, $2, $3, & $5 as well as no incentive. Drivers of 900 randomly-selected automobiles were approached as they stopped at a turnpike toll gate & handed a postage-paid return envelope containing a cover letter, a 10-page questionnaire &, in some packets, a sheet promising a cash incentive for questionnaire completion. Envelopes testing no incentive logically contained no incentive sheet. The different incentive values were randomly distributed. The promised incentive values of $2 with a response rate of 41% resulted in a appreciable increase in response over lower values & represents a statistically significant difference from the $1 cash incentive with a 25% response rate, & from offering no incentive which resulted in a 28% response rate. The incentive value of $0 & $1 are not significantly different & similarly no significant differences are seen between $2 & $3 (40.5% response rate) & between $3 & 1225 (44% response rate). $2 appeared to be the most effective promised monetary incentive rate. 1.

We study what determines taxpayers' deduction behavior when filing tax returns. Preliminary deficits might be viewed as losses assuming zero preliminary balance as reference point. Swedish taxpayers may escape these losses by claiming deductions after receiving information about the preliminary balance. Furthermore, the Swedish income tax system has a substantial kink (20 percentage points) where the central government tax applies. Taxpayers slightly above the governmental tax kink have substantially higher (standard economic) incentives to claim deductions than taxpayers slightly below the kink. Using a regression kink and discontinuity approach with individual fixed effects, we study a panel of 4.1 million Swedish taxpayers in 1999 to 2006. We find strong causal effects of preliminary deficits on the probability of claiming deductions. The initial empirical evidence for a kink in deduction probability at the central government threshold, anticipated by standard economic theory, is weaker but significant. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that the kink at the tax threshold is not likely due to the tax incentives per se. When controlling for the preliminary tax deficit, the kink at the tax threshold disappears. Taxpayers just above the tax kink are namely more likely to run a preliminary tax deficit than those just below it. Hence, the most plausible explanation also for the kink at the tax threshold is therefore loss aversion and not standard economic incentives. The Swedish taxpayers are thus "misbehaving", in a Thaler (2015) sense, on two separate margins: they are highly loss averse but surprisingly inattentive to standard monetary incentives.

We study what determines taxpayers' deduction behavior when filing tax returns. Preliminary deficits might be viewed as losses assuming zero preliminary balance as reference point. Swedish taxpayers may escape these losses by claiming deductions after receiving information about the preliminary balance. Furthermore, the Swedish income tax system has a substantial kink (20 percentage points) where the central government tax applies. Taxpayers slightly above the governmental tax kink have substantially higher (standard economic) incentives to claim deductions than taxpayers slightly below the kink. Using a regression kink and discontinuity approach with individual fixed effects, we study a panel of 4.1 million Swedish taxpayers in 1999 to 2006. We find strong causal effects of preliminary deficits on the probability of claiming deductions. The initial empirical evidence for a kink in deduction probability at the central government threshold, anticipated by standard economic theory, is weaker but significant. However, a more detailed analysis reveals that the kink at the tax threshold is not likely due to the tax incentives per se. When controlling for the preliminary tax deficit, the kink at the tax threshold disappears. Taxpayers just above the tax kink are namely more likely to run a preliminary tax deficit than those just below it. Hence, the most plausible explanation also for the kink at the tax threshold is therefore loss aversion and not standard economic incentives. The Swedish taxpayers are thus "misbehaving", in a Thaler (2015) sense, on two separate margins: they are highly loss averse but surprisingly inattentive to standard monetary incentives.

AbstractThis article develops and tests a theory of asymmetric incentives to explain why politicians might be less motivated to confront deflation than inflation. Leveraging Japan as a least-likely crucial case, we analyze the conditions that lead legislators to take advantage of their power to summon central bankers for questioning. We find that even moderate inflation makes it more likely that legislators will summon central bankers compared to periods when the inflation rate is near zero. By contrast, deflation has either no effect or reduces the likelihood of summonses. We also find some evidence that unconventional monetary policies to combat deflation, specifically quantitative easing, are likely to invite greater legislative scrutiny. These findings have important policy implications. While deflation is widely viewed as pernicious and more difficult to exit than inflation, there are weaker incentives for politicians to address it.

Purpose: To examine the effects of an employer-based monetary incentive program on membership termination and usage at a fitness center. Design: Retrospective nested case–control study examining the relationship between participation in an incentive program, visits to the fitness center, and membership termination at 1 year. Setting: University-based fitness center. Participants: Members (N = 1122) of a university-based fitness center. Intervention: Members were offered either a US$25 incentive for each month they visited the fitness center at least 10 times or no incentive. Measures: Data were extracted from the membership database and included membership termination at 1 year (yes, no), length of membership (days), participation in the incentive program (yes, no), and visits to the fitness center per month. Analysis: Cox proportional hazards model. Results: Members in the incentive program visited the fitness center on average more times per month (5.3 vs 4.3; P < .0001) but were significantly more likely to terminate memberships at 1 year compared to members who did not receive the incentive (38% vs 31%; P = .013). After controlling for relevant covariates, members who received the incentive had a 24% greater hazard of terminating their memberships compared to members who did not receive the incentive (hazard ratio [HR] = 1.24; P = .041). After controlling for the number of visits per month, the incentive program was no longer significantly related to membership termination (HR = 1.21; P = .07). Conclusion: Being in a monetary incentive program to attend a fitness center may be initially associated with a greater fitness center utilization but may not be associated with a reduced risk of membership termination.

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht die Hintergründe der bargeldlosen Staatsfinanzen in Russland. Diese Arbeit ist wie folgt aufgeteilt. Im ersten Kapitel wird ein Überblick über die Entwicklung von Volumen und Formen der non-monetären Steuerzahlungen (NMS) zuerst auf der föderalen und anschließend auf der regionalen Ebene gegeben. Im zweiten Kapitel werden die allgemeinen Ursachen für das Aufkommen von NMS sowie deren Gewichtung und Wechselwirkungen untereinander analysiert. Speziell wird auf die Rolle der föderalen Finanzverfassung für die überproportionale Verbreitung von NMS in den Regionen eingegangen. Im dritten Kapitel werden die Kosten von NMS diskutiert, die sowohl direkt dem Haushalt entstehen, als auch indirekt über strukturelle Einflüsse die Stabilität der Staatsfinanzen langfristig gefährden. Die abschließende Zusammenfassung enthält einen Exkurs über die Maßnahmen, die seitens des Staates, sprich des föderalen Zentrums, gegen die Verbreitung von NMS ergriffen wurden. Ihre Erfolgschancen werden in Abhängigkeit davon beurteilt, inwieweit sie an den Kernursachen von NMS ansetzen. (ICD)

At the end of the Cold War new providers of military technology have emerged in the international market-place. The managers of these firms, as well as their government leaders, are less restrained about exporting sensitive dual-use technologies that can contribute to the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile systems. John C. Baker proposes an ambitious non-proliferation strategy that takes advantage of new opportunities to use international economic and political incentives to discourage irresponsible export behaviour. This paper assesses the challenges posed by the nuclear and aerospace industries inherited from the former Soviet Union. It focuses particularly on the Yuzhnoye facility in southern Ukraine (reportedly the world's largest integrated rocket and satellite manufacturing enterprise) and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom).