Suchergebnisse

Mit Blick auf den Gesamtkontext der Gorbatschowschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zeichnet der Autor zunächst die Entwicklungsphasen (Perzeptions- und Konzeptwandel) der sowjetischen Deutschlandpolitik in den Jahren 1985-1990 auf, wobei sein Interesse den Faktoren und Motiven gilt, die letztlich zur folgenreichen Entscheidung in der Frage der deutschen Einheit führten. Im zweiten Teil des Aufsatzes setzt er sich mit den aus den Veränderungen der europäischen Landkarte resultierenden Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der politischen und militärischen Machtposition der UdSSR auseinander und beleuchtet die "Bausteine der sowjetischen Sicherheit in den 90ern" (Bündnistransformation, Militärpräsenz in Europa etc.) sowie die Perspektiven der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen. (BIOst-hml)

Afrika ist nicht mehr die Arena für die ideologischen Schaukämpfe der Supermächte. Die seit dem Beginn der Entkolonialisierung Afrikas diskutierte Frage nach dem künftigen Weg der afrikanischen Länder, ob er sozialistisch oder kapitalistisch werden solle, hat an Bedeutung verloren. In zunehmendem Maße geht es jetzt darum, welche Formen einer Mischung von markt- und planwirtschaftlichen Elementen sinnvoll und möglich ist, um den dringlichsten ökologischen und ökonomischen Problemen zu begegnen. Aber auch die weltweit in ein neues Stadium gekommene Frage nach der Demokratiebewegung hat die afrikanischen Länder erreicht. (DÜI-Sen)

Belarus ist an der europäischen Integration nicht ernsthaft interessiert. Es hat sich in der Vergangenheit der EU nur zugewandt, um Druck auf die russische Regierung zu erzeugen. Nicht einmal die Ukraine-Krise hat die außenpolitische Situation des Landes grundlegend geändert, das strukturell von Russland abhängig geblieben ist. Allerdings konnte Präsident Aljaksandr Lukaschenka seine Macht festigen und die aktuelle Wirtschaftskrise eröffnet ihm die Chance, das Land ökonomisch zu diversifizieren. Lukaschenkas gewonnenes Selbstvertrauen und der dringende Bedarf an wirtschaftlicher Umstrukturierung haben die Tür für den Westen geöffnet, seine Belarus-Politik neu aufzustellen und dessen Streben nach strategischer Diversifizierung zu unterstützen, um von Russland größere Unabhängigkeit zu erlangen.

"What's happened to the Democrats? They used to be antiwar!" Such is one of the many questions being bandied about by an online commentariat seeking to make sense of a litany of Republican endorsements of Kamala Harris, many of them made by party elites known for their hawkish foreign policy like former Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney and former Vice President Dick Cheney. One could find similar consternation with American liberals' support for U.S. involvement in the Ukraine crisis. The confusion is based primarily on nostalgia, a selective view of history that obscures the Democratic Party's longer, more complicated relationship with interventionism. The reality is quite different: what we are witnessing is the latest iteration of an ongoing intraparty struggle where the dominant liberal interventionist core asserts itself over a smaller progressive noninterventionist periphery. While the latter often dominates popular conceptions of the Democratic Party and its vision for American foreign affairs, the former drives the reality of party politics. This has been happening since the First World War, best encapsulated by the public debate between Columbia professor John Dewey and one of his students, writer Randolph Bourne. While both were considered liberals of a progressive stripe, they maintained opposing views on American entry into Europe's conflagration. Known for his adherence to philosophical pragmatism, Dewey asserted that the war could save the world from German militarism and be used to shepherd the American political economy toward a fairer, managed state. Bourne rejected this notion and argued that American entry into the war would undermine the egalitarianism of the larger progressive project and create a labyrinth of bureaucracies that would undermine democracy.While Dewey's arguments held sway as the United States entered the war, American involvement in Europe's quarrel, compounded by civil rights abuses at home, proved Bourne posthumously correct. Despite succumbing to the Spanish Flu in 1918, Bourne's views of the war, bolstered by the posthumous publication of a collection of essays entitled Untimely Papers, found fertile soil in an American society horrified by the conflict. Chastened by the realities of the Western Front, interwar progressivism took on a solid strain of pacifism and opposition to centralized authority.While Bourne's sentiments survived the Great War and inspired a postwar mood of non-interventionism, they would not survive America's subsequent entry into World War II, which set the tone for the foreign policy of American liberalism and, by extension, the Democratic Party for the next 30 years. Liberal interventionism won out in the face of a threat posed by the distinctly right-wing geopolitical threat in the form of the Axis powers. Except for a few strident leftwing pacifists and a few dissident liberals who took refuge with the Republican Right, the bulk of the formerly pacifist left took up the cause of intervention in the name of antifascism. The tone set by the Second World War carried through into American liberalism's conduct of the Cold War. Beneath the din of anti-communism, one often amplified by conservatives, American foreign policy was shaped by a liberal understanding of recent history and the origins of communism. President Harry Truman's eponymously titled doctrine entangled the United States in Europe's security architecture.After the Eisenhower administration, which solidified the Truman doctrine and expanded it to the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the Cold War framework was thickened further still by a liberal cold warrior, President John F. Kennedy.Empowered by a materialist and universalistic view of human advancement and the belief that the U.S. had fallen behind the Soviets, JFK pursued a policy known as "flexible response" that expanded American military spending beyond the bounds of nuclear deterrence. These policy changes, maintained under his successor, President Lyndon Johnson, and coupled with a dramatic increase in foreign aid spending, expanded U.S. commitments throughout the postcolonial world. This combination of asymmetric warfare and economic development drastically raised the stakes of the Cold War and led directly to U.S. entry into the quagmire of the Vietnam War. Contrary to nostalgia present the Kennedy era as a missed path towards peace, in reality, JFK continued America on a path of war-making and militarization laid out by his predecessors and stretched well beyond the deaths of the slain Kennedy brothers.While the Vietnam War was the product of Cold War liberalism, it was also its undoing. The horrors of the war, coupled with the inequities of the draft and government secrecy revealed, inspired a mass antiwar movement among the heretofore latent progressive left that found a resonant audience on Capitol Hill. Earlier antiwar works from the left, including that of Randolph Bourne, were revived for a youth movement radicalized against the war. This movement similarly inspired subsequent debates during the late Cold War, particularly on the issue of the Reagan administration's arming of the Contras in Nicaragua and intervention in the Angolan Civil War. The future seemed bright for a left-wing anti-war sensibility and its access to a Democratic Party that was amenable to its views. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, internal changes within the Democratic Party, and the subsequent birth of a new logic for humanitarian interventionism subsumed the ruptures caused by the Vietnam War. While the Democrats indeed offered notable resistance to Operation Desert Storm, often invoking the specter of Vietnam, congressional Democrats provided significant support to U.S. operations in Somalia and interventions in the former Yugoslavia. During the Clinton administration, inspired by retrospectives on the Holocaust compounded by the Rwandan genocide, the notion of a "responsibility to protect," the concept that the U.S. had the moral obligation to use force to prevent mass atrocity, took hold within elite liberal circles.Due to these competing impulses, Democratic opposition to the Global War on Terror was checkered and paired by a left-wing anti-war movement that, in retrospect, was a shadow of its Vietnam-era self. While, as with Iraq War I, Democrats posted noticeable opposition to Iraq War II, such opposition was overshadowed by the fact that Democratic leadership, especially in the Senate, acquiesced to a war spearheaded by a Republican administration. Three of the last five Democratic presidential nominees — then Senators John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden — voted in support of using military action against Iraq. President Obama won in 2008 in part because he publicly opposed war in Iraq before it began and campaigned on ending that war. While he advanced that sentiment by pursuing diplomacy with Iran and opening up to Cuba, he also launched interventions into Libya, Syria, and Yemen, often sold on the grounds of a "responsibility to protect." Much like the liberal rationale of interventions past, American involvement was justified on humanitarian grounds and met largely with Democratic acquiescence in Congress and voter apathy. Liberalism has entered a new wave of internal strife regarding America's role in the world. In a new era of great power competition, the progressive base of the Democratic Party has come out hard against unconditional U.S. support for Israel's war in Gaza and Lebanon. It has also shown varying degrees of opposition to U.S. involvement in the Ukraine crisis. Yet, unlike the Vietnam era, this grassroots opposition has been unable to substantively influence Democratic politics, where a party elite clings to old views about upholding international norms and alliances, no matter how inconsistent or counterproductive those views in practice may be. Given this intraparty divide, it should not be surprising that the Harris campaign has courted the endorsement of hawkish Republicans. This history, however, should not be viewed as determinative of an inevitable path forward. The past has shown that these impulses are not static but held by individuals determined to shape the future.

One might assume that U.S. nuclear strategy and force structure are determined through serious deliberations among high-ranking officials in decorated uniforms considering adversary capabilities and targeting requirements. Sometimes that's not too far from reality. But in many cases, business interests and politics have played a larger role in shaping nuclear force structure than military strategy. The most recent example is the Air Force's new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, which the Pentagon has certified to continue despite its questionable strategic value along with its now $141 billion price tag and several-year schedule delays. Just two weeks ago Air Force Lt. Gen Andrew Gebara told an audience at the Mitchell Institute that while the force will "restructure to get after the cost growth," there is no effort to slow down and "work can still continue under the contract that exists today." Bringing the pork homeICBMs in the United States have been intrinsically tied to money and politics since they were first deployed in the 1960s, and rural Midwestern communities witnessed their fortunes changing with the arrival of these weapons of mass destruction. As Matt Korda, Associate Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, explains, local residents watched as the U.S. government paid to pave their dirt roads, rebuild their bridges, and upgrade their telephone and power lines to accommodate the needs of the missile bases. To these long-ignored communities, nuclear missiles brought money, jobs, and modernization. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians from ICBM states have lobbied fiercely to preserve these missile bases. As the primary threat of a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack from the Soviet Union faded, so did the need for a force of ICBMs meant to deliver a devastating preemptive blow against Soviet forces. When the Clinton administration thus considered eliminating ICBMs entirely during its Nuclear Posture Review process, a group of senators lobbied to have the issue dropped. Around the same time, senators from the ICBM host states — Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Utah, home to Hill Air Force Base where ICBM support activities are headquartered — formed the "Senate ICBM Coalition" with the mission of preserving America's missiles.The Senate ICBM coalitionThe coalition's role in the Sentinel ICBM program can be traced back to 2006. The Air Force previously claimed that the arsenal of Cold War-era Minuteman III ICBMs could be sustained through 2040. But an amendment by the Senate ICBM Coalition to the FY07 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) trimmed the lifespan by ten years.
Thus, coalition members used their influence to accelerate the development of a replacement ICBM, sustaining the force and ensuring benefits for their states for decades longer.
The coalition added other measures to the FY07 NDAA to hinder President Bush's planned reduction of the ICBM force by 50 missiles.
As President Obama was finalizing negotiations with Russia for New START in 2009, coalition senators worried what the treaty would mean for their ICBMs. Leveraging their votes on the treaty's ratification, the coalition successfully pressured Obama into limiting the reduction of ICBMs and committing to replace or modernize each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad.
This presented an opportunity for the Air Force to recommend replacing Minutemans with a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), later named "Sentinel."
In 2013, the Senate ICBM Coalition blocked the Pentagon from conducting the environmental impact study required before eliminating ICBMs. Also, when a 2013 interagency review concluded that the U.S. could maintain its strategic deterrent with a one-third reduction in deployed forces, the Pentagon began considering a significant reduction in the ICBM force. The coalition, however, successfully pressured the Pentagon to abandon the idea.
Another significant coalition success was a provision to the FY17 NDAA prohibiting the Air Force from deploying fewer than 400 ICBMs, which has been included in the NDAA every year since and which effectively grants lawmakers nuclear force posture authority over military officials. Lobbying for SentinelIn recent years, members of the Senate coalition, their allies in the House, and Northrop Grumman — the sole contractor for the Sentinel ICBM — have lobbied fiercely to sustain the Sentinel program.
To get ahead of a potential nuclear force review by a new Trump administration, the Senate coalition published a white paper in 2016 presenting the "strong case" for the Sentinel program, while acknowledging the "strong local interests in the ICBM mission" they represent.
In 2019, coalition allies in the House — and lobbying by Northrop Grumman — helped kill an amendment to the FY20 NDAA that would have required a study on life-extending Minuteman. The ICBM coalition then sent a letter to the secretary of defense conveying concerns over considerations of an alternative to GBSD and imploring him to "ensure the GBSD program is not disrupted or delayed."
On top of that, Northrop Grumman and its subsidiaries contributed $1.2 million to members of the Senate ICBM Coalition between 2012 and 2020 and over $15 million to members of the Senate and House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittees and the Senate and House Appropriations subcommittees on defense.
One beneficiary was Sen. Jon Tester (D-Mont.), a long-time member of the ICBM Coalition and Senate Appropriations Committee and current chair of the defense subcommittee. During a recent hearing, Tester urged Air Force leadership to keep the Sentinel program on schedule, saying it is "a project that's near and dear to me."
Tester has made his personal interest in the Sentinel issue clear, communicating to constituents last month that he's working to bring the Sentinel pork home: "[Sentinel will] bolster our local economy… I'll continue pushing the Air Force and government contractors to use as much Montana labor as possible on the project, because if you want a job done right, you hire a Montanan."
Last year, a group of coalition senators including Steve Daines (R-Mont.), John Barrasso (R-Wyo.), Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.), Mike Lee (R-Utah), and Mitt Romney (R-Utah) introduced the "Sentinel Nuclear Deterrence Act of 2023," which would authorize the Air Force to enter multiyear procurement contracts for Sentinel missiles.
North Dakota Senator John Hoeven (R) boasted in May that he pressured Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown to commit to "continue modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent, especially the intercontinental ballistic missiles." Hoeven, a member of the Appropriations Committee, took credit in March for securing $4.5 billion in the FY24 Defense Appropriations bill for Sentinel development and procurement.The fate of SentinelThe Air Force notified Congress in January that the Sentinel ICBM program would cost 37 percent more than projected and take at least two years longer than estimated — an overrun in breach of Congress's Nunn-McCurdy Act, putting the program at risk of cancellation.
The Pentagon's internal review found that the cost would be even higher than previously stated — approximately $141 billion, an 81% increase from 2020 estimates. Despite this exorbitant price tag and "delay of several years," the Department of Defense this month certified the program to continue.
Besides excessive cost, there is little rationale for ICBMs in a post-Cold War era. Despite arguments by ICBM proponents of the responsiveness of ICBMs, government evaluations reveal that U.S. ballistic missile submarines are "almost equal in speed and reliability" and "virtually undetectable."
In contrast, ICBMs' sitting-duck vulnerability invites a devastating strike on U.S. soil by Russia. Beyond Russia, ICBMs are practically useless given that targeting China or North Korea would require overflight of Russia, which could too easily be mistaken by Russia as an incoming attack, risking a preemptive launch.The diminishing utility of ICBMs has been reflected in moves by multiple administrations and Pentagon officials to reduce and even eliminate their role in recent decades. At every turn though, these moves were fought by senators with personal stake in the preservation of ICBMs.

The article on the example of the Republic of Azerbaijan (AR) considers the role of external impulses in the development of hate intolerance and aggressive nationalism. The history of the genocidal behavior of AR dates back to the 19th century when the Caucasus passed from Persia to the Russian Empire. In order to remove the region from the political influence of Persia (deiranization), the empire united the mixed tribes that penetrated from Persia, gave them the ethnonym of the Caucasian Tatars, and provided them with wide privileges. The privileges granted to this orthodox community, which has been deprived of ethnic identity, have built the most permissive behavior in relations with the natives. The Empire 1905-1907 used it to punish Armenians actively involved in political movements. 1918 The Caucasian Tatars took part in the Armenian massacres committed by the Ottoman Turks who entered the region. Permissiveness towards Armenians, acquired under the conditions of the Russian Empire, grew into a deliberate genocidal behavior. 1920-1921 the Bolsheviks, who entered into a deal with the Kemalist Turks, encouraged this behavior by forcibly alienating Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh from the Arm. SSR in favor of Az. SSR. Stalin's plan to build a new Azerbaijani nation in the 1930s was aimed at halting the final Turkification of Caucasian Tatars by assimilating them to non-Turkish indigenous Islamic peoples. However, pro-Turkish figures trapped in state structures turned the program into a program of forcible Turkification of non-Turkish peoples, looting of their history and culture, and expulsion of Armenians from the republic. The publicity policy announced by Gorbachev, the new leader of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1985, seemed to pave the way for the restoration of justice and the reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with the Armenian SSR. However, Moscow described the NKAO regional council's request as "extreme" and addressed the solution to the crowd of Azerbaijanis. The genocide of Armenians of Azerbaijan began with the Sumgait massacre. The Gorbachev Center could have prevented these atrocities. However, subsequent events showed that Gorbachev needed that conflict to dismantle the USSR according to the Soviet republics. The West agreed with him on the issue, refraining from calling it a genocide. He feared recognizing a state that had declared itself a genocidal state after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ignoring the genocide of one of the founding peoples of the Republic of Azerbaijan, he recognized the RA in 1992 within the borders of Az. SSR. It was a genocide encouragement. AR has become a center for the export of aggressive nationalism and genocidal behavior today. There is the contribution of foreign players in it. Their responsibility for instilling a genocidal culture in the Eastern Transcaucasia has not yet been systematically studied. ; Հոդվածում Ադրբեջանական Հանրապետության օրինակով դիտարկվում է ատելության, անհանդուրժողականության և ագրեսիվ ազգայնականության ձևավորման գործում արտաքին ազդակների դերը: Ադրբեջանի ցեղասպանական վարքի ձևավորման նախապատմությունը սկսվում է XIX դարից, երբ Այսրկովկասը Պարսկաստանից անցել է Ռուսական կայսրությանը: Երկրամասը Պարսկաստանի քաղաքական ազդեցությունից հեռացնելու (իրանազերծելու) համար կայսրությունը այնտեղից թափանցող խառնամբոխ ցեղերին միավորել է, նրանց տվել կովկասյան թաթարներ էթնոնիմը և տրամադրել լայն արտոնություններ: Էթնիկական ինքնությունց զուրկ տարախառն այդ հանրույթին տրված արտոնությունները ձևավորել են արտոնյալ վարք բնիկների նկատմամբ: Կայսրռությունը 1905-1907 թթ. դա օգտագործել է քաղաքական շարժումներում ակտիվորեն ներգրավված հայերին պատժելու համար: 1918 թ. կովկասյան թաթարները մասնակցեցին երկրամաս մտած օսմանյան թուրքերի իրագործած հայկական ջարդերին: Ռուսական կայսրության պայմաններում հայերի հանդեպ ամենաթողությունը վերաճեց ցեղասպանական գիտակցված վարքի: 1920-1921 թթ. քեմալական թուրքերի հետ գործարքի մեջ մտած բոլշևիկները խրախուսեցին այդ վարքը՝ ՀԽՍՀ-ից բռնությամբ օտարելով Նախիջևանն ու Լեռնային Ղարաբաղը հօգուտ Ադր. ԽՍՀ-ի: 1930-ականներին ադրբեջանական նոր ազգ կառուցելու ստալինյան ծրագիրը նպատակ ուներ կասեցնել կովկասյան թաթարների վերջնական թուրքացումը՝ իսլամադավան ոչ թուրք բնիկ ժողովուրդների հետ ձուլելու ճանապարհով: Սակայն պետական կառույցներում խրամատավորված թուրքամետ գործիչները տեղում ծրագիրը փոխակերպեցին ոչ թուրք ժողովուրդների բռնի թուրքացման, նրանց պատմության ու մշակույթի կողոպուտի և հայերին հանրապետությունից դուրս մղելու ծրագրի: Բողոքողները մեղադրվում էին ազգայնամոլության մեջ և պատժվում: Անպատասխան էին մնում նաև Լեռնային Ղարաբաղից Մոսկվային հղված բողոքները: ԽՍՀՄ տարիներին կովկասյան թաթարներ կեղծ էթնիկ հանրությանը փոխարինեց դարձյալ ազգային ինքնությունից զերծ մեկ այլ էթնիկ հանրություն՝ ադրբեջանցիներ անվամբ: 1985-ին ԽՄԿԿ նոր առաջնորդ Մ.Գորբաչովի հռչակած հրապարակայնության ուղեգիծը, թվում էր, արդարության վերականգնման և ՀԽՍՀ հետ ԼՂԻՄ-ի վերամիավորման հնարավորություն էր տալիս: Սակայն Մոսկվան ԼՂԻՄ մարզխորհրդի խնդրանք-դիմումը որակեց «ծայրահեղական» և խնդրի լուծումը հասցեագրեց ադրբեջանցիների ամբոխին: Բարեկամության կեղծ լոզունգների տակ մինչ այդ քողարկվող Ադր. ԽՍՀ իշխանությունը և ամբոխը ստացան ինքնաարտահայտման ազատություն: Սումգայիթի հայերի ջարդով սկսվեց ադրբեջանահայության ցեղասպանությունը: Գորբաչովյան Կենտրոնը կարող էր կանխել այդ վայրագությունները: Սակայն հետագա դեպքերը ցույց տվեցին, որ այդ կոնֆլիկտը Գորբաչովին պետք էր ըստ միութենական հանրապետությունների ԽՍՀՄ-ը կազմաքանդելու համար: Արևմուտքը նրա համախոհն էր այդ հարցում և նույնպես ձեռնպահ մնաց տեղի ունեցածը ցեղասպանություն որակելու հարցում: Ադր. ԽՍՀ հիմնադիր ժողովուրդներից մեկի ցեղասպանությունը անտեսելով՝ նա Ադրբեջանական Հանրապետությունը 1992-ին ճանաչեց Ադր. ԽՍՀ սահմաններում: Դա խրախուսանք էր ցեղասպանին: Ադրբեջանն այսօր դարձել է ագրեսիվ ազգայնականության և ցեղասպանական վարքի դրսևորման կենտրոն, և դրանում արտաքին խաղացողների ներդրումը կա նաև: Այդ մշակույթը ներդրողների ցանկում են՝ Ռուսական կայսրությունը, սուլթանական և հանրապետական Թուրքիան, բոլշևիկյան Ռուսաստանը, գորբաչովյան ԽՍՀՄ-ը և մերօրյա Արևմուտքը՝ ի դեմս ԵԱՀԿ-ի: Արևելյան Անդրկովկասում ցեղասպանական մշակույթ ձևավորելու համար նրանց պատասխանատվությունը դեռևս համակարգված ուսումնասիրված չէ: ; В статье рассматривается роль внешних импульсов в формировании ненависти, нетерпимости и агрессивного национализма на примере Азербайджанской Республики. История геноцидного поведения Азербайджана восходит к XIX веку, когда Кавказ перешел от Персии к Российской империи. Чтобы вывести регион из-под политического влияния Персии, империя объединила проникавшие оттуда смешанные племена, дала им этноним кавказских татар и предоставила им широкие привилегии. Привилегии, предоставленные этой этнически смешанной общине, привели к преференциальному отношению к коренным народам. Империя использовала его в 1905–1907 годах для наказания армян, активно участвовавших в политических движениях. В 1918 году кавказские татары приняли участие в резне армян, совершенной вторгшимися в регион турками-османами. В условиях Российской империи толерантность к армянам превратилась в геноцидное поведение. Большевики, заключившие сделку с турками-кемалистами в 1920-1921 годах, поощряли такое поведение, насильственно отчуждая Нахичевань и Нагорный Карабах от Армянской ССР в пользу Азербайджанской ССР. План Сталина по созданию новой азербайджанской нации в 1930-х годах был направлен на то, чтобы остановить окончательную тюркизацию кавказских татар путем ассимиляции исламистских нетурецких коренных народов. Однако протурецкие деятели в государственных структурах превратили этот план в план насильственной тюркизации нетурецких народов, разграбления их истории и культуры и изгнания армян из страны. Протестующих обвинили в национализме и наказали. Жалобы из Нагорного Карабаха в Москву остались без ответа. В советское время кавказские татары заменили ложную этническую общность другой этнической общностью без национальной идентичности, именуемой азербайджанцами. Публичная позиция, объявленная в 1985 году новым лидером Коммунистической партии Советского Союза М. Горбачевым, казалось, предоставила возможность восстановить справедливость и воссоединить НКАО с Армянской ССР. Однако в Москве охарактеризовали запрос-заявление облсовета НКАО как "крайнее" и обратились к решению проблемы к толпе азербайджанцев. Под фальшивыми лозунгами дружбы, ранее замаскированного правительства Азербайджанской ССР толпа получила свободу слова. Геноцид армян Азербайджана начался с резни сумгаитских армян. Горбачев мог предотвратить эти зверства. Однако последующие события показали, что Горбачеву был нужен этот конфликт для развала СССР. Запад согласился с ним и также не стал называть случившееся геноцидом. Игнорируя геноцид одного из народов-основателей Азербайджанской ССР, он в 1992 году признал Азербайджанскую Республику в границах Азербайджанской ССР. Это было поощрением геноцида. Сегодня Азербайджан стал центром выражения агрессивного национализма, геноцидного поведения и вовлечения в него иностранных игроков.