Suchergebnisse

"Im Rahmen des vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft geförderten Internationalen Austauschs für Berufsbildungsfachkräfte hatten 1984 fünfzehn deutsche Berufsausbilder erstmals Gelegenheit, zu Studienzwecken in die Türkei zu reisen. Ziel war es, neben dem dortigen Berufsbildungswesen auch das Land und die Lebensverhältnisse kennenzulernen, um die Mentalität der türkischen Auszubildenden in Deutschland besser verstehen zu können. Die vorliegende Studie über die berufliche Bildung in der Türkei enthält wesentliche Eindrücke dieser Studienreise aus der Sicht der deutschen Ausbilder. Außerdem haben die Erfahrungen der türkischen Berufsbildungsfachkräfte, die seit 1980 die Bundesrepublik Deutschland besuchten, Eingang gefunden." Nach einem gegenüberstellenden Vergleich der bundesdeutschen Gesetzgebung zur beruflichen Bildung und dem im Juni 1986 erlassenen Gesetz für Lehrlingsausbildung und berufliche Bildung in der Türkei werden schließlich einige Schlussfolgerungen für die strukturelle Entwicklung des türkischen Ausbildungswesens vorgenommen. (DIPF/ ssch)

Der Autor untersucht die welthistorischen Voraussetzungen für den Golfkrieg unter Berücksichtigung des altorientalischen und antiken Hintergrunds, des Islams und des Dreieckskonflikts zwischen Arabern, Persern und Türken, der arabisch-muslimischen Doppelkrise sowie der großen Modernisierungskrise in der Region. (DÜI-Sen)

Hamas's attack into Israel and massacre of Israelis, followed by Israel's war of obliteration on Gaza backed by the United States, is a political earthquake in the Middle East. Its tremors are shaking up the politics of the Horn of Africa, bringing down an already tottering peace and security architecture. It's too early to discern the shape of the rubble, but we can already see the direction in which some of the pillars will fall.The most obvious impact is that the Israel-Palestine war has legitimized and invigorated protest across the wider region. Hamas showed that Israel was not invincible, and Palestine would no longer be invisible. Many in the Arab street — and Muslims more widely — are ready to overlook Hamas's atrocious record as a public authority and its embrace of terror, because it dared stand up to Israel, America, and Europe.Hamas's boldness has given a shot in the arm to Islamists, such as Somalia's al-Shabaab. As the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia draws down, al-Shabaab remains a threat— and will likely be emboldened to intensify its operations both in Somalia and neighboring Kenya.Kenyan President William Ruto gave strong backing to Israel while also calling for a ceasefire. For the U.S. and Europe, Kenya is now the anchor state for security in the Horn — but it desperately needs financial aid if it is to shoulder that burden.The war is consuming Egyptian attention and terrifies President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is treading a fine line between sponsoring pro-Palestinian protests and suppressing them.Red Sea SecurityThe Red Sea is strategic for Israel. One quarter of Israel's maritime trade is handled in its port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba, an inlet of the Red Sea. Eilat is Israel's back door, vital in case the Mediterranean coast is under threat. Israel has long seen the littoral countries of the Red Sea — Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia — as pieces in the jigsaw of its extended security frontier.Historically, Egypt has shared the same concern. Last year, revenues from the Suez Canal were $9.4 billion— its third largest foreign currency earner after remittances from Egyptians working in the Gulf States and tourism. Neither Israel nor Egypt can afford a disruption to maritime security from Suez and Eilat to the Gulf of Aden.The Red Sea is also the buckle on China's Belt and Road Initiative, with China's first overseas military base — strictly speaking a "facility" — in the port of Djibouti near the Bab al-Mandab, the narrow straits between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. More than 10 percent of world maritime trade is carried on 25,000 ships through these straits every year.Having long neglected its Red Sea coastline, Saudi Arabia has reawakened to its significance in the last decade. In the 1980s, amid fears that Iran might block tanker traffic through the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia built an east-west pipeline from the Aqaig oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr. Its strategic significance is back in focus.In parallel, the United Arab Emirates is well on track to securing a monopoly over the ports of the Gulf of Aden, which forms the eastern approaches to the Red Sea. It has de facto annexed the Yemeni island of Socotra for a naval base. The UAE is looking for a foothold in the Red Sea proper, and a string of satellite states on the African shore.All these factors intensify the scramble for securing naval bases in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Djibouti is already host to the U.S.'s Camp Lemonnier along with French, Italian, Japanese, and Chinese facilities. Turkey and Russia are actively seeking bases too, focusing on Port Sudan and Eritrea's long coastline.Empowered Gulf StatesWell before the recent crisis, the Horn of Africa was becoming dominated by Middle Eastern powers. This process is now intensified. Decades of competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for alignment of Sudan and Eritrea has swung different ways. Sudan's General Abdel Fattah al-B­­urhan, formerly political partner of Benjamin Netanyahu and signatory to the Abraham Accord, cut an ill-timed deal with Iran in early October, to obtain weapons, which has embarrassed his outreach to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. More recently, Turkey and Qatar's regional ambitions have clashed with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, especially over the Muslim Brothers — supported by the former, opposed by the latter. The latest emerging rivalry is between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as the regional anchor. While running for president, Joe Biden called Saudi Arabia a "pariah." But it is now indispensable to the U.S.Among the Arab states. the UAE has been the most restrained in condemning Israel for its actions in Gaza. It has also said that it doesn't mix trade and politics— meaning that it will continue to implement the economic cooperation agreements it signed with Israel following on from the Abraham Accords. The UAE is also positioned at the center of the U.S.-sponsored India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the September G20 summit in India as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.The UAE also has a free hand in the Horn of Africa, and in the last five years it has moved more rapidly and decisively than Saudi Arabia.Sudan's Fate between Riyadh and Abu DhabiAfter the eruption of war in Sudan in April, the joint Saudi-American mediation was in large part a gift from Washington to try to mend fences with the Kingdom. Talks in Jeddah resumed in late October, with the modest agenda of a ceasefire and humanitarian access, and a pro forma "civilian track" delegated to the African Union, which has shown neither commitment nor competence.Meanwhile, the Emiratis are backing General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as "Hemedti," who is currently driving the Sudan Armed Forces out of their remaining redoubts in Khartoum. This followed more than six months of fighting in which Hemedti's Rapid Support Forces gained a reputation for military prowess and utter disregard for the dignity and rights of civilians. Despite widespread revulsion against the RSF, especially among middle class Sudanese, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan, known as MBZ, stuck with his man.In charge of the ruins of Sudan's capital city, Hemedti will soon be in a position to declare a government, perhaps inviting civilians for the sake of a veneer of legitimacy. What's holding him back is the ceasefire talks in Jeddah. His rival, Gen. al-Burhan is meanwhile floating a plan to form a government based in Port Sudan — raising the prospect of two rival governments, as in Libya. The real negotiations there are between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. If the two capitals agree on a formula, the U.S. and the African Union will applaud, and the Sudanese will be presented with a fait accompli.Ethiopia Goes RogueIn Ethiopia, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's rule is underwritten by Emirati treasure. MBZ has reportedly paid for Abiy's vast new palace, a vanity project whose $ 10 billion price tag is paid for entirely off-budget. Abiy told lawmakers that this bill was none of their business as it was funded by private donations, directly to him. Other megaprojects in and around the capital Addis Ababa, such as glitzy museums and theme parks, have similarly opaque finances.Ethiopia's wars have depended on largesse from the UAE. Ethiopian federal forces prevailed against Tigray, forcing the latter into an abject surrender a year ago, on account of an arsenal — especially drones — supplied by the UAE. Abiy is currently rattling his saber against his erstwhile ally, Eritrea, demanding that landlocked Ethiopia be given a port, or it will take one by force. The likely target is Assab in Eritrea, though other neighbors such as Djibouti and Somalia have been rattled too.Eritrea unexpectedly finds itself as a status quo power and is relishing this role, tersely expressing its refusal to join in the confusing discourse from Addis Ababa. It suddenly has allies in Djibouti, Somaliland, Somalia and even Kenya — all of them threatened by Abiy's bellicosity.If Abiy does invade Eritrea, he will violate the basic international norm — the inviolability of state boundaries — and risk plunging his already failing economy deeper into disaster. This will pose a sharp dilemma for the UAE. It is ready to override multilateral principles, but whether it would bail out its errant client in Addis Ababa, and jeopardize its winning position in Sudan, is a different matter. It would also present Saudi Arabia with the dilemma of whether to back Eritrea's notorious dictator, President Isaias Afewerki.America and the Pax AfricanaPeace and security in the Horn of Africa isn't a priority for the Biden administration. Despite a rhetorical commitment to a rule-based international order, Washington has neither protected Africa's painstakingly-constructed peace and security architecture nor brought the Ethiopian and Sudanese crises to the U.N. Security Council.While the American security umbrella was in place over the Arabian Peninsula, the countries of the Horn of Africa had the chance to develop their own peace and security system, based on a layered multilateral structure involving the regional organization, the InterGovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, and United Nations, with peacekeepers and peace missions funded by the Europeans. This emergent Pax Africana was already imperiled as the U.S. drew down and the Middle Eastern middle powers became more assertive. President Donald Trump authorized his favored intermediaries — Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to pursue their interests across the Horn of Africa. The Biden administration has not pulled that back.It's possible that the administration cares about peace, security and human rights in Africa. But for as long as the U.S.'s Horn of Africa policy is handled by the Africa Bureau at the State Department — whose diplomats scarcely get the time of day from their counterparts in the Gulf Kingdoms — Washington's views will remain all-but-irrelevant. The Horn of Africa doesn't make the cut when staffers prepare talking points for President Biden, Secretary of State Antony Blinken or national security adviser Jake Sullivan to speak to their Arab counterparts. It's a prioritization that leaves the region in a deepening crisis, at the mercy of ruthless transactional politics.America's well-established practice of treating Israel as an exception to international law is rubbing off on Israel's allies and apologists across the Middle East, who are actively dismantling the already-tottering pillars of Africa's norm-based peace and security system. Those African countries most in need of principled multilateralism are paying the price.

Journal of High Energy Physics 2015.11 (2015): 18 reproduced by permission of Scuola Internazionale Superiore di Studi Avanzati (SISSA) ; A search for a charged Higgs boson is performed with a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 19.7 ± 0.5 fb−1 collected with the CMS detector in proton-proton collisions at √s= 8,TeV. The charged Higgs boson is searched for in top quark decays for mH± mt − mb. The H± → τ±ντ and H± → tb decay modes in the final states τh+jets, μτh, ℓ+jets, and ℓℓ' (ℓ =e, μ) are considered in the search. No signal is observed and 95% confidence level upper limits are set on the charged Higgs boson production. A model-independent upper limit on the product branching fraction B(t → H±b) B(H± → τ±ντ ) =1.2–0.15% is obtained in the mass range mH± = 80–160 GeV, while the upper limit on the cross section times branching fraction σ(pp → t(b)H±) B(H± → τ±ντ ) = 0.38–0.025 pb is set in the mass range mH+ = 180–600 GeV. Here, σ(pp → t(b)H±) stands for the cross section sum σ(pp → t(b)H+) + σ(pp → t(b)H−). Assuming B(H± → tb) = 1, an upper limit on σ(pp → t(b)H±) of 2.0–0.13 pb is set for mH± = 180–600 GeV. The combination of all considered decay modes and final states is used to set exclusion limits in the mH±−tan β parameter space in different MSSM benchmark scenarios ; We congratulate our colleagues in the CERN accelerator departments for the excellent performance of the LHC and thank the technical and administrative staffs at CERN and at other CMS institutes for their contributions to the success of the CMS effort. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centers and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy and the Austrian Science Fund; the Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, and Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek; the Brazilian Funding Agencies (CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, and FAPESP); the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science; CERN; the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Technology, and National Natural Science Foundation of China; the Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS); the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport, and the Croatian Science Foundation; the Research Promotion Foundation, Cyprus; the Ministry of Education and Research, Estonian Research Council via IUT23-4 and IUT23-6 and European Regional Development Fund, Estonia; the Academy of Finland, Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, and Helsinki Institute of Physics; the Institut National de Physique Nucléaire et de Physique des Particules / CNRS, and Commissariat à l'Energie Átomique et aux Energies Alternatives / CEA, France; the Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany; the General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Greece; the National Scientific Research Foundation, and National Innovation Office, Hungary; the Department of Atomic Energy and the Department of Science and Technology, India; the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Iran; the Science Foundation, Ireland; the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy; the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea; the Lithuanian Aca We congratulate our colleagues in the CERN accelerator departments for the excellent performance of the LHC and thank the technical and administrative staffs at CERN and at other CMS institutes for their contributions to the success of the CMS effort. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the computing centres and personnel of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid for delivering so effectively the computing infrastructure essential to our analyses. Finally, we acknowledge the enduring support for the construction and operation of the LHC and the CMS detector provided by the following funding agencies: the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy and the Austrian Science Fund; the Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, and Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek; the Brazilian Funding Agencies (CNPq, CAPES, FAPERJ, and FAPESP); the Bulgarian Ministry of Education and Science; CERN; the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Technology, and National Natural Science Foundation of China; the Colombian Funding Agency (COLCIENCIAS); the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sport, and the Croatian Science Foundation; the Research Promotion Foundation, Cyprus; the Ministry of Education and Research, Estonian Research Council via IUT23-4 and IUT23-6 and European Regional Development Fund, Estonia; the Academy of Finland, Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, and Helsinki Institute of Physics; the Institut National de Physique Nucléaire et de Physique des Particules / CNRS, and Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives / CEA, France; the Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, and Helmholtz-Gemeinschaft Deutscher Forschungszentren, Germany; the General Secretariat for Research and Technology, Greece; the National Scientific Research Foundation, and National Innovation Office, Hungary; the Department of Atomic Energy and the Department of Science and Technology, India; the Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, Iran; the Science Foundation, Ireland; the Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, Italy; the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, and National Research Foundation (NRF), Republic of Korea; the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences; the Ministry of Education, and University of Malaya (Malaysia); the Mexican Funding Agencies (CINVESTAV, CONACYT, SEP, and UASLP-FAI); the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, New Zealand; the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission; the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the National Science Centre, Poland; the Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal; JINR, Dubna; the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research; the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Serbia; the Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación and Programa Consolider-Ingenio 2010, Spain; the Swiss Funding Agencies (ETH Board, ETH Zurich, PSI, SNF, UniZH, Canton Zurich, and SER); the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taipei; the Thailand Center of Excellence in Physics, the Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology of Thailand, Special Task Force for Activating Research and the National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand; the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, and Turkish Atomic Energy Authority; the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine; the Science and Technology Facilities Council, U.K.; the US Department of Energy, and the US National Science Foundation. Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie programme and the European Research Council and EPLANET (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund; the OPUS programme of the National Science Center (Poland); the Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino); the Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste); MIUR project 20108T4XTM (Italy); the Thalis and Aristeia programmes cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand); and the Welch Foundation, contract C-1845.demy of Sciences; the Ministry of Education, and University of Malaya (Malaysia); the Mexican Funding Agencies (CINVESTAV, CONACYT, SEP, and UASLP-FAI); the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, New Zealand; the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission; the Ministry of Science and Higher Education and the National Science Centre, Poland; the Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia, Portugal; JINR, Dubna; the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research; the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Serbia; the Secretaría de Estado de Investigación, Desarrollo e Innovación and Programa Consolider-Ingenio 2010, Spain; the Swiss Funding Agencies (ETH Board, ETH Zurich, PSI, SNF, UniZH, Canton Zurich, and SER); the Ministry of Science and Technology, Taipei; the Thailand Center of Excellence in Physics, the Institute for the Promotion of Teaching Science and Technology of Thailand, Special Task Force for Activating Research and the National Science and Technology Development Agency of Thailand; the Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, and Turkish Atomic Energy Authority; the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and State Fund for Fundamental Researches, Ukraine; the Science and Technology Facilities Council, U.K.; the US Department of Energy, and the US National Science Foundation. Individuals have received support from the Marie-Curie programme and the European Research Council and EPLANET (European Union); the Leventis Foundation; the A. P. Sloan Foundation; the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; the Belgian Federal Science Policy Office; the Fonds pour la Formation à la Recherche dans l'Industrie et dans l'Agriculture (FRIA-Belgium); the Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie (IWT-Belgium); the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MEYS) of the Czech Republic; the Council of Science and Industrial Research, India; the HOMING PLUS programme of the Foundation for Polish Science, cofinanced from European Union, Regional Development Fund; the OPUS programme of the National Science Center (Poland); the Compagnia di San Paolo (Torino); the Consorzio per la Fisica (Trieste); MIUR project 20108T4XTM (Italy); the Thalis and Aristeia programmes cofinanced by EU-ESF and the Greek NSRF; the National Priorities Research Program by Qatar National Research Fund; the Rachadapisek Sompot Fund for Postdoctoral Fellowship, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand); and the Welch Foundation, contract C-1845

In a previous note on these same pages, we made reference to Obama's unpredictable use of executive power and his tendency to overuse it for certain domestic policies, while deferring to the military and foreign policy establishmenton issues he is ambivalent about, such as the international use of force. We also alluded to his tendency to isolate himself and rely excessively on his own judgment in shaping policy, to the detriment of his relations with staff, cabinet and other leaders. The long-drawn decision to seek Congressional approval before striking Syria is a case study of these proclivities.After resisting calls for intervention in Syria by Senate Republican "hawks"and foreign policy specialists since 2011, a year ago Obama conceded that, in spite of his aversion to intervene in "sectarian struggles",certain actions such as the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against the opposition would constitute a "red line" which, once crossed, would automatically bring about an armed response by the United States. This week he had to face the consequences of his own words.Whenrobust evidence of the use of sarin gas by Bashar Al Assad's forces in rebel occupied territory was produced, the President had no choice but to spendthelast week of the month of Augustfrantically building a case for immediate intervention. Acting simultaneously as Chief Executive, policy shaper and his own spokesman, he used several venues, including an NPR interview, to announce to the American people that the time had come to act.But while Secretary of State John Kerry made a compelling speech on the need to act swiftly to punish the "moral obscenity" committed by the Assad regime, Obama appeared much more circumspect in his appeals to the American people. His early words conveyed both his outrage at the disproportionate actions by Assad as well as his empathy with the war-weary American citizens. In private, he confided he had qualms both about the legality and the political legitimacy of military action. In public, his argument focused on the violation of an international convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the absolutely unavoidable duty to enforce it. But the fact that UN inspectors had not completed their field report on the attack, coupled with the refusal of the UN Security Council to consider armed action, gave him pause and forced him to confront his own doubts once again.In the meantime, momentum was building in the United States where, according to press reports, it was all but certain there would be a military strike to "punish and deter" the Syrian regime, by Labor Day weekend. GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were vocal in their support of intervention but demanded more than just a punitive strike and showed some impatience towards the President's pondering an action that should have been decided long ago.Abroad, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia were in favor of the US action. As it is widely known, Russia was against it and that is why the US had to bypass the UN Security Council where Russia has veto power. While NATO allies all offered strong support (indeed, both France and Britain were the first to insist on support for the rebels a year ago), Prime Minister David Cameron was delivered a strong blow when he lost a vote in the House of Commons, with some of his own backbenchers voting against intervention. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, facing a coming election and against the perennial background of German Basic Law constraints, had already told the President that Germany would stand in the sidelines, while offering moral support. The long shadow cast by the Iraqi war around the world once again became evident. But the French President, not required by the Fifth Republic Constitution to consult the legislature, and encouraged by France's recent successful actions in Mali and Libya, remained firm.By Friday, Obama's tortured deliberations came to an end as he abruptly changed courses. Against the advice of his National Security and political advisors team, he made a dramatic announcement from the Rose Garden: his decision on the need for a narrow punitive action against Syria had been made, he said, but he had decided to ask for Congressional authorization first. As Commander in Chief, and in spite of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, he is not obligated to do this. He thus appears to be shifting responsibility onto the legislature while simultaneouslybuying some time to explore diplomatic solutions in the upcoming G-20 summer.The cerebral constitutional law professor and the risk- taking politician in him have made a Faustian bargain. If Congress authorizes the use of force, he will have both legal and political cover for his action while at the same time fulfilling his moral duty of punishing a violator of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Humanitarian law. If they vote No, he can just blame them for his own lack of action and use all the power of the Presidency on his domestic agenda.It is, in any case, a big gamble, one that has the potential of weakening him and turning him into a lame duck for the rest of his Presidency. The GOP is internally divided on many issues, among them foreign policy, where conservative ideologies run the gamut from minimalist /isolationist to neo-cons/regime- change interventionists and all the shades in-between. And the far left in Obama's own party is against intervention. So there is no guarantee he will get Congressional approval. The cost of losing this vote is enormous: it may set a strong precedent in diminishing Presidential prerogatives.To be fair to the President and his vacillating stance, this is not an easy decision. None of the world leaders have made a compelling public case for a strategic need of intervention in Syria. The proposed limited "punitive" strike will most likely be inconclusive: it will not deter further extreme actions by Assad, who has now been given time to disperse his military assets and capabilities. The strike will not significantly degrade his capacity to fight, and there will be little change in his main goal, namely, to destroy the opposition and regain total control of the country.This is a fight to the end by both sides. If overthrown, Assad and his Alawite supporters (as well as the Christians who have traditionally been under his protection) will be massacred. There are no desirable outcomes in this conflict. The rebels are divided and the biggest group is that ofthe jihadists with strong support of Al Qaeda. While Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the side of the United States and want a moderate alternative to the Assad regime, Iran, to an extent Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon are on the dictator's side (as, incongruously, is Venezuela). The Palestinian group Hamas, previously favoring Assad has now changed sides and is supporting the rebels. So in many ways this is a war by proxy that could become a generalized regional war. There is no indication that the President or anyone else has a political plan or a diplomatic effort in mind for the post-strike scenario.However, US inaction at this time undermines the security of its allies, especially Israel. Even though Netanyahu has adopted a "no comment" stance and hasn't, accordingly, said a word on this issue, other Israeli politicians are worrying out loud about the implications the US lack of resolve will have on other "red lines": Will the United States act when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold? Or will Israel find itself facing Iran alone?They bitterly remind themselves of Obama's speech in Jerusalem, in March this year, when he said in Hebrew: "Atem lo levad" ("You are not alone"). They are very skeptical, now more than ever, that the President will match his lofty rhetoric with action.In the United States the momentum is gone, Congress won't reconvene until September 9, and the President is using the last week of summer to energetically lobby House and Senate leaders and persuade skeptics through intelligence briefings. Urgent issues in the domestic agenda will thus have to be postponed.What no one, either at home or abroad denies, is that the credibility of the Presidency and with it, that of the United States, is at stake. International support for the operation is unlikely to improve. A negative vote by Congress will further weaken the President and may complicate the White House legislative agenda, where he will have to spend all his political capital and still,perhaps, fall short.In a keynote speech to the National Defense University earlier this year, Obama expressed the need to chart a new way in American foreign policy, one that would end the "perpetual wartime footing" that characterized the post 9-11 era, after G.W. Bush got a virtual blank check from Congress in the use of military force and intelligence gathering. So far, Obama has ended two protracted unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is clear he will not engage in regime change. But a new foreign policy strategy has not crystallized yet. There is no Obama doctrine, no overall framework to guide his decisions and give predictability to his actions.His whole approach to the Middle East, the most explosive region in the planet today, is misconceived. His tepid reaction to the Egyptian situation had already given some approximation of how reluctant he is about taking sides in conflicts in the region. Syrian use of chemical weapons has confirmed his ambivalence and exposed his indecision. At the same time, it has provoked a collapse of American credibility abroad, anduncertainty about its reliability as an ally. Regardless of what follows after this week, his hesitancy will have dire consequences for American foreign policy into the future.The larger problem that looms over the heads of world leaders and that few seem to acknowledge is that this is not about Syria or Egypt or Libya or Yemen or Tunisia as separate conflicts; it is a regional conflagration that has to be addressedcomprehensively, within the larger regional and international context. All major actors, whether it is Europe, Russia, or China and of course the United States, have a stake in the region and it is in their interest to define the rules of the game and together find an overall solution to this predicament.

Das CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) legt den Schwerpunkt auf "the politics of populism", also auf Populismus. Es erforscht länderübergreifend den Zusammenhang zwischen dem Aufstieg von populistischen Parteien und der Verteilung von "populistischen" Einstellungen innerhalb der Bevölkerung. Hauptziel des Moduls ist es, die Auffassungen der BürgerInnen von politischen Eliten, gesellschaftlichen "Out-Groups" und nationaler Identität sowie die sich hieraus ergebenden Implikationen für repräsentative Demokratien zu analysieren. Die Daten erlauben es Forschenden somit, die Variation im Wettbewerb politischer Eliten und "populistischer" Einstellungen über Demokratien hinweg mit einzubeziehen, und zu untersuchen, wie solche Wahrnehmungen das Wahlverhalten von BürgerInnen beeinflussen.

ÖZET10 Kasım 1938 tarihinde Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün hayatını kaybetmesi ile bir-likte Cumhurbaşkanı olan İsmet İnönü ülke yönetiminde en yetkili kişi haline gelmiştir. İnönü'nün CHP ve ülke yönetimindeki adete tek kişilik hakimiyeti ( Milli Şef ) Celal Bayar başta olmak üzere dönemin CHP'li milletvekili ve yöneticilerinde tepkiye neden olmuştur. Bir şahsın parti ve ülke yönetimindeki hakimiyetine İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın da etkisiyle halkın büyük çoğunluğunda oluşan ekonomik sıkıntının ve iktidarın halkın muhafazakarlığı ile çelişen eğitim ve sosyal alanlardaki uygulamaları CHP ve dışındaki siyasi çevrelerde ve halkın büyük bir bölümünde muhalif bir tutumun oluşmasına neden olmuştur. Bu süreç hükümetin birtakım radikal uygulamaları ile birlikte örgütlü bir mu-halif hareketin doğmasına neden olmuştur. Yukarıda belirtilen nedenlerden kaynaklanan ve açıktan açığa bir söylem ve ey-leme dönüşmeyen CHP milletvekillileri içindeki bireysel tavırlar ilk defa Çiftçiyi Top-raklandırma Kanunu teklifi sırasında ortaya çıkmıştır. CHP milletvekilleri Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü ve Refik Koraltan, 14 Mayıs 1945 tarihinde bu kanun teklifinin TBMM'de görüşülmeye başlaması ile birlikte hükümetin bu uygulamasına karşı tavırlarını yaptıkları konuşmalar ile ortaya koymuşlardır. Fakat esasen bu kanun tasarısının TBMM'ye sunulmasından önce CHP içinde muhalif bir grubun oluşması Tevfik Rüştü Aras'ın evinde yapılan perşembe toplantılarıyla başlamıştır. 1945 yılının Nisan ayından itibaren Tevfik Rüştü Aras'ın evinde bir araya gelen Emin Sazak, Adnan Menderes ve Fuat köprülü CHP'nin, İsmet İnönü'nün otoritesi altında olduğunu ifade etmişler ve bu durumu değiştirmek gerektiği üzerinde durmuşlardır. İkinci defa bir ara-ya gelen Adnan Menderes ve Fuat Köprülü demokratik bir merkez oluşturma konusun-da görüş birliğine varmışlardır. Daha sonraki toplantılara Refik Koraltan da katılmıştır. Adnan Menderes, partide ve toplum içinde etkili olan Celal Bayar'ı bu gruba katmak gerektiğini açıklamıştır. Celal Bayar ile yapılan toplantı sonunda o da gruba dahil ol-muştur. Grup üyeleri 18 Mayıs 1945 tarihinde yapılan toplantıda CHP Meclis Grubuna vermeyi düşündükleri Dörtlü Takriri hazırlamışlardır.Takrir verilmeden önce TBMM'de 1945 yılı devlet bütçesinin oylamasına katı-lan üç yüz yetmiş üç milletvekilinden İzmir Milletvekili Celal Bayar, Aydın Milletve-kili Adnan Menderes, İçel Milletvekili Refik Koraltan, Kars Milletvekili Fuat Köprülü ve Eskişehir Milletvekili Emin Sazak bütçeye karşı aleyhte oy kullanmışlardır. Cumhu-riyet Dönemi'nde ilk defa bir bütçeye karşı aleyhte oy kullanılmıştır. Böylece muhalif tavırlarını ikinci defa ortaya koymuşlardır. Grup üyeleri 7 Haziran 1945 tarihinde Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü ve Refik Koraltan'ın imzası ile Dörtlü Takrir'i CHP Meclis Grubu Başkanlığı-na vererek muhalif tutumlarını somutlaştırmışlardır. Takrirde CHP'nin işleyişinin de-mokratik ilkelere uygun hale getirilmesini ve TC. Anayasası'nda var olan vatandaş hak ve hürriyetlerinin tanınması talep etmişlerdir. Bu takrir 12 Haziran 1945 tarihinde CHP Meclis Grubu'nda görüşülmüş ve red-dedilmiştir. Takririn reddedilmesi ile birlikte devam eden süreçte bu kadronun CHP içinde siyaset yapma imkanı kalmadığı gibi takrirde talep edilen bir düzenin kurulma-sının CHP içinde mücadele edilerek olamayacağı ortaya çıkmıştır. Takririn, CHP Meclisi Grubuna verildiği günlerde Cumhurbaşkanı İsmet İnönü, Rauf Orbay ile görüşmüş yeni parti kurulması fikrini ona açmıştır. Bu görüşmeden, İnönü'nün yaptığı diğer konuşmalardan cesaret alan grup üyelerine karşı CHP'li yöne-tici ve milletvekillerinin olumsuz tavrı, partinin yayın organı Ulus gazetesindeki ağır sözlerle dolu yazılar grup üyelerinin CHP'den ayrılmalarına neden olmuştur. Zaten Adnan Menderes ve Fuat Köprülü Vatan gazetesinde yayınlanan yazıları nedeniyle CHP Divanı tarafından 25 Eylül 1945 tarihinde CHP'den ihraç edilmişlerdir. Diğer isimlerde istifa etmişlerdir. Partisiz kalan grup üyeleri parti kurma çalışmalarına başla-mışlar ve Demokrat Parti 7 Ocak 1946 tarihinde resmen kurulmuştur. Demokrat Parti, Dörtlü Takrir'in imzacıları: Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü ve Refik Koraltan tarafından kurulmuştur. Demokrat Parti'nin simgesi "DP", genel merkezi ise Antalya Milletvekili Cemal Tunca'nın Ankara Sümer Sokaktaki sekiz numaralı binası olmuştur. Demokrat Parti'nin kuruluş gerekçesinde ve programında Türkiye'de demok-ratik bir rejimin kurulacağı, TC Anayasası'nda demokrasiye aykırı kanunların kaldırı-lacağı, vatandaşların hak ve hürriyetlerinin anayasal teminat altına alınacağı dile geti-rilmiştir. Muhalefet yıllarında ise CHP ve iktidar demokratik olmayan tutum ve davra-nışlar sergilemekle itham edilmiştir. Muhalefet yıllılarında iki parti arasında demokra-siye aykırı birçok olay yaşanmıştır. Hatta 7 Ocak 1947 tarihinde gerçekleşen Demokrat Parti Birinci Genel Kongresi'nde kabul edilen Hürriyet Misakı'nda TC Anayasası'na aykırı olan kanunların kaldırılması ve demokrasiye uygun kanunların yapılması talep edilmiştir. Bu istekler yerine getirilmez ise Demokrat Parti Genel Yönetim Kurulu'na sine-i millet kararı ( TBMM'den çekilme ) hakkı verilmiştir. Demokrat Parti yönetici-leri iktidara gelmeleri halinde vatandaşlara hak ve hürriyetlerinin tanınacağı, demokra-siye aykırı kanunların kaldırılacağı ve TC Anayasası'nın demokrasiye uyumlu hale ge-tirileceği sözlerini vermişlerdir. 14 Mayıs 1950 seçim faaliyetlerinde aynı vaatler tekrarlanmıştır. Hatta 2 Nisan 1950 tarihinde Kasımpaşa'da konuşan Demokrat Parti Genel Başkanı Celal Bayar, grev hakkının demokratik hak olduğunu ve demokrasinin olduğu ülkelerdeki gibi toplumsal düzene ve ekonomiye zarar vermeyecek biçimde işçilere grev hakkının verileceğini ifa-de etmiştir. Seçimleri kazanan Demokrat Parti adına Adnan Menderes 22 Mayıs 1950 tarihinde hükümeti kurmuş ve 29 Mayıs 1950 tarihinde hükümet programı TBMM'de onaylanmıştır.Hükümet programında partinin seçim beyannamesinde olduğu gibi iktidar deği-şikliğinin ülkede maddi ve manevi hiçbir sarsıntıya yol açmasına imkan tanınmayacağı ve özellikle devri sabık yaratılmayacağı vurgulanmıştır. Programda, TC Anayasası'nda vatandaş hak ve hürriyetlerine ve millet iradesine dayanan kararlı bir devlet düzeninin gerçekleşmesini sağlayacak düzenlemelerin yapılacağı ifade edilmiştir. Ayrıca CHP hükümetlerinden ( tek parti dönemi ) kalan, demokratik olmayan kanunların, alışkan-lıkların ve anlayışların değiştirileceği vurgulanmıştır. Programda, işçilere grev hakkının sosyal ve ekonomik düzeni bozmayacak şekilde tanınacağı açıklanmıştır. Demokrat Parti İktidarı Programı'nda sadece vatandaşlara tanınacak haklar yer almamıştır. Ayrıca o tarihlerde azınlıkta olsa da bazıları tarafından hak olarak görülen faaliyetlerin yasaklanacağı da yer almıştır. Cumhuriyet'in ve inkılapların korunması için aşırı sol akımlara ( komünizm ) izin verilmeyeceği ve bunlarla etkin bir biçimde müca-dele edileceği ifade edilmiştir. Bunlara karşı kanuni tedbirlerin alınacağı çünkü bu tür düşüncelerin günün şartlarında fikir ve vicdan hürriyeti olarak görülmediği vurgulan-mıştır. Bu fikir akımların hürriyet maskesi altında yayın yapmalarına izin verilmeyeceği çünkü bu düşünce akımlarının amacının özgürlükleri ortadan kaldırmak olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Komünizm fikir akımının yanı sıra irticai hareketlere de asla müsaade edil-meyeceği vurgulanmıştır. Demokrat Parti Dönemi'nde iktidarın sivil toplum kuruluşları ile ilişkilerine özetlemeden önce sivil toplumun örgütü tanımını yapmak yerinde olacaktır. Sivil top-lum kavramı farklı biçimlerde tanımlanan bir kavramdır. Özellikle devlet ile sivil top-lum arasındaki ilişki farklı tanımlamalara neden olmaktadır. Bu tanımlardan bazılarında sivil toplum, devletten tamamen bağımsız, devleti kontrol eden ve hatta devletin alter-natifi olan örgütlü bir güç olarak tarif edilmiştir. Diğer tanımlarda ise devlet ile sivil toplum arasında bu kadar keskin bir ayrılığın olmadığı, sivil toplumun devlete top-lumsal katılımı sağlama amacının var olduğu ileri sürülmüştür. Modern anlamda sivil toplum kavramı "Non Govern Mental Organizations" ( devletten bağımsız örgütlen-meler ) olarak tanımlamasının yanı sıra "gönüllü kuruluşlar", "kar amacı gütmeyen ku-ruluşlar" gibi ifadelerle de tanımlanmaktadır. Sivil toplum tanımını yaptıktan sonra Demokrat Parti iktidarları öncesi sivil toplum örgütlenmesine devletin müdahalesinin ne zaman kaldırıldığına kısaca yer verelim. Türkiye'de 28 Haziran 1938 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren 3512 sayılı Cemiyetler Kanunu ile Osmanlı Devleti döneminden kalma 1909 tarih ve 121 sayılı Cemiyetler Kanun'u ve bu kanunda yapılan 353 ve 387 sayılı kanunlar yürürlükten kalkmıştır. Bu kanunun dokuzuncu maddesinin h bendiyle "aile, sınıf, ırk, cins" esasına dayalı der-neklerin kurulması yasaklanmıştır. Bu madde ile sendika ve birçok derneğin kurulması yasaklanmıştır. Bu kanunun kabul gerekçesinde, o dönem de bazı ülkelerde var olan ko-münist ve faşist rejimlerin ülkenin yönetimin ele geçirmesini önlemek olduğu ileri sü-rülmüştür. İsmet İnönü'nün 10-11 Mayıs 1946 tarihinde CHP Kurultayı'nda yaptığı konuşmadan sonra 5 Haziran 1946 tarihinde 4919 sayılı Kanun ile dernek kurma işle-mindeki izin alma formalitesi kaldırılmıştır. Sınıf esasına dayalı dernek kurma yasağı da kalkmıştır. Bu kanunun kabulü sırasında Demokrat Parti adına bir konuşma yapan Adnan Menderes, kanunda yapılan değişikliği demokrasiye giden yolda önemli bir aşa-ma olarak adlandırmıştır. Sivil toplum örgütlenmesinin önündeki engeller Demokrat Parti İktidarı öncesinde kaldırılmıştır. Demokrat Parti İktidarı döneminde sivil toplum kuruluşları ile ilişkiler iki bölü-mde ele alınabilir. Birinci bölüm hükümetin sivil toplum alanında yaptığı düzenleme-lerden oluşur. İkinci bölüm ise iktidarın sivil toplum kuruluşlarına yaklaşımı yani onların faaliyetlerine karşı tutumu, ülke yönetimi ile ilgili alınan kararlara ilgili sivil toplum kuruluşlarının tepkileri ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının kendi alanları ile ilgili alınan kararlarda bu kuruluşların isteklerinin ve itirazlarının dikkate alıp almamasından oluşur.Demokrat Parti İktidarı döneminde sivil toplum alanında birçok düzenleme yapılmıştır. Hükümetin yaptığı bu düzenlemelere günümüzün demokrasi düzeyi ile yaklaşmak zamanın koşullarını ve demokrasi kültürünün oluşum sürecini dikkate almamak anlamına gelir. Hükümetin sivil toplum alanında yaptığı ilk düzenleme 5680 sayılı Basın Kanunu'dur. Kanunun kabulü demokrasi ilkeleri ile bağdaşan bir uygulama olmuştur. Bu nedenle basın ve basın-yayın örgütleri bu yasayı doğru bir adım olarak görmüşlerdir. Hükümetin sivil toplum alanında yaptığı ikinci kanuni düzenleme 5844 sayılı Komünizm İle Mücadele Kanununu çıkarmasıdır. İktidarın programında komü-nizm fikir akımına ve komünist yayınlara karşı mücadele edileceği, bu fikir akımlarının faaliyetlerinin demokratik bir fikir ve vicdan hürriyeti olarak görülmediği aksine de-mokratik rejimi ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik bir tutum ve tavır olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Muhalefetin de bu konuda iktidarla aynı düşünceye sahip olması bu kanunun çıkarıl-masını kolaylaştırmıştır. Demokrat Parti İktidarı'nın bu tür düşünce akımlarına ve onların faaliyetlerine izin vermemesini değerlendirirken zamanın koşullarını ve demok-rasi kültürünün oluşum sürecini göz önünde tutmak yerinde olacaktır. İktidarın sivil toplum alanı ile ilgili yaptığı bir başka uygulama ise 5816 sayılı Atatürk Kanunu'nun çıkarılmasıdır. Atatürk'ün kişiliğine, ilke ve inkılaplarına saldırıların sonucunda kabul edilmiş olan bu kanun günümüzde de geçerlidir. Bu kanunun çıkarılmasına Atatürk'ün kurduğu parti olan CHP'li milletvekillerinin karşı çıkmış olmaları ise üzerinde durul-ması gereken önemli bir husustur. Hükümetin sivil toplum alanında gerçekleştirdiği bir başka düzenleme ise 6761 sayılı Vicdan ve Toplanma Hürriyetini Koruma Kanunu'nun kabul edilmesidir. Kanun, irticai hareketlerin artarak rejimi tehdit eder hale gelmesinin sonucu çıkarılmıştır. İrticai hareketlere izin verilmeyeceğini, demokratik rejimi koruya-cağını programında ilan eden hükümet bunun gereğini yerine getirmiştir. Dinin siyasi veya diğer çıkarlar için kullanılması ve bu tür örgütlenmelerin kurulmasını demokratik ilkelerle bağdaştırmak mümkün değildir. Hükümetin sivil toplum alanına bir başka müdahalesi Neşir Yolu ile veya Radyo ile İşlenecek Bazı Cürümler Hakkındaki Kanun'u çıkarması ile 6732 ve 6733 sayılı basın kanunlarının bazı maddelerini değiş-tirmesi ile olmuştur. Bu kanunlarda yer alan kişilerin şikayeti olmadan savcıların ya-yınlar ile ilgili kendiliğinden harekete geçebilmesi unsuru haber alma ve verme hür-riyetini engelleyen bir koşul oluşturmuştur. Yine gazetecilerin yaptıkları haberler ve köşe yazarlarının yazdıkları yazılar nedeniyle şikayet edilmeleri halinde kendilerini müdafaa edebilmeleri için ispat hakkının onlara verilmeyişi bazı konularda ( iktidar ve mülki amirler ile ilgili yolsuzluk vb) haber yapmalarına, yazı yazmalarına engel olacak ortamı oluşturmuştur. Ayrıca, halkın haber alma özgürlüğüne, gazetecilerin özgür ve bağımsız çalışmasına engel olmuştur. İspat hakkı verilmediği gibi bu tür yazı ve haberler için cezaların arttırılması basın hürriyetini ortadan kaldırmıştır. Bu nedenle bazı basın mensupları hareket içerikli haber ve yazıları nedeniyle ceza almış olsalar da hükümetin politikalarını eleştiren onlarca basın çalışanına hapis cezalarının verilmesi vatandaşlara hak ve hürriyetlerini vereceğini ve devri sabık yaratmayacağını söyleyen Demokrat Parti İktidarı'nın bu uygulamaları onun söylemleri ve adıyla çelişmesine ne-den olmuştur. Hükümetin sivil toplum alanında yaptığı bir başka kanuni düzenleme 6771 Sayılı Toplantılar ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Kanunu'nu çıkarmasıdır. Kanun, siyasi partilerin seçim varmış gibi çok fazla miting yaptığı ve bu mitinglerde konuşanların hükümeti ağır bir şekilde eleştirdiği ve hatta bazı hatiplerin hükümet üyelerine ağır sözler söylediği gerekçeleriyle kabul edilmiştir. Bu kanun ile partilerin miting ve kapalı alan toplantıları seçim zamanı ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Bu nedenle bu uygulama demokrasiye aykırı bir düzenleme olmuştur. Bir parti veya dernek kanunlara aykırı hareket etmediği sürece istediği zaman izin almak koşulu ile miting yapabilmelidir. Hükümetin sivil toplum kuruluşları ile ilişkilerine baktığımızda ise olumlu ve o-lumsuz tutum ve uygulamaların varlığından söz edebiliriz. İktidarın sivil toplum kuru-luşları ile ilişkileri dernekler, sendikalar ve basın teşkilatları ile olmak üzere üç ana bö-lüm halinde ele alınabilir. Derneklerle ilişkilere baktığımızda öğrenci dernekleri ile iliş-kilerin daha yoğun olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Özellikle TMTF ve MTTB gibi öğrenci dernek federasyonları yönetimleri ile ilişkiler öğrenci dernekleri ile ilişkilerin en önemli bölümünü oluşturur. Bu konuda partilerin bugünde devam eden derneklerin yönetimle-rini elde etme isteği Demokrat Parti İktidarı'nın da faaliyetlerinden birisini oluşmuştur. Muhalif olan yönetimleri değiştirmek için çeşitli çalışmalar yapılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Demokrat Partili dört milletvekili tarafından öğrenci derneklerine hükümetin verdiği ö-deneği dağıtma ve gençlik sorunlarını çözmek amacıyla kurulmuş olan Gençlik Bürosu' nun TMTF ve MTTB'nin yönetim kurulları seçimlerine müdahale etmesi ve sonrası yaşanan olaylar demokrasi ilkeleri ile bağdaşmamıştır. Ayrıca Türkiye Milli Gençlik Teşkilatı adında bir gençlik derneği varken Türk Milli Birliği'nin kurulması ve böylece geçliği farklı cephelerde örgütleme isteği gençliğin birbiri ile kavgalı hale gelmesine ne-den olmuştur. Radyo Dinlemeyenler Cemiyeti'nin İstanbul Valisi Ethem Yetkiner tara-fından kanunsuz bir biçimde kapatılması, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dekanı Turhan Fevzioğlu'nun görevden alınması nedeniyle eylem yapan öğrencilerin gözaltına alınması ve mahkemeye verilmesi, İTÜTB'nin üniversitedeki yemek boykotu nedeniyle öğrencilerin gözaltına alınmaları, mahkemeye verilmeleri ve hükümet yetki-lilerinin bu konuda yaptıkları açıklamalar demokratik bir iktidar sivil toplum kuruluşu ilişki tarzına aykırı olmuştur. Tahkikat Komisyonu kararları ile örfi idarelerin kurulması ve öğrencilerin tepkilerinin engellenmesi de demokrasi açısında doğru olmayan uygula-malar olmuştur. Kiracılar Cemiyeti'nin istekleri dikkate alınarak Kira Kanunu'nun ka-bul edilmesi, tüccar, esnaf ve sanayicilerin derneklerinin talepleri dikkate alınarak Milli Korunma Kanunu'nda yapılan değişiklik ve kredi imkanlarının artırılması gibi karar-larda dernekler ile ilgili hükümetin olumlu yönde uygulamaları olmuştur. Ayrıca hükü-metin irtica ve komünizm ile mücadeleleri de dernekler tarafından olumlu karşılan-mıştır. Hükümetin sendikalar ile ilişkilerine baktığımızda ise grev hakkı tartışmalarının en önemli sorun olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. İktidarın seçim vaatlerinde ve programında olan grev hakkı ile ilgili sendikalar tarafından onlarca talep gelmiştir. 1951 yılında bir tasarı hazırlanmış olmasına ve ilgili bakanların bu hakkın verileceğini yıllarca söyleme-lerine karşın grev hakkı verilmemiştir. Çalışma bakanları grev hakkının verilmeme ne-denini, genellikle iktisadi ve sosyal düzenin bozulabileceğine dayandırmışlardır. Ayrıca, grev hakkı verildiğinde işverene lokavt hakkının da tanınması gerektiği için sendikala-rın mali gücünün bunu kaldıramayacağını ve işçilerin zor durumda kalacağını iddia et-mişlerdir. Bu nedenlerle grev hakkı için acele edilmemesini dile getirmişlerdir. İşçiye grev hakkının verilmemesinin yanında işçi mitinglerinin yasaklanması; kanunsuz grev nedeniyle bazı sendikaların kapatılması; işsizlik rakamları açıklamaları nedeniyle Çalışma Bakanlığı ile tartışmaya giren bazı sendika birliklerinin Sendikalar Kanunu'nun sekizinci maddesinde yer alan ayrı ayrı iş kolundaki sendikaların sendikal birlik olama-yacağı gerekçesiyle kapatılması; işçi seminerlerinin yasaklanması ve burada konferans verenlerin cahillikle, komünistlikle ve siyasi propaganda yapmakla ile itham edilmesi; Zonguldak Maden İşçileri Sendikası ikinci başkanının muhalif açıklamaları nedeniyle görevden alınması ve sendikanın kongresine müdahale edilmesi gibi olaylar demokratik olmayan tutumlar olmuştur. Kolektif İş Akdi tasarısının TBMM'ye getirilmesi, işçiler için ev yapılması, yıllık ücretli iznin verilmesi, tatil yapamayanlara çalıştıkları gün için yevmiye ödenmesi, sendikal faaliyet nedeniyle işten çıkarılmaların kanunla yasaklan-ması, işçi sigortalarındaki düzenlemelerde işçilerin ve sendikaların lehine olan demok-ratik uygulamalar olmuştur. Basın ve onun teşkilatları ile ilişkilerine baktığımızda Demokrat Parti, muhalefet yıllarında ve iktidarının ilk üç, dört yılında basının büyük bir bölümü tarafından destek- lenmiştir. Fakat hükümet politikalarındaki değişmeler ve ekonomideki kötü gidiş bası-nın büyük bir bölümünün hükümete muhalif olmasına neden olmuştur. Bu nedenle bası-nının muhalif partilerin eylem ve söylemlerini sayfalarına taşıması; hükümet politikala-rını eleştiren yazılar yayınlaması hükümetin yukarıda aktardığımız kanuni önlemleri al-masına neden olmuştur. Bu kanunların kabulüne bazı gazetecilerin hükümet üyeleri ile ilgili eleştirinin boyutunu aşarak hakaret içeren yazıları kaleme almaları da etkili olmuş-tur. Özellikle 1958 yılından sonra basın kuruluşları ile hükümet üyeleri arasında ilişkiler gerginleşmiştir. Basın sanki bir muhalefet partisi gibi muhalefeti hükümete karşı tek cephede birleşmeye çağırırken hükümette basını reklam ödeneklerinin azalması nede-niyle bu yönde hareket etme ve meşru hükümete karşı halkı ayaklanmaya teşvik etmek-le itham etmiştir. İsmet İnönü'nün ve CHP'lilerin yurt gezileri ile Osman Bölükbaşı'nın Kırşehir'i ziyareti ve tutuklanması sırasında bazı gazetecilerin polis tarafından tartak-lanması, fotoğraf makinelerinin ellerinden alınması, gözaltına alınmaları, yargılanma-ları, bu olayların yayının yasaklanması hükümet ile basının ilişkilerini daha da gergin-leştirmiştir. Bu olaylar nedeniyle basın örgütlerinin tebliğler yayınlamaları ve bu tebliğ-lerden birisi nedeniyle İstanbul Gazeteciler Sendikası'nın siyaset yaptığı gerekçesiyle kapatılması ve Beynelmilel Basın Enstitüsü'nün Türkiye'deki basın hürriyeti ile ilgili açıklamasının yayınının yasaklanması basınla iktidarı karşı karşıya getirmiştir. Bu olay-lar bazı gazeteci örgütlerinden istifa edenlerin Demokrat Parti'ye yakın gazeteciler ile radyo ve Anadolu Ajansı'nda çalışan gazetecilerden oluşan Matbuat Kulübü'nün kurul-ması ile sonuçlanmıştır. CHP'nin son olaylar nedeniyle halkı iktidara karşı isyana teşvik ettiği ve silahlı hücreler kurduğu gerekçesiyle Tahkikat Komisyonu'nun kurulması ve bu olay sonucunda örfi idarelerin ilan edilmesi bazı örfi idare kararlarına uymadığı ne-deniyle bazı gazetelerin kapatılmasına neden olmuştur. Tabi ki sadece hükümetin basın-la olumsuz yönde ilişkileri olmamıştır. Başbakan Adnan Menderes birçok kez bazı ga-zetecilere ziyafet vermiş, onların teşekküllerini ziyaret etmiş ve istek ve sorunlarını din-lemiştir. Özetle Demokrat Parti İktidarı Türkiye'de demokrasi kültürünün oluşmadığı ve Cumhuriyet'in ilanının üzerinden çok fazla zamanın geçmediği bir dönemde işbaşına gelen bir iktidardır. Bu nedenle devri sabık yaratılmayacağı ve demokratik hak ve hürriyetlerin tanınacağı, TC Anayasası'nın demokrasi ilkelerine uygun biçimde tanzim edileceği sözleri tutulamamıştır.ABSTRACTOn November 10, 1938 with the death of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ismet Inonu country, the management of which the President has become the most authoritative person. İnönü, CHP and the state administration dominated by single units (National Chief), especially the period of Celal Bayar reaction caused CHP deputies and managers. Direction of the party and the country is a party to the Second World War due to the domination of the majority of the people and the power of the economic distress of the people in conflict with conservative political circles and outside the CHP applications in educational and social fields, and a large part of the population has led to the formation of an oppositional stance. In conjunction with this process, the government organized a number of radical opposition movement has led to applications.Due to the reasons stated above, and openly turned into a discourse and actions of individual behavior within the CHP has emerged during the bid for the first time legislation for land reform. CHP deputies Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, Fuat Koprulu, and Refik Koraltan, May 14, 1945 with the start of the discussion in Parliament on the proposal of this law the government's attitude towards the application put forward by their speeches. However, prior to the submission to Parliament of the draft of this law is essentially a dissident group within the CHP meetings began Thursday in the home of the formation of Tevfik Rüştü Aras. Aras Tevfik Rüştü since April of 1945 came together at home Emin Sazak sure, Adnan Menderes and Fuat Koprulu CHP reported that they were under the authority of Ismet Inonu and focused on the need to change this situation. Fuat Koprulu Adnan Menderes coming together for the second time and agreed on establishing a democratic center. Refik Koraltan later participated in the meetings. Adnan Menderes, the party and in the community should join this group Celal Bayar has announced that effective. The meeting with the group at the end of Celal Bayar, it has been included. Group members at the meeting held on May 18, Calm before the Turkish Grand National Assembly without a vote of the state budget of 1945 three hundred and seventy-three deputies involved in İzmir deputy Celal Bayar,Deputy Aydin Adnan Menderes, Mersin deputy Refik Koraltan, Kars deputy Fuat Koprulu and Eskişehir deputy Emin Sazak used negative vote against the budget. Against the budget vote against the Republican period was used for the first time. Thus, the attitudes of the opposition put forward a second time. 1945 was prepared by the CHP Parliamentary Group Quartet Motion to think.Group members on June 7, 1945 at Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, Fuat Koprulu and the CHP Parliamentary Group of the motion hazard with the signature of President Rafik Koraltan'ın attitudes explicitly put forward by the opposition. The operation of the CHP's proposal to be brought into line with democratic principles and the TC. Recognition of citizens' rights and freedoms of the Constitution claimed that exists.CHP Parliamentary Group on June 12, 1945 This resolution was discussed and rejected. Calm in the ongoing process of this staff within the CHP with the rejection of the possibility of politics as no event requested a proposal to establish an order could not be fighting in the CHP has emerged.The proposals given in the CHP parliamentary group, recently President Ismet Inonu, the idea of establishing a new party he has met with Rauf Orbay. This meeting, the group ventured İnönü his other speeches negative attitude against members of the CHP managers and members of parliament, the party organ of the Nation newspaper articles full of heavy words to leave the group members has led to the CHP. Already published in Homeland Adnan Menderes and Fuat Koprulu writings were expelled from the CHP CHP by the Court on September 25, 1945.Other names resigned. The remaining members of the group began the work of establishing party-Party and the Democratic Party was formally established on January 7, 1946. The Democratic Party, Four signatories to the motion: Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, was founded by Fuat Koprulu, and Refik Koraltan. Symbol of the Democratic Party, "DP", is headquartered in Ankara Antalya Deputy Cemal Tunca Sumerian has been building street number eight.The justification of the Democratic Party establishment of a democratic regime in Turkey to install and program, contrary to the laws of democracy, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey removed, will be guaranteed by the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens are expressed. In opposition to the CHP, and the government has been accused of exhibiting non-democratic attitudes and behaviors. The opposition between the two parties yıllılarında many events occurred against democracy. Even the Democratic Party, which took place on January 7, 1947 the First General Congress of the abolition of laws which are contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey adopted the Convention on Freedom and democracy has been requested to the appropriate law. These requests are not adhered to given the right to withdraw from the Parliament of the Board of Directors of the Democratic Party. If the Democratic Party came to power managers to recognize the rights and freedoms of citizens, democracy, contrary to the laws of the Republic to remove the words of the Constitution gave making them compatible with democracy.May 14, 1950 election activities, the same promise was repeated. Even speaking Kasımpaşa on April 2, 1950 Democratic Party Chairman Celal Bayar, that democratic rights and democracy in countries where the right to strike as the social order and stated that the economy will not harm the workers the right to strike. On behalf of the Democratic Party won the elections on May 22, 1950 the government of Adnan Menderes set up and on May 29, 1950 the Parliament approved the government's program.The government program as well as the party's electoral declaration is no shock of the moral and material change of government in the country the possibility to open the account will not be recognized, and in particular sorulmayacağı previous government was emphasized. In the program, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey is based on the will of the citizens' rights and freedoms and the nation are expressed in stable arrangements shall be made to ensure the realization of a state order. In addition, the governments of the CHP (single-party period) and the remaining non-democratic laws, habits, and understandings change is emphasized. In the program, the workers explained to recognize the right to strike will not disrupt the social and economic order.Programme of the Government of the Democratic Party would get only the rights of citizens were not included. In addition, even though at that time by some of the minority rights in the banned activities took place. Reforms for the protection of the Republic and the extreme left movements (communism) and will not be allowed to deal with them effectively unless otherwise indicated. Legal action will be taken against them because such conditions, the ideas and thoughts of the day is not seen as freedom of conscience is emphasized. This idea will not be allowed to broadcast under the guise of freedom of currents currents of thought because it has been claimed that the purpose of eliminating freedoms. The idea of communism would not be allowed to flow as well as the reactionary movements never be emphasized.Democratic Party Period Before summarizing the power of civil society in its relations with non-governmental organizations would be appropriate to define the organization. The concept of civil society is a concept defined in different ways. In particular the relationship between the state and civil society leads to different definitions. Some of these definitions, civil society, completely independent of the government, which controls the state and even the organized power of the state, which has been described as an alternative. Other definitions of the state and civil society is not so much a sharp separation, has the purpose of ensuring the participation of civil society, the state has been suggested that social. The concept of civil society in the modern sense "Non Govern mental Organizations" (independent of the state organizations), as well as the definition of "voluntary organizations", "nonprofit organizations" as well as the terms are defined. After the definition of civil society non-governmental organization prior to the governments of the Democratic Party has been removed briefly when you let the government's interference.Turkey Associations law no. 3512 came into force on June 28, 1938 and 1909 by the Ottoman Empire era and societies act no. 121 and no. 387 to the law and the law was abolished 353. This is the ninth article of the law bendiyle h "family, class, race, gender" on the basis of the establishment of associations is prohibited. This material association with the trade unions and the establishment of many prohibited. Accept the justification for this law, existing at the time of communist and fascist regimes in some countries to avoid taking over the administration of the country suggested that.Ismet Inonu, 10 to 11 May 1946, after his speech to the CHP congress of the law no. 4919 on June 5, 1946 permitting process and formalities to freedom of association has been removed. Class on the basis of the ban on freedom of association disappeared. Time of the adoption of this law, gave a speech on behalf of the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes, the change in the law is an important step on the road to democracy, termed. Removed the obstacles to the organization of civil society ahead of the Democratic Party Government.Relations with non-governmental organizations in the Government of the Democratic Party can be considered in two parts. The first part consists of the Regulation in the field of government, civil society. The second part of power approach to civil society organizations, that is, their attitude towards the activities of the country, on the decisions taken on the management of non-governmental organizations and civil society responses in decisions related to their field consists of absence from these organizations to take into account requests and objections.The Governments of the Democratic Party made many regulations in the field of civil society. The government's approach to his time with the level of democracy in today's terms of these regulations and take no account of the formation process of a culture of democracy means. The government's first regulation in the field of civil society Press Act no. 5680. The adoption of the Law has been a practice incompatible with the principles of democracy. Therefore, the press and media organizations saw this as a step towards the law. The second legal regulation in the field of civil society, the government's Struggle Against Communism Act 5844 to issue no. The idea of communism and communist publications program flow of power to fight against the idea of a democratic currents of ideas and activities seen as contrary to freedom of conscience to abolish the democratic regime is emphasized as an attitude and demeanor. Opposition to have the same thought on this subject, power and facilitated the removal of this law. İktidarı'nın Democratic Party not to allow this kind of thought currents and their activities in terms of assessing the time and would be wise to keep in mind that the process of the formation of a culture of democracy. Another application is related to the field of civil society that the government is the removal of the law no. 5816 of Atatürk. Atatürk's personality, principles and reforms of this law which has been adopted as a result of the attacks also applies today. This law established by Ataturk party, the CHP deputies opposed the removal of the need to focus on to be an important consideration. If the regulation is carried out by the Government in the field of non-governmental No. 6761 is the adoption of the Law on Protection of conscience and the right to freedom of assembly. The law was a result of the arrival of fundamentalist movements become increasingly threaten the regime. Harekelere reactionary allowed the democratic regime of government that proclaimed the need to protect the program fulfilled. The use of religion for political or other interests is not possible to reconcile democratic principles and the establishment of such organizations. Another area of civil society through the intervention of the government or the Radio Broadcasting to be covered by the Act on Certain Felonies by extraction with replacement of some provisions of the laws of 6732 and 6733 has been no press. Without these laws, prosecutors publications related to the complaints of the people pass the element of self-motivation has created a condition that prevents the freedom to receive and impart news. Again, journalists, columnists wrote articles for their news and to be able to prove that the right to defend themselves if they are complaining verilmeyişi them on some issues (related to power and corruption, governors, etc.) make news, the media has created to prevent writing to write. In addition, the public freedom of information, has been hampered by journalists to operate freely and independently. Proof is not given the right to increase the penalties for press articles and news like this kind of freedom is eliminated. For this reason, some members of the media even if they are convicted of moving content, news and articles critical of the government's policies, press the dozens of employees and the transfer of prison sentences would be given rights and freedoms of citizens who have no former Democratic Party İktidarı'nın these practices conflict with the name of his discourses, and from what has been . Any other legal regulation in the field of civil society that the Government No. 6771 Law on Meetings and Demonstrations landing. The law of political parties and election rallies like there's a lot of rally speakers heavily criticized the government and even some harsh words said to the members of the government on grounds of orators were adopted. With this law, meetings, parties, rally and off the field is limited to election time. Therefore, this application has an arrangement undemocratic. Act contrary to the laws of association, unless a party or get permission at any time be able to rally with the condition.If we look at the government's relations with civil society organizations can talk about the existence of positive and negative attitudes and practices. Power relations with non-governmental organizations, associations, trade unions and the press offices of three main parts: can be handled. When we look at the relations of relations with associations, student associations say that more intense. Student associations and federations, such as TMTF MTTB especially relations with governments creates the most important part of relations with student associations. Management of associations in this regard the parties desire to achieve, which continues today İktidarı'nın Democratic Party, one of the activities occurred. Various studies the management of the opposition to change. In this respect the government of the Democratic Party the benefit of four deputies student associations established to solve the problems of deploying and youth, the Youth Bureau's board of directors MTTB'nin TMTF and after the elections and the events in the intervention was not consistent with democratic principles. In addition, while Turkey's National Youth Organization is a youth association, and thus the establishment of the Turkish National Union geçliği different fronts at loggerheads with each other to become the youth organization has led to the request. Radio unlawfully by not obeying the closure of the League of the Governor of Istanbul Ethem Yetkiner, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences, Ankara University, Turhan Fevzioğlu'nun dismissal of the action because of the detention and court-students who, due to the boycott of food İTÜTB'nin university students detention, without trial and government officials and their explanations in this regard the relationship of a democratic style of government, non-governmental organizations has been inconsistent. Research Commission decisions and the establishment of the legal authorities and the students' reactions have been prevented by applications that are not correct in terms of democracy. Requests, taking into account the adoption of the Law on Lease Tenants Association, merchants, tradesmen, and taking into account the demands of the industrialists' associations, and credit facilities amendment to the Law on Protection of National Associations of decisions, such as increasing the government has applications in a positive way. In addition, the government struggles with fundamentalism and communism was welcomed by the associations.If we look at the government's relations with the trade unions the right to strike is the most important problem söyleyebiliriz.Hükümetin election promises and program discussions with the trade unions on the right to strike has been requested by the dozens. In 1951, a bill has been prepared and the relevant ministers would say that for many years, but the right to strike were not given this right. The right to strike or not to study the cause of ministers, generally relied on the economic and social order can go wrong. In addition, the employer is given the right to strike or lock-out should be recognized the right of the workers to handle this difficult situation will remain the financial power of the trade unions have claimed. For these reasons expressed not to rush to the right to strike. An employee is not given the right to strike of workers rallies next to the prohibition of certain trade unions due to the closure of illegal strikes, unemployment figures into the discussion with the Ministry of Labour for comments eighth article of the Law on Trade Unions located in some of the trade union trade union trade union unity can not be separate business line on the ground, working seminars ban and ignorance of those who lecture here, to be accused of being a communist and political propaganda; Zonguldak Mine Workers' Union and the second president of the union congress to intervene in the dismissal of the opposition, such as descriptions of events were non-democratic attitudes. The introduction to Parliament of the draft collective employment contract for workers to home, paid annual granting of a permit, work groups not on the payment of per diem for the day, because of the dismissal law, the prohibition of trade union activity, labor regulations, workers and trade unions in favor of insurances has been democratic practices.Look at the Democratic Party's relations with the press and its agencies, the opposition and the government die in the first three, four, supported by a large part of the press in. However, changes in government policies and the economy is going bad, the opposition to the government has led to a large part of the media. For this reason, the actions and rhetoric of media sheets to carry the opposition parties and the government to publish articles critical of the government's policies have quoted above, has led to take legal measures. The adoption of this law, the size of some of the criticism of journalists, members of the government to submit written papers has been effective in overcoming-round insulting. Especially in 1958, after the tense relations between members of the press and the government. Press it as an opposition party, the opposition to unite against the government calling a single front to move in this direction due to the decline in government appropriations media advertising and the people to revolt against the legitimate government has been accused. . Ismet Inonu and CHP foreign trips and a visit to Kirşehir Osman Bölükbaşı some journalists during his arrest by the police, beaten, deprived cameras, detention, trial, media relations with the government banning the publication of these events gerginleştirmiştir. This is due to the events of press organizations publish papers and one of the papers due to the closure of Istanbul, on the grounds that the political Union of Journalists and the international Press Institute press freedom in Turkey, the prohibition of publication of the statement on the power of the press has faced. These events are close to the Democratic Party, who resigned some journalist organizations, journalists and radio and printed documents of journalists working in the Anatolian Agency resulted in the establishment Club. Due to recent events in the CHP encourages people to revolt against the government and the armed cells, and this event as a result of the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on the grounds established by customary authorities declared martial law in some of the decisions of the breach has led to the closure of some newspapers. Of course, only the government's relationship with the press has been negative. Some reporters several times Prime Minister Adnan Menderes feast, I have visited their formations and listened to requests and problems.In summary declaration of the Democratic Party Government of the Republic of Turkey, the culture of democracy are generated does not exceed too much time in power, which came to power at a time. For this reason, touched and democratic rights and freedoms recognized representatives of the previous government, the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey promises to be devised in accordance with the principles of democracy has not been realized.

Die Variablenübersicht über die vier Wellen EVS 1981, 1990, 1999/2000 und 2008
ermöglicht die Identifizierung der Trendvariablen in allen vier Wellen sowie
länderspezifischer Abweichungen im Fragewortlaut innerhalb und zwischen den EVS Wellen.

Diese Übersicht ist abrufbar unter:
Online Variable Overview.


Moralische, religiöse, gesellschaftliche, politische, ökonomische und
soziale Wertvorstellungen der Europäer.

Themen: Das Fragenprogramm ist dreigeteilt: Neben einem gemeinsamen
Fragenprogramm für alle Ländern gibt es ein freiwilliges Zusatzprogramm
und weitere länderspezifische Fragen.

1. Gemeinsames Fragenprogramm:

Freizeit: Wichtigkeit der Lebensbereiche; Glücksgefühl;
Mitgliedschaften und ehrenamtliche Tätigkeiten in Vereinen, Parteien,
Organisationen, Bürgerinitiativen und Berufsorganisationen;
Verkehrskreise in der Freizeit; Toleranz gegenüber Minderheiten,
Andersgläubige und Ausländer; zwischenmenschliches Vertrauen;
Selbstwirksamkeit (Skalometer); allgemeine Lebenszufriedenheit
(Skalometer).

Arbeitswelt: Wichtigkeit ausgewählter Merkmale beruflicher Arbeit
(Skala); eigene Erwerbstätigkeit; allgemeine Arbeitszufriedenheit
(Skalometer); Selbstbestimmung in der Arbeit (Skalometer); Arbeitsethos
(Skala); Einstellung zu einer leistungsorientierten Bezahlung und zum
kritiklosen Befolgen von Arbeitsanweisungen; Priorität von Inländern
gegenüber Ausländern sowie Männern gegenüber Frauen bei
Arbeitsplatzknappheit; vermuteter Vorrang individueller oder
gesellschaftlicher Ursachen für die wirtschaftliche Notlage Einzelner;
Entscheidungsfreiheit von Arbeitslosen zur Ablehnung eines
Arbeitsangebots (Skalometer).

Politik: Parteipräferenz; Einstellung zu ausländischen Arbeitnehmern
im eigenen Land; Zukunftsangst; Assimilation und Integration von
Immigranten; Vorstellung von einer gerechten Gesellschaft (mehr
Wohlfahrtsstaat oder Liberalismus, Skala); Interesse an politischen
Nachrichten in den Medien; Individualismus und Gemeinschaftsdenken;
Politikinteresse; politische Partizipation; Selbsteinschätzung auf einem
Links-Rechts-Kontinuum (Skalometer); Selbstverantwortlichkeit oder
staatliche Vorsorge (Skalometer); Einstellung zur Wettbewerbsfreiheit
und Unternehmerfreiheit (Skalometer); Demokratiezufriedenheit;
Einstellung zum derzeitigen politischen System des Landes und
Beurteilung des politischen Systems des Landes vor zehn Jahren
(Skalometer); Präferenz für ein demokratisches politisches System oder
für eine starke Führerschaft eines einzelnen Politikers (Skala);
Einstellung zur Demokratie (Skala); Verlust nationaler Charakteristika
durch die Vereinigung Europas.

Religion: individueller oder genereller Maßstab für Gut und Böse;
derzeitige und gegebenenfalls frühere Konfession; derzeitige
Kirchgangshäufigkeit und im Alter von 12 Jahren; Wichtigkeit religiöser
Feiern bei Geburt, Hochzeit und Beerdigung; Selbsteinschätzung der
Religiosität; Kompetenz der Religionsgemeinschaft in moralischen Fragen,
bei Problemen im Familienleben, bei geistigen Bedürfnissen und aktuellen
sozialen Problemen des Landes; Glaube an Gott, an ein Leben nach dem
Tod, an die Hölle, den Himmel, die Sünde, an Telepathie und an
Wiedergeburt; Gottgläubigkeit oder Nihilismus (Skala); Wichtigkeit von
Gott im eigenen Leben (Skalometer); Trost und Kraft durch den Glauben;
Beten und Meditation; Gebetshäufigkeit; Besitz und Glauben an
Glücksbringer oder Talisman (Skalometer); Lesen und Berücksichtigen von
Horoskopen; Einstellung zur Trennung von Kirche (Religion) und Staat
(Skala).

Familie und Ehe: wichtigste Kriterien für eine erfolgreiche Ehe
(Skala); Einstellung zur Ehe und zur traditionellen Familienstruktur
(Skala); Einstellung zu eigenen Kindern (Skala); Einstellung zum
traditionellen Rollenverständnis von Mann und Frau in Beruf und Familie
(Skala); Einstellung zu einer traditionellen oder liberalen
Eltern-Kind-Beziehung; Wichtigkeit von Erziehungszielen; Einstellung zur
Abtreibung.

Gesellschaft: Präferenz für individuelle Freiheit oder soziale
Gleichheit; Postmaterialismus (Skala); präferierte gesellschaftliche
Entwicklung (Skala); Einstellung zum technischen Fortschritt; Vertrauen
in Institutionen; Beachtung der individuellen Menschenrechte im Lande;
Einstellung zum Umweltschutz (Skala); Nähe zur Familie, zur
Nachbarschaft, den Menschen in der Region, zu den Landsleuten, den
Europäern und der Menschheit; Nähe zu älteren Menschen, zu Arbeitslosen,
Ausländern und Behinderten sowie Bereitschaft sich für diese Gruppen
einzusetzen; persönliche Gründe für Hilfeleistungen bei älteren Menschen
sowie bei Ausländern; Identifikation mit dem Ort, der Region, der
Nation, Europa und der Welt; Nationalstolz.

Moral und Sexualität: moralische Einstellungen (Steuerhinterziehung,
Diebstahl, Drogengebrauch, Lügen, Schmiergelder, Korruption, Euthanasie,
Selbstmord, Umweltverschmutzung, Alkohol am Steuer; Skala); moralische
Einstellungen zu Partnerschaft und Sexualität (Homosexualität,
Abtreibung, Scheidung, Promiskuität; Skala); vermutete Verbreitung
unmoralischer Verhaltensweisen in der Bevölkerung des Landes (Skala);
Einstellung zu einer Bestrafung in Abhängigkeit von der Situation des
Täters bzw. des Geschädigten (Skala).

Demographie: Geschlecht; Geburtsjahr; Familienstand und Zusammenleben
mit einem Partner; Kinderzahl; Schulbildung; Alter bei Beendigung der
Schulausbildung; Berufstätigkeit; Vorgesetztenfunktion und
Kontrollspanne; Betriebsgröße; Beruf (ISCO88) und berufliche Stellung;
Dauer der Arbeitslosigkeit; Haushaltsgröße; Alter der Kinder im
Haushalt; Haushaltsvorstand; Charakteristika des Haushaltsvorstands;
Haushaltseinkommen.

Zusätzlich verkodet wurden: Ortsgröße; Region; Land.

2. In einigen Ländern wurde zusätzlich gefragt:
Einstellung zur Privatisierung staatlicher Unternehmen (Skalometer);
Bereitschaft für das eigene Land in den Krieg zu ziehen; Einstellung zu
egalisierten oder leistungsorientierten Einkommen (Skalometer);
Präferenz für individuelle oder staatliche Vorsorge für Renten sowie für
Wohnung (Skalometer); Einstellung zu grundlegenden oder nur vorsichtigen
Veränderungen des eigenen Lebens; Einstellung zur revolutionären
Veränderung der Gesellschaft; Beurteilung der Lösbarkeit von
Umweltproblemen, Kriminalität und Arbeitslosigkeit auf nationaler Ebene;
Arbeitsplatzsicherheit; Gedanken über den Sinn des Lebens; Glaube an
Engel und an übernatürliche Kräfte; Einstellung zur Ausübung religiöser
Praktiken in der Schule; Einstellung zur Beschäftigung mit
unterschiedlichen religiösen Traditionen; Einstellung zu einer
Verbannung von religionsfeindlichen Büchern und Filmen; Einschätzung des
Einflusses der Kirchen auf die Politik des Landes; moralische
Vorstellungen über Schwarzfahren, politischen Mord, Embryonenforschung,
Genmanipulation, Prostitution, Pädophilie (Skala); Vertrauen in die
Landsleute.

Interviewerrating: Schichtzugehörigkeit des Befragten;
Kooperationsbereitschaft des Befragten.

Zusätzlich verkodet wurden: Interviewdatum; Interviewdauer.

Foreword by Lynne Healy -- Introduction: Signature Pedagogy -- A Practice Laboratory of Social Work Education / Rajendra Baikady, Varoshini Nadesan, Sajid S.M. and M. Rezaul Islam -- Part I: Transforming Practice Teaching: Perspectives from Asia and the Pacific -- Chapter 1: Reclaiming a Macro Lens, Recasting Multilevel Practice: Social Work Field Education in Hong Kong / Andrew Pau Hoang, Lo Kai Chung and Lucy Porter Jordan -- Chapter 2: Developing Healthcare Social Work Curriculum and Arranging Field Work Education in China -- Johnston H. C. Wong -- Chapter 3: Fieldwork Education in Social Work as One Way of Building Bridges Between China and Europe -- Staffan Höjer, Honglin Chen, Juha Hämäläinen, Jie Lei, Steven M Shardlow, Zhao Fang -- Chapter 4: Fieldwork Education in Social Work: Perspectives of Vietnamese Social Work Students -- Huong / T Hoang and Hang T Dao -- Part II: Strengthening Field Education in Social Work: The North and South American Experience -- Chapter 5: Adopting a Trauma-Informed Perspective in the Field Practicum: Current Realities and Future Challenges -- Carolyn Knight -- Chapter 6: Social Work Field Education in the United States -- Carole Cox and Jan Miner -- Chapter 7: It's Time to Deconstruct the Problematic Attitude of 'Fieldwork' of 'Global North'! -- Shweta Singh -- Chapter 8: Social Work Field Education in Canada -- Marion Bogo and Karen M. Sewell -- Chapter 9: Integrated and Holistic Education for Social Work: The Special Place of Field Education -- Naomi B. Farber, Mariah Moran and Steven Wahle -- Chapter 10: When the Going Gets Tough: Case Studies of Challenge and Innovation in Canadian Field Education -- Brenda Morris, Sarah Todd and Alicia Kalmanovitch -- Part III: Current Realities of Social Work Field Education in Australia and Oceania -- Chapter 11: Social Work Field Education in Australia: Concepts, Challenges and 21st Century Concerns -- Helen Cleak -- Chapter 12: 'Getting Used to the First Nation Person in the Room': A Discussion on Field Practice in Australia -- Kiel Hennessey, Steven Keed, Rachael Howard, Bindi Bennett, Phillip Pallas, Kylie Agllias -- Chapter 13: Aotearoa New Zealand Field Education Practice -- Kathryn Hay, Dominic Chilvers andJane Maidment -- Chapter 14: Understanding Simulated Learning and its Relationship to Field Education -- Jennifer Boddy, Lise Johns, Christian Frost, Mark Lynch andFiona Stevens -- Chapter 15: Social Work Field Education in Australia: Issues and Trends -- Kylie Agllias and Leanne Schubert -- Part IV: Social Work Field Education in Europe -- Chapter 16: 'She Subjected Me to Pressure from Everybody in the Team': Aligning Black African Students' Experiences of Field Education with Social Workers' Motivations for Becoming Practice Educators in England -- Prospera Tedam and Irine Mano -- Chapter 17: Teaching Field Social Work: Views from Ukrainian Academia -- Tetyana Semigina -- Chapter 18: Professional Placements in Social Work Training in Southern Spain: A Comparison with Other Social Sciences -- Roser Manzanera Ruiz and Maria del Valle Medina Rodriguez -- Chapter 19: Estonian Undergraduate Social Work Students' Reflections on the Field Placement: Challenges for the Novice Social Workers -- Karmen Toros, Kersti Kriisk and Anne Tiko -- Chapter 20: Field Work Education in Social Work in Italy -- Annamaria Campanini, Marilena Dellavalle and Giovanni Cellini -- Chapter 21: A Critical Review of Practice Education in England -- Graham Ixer, Mary Baginsky and Jill Manthorpe -- Chapter 22: Hearing the Student Voice: An Evaluation of Students' Experiences and Learning in Fieldwork Education in University College Dublin, Ireland -- Elaine Wilson and Niamh Flanagan -- Chapter 23: Fieldwork in Social Work Education in Slovenia: Needs, Challenges and Possible Solutions -- Liljana Rihter and Tamara Rape Žiberna -- Chapter 24: Prior to Embarking on First Fieldwork Education Exposure: Preparing Social Work Students Through Five Experiential Learning Activities -- Elena Cabiati and Fabio Folgheraiter -- Chapter 25: Reflexivity Development Demonstrated in Examples of Field Placements of Social Work Students -- Navrátil Pavel and Navrátilová Jitka -- Chapter 26: Experiences on Social Work Field Work Education in Romania -- Béla Szabó, Ágnes Dávid-Kacsó and Éva László -- Chapter 27: Reflexivity as a Pivotal Component of Fieldwork in Social Work Education -- Jarosław Przeperski and Małgorzata Ciczkowska-Giedziun -- Chapter 28: Unconventional Practice Placements: Creativity, Partnership and New Professional Opportunities in an Italian Experience of Social Work Field Education -- M.L. Raineri, F. Corradini. C. Landi, P. Limongelli -- Chapter 29: Construction and Evaluation of Knowledge in Social Work from the Evidence of Professional Internships in Spain -- Enrique Pastor Seller -- Chapter 30: Character Strengths and Virtues for Competent Fieldwork Education: Perspectives of Undergraduate Students from Two University Departments of Social Work in Greece -- Eleni Papouli, Sevaste Chatzifotiou and Charalampos Tsairidis -- Chapter 31: Supervision about Culture and Culture in Supervision: International Field Placement -- Gurid Aga Askeland and Elsa Døhlie -- Chapter 32: Resilience Enhancement in Social Work Field Education -- Monika Punová -- Chapter 33: Social Work Field Instruction in Turkey: Challenges, Problems and Based Implications -- Cemre Bolgün and Buğra Yildirim -- Part V: Social Work Field Education under Covid-19 -- Chapter 34: The Self-directed Practicum: An Innovative Response to COVID-19 and a Crisis in Field Education -- Beth Archer-Kuhn, Angela Judge-Stasiak, Lorraine Letkemann, Jennifer Hewson and Jessica Ayala -- Chapter 35: Covid-19 Pandemic: A Threat or an Opportunity to Fieldwork Education in England? -- Paula Beesley -- Chapter 36: Performance of Volunteering and Work Duties during the Pandemic of Covid-19 in the Czech Republic: Lived Experience of Social Work Students -- Marie Špiláčková, Kateřina Glumbíková, Veronika Zegzulková, Iva Tichá and Pavlína Rabasová -- Conclusion: Technological Advancement and Changing Landscape of Social Work Practice -- Challenges Ahead of Next-Generation Practitioners -- Rajendra Baikady, Varoshini Nadesan, Sajid S.M. and M. Rezaul Islam.

A July poll shows that a majority of the American public does not support sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan or Ukraine, sentiment that lines up with findings from other recent surveys on these heated subjects, which suggests that Americans appear to be warming to restraint and non-interventionism in international affairs. Indeed, another poll, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in February found that a majority of Americans (56%) do not believe that the United States should pick a side in Israel's war on Gaza. And a more recent survey from Council this month found that just four in ten support the United States sending troops to defend Israel if attacked by its neighbors. Similarly, Americans' suspicions of foreign intervention were uncovered in a recent YouGov poll, which found that 79% said that they only support intervention if the U.S. were directly threatened (that number significantly dropped to 49% if an ally were attacked). In the same study, the only recent war that a majority of Americans viewed as justified was World War II. Despite these findings, Washington continues to push forward with fanning the flames of war around the world, whether being slow to work toward peace settlements in Ukraine and Gaza, stoking conflict with China, or throwing gargantuan amounts of money, unnecessarily, at the Pentagon and thus, the weapons industry. "The general through line of the polling data is there is a disconnect between official U.S foreign policy and the preferred policies of the American people," Tucker Kass, spokesman at Defense Priorities which conducted the July survey, told Responsible Statecraft concerning their findings. "The policy coming out of D.C. is interventionist but the American people, at least based on the answers we received, support a more judicious, more discerning policy that would frankly be wiser than current policy."The Defense Priorities poll also found that just 22% of those surveyed support the United States defending Ukraine. Forty-six percent opposed while 32% were neutral. Thirty percent said they support America militarily defending Taiwan against China, while 37% opposed and 33% were neutral. Additionally, a plurality of Americans surveyed, 44%, agreed that avoiding war with China is more important than Taiwan's autonomy.Meanwhile, Americans have been increasingly less likely to support U.S. military aid being sent to Ukraine. A 2022 survey from the Chicago Council found that 79% of Americans supported sending military aid to Kyiv, but that number shrunk to 63% in the Council's September 2023 poll. Defense Priorities' July survey found that only 20% of Americans supported continued unconditional support for Ukraine. Other surveys also found that Americans have opposed the U.S. militarily defending Taiwan against a Chinese attack. In addition to the previously mentioned Defense Priorities poll, a survey from November 2023 by the Chicago Council found that only 39% would support defending Taiwan, rising to 43% in 2024. Support among Americans for defending Israel militarily has also been trending downwards. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, support for using U.S. troops to defend Israel has hovered just over 50 percent from 2015 through 2021, but dropped to 41% in 2024. The American public appears to be questioning U.S. military involvement in world affairs more generally. Support for U.S. military bases in Germany, Turkey, Poland, Baltic partners, Japan, South Korea, and Australia is down across the board from 2022 to 2023. Despite these apparent trends, there are some caveats. As seen in the Defense Priorities poll from July, Americans don't tend to follow U.S. foreign policy closely, leading to large shares of neutral or "don't know" responses to related polling questions. Polls also have the potential to differ widely. For example, some polls have shown support for America defending Taiwan, including one survey from the Global Taiwan Institute showing 61% in support as recently as 2022. Additionally, the public can be swayed by conflict or strong media driven narratives. For example, after the September 11th attacks, the media helped to normalize the idea of deposing Saddam Hussein. By January 2002, 73% of the American public supported the use of force in Iraq, believing what the Bush administration said about the presence of WMDs in the country. After years of hindsight, only 32% of Americans considered the Iraq War the right thing to do according to a 2024 survey. Americans today are now able to see alternative opinions on social media and non-mainstream outlets, leading to perhaps more skepticism towards official Washington perspectives. As polling has shown, Americans have appeared to be able to see through pro- war narratives on Taiwan, Israel-Hamas, and Ukraine."Presidents and other interventionists often win short-term public support for military adventurism by moralizing and scaremongering," Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, told RS. "However, when the effects of these tactics begin wearing off — and Americans start coming home in body bags — public enthusiasm typically wanes. Hence eventual popular disgust with the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and more."