Suchergebnisse

AbstractMalta, Cyprus and Luxembourg are sovereign states with less than one million inhabitants and, consequently, are often referred to as "microstates." This article inquires into the negotiation activities and conditions for success of microstates in negotiations beyond the nation-state. It develops a set of hypotheses on negotiation activity and on negotiation success and tests them qualitatively by drawing on the example of day-to-day negotiations in the European Union. Luxembourg is considerably more active than Malta and Cyprus. This is due to differences in domestic coordination practices (performance and cooperation between lead ministries and Permanent Representations), as well as different negotiation styles (proactive vs. reactive). Microstates can be influential, if they actively participate in negotiations for issues of high importance and if they select effective strategies in the given setting. Thus, microstates can sometimes turn into successful shapers of law beyond the nation-state ‐ despite their slimmer administrations, fewer staff and ‐ on average ‐ negligible bargaining power.

Based on a comprehensive survey conducted in 2009, this article analyses similarities and differences in the policy-shaping activities of all 27 European Union member states in the day-to-day policy-making process of the EU. It shows that some states participate more actively in EU working parties and the COREPER than others. Do bigger states use negotiation strategies more frequently than smaller states? Do the available capacities crucially influence how frequently a delegation employs negotiation strategies in a particular policy field? The article develops a set of willingness- and capacity-related hypotheses and tests them using qualitative and quantitative methods. It shows that small states can surmount size-related difficulties most importantly through the accumulation of expertise. Thus, size is what states make of it. Small states are neither per se political dwarfs nor power-brokers.

Obwohl die Europäische Union eine vitale Rechtsgemeinschaft ist, gibt es schwerwiegende Vertragsverletzungen, die an den Europäischen Gerichtshof verwiesen werden. Dieser setzt Rechtsdiskurse und Urteile ein, um Rechtsverletzungen zu beheben. Obwohl beide Instrumente in internationalen Institutionen weit verbreitet sind, ist über ihre Funktionsweise wenig bekannt. Empirisch zeigt sich, dass ihr Erfolg vor allem innerhalb der Mitgliedstaaten beträchtlich variiert. Prominente Theorien betonen Varianzen zwischen Staaten und können Erfolgsunterschiede innerhalb von Staaten kaum erklären. Dieser Beitrag stellt fest, dass Rechtsdiskurse auf Prozessen effektiven Argumentierens und Urteile auf Prozessen effektiven Verhandelns beruhen, und identifiziert auf dieser Basis policy-bezogene Erfolgsbedingungen der Instrumente. Rechtsdiskurse sind nur erfolgreich, wenn die Akteure rechtliche Auslegungsheuristiken teilen, die zur Komplexität des Streitgegenstandes passen. Hingegen sind Urteile wirksam, wenn diese an bereits bestehende innerstaatliche Normen anschlussfähig sind. Sind beide Randbedingungen nicht gegeben, setzen Staaten die Regelverletzung fort, sodass dem EuGH nur noch Sanktionsdrohungen als allerletztes Mittel bleiben. (ICE2)

AbstractPre- and post-agreement discourses are an integral part of international relations. Yet, they only matter sometimes as an empirical analysis of European judicial discourses shows. State of the art Habermasisan and social psychology approaches on effective arguing cannot sufficiently explain variation in the success of discourses. This requires a fine-grained perspective: Only if actors share yardsticks fitting to the issue at stake, they can commonly assess the quality of arguments and incrementally develop a consensus. If such issue-specific reference standards are absent, actors talk at cross-purposes and dissent prevails. The article empirically illustrates the importance of intersubjective validity for the effectiveness of discourses and tests its central claim against alternative constructivist and rationalist explanations.