Suchergebnisse

Over the last decades, non-tari measures (NTMs) have seen an important upsurge. How-ever, little research has focused on the political economy of non-tariff protection, and the existing studies are mainly based on a single country or a specific type of measures. This paper seeks to fill the gap by empirically evaluating the determinants of NTMs in several countries, both developed and developing. Overall results show certain protectionist purposes behind the adoption of NTMs. This conclusion is reinforced for restrictive measures (i.e. subject to trade concerns), but does not hold for non-restrictive measures, suggesting the legitimate goal of several NTMs. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the influence exerted by national business groups during the Ministerial Conferences - the highestauthority of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - increases the probability of adopting NTMs in both developed and developing countries.

This paper begins with a definition of dumping, & then offers an overview of anti-dumping measures & their economic impacts. First, it describes the concept of dumping & explains that anti-dumping measures are quite ineffective. Next, it documents the raise of anti-dumping measures over time. It demonstrates that, nowadays, developing countries are using this protectionist tool as much as traditional industrial countries. Finally, the paper comments the WTO regulation in order to examine the effectiveness of dispute settlement cases involving anti-dumping measures. Tables. Adapted from the source document.

Over the last decades, non-tari measures (NTMs) have seen an important upsurge. How-ever, little research has focused on the political economy of non-tariff protection, and the existing studies are mainly based on a single country or a specific type of measures. This paper seeks to fill the gap by empirically evaluating the determinants of NTMs in several countries, both developed and developing. Overall results show certain protectionist purposes behind the adoption of NTMs. This conclusion is reinforced for restrictive measures (i.e. subject to trade concerns), but does not hold for non-restrictive measures, suggesting the legitimate goal of several NTMs. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the influence exerted by national business groups during the Ministerial Conferences - the highestauthority of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - increases the probability of adopting NTMs in both developed and developing countries.

In 2018, the Government of the United States of America announced and implemented a number of protectionist measures in various sectors of the economy of other countries, especially in China. Initially, these measures were aimed only at certain goods, but as the conflict between the US and China increased, the list of goods falling under these sanctions also increased. All these factors have led to an even greater aggravation of the trade and economic conflict.The analysis of the current tension between the United States and its trade partners, given in this article, shows that the current foreign economic events can lead to the emergence of a global trade war. In addition to the direct effect caused by the increase in tariffs, a trade war may also have an impact on GDP indirect channels, such as the performance degradation due to uncertainty and changes in the production environment. This article shows that a global tariff increase of 10% can reduce the level of world GDP by almost 2.0% at once, and to 3.0% in two years, when all additional indirect channels materialize. ; В 2018 году Правительство Соединенных Штатов Америки объявило и реализовало ряд протекционистских мер в различных секторах экономики других стран, в особенности в Китае. Изначально данные меры были направлены лишь на определённые товары, однако по мере возрастания конфликта между Соединенными Штатами Америки и Китаем, увеличился и перечень товаров, попадающих под данные санкции. Все эти факторы привели к еще большему обострению торгово-экономического конфликта. Приведенный в данной статье анализ существующей на сегодняшний день напряженности между Соединенными Штатами Америки и их торговыми партнерами показывает, что происходящие внешнеэкономические события могут привести к возникновению глобальной торговой войны. Помимо прямого эффекта, обусловленного повышением тарифов, торговая война может также повлиять и на Валовый Внутренний Продукт (ВВП) по косвенным каналам, таким как падение производительности из-за неопределенности и изменений в производственной среде. Данная статья показывает, что глобальное увеличение тарифов на 10% может снизить уровень мирового ВВП почти на 2,0% сразу, и до 3,0% через два года, когда все дополнительные косвенные каналы материализуются.

Since China first joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, many countries around the world have sought to capitalize on lower tariff rates and China's increasing demand for high quality agricultural products. However, as competitive pressures in its agricultural sector have intensified, the Chinese government has implemented other forms of protectionist measures. Known as non-tariff measures (NTMs), these policy initiatives have added another dimension to international trade activities that needs to be better understood. Using a set of variables clearly identified in academic literature, our paper analyzes the effect that sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) have on New Zealand, U.S., Korean, and Japanese agricultural exports to China. To measure the effect that NTMs have on exports, we use an adapted version of the gravity model and the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood method. The key findings from the empirical projection show that Chinese SPS measures have a negative, albeit insignificant effect on the sample as a whole. However, when looking at the individual countries, the SPS measures were seen to have a negative effect on Japan and the U.S., while from a Korean perspective, their impact was positive and significant. As part of a secondary analysis, it was interesting to note that the SPS measures had a positive effect on New Zealand's exports before its free trade agreements (FTA) with China came into force. However, in the years since then, they were seen to have a negative impact.

Die Globalisierung und damit die weitere Vertiefung der wirtschaftlichen Integration werden von verschiedenen Seiten infrage gestellt. In vielen Ländern sind protektionistische Tendenzen zu erkennen. Die Folgen der US-Steuerreform und die Auswirkungen auf den internationalen Steuerwettbewerb werden detailliert betrachtet. ; Globalisation and the further deepening of economic integration that it involves are called into question from several angles. Protectionist measures can be seen in many countries. This paper discusses the issue of protectionist tax policy and links this debate to the current US tax reform.

THE PASSAGE OF BILL C-58 BY THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IN 1976 WAS AN ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE CANADA'S IDENTITY AND CULTURE BY PROMOTING THE PRINT AND BROADCAST MEDIA. BILL C-58 IS AN EXAMPLE OF A PROTECTIONIST MEASURE AIMED AT DISCOURAGING CANADIAN ADVERTISERS FROM USING NON-CANADIAN MEDIA.

Discussions in the WTO on Emergency Safeguards Measures (ESMs) for services are now stalemated. While possibly justified on political economy grounds if they resulted in WTO members making more liberal commitments, their main supporters (ASEAN minus Singapore) have not amply demonstrated their desirability or technical feasibility (legal and economic means). The GATS already has sufficient in-built flexibility, and several forms of de facto safeguard provisions and other measures exist. The economic case for ESMs is weak, and the efficiency costs from capture by protectionists and lost investment from restricting established foreign investors could be potentially large. The proposed ASEAN model essentially replicates the goods' ESM, and has a number of deficiencies, such as having no national interest or economic test. The paper suggests a number of ways that the ASEAN model could be improved if the case for ESM on services was accepted. It also examines, as an alternative to an ESM, the possibility of members introducing a waiver to temporarily withdraw services commitments should an emergency situation arise.

Discussions in the WTO on Emergency Safeguards Measures (ESMs) for services are now stalemated. While possibly justified on political economy grounds if they resulted in WTO members making more liberal commitments, their main supporters (ASEAN minus Singapore) have not amply demonstrated their desirability or technical feasibility (legal and economic means). The GATS already has sufficient in-built flexibility, and several forms of de facto safeguard provisions and other measures exist. The economic case for ESMs is weak, and the efficiency costs from capture by protectionists and lost investment from restricting established foreign investors could be potentially large. The proposed ASEAN model essentially replicates the goods' ESM, and has a number of deficiencies, such as having no national interest or economic test. The paper suggests a number of ways that the ASEAN model could be improved if the case for ESM on services was accepted. It also examines, as an alternative to an ESM, the possibility of members introducing a waiver to temporarily withdraw services commitments should an emergency situation arise.

Автор описывает опыт изучения степени прибыльности сельских территорий и применения к ним протекционистских мер государства, накопленный в странах Европейского союза. ; The author describes experience of studying of degree of profitableness of rural territories and application to them of the state protectionist measures, accumulated in the European union countries.

Trade may increase or decrease by imposing food standards. Thus there is not yet a clear trend whether the standards promote or hinder trade. From political point of view, a standard is considered as trade protectionist tool, which in agricultural trade takes the form of the so-called non-tariff measure (NTMs) including the Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs), which is in the focus of this research work. The objective of this work is to quantify the protectionism of MRLs standards relative to the stringency of international standards of Codex Alimentarius and to give insights on the effects of European MRL standards on trade versus US and other countries. The empirical approach of gravity model is used to explain international trade flows. For the quantification of the protectionism we implement the aggregation index of NTMs established by Li and Beghin (2014). An importer's MRL is defined as protectionist when the stringency of MRL standards exceeds the levels of Codex's MRL. In our research work, the country-level results show that Europe has more protectionist food standards, compared to US.

To measure Ad valorem tariff equivalents (AVEs) of non-tariff measures (NTMs), we propose a new alternative that relies on the estimation of bilateral trade flows on two-way panels at the HS 2-digit level with importer, exporter, and product fixed effects and interaction terms between NTM variables and a full vector of country-specific characters. Our results show AVEs for technical barriers to trade measures on manufactured products, for ASEAN countries and the whole sample are 4.5% and 5%, respectively. The AVEs for sanitary and phytosanitary measures on agricultural and food products for ASEAN countries and the whole sample are 6.5% and 6.7%, respectively. It should be noted that AVEs can mean very different things depending on whether they play as correction of a market failure. This depends on the technical capabilities of domestic regulatory agencies.

Highly educated professionals in the United States, such as doctors and lawyers, earn salaries that are considerably higher than their counterparts in other wealthy countries. In many cases the ratios of pay in the United States to that of other wealthy countries exceeds two to one. These gaps are not explained by differences in per capita income, which are not nearly as large, or pay scales more generally. In many occupations U.S. workers get lower pay than their counterparts in other wealthy countries.This paper examines the evidence that the pay gap is due to protectionist measures that restrict competition. The most important of these protectionist measures are licensing practices that both unnecessarily restrict domestic competition and also prevent foreign-trained professionals from practicing their profession in the United States. There is a considerable amount of money at stake in excess pay for U.S. professionals. Higher pay for doctors alone costs close to $100 billion annually (more than 0.5 percent of GDP). Adding in the excess pay for other professionals could double this amount.