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"What's happened to the Democrats? They used to be antiwar!" Such is one of the many questions being bandied about by an online commentariat seeking to make sense of a litany of Republican endorsements of Kamala Harris, many of them made by party elites known for their hawkish foreign policy like former Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney and former Vice President Dick Cheney. One could find similar consternation with American liberals' support for U.S. involvement in the Ukraine crisis. The confusion is based primarily on nostalgia, a selective view of history that obscures the Democratic Party's longer, more complicated relationship with interventionism. The reality is quite different: what we are witnessing is the latest iteration of an ongoing intraparty struggle where the dominant liberal interventionist core asserts itself over a smaller progressive noninterventionist periphery. While the latter often dominates popular conceptions of the Democratic Party and its vision for American foreign affairs, the former drives the reality of party politics. This has been happening since the First World War, best encapsulated by the public debate between Columbia professor John Dewey and one of his students, writer Randolph Bourne. While both were considered liberals of a progressive stripe, they maintained opposing views on American entry into Europe's conflagration. Known for his adherence to philosophical pragmatism, Dewey asserted that the war could save the world from German militarism and be used to shepherd the American political economy toward a fairer, managed state. Bourne rejected this notion and argued that American entry into the war would undermine the egalitarianism of the larger progressive project and create a labyrinth of bureaucracies that would undermine democracy.While Dewey's arguments held sway as the United States entered the war, American involvement in Europe's quarrel, compounded by civil rights abuses at home, proved Bourne posthumously correct. Despite succumbing to the Spanish Flu in 1918, Bourne's views of the war, bolstered by the posthumous publication of a collection of essays entitled Untimely Papers, found fertile soil in an American society horrified by the conflict. Chastened by the realities of the Western Front, interwar progressivism took on a solid strain of pacifism and opposition to centralized authority.While Bourne's sentiments survived the Great War and inspired a postwar mood of non-interventionism, they would not survive America's subsequent entry into World War II, which set the tone for the foreign policy of American liberalism and, by extension, the Democratic Party for the next 30 years. Liberal interventionism won out in the face of a threat posed by the distinctly right-wing geopolitical threat in the form of the Axis powers. Except for a few strident leftwing pacifists and a few dissident liberals who took refuge with the Republican Right, the bulk of the formerly pacifist left took up the cause of intervention in the name of antifascism. The tone set by the Second World War carried through into American liberalism's conduct of the Cold War. Beneath the din of anti-communism, one often amplified by conservatives, American foreign policy was shaped by a liberal understanding of recent history and the origins of communism. President Harry Truman's eponymously titled doctrine entangled the United States in Europe's security architecture.After the Eisenhower administration, which solidified the Truman doctrine and expanded it to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the Cold War framework was thickened further still by a liberal cold warrior, President John F. Kennedy.Empowered by a materialist and universalistic view of human advancement and the belief that the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets, JFK pursued a policy known as "flexible response" that expanded American military spending beyond the bounds of nuclear deterrence. These policy changes, maintained under his successor, President Lyndon Johnson, and coupled with a dramatic increase in foreign aid spending, expanded U.S. commitments throughout the postcolonial world. This combination of asymmetric warfare and economic development drastically raised the stakes of the Cold War and led directly to U.S. entry into the quagmire of the Vietnam War. Contrary to nostalgia present the Kennedy era as a missed path towards peace, in reality, JFK continued America on a path of war-making and militarization laid out by his predecessors and stretched well beyond the deaths of the slain Kennedy brothers.While the Vietnam War was the product of Cold War liberalism, it was also its undoing. The horrors of the war, coupled with the inequities of the draft and government secrecy revealed, inspired a mass antiwar movement among the heretofore latent progressive left that found a resonant audience on Capitol Hill. Earlier antiwar works from the left, including that of Randolph Bourne, were revived for a youth movement radicalized against the war. This movement similarly inspired subsequent debates during the late Cold War, particularly on the issue of the Reagan administration's arming of the Contras in Nicaragua and intervention in the Angolan Civil War. The future seemed bright for a left-wing anti-war sensibility and its access to a Democratic Party that was amenable to its views. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, internal changes within the Democratic Party, and the subsequent birth of a new logic for humanitarian interventionism subsumed the ruptures caused by the Vietnam War. While the Democrats indeed offered notable resistance to Operation Desert Storm, often invoking the specter of Vietnam, congressional Democrats provided significant support to U.S. operations in Somalia and interventions in the former Yugoslavia. During the Clinton administration, inspired by retrospectives on the Holocaust compounded by the Rwandan genocide, the notion of a "responsibility to protect," the concept that the U.S. had the moral obligation to use force to prevent mass atrocity, took hold within elite liberal circles.Due to these competing impulses, Democratic opposition to the Global War on Terror was checkered and paired by a left-wing anti-war movement that, in retrospect, was a shadow of its Vietnam-era self. While, as with Iraq War I, Democrats posted noticeable opposition to Iraq War II, such opposition was overshadowed by the fact that Democratic leadership, especially in the Senate, acquiesced to a war spearheaded by a Republican administration. Three of the last five Democratic presidential nominees — then Senators John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden — voted in support of using military action against Iraq. President Obama won in 2008 in part because he publicly opposed war in Iraq before it began and campaigned on ending that war. While he advanced that sentiment by pursuing diplomacy with Iran and opening up to Cuba, he also launched interventions into Libya, Syria, and Yemen, often sold on the grounds of a "responsibility to protect." Much like the liberal rationale of interventions past, American involvement was justified on humanitarian grounds and met largely with Democratic acquiescence in Congress and voter apathy. Liberalism has entered a new wave of internal strife regarding America's role in the world. In a new era of great power competition, the progressive base of the Democratic Party has come out hard against unconditional U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza and Lebanon. It has also shown varying degrees of opposition to U.S. involvement in the Ukraine crisis. Yet, unlike the Vietnam era, this grassroots opposition has been unable to substantively influence Democratic politics, where a party elite clings to old views about upholding international norms and alliances, no matter how inconsistent or counterproductive those views in practice may be. Given this intraparty divide, it should not be surprising that the Harris campaign has courted the endorsement of hawkish Republicans. This history, however, should not be viewed as determinative of an inevitable path forward. The past has shown that these impulses are not static but held by individuals determined to shape the future.

One might assume that U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure are determined through serious deliberations among high-ranking officials in decorated uniforms considering adversary capabilities and targeting requirements. Sometimes that's not too far from reality. But in many cases, business interests and politics have played a larger role in shaping nuclear force structure than military strategy. The most recent example is the Air Force's new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, which the Pentagon has certified to continue despite its questionable strategic value along with its now $141 billion price tag and several-year schedule delays. Just two weeks ago Air Force Lt. Gen Andrew Gebara told an audience at the Mitchell Institute that while the force will "restructure to get after the cost growth," there is no effort to slow down and "work can still continue under the contract that exists today." Bringing the pork homeICBMs in the United States have been intrinsically tied to money and politics since they were first deployed in the 1960s, and rural Midwestern communities witnessed their fortunes changing with the arrival of these weapons of mass destruction. As Matt Korda, Associate Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, explains, local residents watched as the U.S. government paid to pave their dirt roads, rebuild their bridges, and upgrade their telephone and power lines to accommodate the needs of the missile bases. To these long-ignored communities, nuclear missiles brought money, jobs, and modernization. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians from ICBM states have lobbied fiercely to preserve these missile bases. As the primary threat of a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack from the Soviet Union faded, so did the need for a force of ICBMs meant to deliver a devastating preemptive blow against Soviet forces. When the Clinton administration thus considered eliminating ICBMs entirely during its Nuclear Posture Review process, a group of senators lobbied to have the issue dropped. Around the same time, senators from the ICBM host states — Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Utah, home to Hill Air Force Base where ICBM support activities are headquartered — formed the "Senate ICBM Coalition" with the mission of preserving America's missiles.The Senate ICBM coalitionThe coalition's role in the Sentinel ICBM program can be traced back to 2006. The Air Force previously claimed that the arsenal of Cold War-era Minuteman III ICBMs could be sustained through 2040. But an amendment by the Senate ICBM Coalition to the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) trimmed the lifespan by ten years.
Thus, coalition members used their influence to accelerate the development of a replacement ICBM, sustaining the force and ensuring benefits for their states for decades longer.
The coalition added other measures to the FY07 NDAA to hinder President Bush's planned reduction of the ICBM force by 50 missiles.
As President Obama was finalizing negotiations with Russia for New START in 2009, coalition senators worried what the treaty would mean for their ICBMs. Leveraging their votes on the treaty's ratification, the coalition successfully pressured Obama into limiting the reduction of ICBMs and committing to replace or modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.
This presented an opportunity for the Air Force to recommend replacing Minutemans with a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), later named "Sentinel."
In 2013, the Senate ICBM Coalition blocked the Pentagon from conducting the environmental impact study required before eliminating ICBMs. Also, when a 2013 interagency review concluded that the U.S. could maintain its strategic deterrent with a one-third reduction in deployed forces, the Pentagon began considering a significant reduction in the ICBM force. The coalition, however, successfully pressured the Pentagon to abandon the idea.
Another significant coalition success was a provision to the FY17 NDAA prohibiting the Air Force from deploying fewer than 400 ICBMs, which has been included in the NDAA every year since and which effectively grants lawmakers nuclear force posture authority over military officials. Lobbying for SentinelIn recent years, members of the Senate coalition, their allies in the House, and Northrop Grumman — the sole contractor for the Sentinel ICBM — have lobbied fiercely to sustain the Sentinel program.
To get ahead of a potential nuclear force review by a new Trump administration, the Senate coalition published a white paper in 2016 presenting the "strong case" for the Sentinel program, while acknowledging the "strong local interests in the ICBM mission" they represent.
In 2019, coalition allies in the House — and lobbying by Northrop Grumman — helped kill an amendment to the FY20 NDAA that would have required a study on life-extending Minuteman. The ICBM coalition then sent a letter to the secretary of defense conveying concerns over considerations of an alternative to GBSD and imploring him to "ensure the GBSD program is not disrupted or delayed."
On top of that, Northrop Grumman and its subsidiaries contributed $1.2 million to members of the Senate ICBM Coalition between 2012 and 2020 and over $15 million to members of the Senate and House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittees and the Senate and House Appropriations subcommittees on defense.
One beneficiary was Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.), a long-time member of the ICBM Coalition and Senate Appropriations Committee and current chair of the defense subcommittee. During a recent hearing, Tester urged Air Force leadership to keep the Sentinel program on schedule, saying it is "a project that's near and dear to me."
Tester has made his personal interest in the Sentinel issue clear, communicating to constituents last month that he's working to bring the Sentinel pork home: "[Sentinel will] bolster our local economy… I'll continue pushing the Air Force and government contractors to use as much Montana labor as possible on the project, because if you want a job done right, you hire a Montanan."
Last year, a group of coalition senators including Steve Daines (R-Mont.), John Barrasso (R-Wyo.), Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.), Mike Lee (R-Utah), and Mitt Romney (R-Utah) introduced the "Sentinel Nuclear Deterrence Act of 2023," which would authorize the Air Force to enter multiyear procurement contracts for Sentinel missiles.
North Dakota Senator John Hoeven (R) boasted in May that he pressured Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown to commit to "continue modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, especially the intercontinental ballistic missiles." Hoeven, a member of the Appropriations Committee, took credit in March for securing $4.5 billion in the FY24 Defense Appropriations bill for Sentinel development and procurement.The fate of SentinelThe Air Force notified Congress in January that the Sentinel ICBM program would cost 37 percent more than projected and take at least two years longer than estimated — an overrun in breach of Congress's Nunn-McCurdy Act, putting the program at risk of cancellation.
The Pentagon's internal review found that the cost would be even higher than previously stated — approximately $141 billion, an 81% increase from 2020 estimates. Despite this exorbitant price tag and "delay of several years," the Department of Defense this month certified the program to continue.
Besides excessive cost, there is little rationale for ICBMs in a post-Cold War era. Despite arguments by ICBM proponents of the responsiveness of ICBMs, government evaluations reveal that U.S. ballistic missile submarines are "almost equal in speed and reliability" and "virtually undetectable."
In contrast, ICBMs' sitting-duck vulnerability invites a devastating strike on U.S. soil by Russia. Beyond Russia, ICBMs are practically useless given that targeting China or North Korea would require overflight of Russia, which could too easily be mistaken by Russia as an incoming attack, risking a preemptive launch.The diminishing utility of ICBMs has been reflected in moves by multiple administrations and Pentagon officials to reduce and even eliminate their role in recent decades. At every turn though, these moves were fought by senators with personal stake in the preservation of ICBMs.

The article on the example of the Republic of Azerbaijan (AR) considers the role of external impulses in the development of hate intolerance and aggressive nationalism. The history of the genocidal behavior of AR dates back to the 19th century when the Caucasus passed from Persia to the Russian Empire. In order to remove the region from the political influence of Persia (deiranization), the empire united the mixed tribes that penetrated from Persia, gave them the ethnonym of the Caucasian Tatars, and provided them with wide privileges. The privileges granted to this orthodox community, which has been deprived of ethnic identity, have built the most permissive behavior in relations with the natives. The Empire 1905-1907 used it to punish Armenians actively involved in political movements. 1918 The Caucasian Tatars took part in the Armenian massacres committed by the Ottoman Turks who entered the region. Permissiveness towards Armenians, acquired under the conditions of the Russian Empire, grew into a deliberate genocidal behavior. 1920-1921 the Bolsheviks, who entered into a deal with the Kemalist Turks, encouraged this behavior by forcibly alienating Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh from the Arm. SSR in favor of Az. SSR. Stalin's plan to build a new Azerbaijani nation in the 1930s was aimed at halting the final Turkification of Caucasian Tatars by assimilating them to non-Turkish indigenous Islamic peoples. However, pro-Turkish figures trapped in state structures turned the program into a program of forcible Turkification of non-Turkish peoples, looting of their history and culture, and expulsion of Armenians from the republic. The publicity policy announced by Gorbachev, the new leader of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1985, seemed to pave the way for the restoration of justice and the reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with the Armenian SSR. However, Moscow described the NKAO regional council's request as "extreme" and addressed the solution to the crowd of Azerbaijanis. The genocide of Armenians of Azerbaijan began with the Sumgait massacre. The Gorbachev Center could have prevented these atrocities. However, subsequent events showed that Gorbachev needed that conflict to dismantle the USSR according to the Soviet republics. The West agreed with him on the issue, refraining from calling it a genocide. He feared recognizing a state that had declared itself a genocidal state after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ignoring the genocide of one of the founding peoples of the Republic of Azerbaijan, he recognized the RA in 1992 within the borders of Az. SSR. It was a genocide encouragement. AR has become a center for the export of aggressive nationalism and genocidal behavior today. There is the contribution of foreign players in it. Their responsibility for instilling a genocidal culture in the Eastern Transcaucasia has not yet been systematically studied. ; Հոդվածում Ադրբեջանական Հանրապետության օրինակով դիտարկվում է ատելության, անհանդուրժողականության և ագրեսիվ ազգայնականության ձևավորման գործում արտաքին ազդակների դերը: Ադրբեջանի ցեղասպանական վարքի ձևավորման նախապատմությունը սկսվում է XIX դարից, երբ Այսրկովկասը Պարսկաստանից անցել է Ռուսական կայսրությանը: Երկրամասը Պարսկաստանի քաղաքական ազդեցությունից հեռացնելու (իրանազերծելու) համար կայսրությունը այնտեղից թափանցող խառնամբոխ ցեղերին միավորել է, նրանց տվել կովկասյան թաթարներ էթնոնիմը և տրամադրել լայն արտոնություններ: Էթնիկական ինքնությունց զուրկ տարախառն այդ հանրույթին տրված արտոնությունները ձևավորել են արտոնյալ վարք բնիկների նկատմամբ: Կայսրռությունը 1905-1907 թթ. դա օգտագործել է քաղաքական շարժումներում ակտիվորեն ներգրավված հայերին պատժելու համար: 1918 թ. կովկասյան թաթարները մասնակցեցին երկրամաս մտած օսմանյան թուրքերի իրագործած հայկական ջարդերին: Ռուսական կայսրության պայմաններում հայերի հանդեպ ամենաթողությունը վերաճեց ցեղասպանական գիտակցված վարքի: 1920-1921 թթ. քեմալական թուրքերի հետ գործարքի մեջ մտած բոլշևիկները խրախուսեցին այդ վարքը՝ ՀԽՍՀ-ից բռնությամբ օտարելով Նախիջևանն ու Լեռնային Ղարաբաղը հօգուտ Ադր. ԽՍՀ-ի: 1930-ականներին ադրբեջանական նոր ազգ կառուցելու ստալինյան ծրագիրը նպատակ ուներ կասեցնել կովկասյան թաթարների վերջնական թուրքացումը՝ իսլամադավան ոչ թուրք բնիկ ժողովուրդների հետ ձուլելու ճանապարհով: Սակայն պետական կառույցներում խրամատավորված թուրքամետ գործիչները տեղում ծրագիրը փոխակերպեցին ոչ թուրք ժողովուրդների բռնի թուրքացման, նրանց պատմության ու մշակույթի կողոպուտի և հայերին հանրապետությունից դուրս մղելու ծրագրի: Բողոքողները մեղադրվում էին ազգայնամոլության մեջ և պատժվում: Անպատասխան էին մնում նաև Լեռնային Ղարաբաղից Մոսկվային հղված բողոքները: ԽՍՀՄ տարիներին կովկասյան թաթարներ կեղծ էթնիկ հանրությանը փոխարինեց դարձյալ ազգային ինքնությունից զերծ մեկ այլ էթնիկ հանրություն՝ ադրբեջանցիներ անվամբ: 1985-ին ԽՄԿԿ նոր առաջնորդ Մ.Գորբաչովի հռչակած հրապարակայնության ուղեգիծը, թվում էր, արդարության վերականգնման և ՀԽՍՀ հետ ԼՂԻՄ-ի վերամիավորման հնարավորություն էր տալիս: Սակայն Մոսկվան ԼՂԻՄ մարզխորհրդի խնդրանք-դիմումը որակեց «ծայրահեղական» և խնդրի լուծումը հասցեագրեց ադրբեջանցիների ամբոխին: Բարեկամության կեղծ լոզունգների տակ մինչ այդ քողարկվող Ադր. ԽՍՀ իշխանությունը և ամբոխը ստացան ինքնաարտահայտման ազատություն: Սումգայիթի հայերի ջարդով սկսվեց ադրբեջանահայության ցեղասպանությունը: Գորբաչովյան Կենտրոնը կարող էր կանխել այդ վայրագությունները: Սակայն հետագա դեպքերը ցույց տվեցին, որ այդ կոնֆլիկտը Գորբաչովին պետք էր ըստ միութենական հանրապետությունների ԽՍՀՄ-ը կազմաքանդելու համար: Արևմուտքը նրա համախոհն էր այդ հարցում և նույնպես ձեռնպահ մնաց տեղի ունեցածը ցեղասպանություն որակելու հարցում: Ադր. ԽՍՀ հիմնադիր ժողովուրդներից մեկի ցեղասպանությունը անտեսելով՝ նա Ադրբեջանական Հանրապետությունը 1992-ին ճանաչեց Ադր. ԽՍՀ սահմաններում: Դա խրախուսանք էր ցեղասպանին: Ադրբեջանն այսօր դարձել է ագրեսիվ ազգայնականության և ցեղասպանական վարքի դրսևորման կենտրոն, և դրանում արտաքին խաղացողների ներդրումը կա նաև: Այդ մշակույթը ներդրողների ցանկում են՝ Ռուսական կայսրությունը, սուլթանական և հանրապետական Թուրքիան, բոլշևիկյան Ռուսաստանը, գորբաչովյան ԽՍՀՄ-ը և մերօրյա Արևմուտքը՝ ի դեմս ԵԱՀԿ-ի: Արևելյան Անդրկովկասում ցեղասպանական մշակույթ ձևավորելու համար նրանց պատասխանատվությունը դեռևս համակարգված ուսումնասիրված չէ: ; В статье рассматривается роль внешних импульсов в формировании ненависти, нетерпимости и агрессивного национализма на примере Азербайджанской Республики. История геноцидного поведения Азербайджана восходит к XIX веку, когда Кавказ перешел от Персии к Российской империи. Чтобы вывести регион из-под политического влияния Персии, империя объединила проникавшие оттуда смешанные племена, дала им этноним кавказских татар и предоставила им широкие привилегии. Привилегии, предоставленные этой этнически смешанной общине, привели к преференциальному отношению к коренным народам. Империя использовала его в 1905–1907 годах для наказания армян, активно участвовавших в политических движениях. В 1918 году кавказские татары приняли участие в резне армян, совершенной вторгшимися в регион турками-османами. В условиях Российской империи толерантность к армянам превратилась в геноцидное поведение. Большевики, заключившие сделку с турками-кемалистами в 1920-1921 годах, поощряли такое поведение, насильственно отчуждая Нахичевань и Нагорный Карабах от Армянской ССР в пользу Азербайджанской ССР. План Сталина по созданию новой азербайджанской нации в 1930-х годах был направлен на то, чтобы остановить окончательную тюркизацию кавказских татар путем ассимиляции исламистских нетурецких коренных народов. Однако протурецкие деятели в государственных структурах превратили этот план в план насильственной тюркизации нетурецких народов, разграбления их истории и культуры и изгнания армян из страны. Протестующих обвинили в национализме и наказали. Жалобы из Нагорного Карабаха в Москву остались без ответа. В советское время кавказские татары заменили ложную этническую общность другой этнической общностью без национальной идентичности, именуемой азербайджанцами. Публичная позиция, объявленная в 1985 году новым лидером Коммунистической партии Советского Союза М. Горбачевым, казалось, предоставила возможность восстановить справедливость и воссоединить НКАО с Армянской ССР. Однако в Москве охарактеризовали запрос-заявление облсовета НКАО как "крайнее" и обратились к решению проблемы к толпе азербайджанцев. Под фальшивыми лозунгами дружбы, ранее замаскированного правительства Азербайджанской ССР толпа получила свободу слова. Геноцид армян Азербайджана начался с резни сумгаитских армян. Горбачев мог предотвратить эти зверства. Однако последующие события показали, что Горбачеву был нужен этот конфликт для развала СССР. Запад согласился с ним и также не стал называть случившееся геноцидом. Игнорируя геноцид одного из народов-основателей Азербайджанской ССР, он в 1992 году признал Азербайджанскую Республику в границах Азербайджанской ССР. Это было поощрением геноцида. Сегодня Азербайджан стал центром выражения агрессивного национализма, геноцидного поведения и вовлечения в него иностранных игроков.

La discusión sobre la declinación americana ha generado una profusa literatura. Por ejemplo, un libro clásico fue publicado por Paul Kennedy, historiador británico y profesor de la Universidad de Yale. En "TheRise and Fall of the Great Powers" (RamdonHouse, 1987) el autor hace hincapié en la dinámica de "over-expansión" en la que sistemáticamente han caído los imperios y grandes potencias. Por su parte, el notable economista americano MancurOlson escribió un trabajo titulado "TheRise and Decline of Nations: EconomicGrowth, Stagflation and Social Regidities" (Yale UniversityPress, 1982). Olson prosigue en parte su saga de "La lógica de la acción colectiva" (Harvard UniversityPress, 1965) para argumentar que la prosperidad genera sobre-demandas por parte de grupos de interés ineficientes cuyas ineficiencias son subestimadas (racionalmente) por el resto porque se encuentran en una economía que ha sido, y se percibe que seguirá siendo, lo suficientemente productiva como para tolerar esas ineficiencias. Sin embargo, hay un momento en que la suma de ineficiencias y privilegios no puede seguir siendo tolerada por el resto y, paulatinamente, ello comienza a hacer mella en la tasa de innovación y crecimiento. Por otro lado, es también suficientemente amplia la literatura que duda o descree abiertamente de la declinación americana. Por ejemplo, podemos citar a los Profesores Michael Cox y Josef Joffe. Cox ha escrito breves pero profundos artículos (que se encuentran online) como "Powershift and thedeath of thewest? notyet!o "Is United States in Decline-Again? An Essay?".En cuanto a Joffe, acaba de salirsulibro "The Myth of American Decline: Politics, Economics and a Half Century of False Prophecies" (Liveright, 2013). Aquí, es importante destacar que mientras Cox critica a los profetas de la declinación desde una concepción de izquierda o neo marxista, Joffe lo hace desde una concepción conservadora. En una corta y precisa reseña del libro de Joffe, el diario "TheWal Street Journal" sintetiza la visión del autor: "Theauthor's case isbolsteredbythelonghistory of past false alarms. After the 1957 launch of Sputnik, Americans had a full-blown panic attack that they would be buried by the Soviet Union, as Nikita Khrushchev had famously promised. The U.S. was suffering a "crisis in education" along with a "missile gap." Paul Samuelson, the future economics Nobelist, predicted that the Soviet economy would overtake America's sometime around 1984. "Only self-delusion can keep us from admitting our decline to ourselves," a Harvard professor named Henry Kissinger mused in a 1961 book. Similar warnings and premonitions of decline would sound with every passing decade, usually in tandem with the emergence of another contender to the American throne. In 1979, Ezra Vogel, also a Harvard Professor, published "Japan as Number One." It helped inaugurate a decade of awe and hysteria about the country that—according to common belief—would own the 21st century". Por su parte, podemos marcar una tercera línea donde se encuentran autores que remarcan los problemas que enfrenta EE.UU. en el corto-mediano plazo pero que perciben que ello puede ser modificado o, al menos, atenuado. Por ejemplo, desde una perspectiva más académica podemos mencionaral Profesor de Harvard NiallFerguson y su notable saga que va desde "Colossus, theRise and Fall of the American Empire" (Penguin,2004), pasando por "TheAscent of Money: A FinancialHistory of theWorld" (Pinguin, 2008) y "Civilization: Thewest and therest" (Pinguin, 2011) hasta llegar a "The Great Degeneration: HowInstitutionsDecay and Economies Die" (Pinguin, 2012). Los 3 primeros libros citados son notables trabajos. Desde una perspectiva menos académica podemos mencionar al influyente periodista del TheNew York Times, Thomas Friedman. En el libro"That Used to be Us: What Went Wrong with America and How it Can Come Back" (Hachette, 2011), Friedman y Michael Mandelbaummencionanque los 4 desafíoscontemporaneous de los EE.UU. son: "1) How to adapt to globalization, 2) how to adjust to the information technology, 3) how to cope with deficits and debts, 4) how to manage a world of both rising energy consumption and rising climates threats".Sin embargo, es claro que para los autores los EE.UU. están en condiciones de enfrentar esos desafíos. La comparación con el ascenso de Oriente, particularmente China, se encuentra presente, en mayor o menor medida, en todos los trabajos mencionados. La declinación asume el ascenso de uno y la caída relativa de otro. Como mencionamos, eso no es un problema en sí mismo. Sin embargo, lo destacable de este proceso que se ha acelerado en la última década es lo sorprendente del crecimiento chino y lo sorprendente de algunos aspectos de la decadencia americana. Es muy posible que ambas situaciones no permanezcan en el mediano plazo en semejante dimensión. Es decir, es posible que el ascenso chino sea menos vertiginoso en el mediano plazo y es posible que la decadencia americana sea menos vertiginosa de lo que es. Sin embargo, la pregunta es otra: ¿En qué medida lo acontecido ya no supone un cambio estructural en la relación de poder como para relativizar determinadas consecuencias? Así, la declinación como análisis comparado gana relevancia aún cuando la historia contemporánea de los EE.UU. tiene demasiados antecedentes de inminentes procesos de declinación que, como menciona Joffe, no se concretaron: el "momento Sputnik", la crisis del petróleo, el "milagro japonés" y ahora el milagro chino. En verdad, cuando analizamos la declinación americana y estudiamos los indicadores socio-económicos relevantes del desempeño de China y Oriente en los últimos 30 años, estamos principalmente sopesando los desafíos que enfrentan el liberalismo y la sociedad abierta. Es poco importante la salud financiera y empresarial de los EE.UU. y, en cambio, es demasiado importante los desafíos y amenazas que supondrán para los derechos individuales la aparición de un sistema capitalista autoritario que ha generado un inédito bienestar a amplios sectores populares en Oriente, particularmente en China.La declinación posee dos ámbitos geo-políticos (interno y externo). Dentro del ámbito o escenario interno, encontramos dos variables principales: la calidad de la política y la productividad de la economía. Ambas se encuentran, lógicamente, en el actor que supuestamente declina (EE.UU.) y en el o los actores que supuestamente ascienden (China). El éxito contemporáneo de los EE.UU. ha descansado en la interacción virtuosa de ambas variables. La calidad de la política (es decir, la vigencia de pesos y contrapesos) ha contribuido a la productividad de la economía. La posible declinación relativa descansa en la dificultad de mantener una economía altamente productiva frente a una política deficitaria. Por otro lado, la ascendencia china ha reflejado en esta nación una virtuosa interacción entre política y economía. A diferencia de la experiencia americana, el éxito chino ha descansado en una interacción que reflejaba una economía productiva porque había ausencia de pesos y contrapesos. El Politburó del Partido Comunista Chino (PCI) expresa lo opuesto al Shutdown acontecido Washington en las dos primeras semanas de octubre de 2013. Es decir, la eficiencia americana ha descansado en una relación virtuosa entre política y economía. Esta forma de relacionamiento se encuentra en crisis. En cambio, la relación virtuosa entre política y economía china ha alcanzado su apogeo. Sin embargo, una hipótesis es que tanto la dinámica del fracaso americano como la del éxito chino son de corto plazo. Es decir, el nuevo orden emergente (un orden bipolar) sería un orden esencialmente inestable. Por un lado, el propio proceso democrático americano debiese encontrar (aunque no sabemos cuándo) un mecanismo para generar una interacción algo más virtuosa entre política y economía. Por otro lado, el proceso chino se enfrentará (aunque no sabemos cuándo) a las tensiones propias de una economía altamente productiva frente a una política altamente represiva. Si bien hoy sabemos que eso no es inexorable (y que la teoría de la modernización ha quedado acotada) también sabemos que es un arreglo institucional en algún lado, en algún punto, inestable.Sobre el autorUniversidad ORT-Uruguay

Исследования российской академической диаспоры получили сегодня значительное развитие. Вместе с тем обращает на себя внимание тот факт, что большинство работ в этой области направлены на исследование той части диаспоры, которая связана с точными техническими науками, биологией и химией. При этом экономисты, социологи и другие обществоведы остаются «за кадром». На наш взгляд это несправедливо по ряду причин. Российские экономические, социальные и гуманитарные науки находятся в значительно более тяжелой ситуации, нежели науки точные. Развивавшиеся в советские годы в изоляции, эти дисциплины пытаются наверстать упущенное, но отставание от западных исследователей остается катастрофическим. Привлечение к развитию российской науки специалистов с опытом работы в ведущих международных университетах могло бы дать заметный импульс укреплению этих дисциплин. Вместе с тем, исследователям, работающим в этом поле для научной работы, не требуется ни дорогостоящих оборудования, ни создания отдельной инфраструктуры, что облегчает задачу привлечения специалистов. Возможно, этой ситуацией стоило бы воспользоваться для отработки пилотных моделей взаимодействия между учеными из российских ВУЗов, НИИ и представителями диаспоры. В фокусе настоящего исследования находятся исследователи, представляющие социально-экономические науки: экономику, историю, социологию, политологию, психологию, менеджмент (включая логистику), право, философию, образование, коммуникации, международные отношения. Спрос на эти направления подготовки в России остается высоким. Однако не вполне ясно, как наладить международное сотрудничество в условиях ограниченных ресурсов и высокой конкуренции за квалифицированные кадры. В этом отношении изучение возможностей сотрудничества с теми, кто предрасположен к совместной работе с российскими организациями, представляется вполне обоснованным ; Migrants' flows and diasporas have become important phenomenon in the modern world. Although diasporas differ in their scales, they definitely demonstrate the potential for being an important and often underestimated policy tool. This paper reviews the opportunities for cooperation with homeland, considering the example of the Russian academic diaspora in social sciences (the data from a descriptive pilot study, competed in autumn-winter 2008). The chosen focus is interesting because a) the studied community is small and questions its own attribution to diaspora, b) highly skilled professionals seem to present a special case for all diaspora studies, tend to be more independent from the rest of their compatriots, and to integrate closer into the host culture, c) social science was underdeveloped in the Soviet Union and remains rather isolated from the general flow of studies in nowadays Russia, thus limiting the attractiveness of return option. While some countries are competing for the highly skilled migrants, others either try to regulate emigration flows or develop the policies, enabling to turn the brain drain into the brain gain. The latter became a popular topic, also because of its relevance to the agenda of so many countries all over the world, including the most developed. Whether Russian academic diaspora in socio-economic field could be a noticeable change agent in developing Russian research and education; what are these people, are they interested in having more cooperation with Russia; how it could be stimulated that was the overall perspective of the study, and it defined the logic of the following text. High-skilled migration became a popular phenomenon in both reality and academic studies. If the normal migrants need an identity in a host society, the professionals get it with their job affiliation, thus do not need to seek or create one. Also the use of term 'minority' is often inadequate while describing Babylonian crowd, which forms many departments or laboratories in the developed countries thus the very essence of diaspora phenomenon is questioned by this category of people. Instead of solving the problem of adaptation to the new society, the migrants of this type seem to maximize the professional opportunities, which are often better in the host, than in home countries. Thus they often do not demonstrate most of the attributes, expected from a migrant sticking together with the other people of the same origin, supporting ethnic networks, etc. they do not need that assistance, as they get it through the job. A situation that stimulates emergence of networks: a migrant needs to find the ways in the society is substituted by much more individualistic perspective: 'the society (through the host institutions) assists the specialists to be integrated' or at least does not create any additional obstacles and provides the necessary support (e.g. visa support, insurance, housing, etc.). Integration through professional networks is often easier, as they are already established and recognized in the host society, such networks are often dense enough to provide the necessary support, and the colleagues help to integrate also psychologically and culturally. Diaspora could also be seen as a resource, opening additional opportunities in social or political space for its members: through creating own associations immigrants establish many contacts, at least with other immigrant associations, third-sector organizations, and the local authorities. Again high-skilled migrants might find integration into professional community more beneficial than addressing the diaspora as a tool for establishing themselves in the host society. Some studies suggest that as long as the migrant researchers are familiar with the social systems in both the host and the home country, they could serve as a special link between both, stimulating the circulation of intellectual resources. Thus it could be also expected to find a well-integrated community, sharing the same or close values and interests, and searching for the ways for further expansion ready to integrate the new members, etc. Finally, one should expect to find the Russian community abroad as fairly heterogeneous: complicated history of Russia in the 20th century has created different identities for 'Russians', meaning both geographical and cultural diversity. The definition 'Russian' could be attributed to those, associated with the Russian empire, its huge territories and mixed history, thus covering most of the so-called 'Russian-speakers'. It could also deal with the 'Russian-Soviet' divide, and the different views on country's past and future it is creating. Each definition of 'a Russian' in a mixed social environment of a host country loosens the diaspora tights further. Several key findings are discussed in the article. Those include: Heterogeneity of the category in question. Internationally integrated social researchers of widely defined Russian origin make a mixed group with very different background, different relations to Russia and its academic community, and presumably different identities (the question, which was not addressed in the study). Globalised logic of career-making dominates over any ethnic identity. The researchers have positive feelings about Russia, often are interested in the social processes there as a real or potential subject for their research, but it does not mean their readiness to move to Russia, neither their preference to cooperation with other researchers of the same origin in or outside the country. Career considerations define the further move of the well-integrated researchers. The origin does not play an important role, because the community is too small and the research topics are too diverse. Thus the term diaspora in its standard meaning is not fully applicable to the category in question these people form a special professional community, where work identity and work-related networking dominate. Broader focus is possible, while looking for the ways to attract internationally recognized researchers. Smaller importance of ethnic identity however broadens the pool of researchers, who might be interested in cooperation with their Russian counterparts. In the case of large country with many special processes, interesting for social researchers, there is a good chance of attracting not only those, related to the country by the background, but also those, looking for interesting data and good research opportunities. A number of suggestions on the formats and conditions of cooperation between internationally recognized and local researchers is made these schemes could be applied in different countries, not only in Russia

Die Arbeit zeichnet die Entwicklung der Europadiskurse in Ungarn vom Ausgang des 18. Jahrhundert bis zum Ende des Kommunismus nach. Sie zeigt die Vielfalt und Wandelbarkeit der Vorstellungen von und Bezugnahmen auf "Europa" durch Schriftsteller, Künstler, Politiker und Intellektuelle. Geprägt war der Diskurs vor allem durch ein beinahe permanent anzutreffendes Rückständigkeitsnarrativ. "Europa", das bedeutete meist Westeuropa, England, Frankreich, aber auch Deutschland. Zwar zählte man sich seit der Krönung des ersten ungarischen Königs Istvan I. im Jahre 1000 mit einer vom Papst gesandten Krone zu einem festen Bestandteil (West-)Europas, die Zugehörigkeit wurde aber durch die fehlende beziehungsweise verzögerte wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Modernisierung häufig in Frage gestellt. Zudem sah man sich mit einer gewissen Ignoranz des Westens konfrontiert, der nur allzu oft sich selbst als eigentliches Europa darstelle und die Leistungen der Ungarn für den Schutz Europas, beispielsweise durch die Abwehr der Türken, nicht würdige. Dieses Isolationsmotiv zieht sich gleichsam wie ein roter Faden durch den Diskurs und wird vielfältig, aber ambivalent eingesetzt. Einerseits werden die niedergeschlagenen Aufstände 1848 und 1956, in denen "Europa" tatenlos zusah wie Ungarns Freiheitskampf von außen erstickt wurde, für eine Anklage des Westens und symbolische Überhöhung Ungarns als verlassener Vorkämpfer der Zivilisation instrumentalisiert, andererseits führt dieser Isolationsdiskurs häufig zu geradezu anti-europäischen Diskursbeiträgen, in denen Ungarn als ein Land des Ostens charakterisiert wird und westliche Wertvorstellungen und Errungenschaften negiert werden. Die verbreitetste diskursive Verortung Ungarns aber ist die, dass es die "Mitte" Europas" sei, ein Ort des Ausgleichs westlicher Moderne und östlicher Rückständigkeit, Bewahrer der ureigenen europäischen Werte. Diese Figur findet sich sowohl im national-liberalen Diskurs des 19. Jahrhunderts, als auch im Dissidentendiskurs der 1980er Jahre. Der ungarische Europadiskurs pendelte also, wie gezeigt wurde tatsächlich von West nach Ost, aber die Mitte war in der Perspektive der betrachteten 200 Jahre ein tradierter Rückzugs- und Bestimmungspunkt der ungarischen Identität in Europa und als Ausgleich der Extreme auch die Identität Europas selbst.:1. Einleitung.3 1.1. Thematische Vorbemerkungen.3 1.2 Methodische Vorbemerkungen.7 2. Liberalismus und Nationalismus als Modelle der "Europäisierung" – 1780-1848.10 2.1 Sprachnationalismus vs. Staatspatriotismus.12 2.2 Der Europadiskurs in Literatur und Historiographie.15 2.3 Der Europadiskurs im Vormärz-Ungarn.19 2.3.1 "Fährenland" nach Europa – István Graf Széchenyi.19 2.3.2 Wider den Osten – Miklós Wesselényi.22 2.3.4 Die westliche Mitte – Lajos Kossuth.25 3. Revolution und Neoabsolutismus – 1848-1867.30 3.1 Die Revolution in Ungarn im europäischen Kontext.30 3.1.1 Vorstoß.31 3.1.2 Rückschlag.34 3.2 Ungarn im Neoabsolutismus – Europa im Exil.37 3.2.1 Nicht ohne Österreich – Zsigmond Kemény.39 3.2.2 Die herrschenden Ideen in Europa – József Eötvös.39 3.2.3 Zerfall Österreichs und neuer Bund für Europa – Mihály Táncsics.43 3.2.4 Mahnung aus dem Exil – Kossuths "Donaubund".45 3.2.5 Nationalstaat statt Föderation – Der Königsweg für Europa?.48 4. K.u.K. in Europa – 1867-1918.50 4.1 Die "Europäizität Ungarns" im Dualismus .50 4.1.1 Das Nationalitätengesetz als Beitrag zur "Europäisierung".51 4.1.2 Wirtschaftlicher Anschluss an Europa? .54 4.1.3 Die Innen- und Außenpolitik der "Tisza-Ära".56 4.1.4 Historiographie zwischen "kuruz" und "labanc".57 4.2 "Fährenland" zwischen Ost und West – 1890-1918.59 4.2.1 Marschrichtung Osten – Von Großungarn zum Turanischen Reich.61 4.2.2 Marschrichtung Westen – Die bürgerlichen Radikalen und der erneuerte Föderationsgedanke.65 4.2.3 Ungarn in "Mitteleuropa".69 5. Zwischen Isolation und Europaeuphorie – 1918-1945.72 5.1 Das Ende der Monarchie und die Phase der Experimente – 1918-1920.72 5.1.1 Europas Zusammenbruch und Zukunft – Oszkár Jászi.73 5.1.2 Neues Europa durch neue Staaten – József Pásztor.76 5.1.3 Die Räterepublik und Europa.80 5.2 Revision und Föderation – Der Europadiskurs der zwanziger und dreißiger Jahre.82 5.2.1 Die Friedensverhandlungen in Trianon.83 5.2.2 Der Revisionismus als dominanter Denkstil der Zwischenkriegszeit.84 5.2.3 Die "Östliche Schweiz" – Oszkár Jászi.87 5.2.4 Das neue "Hungaria" in Europa – Lászlo Ottlik.90 5.2.5 Die Pan-Europa Bewegung in Ungarn.92 5.2.6 Das neue Mitteleuropa – Elemér Hantos.94 5.2.7 Ungarn in Osteuropa – Tivadar Raith und Dezső Szabó.97 5.3 Das "rechte" Europa.100 6. Ungarn im "Osten" – Der Europa-Diskurs in der Volksrepublik – 1945-1990.107 6.1 Ungarn zwischen "Ost" und "West".107 6.1.1 Der Ausgang des Krieges und die Etablierung des Stalinismus.107 6.1.2 Die Misere Osteuropas – István Bibó.109 6.2 Aspekte einer eigenständigen außenpolitischen Konzeption – 1956 als Versuch der Rückkehr nach Europa.113 6.2.1 Neutralität in Europa – Imre Nagy.113 6.2.2 1956 – Eine Revolution für Europa.116 6.3 Die Historiographie und der Mitteleuropadiskurs der 1980er Jahre.119 6.3.1 Ungarn als östliches Zerrbild des Westens – Jenő Szűcs.121 6.3.2 Die unvollständige Modernisierung – Iván T. Berend.123 6.3.3 Ungarn in Mitteleuropa – György Konrád.125 7. Resumee.128 8. Quellen und Literaturverzeichnis 8.1 Quellen 8.1.1 Internet-Quellen 8.1.2 gedruckte Quellen 8.2 Sekundärliteratur 8.2.1 selbstständige Beiträge 8.2.2 unselbstständige Beiträge ; The article starts with the notion of a remarkable research deficit (within the wider field of historically oriented European studies) regarding the thinking and discourses on "Europe" in East Central Europe, especially in Hungary. This desiderate could be explained by the partition of the continent through the Iron Curtain lasting for fourty years, what seemed to exclude these countries from Europe in several respects. Nevertheless there was and is a reconstructable, various if plural discourse on the place of Hungary in Europe. It was tightly linked with the discourses on the nation-state and on modernization in the 19th century, while the country was part of the Austrian monarchy of Habsburg. Thus it received main impulses from Western Europe, whose development was taken as an ideal to follow. The East, particularly Russia, was in contrast considered as the non-european "other", the enemy of liberty and progress. Despite this notion, there were remarkable attempts to frame Hungary in an Eastern context, espeacially through the idea of "Turan", that claimed a tribal community between Hungarians, Turks and Iranians, which should unite in a common empire. However catching up to the West remained the dominant goal, but was complicated by the structural, economic and cultural differences that lasted on feudal and agrarian Hungary until the beginning of the 20th century. Yet "Europe" was not only a model, it was also a, rather metaphysic and symbolic, institution to which the country appealed for support during the revolutions 1848 and 1956. Both upheavels against an imperial enemy, Habsburg and the Soviet Union, failed and Hungarians felt abandoned by the West, that is Europe. As a consequence of these gaps and failures the idea of Hungary as a part of Central Europe, a special region of small states between the Great powers in the East and the West with a specific identity was conceived. This concept also included the vision of a joint federation to facilitate the negotiations of the everlasting national and ethnic conflicts of the region. It can be found within the texts of 19th century liberal politicians like István Széchenyi, who shaped the metaphor of Hungary as a "ferry-land", and Lajos Kossuth, who presented the first plan for Danubian Federation, Interwar-politicians like Oszkár Jászi and anti-soviet dissidents like György Konrád in the 1980ies. According to these and other protagonists of the discourse, the "centre" can be classified as the ultimate place of Hungary in Europe throughout the centuries, sharing and preserving the European Heritage.:1. Einleitung.3 1.1. Thematische Vorbemerkungen.3 1.2 Methodische Vorbemerkungen.7 2. Liberalismus und Nationalismus als Modelle der "Europäisierung" – 1780-1848.10 2.1 Sprachnationalismus vs. Staatspatriotismus.12 2.2 Der Europadiskurs in Literatur und Historiographie.15 2.3 Der Europadiskurs im Vormärz-Ungarn.19 2.3.1 "Fährenland" nach Europa – István Graf Széchenyi.19 2.3.2 Wider den Osten – Miklós Wesselényi.22 2.3.4 Die westliche Mitte – Lajos Kossuth.25 3. Revolution und Neoabsolutismus – 1848-1867.30 3.1 Die Revolution in Ungarn im europäischen Kontext.30 3.1.1 Vorstoß.31 3.1.2 Rückschlag.34 3.2 Ungarn im Neoabsolutismus – Europa im Exil.37 3.2.1 Nicht ohne Österreich – Zsigmond Kemény.39 3.2.2 Die herrschenden Ideen in Europa – József Eötvös.39 3.2.3 Zerfall Österreichs und neuer Bund für Europa – Mihály Táncsics.43 3.2.4 Mahnung aus dem Exil – Kossuths "Donaubund".45 3.2.5 Nationalstaat statt Föderation – Der Königsweg für Europa?.48 4. K.u.K. in Europa – 1867-1918.50 4.1 Die "Europäizität Ungarns" im Dualismus .50 4.1.1 Das Nationalitätengesetz als Beitrag zur "Europäisierung".51 4.1.2 Wirtschaftlicher Anschluss an Europa? .54 4.1.3 Die Innen- und Außenpolitik der "Tisza-Ära".56 4.1.4 Historiographie zwischen "kuruz" und "labanc".57 4.2 "Fährenland" zwischen Ost und West – 1890-1918.59 4.2.1 Marschrichtung Osten – Von Großungarn zum Turanischen Reich.61 4.2.2 Marschrichtung Westen – Die bürgerlichen Radikalen und der erneuerte Föderationsgedanke.65 4.2.3 Ungarn in "Mitteleuropa".69 5. Zwischen Isolation und Europaeuphorie – 1918-1945.72 5.1 Das Ende der Monarchie und die Phase der Experimente – 1918-1920.72 5.1.1 Europas Zusammenbruch und Zukunft – Oszkár Jászi.73 5.1.2 Neues Europa durch neue Staaten – József Pásztor.76 5.1.3 Die Räterepublik und Europa.80 5.2 Revision und Föderation – Der Europadiskurs der zwanziger und dreißiger Jahre.82 5.2.1 Die Friedensverhandlungen in Trianon.83 5.2.2 Der Revisionismus als dominanter Denkstil der Zwischenkriegszeit.84 5.2.3 Die "Östliche Schweiz" – Oszkár Jászi.87 5.2.4 Das neue "Hungaria" in Europa – Lászlo Ottlik.90 5.2.5 Die Pan-Europa Bewegung in Ungarn.92 5.2.6 Das neue Mitteleuropa – Elemér Hantos.94 5.2.7 Ungarn in Osteuropa – Tivadar Raith und Dezső Szabó.97 5.3 Das "rechte" Europa.100 6. Ungarn im "Osten" – Der Europa-Diskurs in der Volksrepublik – 1945-1990.107 6.1 Ungarn zwischen "Ost" und "West".107 6.1.1 Der Ausgang des Krieges und die Etablierung des Stalinismus.107 6.1.2 Die Misere Osteuropas – István Bibó.109 6.2 Aspekte einer eigenständigen außenpolitischen Konzeption – 1956 als Versuch der Rückkehr nach Europa.113 6.2.1 Neutralität in Europa – Imre Nagy.113 6.2.2 1956 – Eine Revolution für Europa.116 6.3 Die Historiographie und der Mitteleuropadiskurs der 1980er Jahre.119 6.3.1 Ungarn als östliches Zerrbild des Westens – Jenő Szűcs.121 6.3.2 Die unvollständige Modernisierung – Iván T. Berend.123 6.3.3 Ungarn in Mitteleuropa – György Konrád.125 7. Resumee.128 8. Quellen und Literaturverzeichnis 8.1 Quellen 8.1.1 Internet-Quellen 8.1.2 gedruckte Quellen 8.2 Sekundärliteratur 8.2.1 selbstständige Beiträge 8.2.2 unselbstständige Beiträge

ÖZETBu doktora tezi temel olarak iki amaca sahiptir. Bunlardan ilki; eski Sovyetler Birliği'nin Güney coğrafyasında, şu anda Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri'nin bulunduğu bölgede Türkiye'nin ekonomik, siyasal ve güvenliğe ilişkin beklentileri maksimize edebilmesi için işbirliği stratejisi modelleri geliştirmek ve ikincisi; bu işbirliği stratejisi modellerinin uygulanmasını takiben belirecek olası yeni güç dengesi kapsamında Türkiye'nin içinde bulunacağı olası durumu senaryo planlama metodunu kullanarak oluşturulacak gelecek senaryoları ile tahmin etmek ve bunu gerçekleştirerek Türk karar alıcılarını oluşacak bu olası güç dengesi sisteminden önceden bilgilendirmek.Tez üç bölümden oluşmaktadır:Bölüm I'de Orta Asya halkları ve Orta Asya bölgesine ilişkin genel bilgi sunulmaktadır. Bu bölümde temel olarak dört husus üzerinde yoğunlaşılmıştır: İlk olarak; Türk kökenli halkların tarihi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Rus hakimiyeti altındaki Türk Hanlıkları arasındaki münasebetler, Sovyetler Birliği hakimiyeti altındaki Orta Asya halkları ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ndeki Türkler arasındaki münasebetler açıklanmakta, ikinci olarak; Türk karar alıcılarını Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri'ni Türk dış politikasının ilgi alanına dahil etmeye sevkeden faktörler belirtilmekte, üçüncü olarak; Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri'nin politik, sosyal, ekonomik yapısı, Orta Asya bölgesinin coğrafi ve ekonomik önemi ve son olarak Türkiye'nin Orta Asya bölgesindeki rolü ifade edilmektedir. Bölüm II'de dört farklı "İşbirliği Strateji Modelleri" önerilmektedir; Strateji Modeli I: Türkiye-A.B.D., Strateji Modeli II: Türkiye-A.B.D-İsrail, Strateji Modeli III: Türkiye-A.B.D.-İran ve Strateji Modeli IV: Türkiye-Orta Asya Ekonomik İşbirliği. Bu strateji modelleri gerçekleşme olasılığı en yüksek olandan gerçekleşme olasılığı en düşük olana şeklinde numaralandırılmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle tezde işbirliği strateji modellerine dahil edilen beş devletin (A.B.D., İsrail, İran, Hindistan ve Pakistan) Türkiye'ye sunacakları politik ve ekonomik avantajların aynı düzeyde olamayacağı gerçeği göz önünde bulundurularak bu beş devlet ayrı strateji modelleri kapsamına alınmaktadır. Ayrıca, İşbirliği Strateji Modelleri iki temel kritere dayandırılarak yapılandırılmaktadır: İlk olarak; bu devletlerle işbirliği gerçekleştirmesi durumunda Türkiye'nin Orta Asya bölgesindeki politikalarını kolaylaştıracak ve maksimize edebilecek ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel imkan ve de kabiliyetlere sahip ülkelerin İşbirliği Strateji Modelleri için seçilmesi ve ikinci olarak; uluslar arası ilişkilerde devletlerin milli menfaatleri hususunun hayati önem taşıdığı dikkate alınarak İşbirliği Strateji Modellerine dahil edilen devletlerin Orta Asya bölgesine ilişkin doğrudan ya da dolaylı ilgi ve beklentilerinin göz önünde bulundurulması. Bunun yanısıra, bu bölümde sadece "İşbirliği Strateji Modelleri" üzerinde yoğunlaşmamızı gerektiren beş temel sebep açıklanmaktadır: 1. Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri'nin beklentilerini karşılayabilecek ekonomik güce sahip olmaması, 2. Rusya'nın Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri'ne ilişkin politik tutumu, 3. Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri'nin sadece Türkiye tarafından karşılanamayacak ekonomik, politik ve güvenlik beklentileri, 4. Türkiye ve Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri arasındaki tarihi ve kültürel farklar ve 5. Türkiye'nin Orta Asya bölgesine direkt geçiş sağlayamayan coğrafi konumu. Bölüm III'te beş makro senaryo geliştirilmektedir; Gelecek Senaryosu I: Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya İlişkin Olası Durumu, Gelecek Senaryosu II: Türkiye'nin A.B.D'ne İlişkin Olası Durumu, Gelecek Senaryosu III: Türkiye'nin Rusya Federasyonu'na İlişkin Olası Durumu, Gelecek Senaryosu IV: Türkiye'nin Yunanistan'a İlişkin Olası Durumu ve Gelecek Senaryosu V: Türkiyenin Avrupa Birliği'ne İlişkin Olası Durumu. Makro Senaryoların yanısıra bazı mikro senaryolar da sunulmatadır. Mikro Senaryolar gerçekleşme ihtimali en yüksek olandan en düşük olana şeklinde numaralandırılırken; gerçekleşme ihtimali en yüksek olarak kabul edilen senaryoya, uluslararası sistemde beklenmedik bir sapma olabileceği hususu gözönünde bulundurularak, maksimum realizasyon şansı tanınmaktadır. Bu bölümde işbirliği strateji modellerinin gerçekleştirilmesini takiben Türkiye'nin sadece Orta Doğu, A.B.D., Rusya Federasyonu, Yunanistan ve AB'ne ilişkin olası durumuna ait Gelecek Senaryoları geliştirilmesinin nedeni Türkiye'nin adı geçenlerden herbiri ile köklü güvenlik, ya da politik ya da ekonomik sorunlarının bulunmasıdır. Beş Makro senaryo gerçekleştirilirken "Gelecek Senaryo Planlama Metodu" kullanılmaktadır.ABSTRACTThis study has two main aims; firstly to develop cooperation strategy models in order to maximise Turkey's economic and political advantages in the former Soviet South geopolitical area and secondly to plan future scenarios through future scenario planning method to forecast the probable stand of Turkey in the probable new balance of power to be emerged as the result of the realisation of these strategy models and by doing so, to inform Turkish officials about this new balance of power before hand.The study has three chapters:In Chapter I we try to present necessary and overall information related to the Central Asian peoples and Central Asian region. We focus on four points; first of all, we explain a short history of Turkish origin peoples, give the background information about the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Central Asian Turkish Khanates under Russian dominance and between the Central Asian peoples in the Soviet Union and the Turks in Turkish Republic; secondly, we explain the factors that led Turkish decision-makers to include Central Asian states in Turkish foreign policy menu; thirdly, we present political, social and economic structure of the Central Asian states, geo and eco strategical importance of the Central Asian region, the problems that the Central Asian states face, and last we explain the role of Turkey in the Central Asian region. In Chapter II we propose four different "cooperation strategy models"; Strategy Model I: Turkey - U.S., Strategy Model II: Turkey - U.S. - Israel, Strategy Model III: Turkey - U.S. - Iran, and Strategy Model IV: Turkey - Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization (CAECO). The strategy models are numbered from the most probable to the least probable. In other words, in the study taking the fact into consideration that cooperating with these five states will not present equal political and economic advantages for Turkey we include different states in different strategy models. In the study, Cooperation Strategy Models are based on two basic criteria: Firstly, economic or political or cultural capabilities and possibilities of the states included in the Models, which can directly facilitate and maximise Turkey's policies in the Central Asian region in case Turkey cooperates with them, and secondly, the states' direct or indirect interests and expectations in the Central Asian region since national interests of the states bear vital importance in international relations. Besides, there have been five main reasons which direct us to propose and concentrate on only "cooperation strategy model".in this study: 1. Economic incapabilities of Turkey which unables her to cover the needs of the CAR, 2. Russian Federation's firm stand towards these republics, 3. CAR's political, economic and security expectations which can not satisfied by Turkey alone, 4. Differences in culture and history between the CAR and Turkey, 5. Geographic location of Turkey which represents no contiquity with the Central Asian region.In chapter III we develop five macro future scenarios; Future Scenario I: Future Scenarios on Turkey's Position Regarding the Middle East Region, Future Scenario II: Future Scenarios on Turkey's Position Regarding the U.S., Future Scenario III: Future Scenarios on Turkey's Position Regarding the Russian Federation, Future Scenario IV: Future Scenarios on Turkey's Position Regarding Greece and Future Scenario V: Future Scenarios on Turkey's Position Regarding the EU. We also develop several micro scenarios which are interrelated with the mentioned macro scenarios. In the study we number the micro scenarios from the most plausible one to the least plausible one and give maximum 60 percent of realisation chance for the most plausible scenario taking the possibility of emergence of wild card (negative) scenarios (negative trends) into consideration. In this chapter we try to forecast Turkey's probable stand in regard to the Middle East region, U.S., Russian Federation, Greece and EU following the application of cooperation strategies and create future scenarios on them only since Turkey has had deep-rooted security, or political or economic conflicts with each one of them in history largely. In addition to these, while forecasting the future and in creating these five macro future scenarios we adopt future scenario planning method.

Belarus ist an der europäischen Integration nicht ernsthaft interessiert. Es hat sich in der Vergangenheit der EU nur zugewandt, um Druck auf die russische Regierung zu erzeugen. Nicht einmal die Ukraine-Krise hat die außenpolitische Situation des Landes grundlegend geändert, das strukturell von Russland abhängig geblieben ist. Allerdings konnte Präsident Aljaksandr Lukaschenka seine Macht festigen und die aktuelle Wirtschaftskrise eröffnet ihm die Chance, das Land ökonomisch zu diversifizieren. Lukaschenkas gewonnenes Selbstvertrauen und der dringende Bedarf an wirtschaftlicher Umstrukturierung haben die Tür für den Westen geöffnet, seine Belarus-Politik neu aufzustellen und dessen Streben nach strategischer Diversifizierung zu unterstützen, um von Russland größere Unabhängigkeit zu erlangen.

Food, water, and shelter, as fundamental components of human existence are no less critical in an aviation unit than the number of enemies shot down, as a combat force can be made or broken over necessities. During World War II, Russian pilots returned to bases where food and housing were not to be taken for granted, and free time was dictated by forces largely outside their control. The overall living conditions of Russian pilots during the war were varied, unpredictable, and improvised. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the Junior Arts/Humanities category. ; Borscht, Barracks, and Bears: How Russian Pilots Lived in WWII Sarah Clark HI 355: WW2 Colloquium Phase 3 Word Count: 3,307 December 6, 2019 Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 1 Introduction What were the living conditions of Russian pilots in WWII? Food, water, and shelter, as fundamental components of human existence are no less critical in an aviation unit than the number of enemies shot down, as a combat force can be made or broken over necessities. During World War II, Russian pilots returned to bases where food and housing were not to be taken for granted, and free time was dictated by forces largely outside their control. The overall living conditions of Russian pilots during the war were varied, unpredictable, and improvised. When the war began, pilots unused to wartime conditions had to adapt quickly to their new conditions. One pilot recalled: the sun was baking hot on the street. I walked slowly towards the airfield and came up to the dispersal area. It was like a disturbed anthill. They were repairing the old shelters. Here and there they were digging new ones. They assigned the headquarters dug-out for the use of the staff. Fyodorov and Godunov decided to use an enormous plywood container in which, at one time, an aircraft had arrived from the factory in parts…We had supper –field rations, as if we were at the front—and spent the night in the dug-out. Tired after the day's work and even more so after the previous sleepless night, everyone soon dropped off. Of course, after comfortable quarters, snow-white sheets and a soft bed, it is not cosy to sleep on a plank bed; but aircrew get used to anything.1 Food Sources Throughout the war, sources of food varied, but the three most common were rations, villagers, and American Lend-Lease food. Rations were the primary source of food for Russian pilots. The military had its own rationing system, separate from and prioritized above the civilian system.2 At first, most foods were produced and distributed by state associated farms and collectives. Throughout the war, more and more initiative was given to peasants to make food production a private enterprise to increase production and reduce the burden on state-owned 1 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 5. 2 Ganson, "Food Supply," 78. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 2 sources.3 Typical rations for the Russian armed forces consisted of a simple breakfast of porridge known as kasha, a type of soup called borscht for lunch, and bread with pickles or cucumbers for dinner, and for aviators 100 grams of vodka after combat missions.4 In general, variety and items such as meat, fat, and fresh fruits and vegetables were hard to come by. Throughout the war, Russians both were allocated and received fewer daily calories than the soldiers of several other countries. In early 1941, Russian infantrymen were allocated 2,954 calories a day, which was increased to 3,450 in September.5 Members of active flying units were supposed to receive 4,712.6 Compared to other Allied nations, this basic allowance was low. For instance, the United States allocated 4,748 calories for front-line soldiers, and Britain allocated 5,300 for soldiers fighting in cold weather.7 Despite official instructions, it was common for Russians to receive less than their daily allotted calories, placing them even farther below their Allied comrades. Pilots overcame the lack of food and added variety by trading with nearby villagers if based near or in a village. There are multiple accounts of pilots and technicians going into towns to exchange unused items such as underwear or more common items such as "tobacco, cigarettes, bread, and sugar for milk, sour cream, eggs, and butter and sometimes meat."8 Exchanges could be a one-time or reoccurring transaction. For instance, while in Romania, one squadron member paid a Romanian for a daily supply of ten eggs.9 However, making deals with the locals was not always favored by senior officers, as squadron members were arrested and 3 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 126; Ganson, "Food Supply," 75-76. 4 Collingham, "Fighting on Empty," 319. 5 Collingham, "Fighting on Empty." 319. 6 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 127. 7 Collingham, "Out of Depression," 434; Collingham, "Fighting on Empty," 319. 8 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 145, 186. 9 Mariinskiy, Airacobra, 142. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 3 imprisoned in some units.10 Yet, the prevalence of such transactions illustrates the desperation for sufficient and adequate food. Pilots not only traded with villagers and peasants, but they also took advantage of their surroundings. They scavenged through the remains of old villages, especially on the way towards Berlin in 1944 and 1945.11 One of the most common items searched for was alcohol. For instance, one fighter pilot, heading towards Berlin, recalled that "in the deserted workshops of the sugar mill the omnipresent procurement officers…found tanks of spirits."12 In other locations, where natural resources such as rivers were more abundant, pilots occasionally resorted to fishing to provide fresh meat in desperate times, when the food supplied in the mess hall was either meager or nonexistent.13 Another way variety was increased was through the introduction of American Lend- Lease items, especially in 1943 and after. For instance, dairy items from America like dried eggs and milk powder, hard to come by in Russia, supplemented protein and fat intake, and packaged meats such as Spam were a welcome respite from dried fish.14 To show this one pilot reported that "American food, it was a feast—canned meat, dried eggs, canned milk."15 While American food was only a tiny sliver of what the air forces ate during the war, it certainly provided a respite from the standard fare. 10 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 145. 11 I Remember, "Airmen: Ivan Konovalov," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ivan-konovalov/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 12 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 77-78. 13 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 114. 14 Collingham, "Fighting on Empty," 340; I Remember, "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 15 Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 119. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 4 Factors that Affected Food Squadron location, when correlated with timeframe, was one of the most significant factors affecting food availability and type, including geographic location, distance relative to frontlines, and proximity to inhabited villages. Geographic location was significant because Russia is a massive country, and front lines stretched for hundreds of miles. Food supplies were inadequate to begin with, and the distribution system was incomplete and inefficient. These issues were only compounded by the rapidly advancing German forces during Operation Barbarossa.16 Not every unit received equal amounts of food, and food reserves were not in place, especially at the beginning, resulting in troops at the front and rear being shorted.17 To show the variation, one fighter pilot, who spent some time near the front lines at Smolensk, wrote "I'm still amazed that—whether advancing or retreating—we were always well supplied with food."18 Conversely, other pilots reported periodic food shortages lasting several days near front lines.19 Therefore food availability varied greatly from one unit to the next. Distance from the front impacted food supply because it affected the ability of food to reach airfields. At the beginning of the war, food shortages were common in contested areas, such as the North Caucasus and Ukraine.20 Plus, reserves were either too far away or not built up enough to sustain prolonged shortages.21 During German advances supplies were not always able to be delivered, causing aircrews to survive on what meager items they had stockpiled.22 Other 16 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 113. 17 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 115. 18 Drabkin, Barbarossa, 85. 19 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 186. 20 Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 79. 21 Moskoff, "The First Priority," 115. 22 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 186; Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 79. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 5 times, aircrews were forced to pick up supplies with their aircraft because the ground vehicles were unable to reach their airfields.23 The type of action an air unit was supporting, such as a retreat or an advance, also affected their food supply. When a regiment formally moved to a new airfield in preparation for an operation, and if time allowed, the airfield would be prepped by a service battalion consisting of combat support and maintenance personnel, who stocked up supplies and prepared the housing and airfield facilities for the arrival of the unit.24 Thorough preparation resulted in efficiency and ease of movement. However, when movement to a new airfield was either hastily planned or unplanned as a result of an unexpected retreat, there was no preparation, resulting in the opposite effect: no supplies. For instance, while retreating in 1942, one pilot wrote that upon reaching the assigned base they "found nothing there—no staff, no mess hall, no fuel" because the ground support had been unable to reach the base in time to prepare it.25 However, the unit in that scenario ended up being fed by a woman from a local village, illustrating the last essential component of location: proximity to an inhabited area.26 Airfields were frequently built near villages. Consequently, instead of official housing, pilots would be billeted with the town residents. Occasionally villagers had items unavailable to military members, such as fresh vegetables from their gardens or dairy products, such as milk. 27 One last factor to consider in analyzing food supply is unit type: bombers versus fighters. Food for both types of units was dreary and monotonous with occasional highlights of canned 23 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 67. 24 Bessette, "Soviet Military Transportation Aviation," 196. 25 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 108. 26 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 108. 27 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 85, 176. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 6 American food, items gained from the locals, or the rationed chocolate and Coca-Cola.28 For instance, in 1942, one bomber pilot reported eating brown bread, a lot of cereal, and in the fall-potatoes, while another bomber pilot reported eating a breakfast of gruel, bread, butter, and tea the following year.29 Fighter pilots reported similar types of food including soup, tea, and bread.30 Overall, food was more affected by location, type of action, and timeframe than type of unit because units across all aircraft types experienced times of relative abundance and shortage, based on locational and situational factors. Housing Housing was also based on location and situation. The spectrum ranged from sleeping in and under aircraft using tarps and covers as blankets to large houses in nearby villages, and later even villas. Pilots were usually billeted separately from the enlisted technicians. Commonly, the technicians were kept closer to the aircraft in dugouts, huts, or trenches, so that they were quickly accessible and ready for action, while it was more common for pilots to live outside the airfield. However, there were times when pilots and technicians lived together, such as one tail gunner who lived in the same local home as her pilot.31 Housing Situations One of the main differences in airfield accommodations was the age of the airfield. New airfields were usually less developed because they were formed during war when a base was needed during a rapid advance or unplanned retreat. Hasty quarters usually consisted of dugouts built into the ground, sometimes made by female workers from nearby cities, such as 28 I Remember, "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 29 I Remember. "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich," https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]; I Remember, "Airmen: Ivan Konovalov," https://iremember.ru /en/memoirs/airmen/ivankonovalov/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. 30 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 78. 31 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 176. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 7 Leningrad.32 Pilots also lived in trenches or around the aircraft until more permanent quarters could be made.33 Again, there were exceptions. New airfields were better prepared when movements were planned well in advance, and airfield service battalions were available to go to the airfield first and prepare it for the unit, which included billeting arrangements.34 Conversely, older airfields, many of which had been training schools or air bases before the war, already had a developed infrastructure. They had permanent quarters or at least buildings that could be readily turned into barracks. For instance, one pilot recalled living in an old school building on an airfield that had been a training school two years before the war.35 Even in 1944, when the Russians refitted three Ukrainian air bases for the Americans, they refitted an artillery barracks and school buildings for the Americans to live in.36 Also, as the Russians moved east in 1944 and 1945 they utilized barracks on former German airfields. If housing was not available on the airfield, pilots were billeted in the homes of villagers or other available buildings, within several miles of the airfield. Even within the homes there was a lot of variation. Usually the home's residents still lived there, and one of two scenarios occurred: either a couple or as many as possible pilots would be billeted there. For example, one pilot recalls that "the overcrowding was horrendous, but room was found for me. In a crooked hut…having delicately pushed the hostess to the oven in her kitchen."37 Houses could become crowded and uncomfortable when pilots, other officers, and non-maintenance personnel, were forced to live together. Alternatively, other pilots were billeted alone and given a lot of space and 32 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 91. 33 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 106. 34 Bessette, "Soviet Military Transportation Aviation," 196. 35 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 33. 36 Plokhy, Forgotten Bastards, 35. 37 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 138. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 8 relatively nice accommodations. Also, nearby villages were occasionally abandoned, resulting in pilots living in vacant homes.38 Overall, village billeting was varied. Uncontrollable Factors Another variable that should not be overlooked is the effect of the war on housing options. Barracks and dugouts were not immune to German air raids. When permanent buildings or dugouts were destroyed, pilots slept in hastily rebuilt dugouts or under the aircraft. Combat readiness also dictated how close aircrews slept to their aircraft because if a raid was expected, pilots needed to be ready to defend their airfield at a moment's notice.39 Bombings, when the signal of a German advance, also contributed to units moving from new bases and having to find new quarters altogether. Other times, the housing at a new base was inhabitable. For instance, one mechanic wrote that "all of the habitable dwellings nearby were mined by the Germans, so we had to live under the wings of our aircraft."40 Therefore, stable and safe housing was not to be taken for granted in combat conditions. Weather also played devil's advocate with housing. Mud, rain, and snow are all part of life in Russia and had devastating effects on airfield usage and quality of life inside aircrew quarters. During the rainy season, dugouts were flooded with inches to feet of water, either forcing pilots to pump the water out in colder seasons or live under the aircraft in warmer weather.41 Snow, on the other hand, made its way into primitive buildings in the form of ice. Escaping the cold was impossible. Changes in weather patterns and the beginning of colder seasons also resulted in insect and animal infestations, such as fleas, rats, and mosquitos. One rat 38 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 26. 39 Tomofeyeva-Yegorova, Black Sky Red Death, 106. 40 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 151. 41 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 110, 173. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 9 infestation was so bad a pilot remarked that "they were routinely crushed under people's feet."42 Overall, weather was just one more variable that made housing unpredictable. Commodities Not only was housing itself varied and often improvised, but commodities nowadays taken for granted were as well. Most of what the pilots had for furniture, light, and linens were makeshift. Oil drums and shell casings were used as crude lamps and stoves. Any available material was burned in those stoves, including used bomb fuse-boxes.43 Beds, tables, and any other furniture were typically cobbled together from planks, wood scraps, straw, and aircraft covers. Pillows were stuffed with everything from weeds to straw. Again, there were exceptions, especially later in the war, when air units took over German airfields or lived in residences currently or previously owned by the wealthy. For example, one pilot wrote that his unit was "billeted for a rest in some factory-owner's villa…on soft feather beds," and remarked that "the conqueror's position has its advantages."44 Overall though, pilots did not live in luxury. They made what they needed from what was available. Personal Free Time The small amount of free time in between tasking, or during rough weather, helped the pilots let loose and mentally cope with being in combat. On a personal level, people kept busy with what was available. Those who had books read them and then shared them, which led to book discussions.45 Games requiring little space, such as dominos, chess, and cards were played; although, some commands forbade cardplaying, calling it bourgeois.46 People who were musically gifted and carried their instrument, such as a guitar or accordion, around would play 42 Pennington, Wings, Women, and War, 116. 43 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 124. 44 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 73. 45 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 138. 46 Drabkin, Barbarossa, 42. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 10 for their fellow airmen. Some of the women would knit, embroider, or sew new pairs of silk underwear. And everyone looked forward to letters from home, especially when the Germans occupied territory where their loved ones lived. For instance, one pilot wrote that when she received the first letter from her mother, five months into the war, she "felt such relief! All these months I had worried about my family, whether they were suffering somewhere under German occupation."47 Pilots were desperate for news about the wellbeing and whereabouts of relatives and friends. Unit Free Time Beyond the personal level, units organized events amongst themselves. Some had a newsletter that members would write in and distribute amongst the unit.48 Usually those had a political overtone. Nevertheless, they were an opportunity for people to use skills other than flying, such as creative writing, journalism, and drawing. Activities such as talent shows and performances were also organized, including events such as formal readings, performance of plays or sketches, and solo acts. For example, one squadron had the only Gypsy to fly for Russia in the war, who performed dances of his culture, until he died in combat.49 Parties and dances were also held, especially in some of the female units, to celebrate successful missions with dancing and singing.50 Celebrations were an outlet for the emotion created by the stresses of combat and unpredictable living conditions. Occasionally if located near a larger city, such as Leningrad, and if tasking allowed, pilots were able to partake in urban activities, such as movies, concerts, and dance classes. At times, events were formally organized by unit commanders to increase morale and let their 47 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 81. 48 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 6. 49 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 61. 50 Noggle, A Dance with Death, 71 . Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 11 personnel get away from the humdrum of front-line duties, while other times, attending a movie or performance was not command mandated. For instance, one corps commander gave circus tickets to his officers and ordered them to go on a night when no flights were scheduled.51 While in a different squadron a group of pilots was invited to a musical premiere in Leningrad while the city was being barraged by the Germans.52 Not only did pilots seek out entertainment, but entertainment sought them out, in the form of traveling performers, artists, and mobile theaters that traveled throughout the eastern front, providing performances for units unable to go to a city or populated area. Relationships Beyond mere activities, relationships were another way to pass the time. Wedding ceremonies were a change from the more frequent funeral ceremonies. Pilots married either pilots from other commands or members of various service battalions. To illustrate the difference between a funeral and wedding, an airman wrote, "the regiment personnel celebrated a festive and memorable event. And it had nothing to do with war, blood, or death. It was quite the opposite of a funeral."53 Joyous occasions were a welcome relief from the cruel ways of combat. Relationships were unavoidable in squadrons where technicians and combat support staff were frequently female. Even in units with only female pilots, relationships were not uncommon with male members of the same or other units. There was one female pilot, for example, whose former commanding officer proposed after the war ended.54 Relationships were crucial in motivating pilots to return from every flight and survive the war, while also serving to satisfy the soft side of human existence. 51 Reshetnikov, Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front, 157. 52 Kaberov, Swastika in the Gunsight, 178. 53 Antipov & Utkin, Dragons on Bird Wings, 75. 54 Timofeyeva-Yegorova, Red Sky Black Death, 201. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 12 However, humans were not the only ones to fulfill this need for affection, as pets were not forbidden. Often, stray dogs or cats were picked up when a unit passed by an abandoned area. They were either adopted by a whole unit or individuals, as was the case with the Gypsy and his dog, Jack.55 However, there were other scenarios, where a pet would be left behind by higher-ups who briefly visited the unit. For example, Alexander Novikov, then Air Force supreme commander, left behind a bear cub he had been given. At the squadron, the small cub ate and slept with the men, which became difficult as she grew. In the end, she was killed by outsiders, and the air unit refused to eat her.56 While an unusual scenario, it still shows the connections unit members made with animals that ended up in their possession. Focusing on caring for a pet was a needed distraction. Conclusion During World War II, the men and women in the Russian air forces lived an unpredictable life, dictated by the whims of combat. Food would be available one day and not the next. Moving from base to base increased unpredictability, as not all locations were supplied equally, especially when close to combat or advancing German forces. Air force units stretched from Leningrad to Ukraine, which strained the initially inadequate supply system. Time was not always available for building new housing, resulting in external billeting and quickly-built dugouts. Improvisation was the name of the game, as the pilots had to make do with the food, materials, and housing they could scavenge or trade for. Pilots with imagination and creativity were able to create a home away from home that at least met the bare minimum of their needs, despite limited free time to decompress and get away from combat stressors. 55 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 61. 56 Kramarenko, Combat over the Eastern Front, 69. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 13 Research Question: What were the living conditions of Russian pilots in WWII?Outline 1. Introduction 1.1. Research question 1.2. Idea of the variability, range of living conditions 2. Living Conditions 2.1. Food 2.1.1. Food sources 2.1.1.1. Rations 2.1.1.1.1. Calorie comparison 2.1.1.2. Local sources 2.1.1.3. American food 2.1.2. Factors affecting food 2.1.2.1. Location 2.1.2.1.1. Timeframe 2.1.2.1.2. Movement type 2.1.2.1.3. Billeting 2.1.2.2. Unit type 2.2. Housing 2.2.1. Introduction 2.2.2. Housing Situations 2.2.2.1. New Airfields 2.2.2.2. Old Airfields 2.2.2.3. Living in Villages 2.2.3. Uncontrollable Factors 2.2.3.1. Combat Conditions 2.2.3.2. Weather 2.2.4. Commodities 2.3. Free Time 2.3.1. Personal Level 2.3.1.1. Hobbies: sewing, knitting, poetry, music 2.3.1.2. Letters from home 2.3.2. Unit Level Activities 2.3.2.1. Newspapers, performances 2.3.2.2. Nearby towns 2.3.2.2.1. Leader/command initiated 2.3.3. Relationships 2.3.3.1. People 2.3.3.2. Pets 3. Conclusion Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 14 Bibliography Primary Sources Drabkin, Artem. Barbarossa and the Retreat to Moscow: Recollections of Fighter Pilots on the Eastern Front. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books LTD, 2007. I Remember. "Airmen: Kolyadin Victor Ivanovich." https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ kolyadin-victor-ivanovich/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. I Remember. "Airmen: Ivan Konovalov." https://iremember.ru/en/memoirs/airmen/ivan-konovalov/ [accessed 14 October 2019]. Kaberov, Igor. Swastika in the Gunsight: Memoirs of a Russian Fighter Pilot 1941-1945. Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999. Kramarenko, Sergei. The Red Air Force at War: Air Combat over the Eastern Front and Korea: A Soviet Fighter Pilot Remembers. Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Military, 2008. Mariinskiy, Evgeniy. Red Star Airacobra: Memoirs of a Soviet Fighter Ace, 1941-45. Solihull: Helion & Company, 2006. Noggle, Anne. A Dance with Death: Soviet Airwomen in World War II. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1994. Reshetnikov, Vasiliy. Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front: 307 Missions Behind Enemy Lines. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books LTD, 2008. Timofeyeva-Yegorova, A. Red Sky, Black Death: A Soviet Woman Pilot's Memoir of the Eastern Front. Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2009. Scholarly Books Pennington, Reina. Wings, Women, and War: Soviet Airwomen in World War II Combat. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Plokhy, Serhii. Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: American Airmen Behind the Soviet Lines and the Collapse of the Grand Alliance. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019. Clark-Borscht, Barracks, and Bears-page 15 Scholarly Articles Bessette, John. "Soviet Military Transport Aviation" in The Soviet Air Forces edited by Paul Murphy, 188-211. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1984. Collingham, Lizzie. "The Soviet Union—Fighting on Empty" in The Taste of War, 317-346. New York: Penguin Press, 2012. Collingham, Lizzie. "The United States—Out of Depression and into Abundance" in The Taste of War, 415-466. New York: Penguin Press, 2012. Ganson, Nicholas. "Food Supply, Rationing, and Living Standards" in The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945 edited by David Stone, 69-92. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2010. Moskoff, William. "The First Priority: Feeding the Armed Forces" in The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR During World War II, 113-134. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Additional Sources Antipov, Vladislav, and Igor Utkin. Dragons on Bird Wings: The Combat History of the 812th Fighter Regiment. Translated by James F. Gebhardt. 1st English ed. Kitchener, ON: Aviaeology, 2006.

The most important security issue for the United States, the contest/competition/rivalry with China, may soon fade away.The plausibility of this proposition is enhanced if we take as a parallel not the rivalry with the USSR during the Cold War, but the one that smoked through the 1980s and early 1990s when Japan appeared to be becoming "Number One." The rather benign ending of that rivalry may have something to say about what will happen as China slides into what many suggest will be a lengthy period of slow growth or even stagnation.In both cases, the perceived threats have been primarily economic.JapanAs with China today, concerns about Japanese economic growth and business practices were once intense and widespread.In a 1987 best-seller, Yale's Paul Kennedy confidently listed a set of reasons why Japan was likely to expand faster than other major powers, stressing the country's "immensely strong" industrial bedrock and its docile and diligent work force. He also predicted that Japan was likely to become "much more powerful" economically. Meanwhile, Harvard's Samuel Huntington assured us, in phrases that sound much like what we are hearing about the China challenge today, that a need had suddenly arisen to fear not "missile vulnerability" but "semiconductor vulnerability," that "economics is the continuation of war by other means," and that there was danger in the fact that Japan had become the largest provider of foreign aid and had endowed professorships at Harvard and MIT. One book of the time was even entitled, "The Coming War with Japan," and some analysts argued that Japan by natural impulse would soon come to yearn for nuclear weapons.Fareed Zakaria, managing editor of Foreign Affairs at the time, recalled a few years ago his experience "sorting through manuscript after manuscript arguing that Japan was going to take over the world."The public responded to this threatening perspective — especially after the diabolical Japanese bought Rockefeller Center (which they later sold at a loss) and a major Hollywood film studio. By 1989, the Japanese "threat" was seen by the public to be nearly comparable to the one posed by the still heavily armed Soviet Union, and America was convinced that Japan would be the number one economic power in the next century.Politicians predictably followed suit, finding that Japan-bashing sold well. In 1987, several members of Congress publicly sledgehammered Toshiba products on the front steps of the Capitol. Meanwhile, Donald Trump complained at the time, "They come over here, they sell their cars, their VCRs. They knock the hell out of our companies," and, "First they take all our money with their consumer goods, then they put it back in buying all of Manhattan."These concerns evaporated in the early 1990s when Japan's "threatening" economy stagnated and the American one surged. Huntington quickly decided that, as it turned out, the real problem was actually a "clash of civilizations" like the one going on at the time in Bosnia, and Kennedy moved on to warn of the dangers from job‑stealing robots and — as the rise in world population began to stagnate or even reverse — population explosions.ChinaWhen he began his quest for the presidency in 2016, Trump tried Japan-bashing again, designating it along with China and Mexico as a country where "we are getting absolutely crushed on trade."However, by that time Japan's growth had been mostly flat, and trade friction had become much more subdued even though the United States continued (and still continues) to run large trade deficits with Japan while Japan can still make foreign investment difficult.China-bashing sold much better, as Trump found out in a speech in which his line, "We can't allow China to rape our country, and that's what we're doing," inspired an approving roar from the audience. Trump spent the rest of the 2016 campaign building on that theme and repeating much of it in his 2020 campaign, as did many other candidates.Something similar to the Japanese experience may now be happening with the China threat as its growth slumps and the U.S., far from being "displaced" in its GDP ranking as number one, retains its statistical advantage.Most troubling for China is a growing set of difficulties, most of them deriving from a determination to prioritize control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Chinese Communist Party over economic development. The list of resulting problems is substantial: endemic corruption, environmental degradation, slowing growth, capricious shifts in government policies (including the abruptly canceled "zero COVID" policy), inefficient enterprises, fraudulent statistical reporting, a rapidly aging population, enormous overproduction, huge youth unemployment, increasing debt, a housing bubble, restive minorities, the alienation of Western investors, and a clampdown on civil liberties. There also seems to be something of a decline in confidence in, and in the credibility of, the Communist Party's dictates, a change that could have dire long‐term consequences for the regime.The ComparisonThere are some non-comparable elements between the cases, of course. Despite books like "The Coming War with Japan," concerns about Tokyo were less military than they are for China, which has increased its defense expenditures and is accused of threatening to invade Taiwan and becoming a dominant "hegemon" in its area, while expanding its global reach.Nonetheless, the perceived threat remains mainly economic. For example, a recent report by a devotedly anti-China committee in Congress restricts its concerns to what it calls China's "economic aggression" (while recommending a series of changes including a rise in tariffs that might cost the American economy nearly two trillion dollars over five years).Although books entitled "Destined for War" may continue to sell for a while, China's economic stagnation (but not collapse) is in the air, and some elements of its counterproductive "wolf warrior" diplomacy have been relaxed. As a result, the political appeal of China-bashing may be headed for a degree of remission.When Toyota became the number one car maker in the U.S. in recent years, scarcely anyone noticed and fewer cared. If there's an electric car in the future, it may well be Chinese. But, if the Japan analogy holds, it is likely that the reaction will be much the same.

Ukraine's government presented its National Recovery Plan in July 2022, when the vast part of southern and eastern Ukraine was still occupied. The plan proposed that certain European countries, the United States, and Canada each take charge of one region's recovery. Though Denmark was not on the list of suggested countries to provide patronage, it was moved to action after Zelensky addressed the Danish parliament on March 29, 2022, when Russia's brutal attacks on Mykolaiv were fresh news. Denmark's early lead provides a model for future restoration efforts by other countries working with Ukraine.Mykolaiv a Key CityMykolaiv, a prominent shipbuilding center of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, was one of the key Ukrainian cities that Russia had its eyes on after the start of the full-scale invasion.In 2022, Russian forces tried to take over Mykolaiv many times, using occupied Kherson as a base for attacks. There followed months of bombings, air strikes, and assaults by ground forces on fighters and noncombatants alike in Mykolaiv center. In April 2022, Russian forces cut off the water supply to Mykolaiv. The air strikes destroyed substantial civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, railyards, and residences. However, the Ukrainian army managed to resist, and the city remained in Ukrainian control. After the Ukrainian army liberated Kherson on November 11, 2022, the situation in Mykolayiv started to improve. Denmark became one of the countries most active in helping restore facilities and providing specific assistance to many Ukrainian partners. Mykolaiv and the entire region became exemplars of recovery, at least in the eyes of the public, with the help of Denmark. Denmark's Assistance to MykolaivDenmark's assistance to Mykolaiv is quite transparent. Notably, Denmark has provided Mykolaiv local authorities with no direct financial assistance. That has helped the Denmark-Mykolaiv partnership become a model for other countries in assisting Ukraine.According to the Danish ambassador to Ukraine, Ole Egberg Mikkelsen, approximately 60 percent of Danish aid sent to Ukraine is directed to Mykolaiv city and region. Mykolaiv city mayor, Oleksandr Senkevich, explained that Denmark's support includes technical assistance.Another notable feature of the arrangement is that Denmark is addressing specific, contemporaneous needs of Mykolaiv city and region. For example, late summer and early fall saw wildfires occurring spontaneously because of the high temperatures. In late September the Danish embassy in Ukraine issued a statement on the delivery of rapid-action pumping equipment to help suppress the fires quickly.Since April 2022, drinking water has remained a significant problem for Mykolaiv citizens as Russia has bombarded the irrigation system. Denmark has helped the local authorities set up more than sixty water pumps to ensure the city's water purification system remains in operation.Fresh Russian attacks on Ukraine's energy facilities are expected during the coming winter. In advance of that threat, Denmark in coordination with UNDP Ukraine has provided more than 182 generators to support government, law enforcement, schools, and medical and social agencies in Mykolaiv region when other energy infrastructure is lost.The provision of such aid follows one of many available templates but is perhaps most gratifying to Ukrainians as it demonstrates real help and eliminates the risk of corruption around foreign aid. A Boost to Mykolaiv's Shipbuilding IndustryThe framework of cooperation between Ukraine and Denmark includes restoring Mykolaiv's shipbuilding industry. The operational readiness of at least two of three local shipbuilding yards, a state-owned yard and the private "Ocean" yard, has declined sharply during the war. A December 18, 2021, memorandum of understanding signed by the two countries outlines a joint shipbuilding project whereby all construction would be done in Ukraine using Ukrainian sourced materials to the extent possible, with Denmark providing vessel designs. Both military and civilian uses are anticipated for the ships. As Ukraine's Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandr Kubrakov pointed out, the arrangement would take advantage of Ukraine's existing port infrastructure and its access to major rivers. Moreover, a water transport industry would nicely complement Ukraine's strong agricultural sector.Russia's war in Ukraine and the altered security situation in Europe have prompted Denmark to strengthen its own maritime defenses. A public-private partnership is envisioned that would focus on increasing warship-building skills and strengthen procurement chains, in addition to renewing and enlarging Denmark's fleet.Reestablishing Mykolaiv as a Business CenterDenmark plans to open an embassy office in Mykolaiv in October 2023, the first country to do so. As Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs Lars Løkke Rasmussen emphasized in an early October announcement, the reconstruction of Ukraine cannot wait for the war to end. Denmark expects to work closely with local and regional authorities, providing know-how in identified areas such as water, energy, and waste management.The Danish Refugee Council has also opened an office in Mykolaiv. The DRC is providing water treatment plants and basic building materials to help support a citizenry exhausted by war and shorn of financial resources. Denmark's as well as other Western partners' support remains crucial for the community of Mykolaiv and other cities in the region. Mykolaiv city lacks national and local investment, and until the war ends, this situation will not improve. Another confounding factor is that the Ukrainian government appears poised to redirect tax revenues originally designated for local communities to the central budget for the last quarter of 2023 and all of 2024. In 2022–2023 the Mykolaiv city budget received 46 percent of its input from those now reassigned tax revenues. This situation will likely force Mykolaiv and other cities to seek more specific partnerships with foreign countries and cities to get assistance in covering basic needs. Mykolaiv and its community have a remarkable experience in cooperating with Denmark. Denmark's approach of working with local and regional authorities both to remediate specific, immediate problems and, in the longer term, to develop modern industries provides a model that could be replicated by other countries as they take up the challenge of Ukraine's National Recovery Plan. The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.

The second Republican debate last night hosted by Fox news was marked by a lot of acrimony, interruptions, personal insults and jokes that didn't quite land, like Chris Christie calling an (absent) Donald Trump, "Donald Duck," and Mike Pence saying he's "slept with a teacher for 30 years" (his wife).What it did not feature was an informed exchange on the land war in Europe that the United States is heavily invested in, to the tune of $113 billon dollars and counting, not to mention precious weapons, trainers, intelligence and political capital. Out of the tortuous two hours of the debate — which included of course, minutes-long commercials and a "game" at the end that they all refused to play — Ukraine was afforded all but 4 minutes and 39 seconds. This, before the rancor moved on — not to China, though that country took a beating throughout the evening — but to militarizing the border and sending special forces into Mexico to take out cartel-terrorists who are working with the Chinese.Here is how the Ukraine conversation went (keep in mind this was recorded by a translation tool and most of this discussion was overwhelmed by interruptions from the other candidates, so this was edited for clarity and ellipses indicate crosstalk):Florida Gov Ron DeSantis : "It's in our interest to end this war. And that's what I will do as president. We are not going to have a blank check. We will not have U.S. troops. We're going to make the Europeans do what they need to do. But they've sent money to pay bureaucrats, pensions and salaries and funding small businesses halfway around the world. Meanwhile, our own country is being invaded. We don't even have control of our own territory. We have got to defend the American people. Before we even worry about all these other things. I watch these guys in Washington D.C. and they don't care about the American people. They don't care about the fentanyl deaths. They don't care about the communities being overrun because of this border. They don't care about the Mexican drug cartels. So as Commander in Chief, I will defend this country sovereignty."Former South Carolina Gov. Nikki Haley (0:52): "It's never been a territorial dispute!"Senator Tim Scott: "Ninety percent of the resources that we send over to Ukraine is guaranteed as a loan... at the end of the day, 90% of the money that we send over there is actually about Ukraine... is paid by the NATO or NATO allies ... our national vital interest is in defeating the Russian military, by degrading the Russian military, we actually keep our homeland safer. We keep our troops at home. And we all understand article five of NATO. ... So at the end of the day...we reduce if not eliminate an attack on NATO territory."Vivek Ramaswamy: "We have to level with the Americans. We have to level with the American people on this issue. The reality is just because Putin's an evil dictator does not mean that Ukraine is good. This is a country that has banned 11 opposition parties so ...."Haley: "A win for Russia is a win for China! A win for Russia is a win for China! A win for Russia ...."Ramaswamy: "You'll have you'll have your chance in just a moment. The hurling personal insults isn't helping. China's the real enemy and we're driving Russia further into China's arms. We need a reasonable peace plan to end this. Especially this is a country whose president just last week was hailing..."Vice President Mike Pence:"Vivek, if you let Putin have Ukraine, that's a green light to China [to] take Taiwan!"Former New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie:"They're all connected. The Chinese are paying for the Russian war in Ukraine. The Iranians have supply more sophisticated weapons, and so are the North Koreans now as well, with the encouragement of the Chinese, the naivete on the stage from some of these folks is extraordinary. Look, I understand people want to go and talk to Putin. Guess what so did George W. Bush. So to Barack Obama, so to Donald Trump. And so to Joe Biden when he said a small invasion wouldn't be so bad. Every one of them has been wrong. And the fact of the matter is, we need to say right now that the Chinese Russian alliance is something we have to fight against, and we are not going to solve it by going over and cuddling up to Vladimir Putin. Well, Donald Trump said Vladimir Putin was brilliant, and a great leader. This is the person who is murdering people in his own country and now not having enough blood, he's now going to Ukraine to murder innocent civilians and kidnap 20,000 children. And let me tell you, if you think that's where it's going to stop. If we give him any of Ukraine, next will be Poland. This is a guy who in 1991 said that was the darkest moment world's history when the Soviet Union fell. Listen, everybody. He wants to put the old band back together and only America can stop it. And when I'm President, we will ...."Fox Host Stuart Varney (4:39):"Let's get to the governor of Oregon. He hasn't had a chance. I have a question I think you're going to really like or at least you have experience in it. And we need to talk about America's farmers because there is a foreign policy connection here, the U.S. and China and this fierce economic competition. It's hurting American businesses, and there is blowback against American farmers because China then targets them in retaliation. How would you as president protect American farmers and ranchers from that kind of retaliation from a foreign government like China?"