The political economy of non-tariff measures

Abstract

Over the last decades, non-tari measures (NTMs) have seen an important upsurge. How-ever, little research has focused on the political economy of non-tariff protection, and the existing studies are mainly based on a single country or a specific type of measures. This paper seeks to fill the gap by empirically evaluating the determinants of NTMs in several countries, both developed and developing. Overall results show certain protectionist purposes behind the adoption of NTMs. This conclusion is reinforced for restrictive measures (i.e. subject to trade concerns), but does not hold for non-restrictive measures, suggesting the legitimate goal of several NTMs. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the influence exerted by national business groups during the Ministerial Conferences - the highestauthority of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - increases the probability of adopting NTMs in both developed and developing countries.