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AbstractTraditionally, knowledge and beliefs are attributed to agents. The article explores an alternative approach where knowledge is informed by data and belief comes from trust in, not necessarily reliable, data. At the core of the article is the modality "if one dataset is trusted, then another dataset informs a belief". The main technical result is a sound and complete logical system capturing the properties of this modality and its connection with functional dependency between datasets.

I: Signs and Signalling -- I.1. Lewis on Signalling Systems -- I.2. Signs and Meaning -- I.3. Sign Systems and the Possibility of Deceit -- I.4. Generalization of Rules of Information -- I.5. ISS's and Lewis Indicative Signalling Systems -- I.6. Conventions of Truthfulness and Trust v. Rules of Information -- II: A Formal Language -- II.1. LC: its Syntax and the General Form of its Semantics -- II.2. Action Modalities -- II.3. Normative Modalities -- II.4. The Belief Modality -- II.5. Mutual Belief -- II.6. The Modality Va -- II.7. Deontic Modalities -- II.8. Knowledge that p -- II.9. On the Alleged Circularity of Possible-World Semantics -- III: Some Features of Communication Situations -- III.1. Truthfulness and Trust -- III.2. Moore's Paradox of Saying and Disbelieving -- III.3. Informing and Asserting -- III.4. Trust of Type No-Deceit, Communicators' Intentions and "Saying One Thing and Meaning Another" -- III.5. Non-Deceiving Performances and the Implementation of Rules of Information -- IV: Non-Indicatives -- IV.1. Non-Indicatives and Truth Conditions -- IV.2. Performatives -- IV.3. Sketch for a Logic of Imperative Inference -- IV.4. Other Types of Non-Indicatives -- IV.5. Non-Indicative Usage of Indicatives -- V: Intention-Dependent Evidence -- V.1. Bennett's Defence of the Gricean Theory -- V.2. The Modality Shall and the Analysis of Signalling -- VI: The Double Bind -- VI.1. General Features of a Double-Bind Situation -- VI.2. The Illustration from Clinical Data — a Formal Description -- VI.3. Bateson's Theory of Communication -- VI.4. The Double Bind and Levels of Communication -- Concluding Remarks -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

Half Title -- Series Information -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- Preface to the English Edition -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1 Philosophy and Its Topic -- 2 Form as Relation-Preliminaries -- 3 On the Form of the Syllogism -- 4 External Reflection -- 5 Consciousness and Appearance -- Chapter 2 Kant and Hegel -- 1 Critique and System -- 2 From Kant to Hegel? -- 3 Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, Language -- Chapter 3 Absolute Individuality -- 1 Individualisation of Cognition -- a) Absolute Inversion -- b) Infinite Proposition -- c) Cognition as Process and Definition -- 2 On the Way to the Predicate -- a) Reality of Perception -- b) Categories and the Context of Experience -- c) Transcendental Ideal -- 3 Hegel's Category of the Absolute -- a) The Absolute in the Logic -- b) Interpreting the Absolute -- c) Absolute Attribute -- d) Modus of the Absolute -- Chapter 4 Kant's Modal Concepts -- 1 Logical versus Ontological Modality -- a) Kant's Concept of Logic -- b) Kant and the History of Modal Logic -- 2 Differentiating Logical Modality -- a) Logical Possibility -- b) Logical Actuality (Truth) -- c) Logical Necessity -- d) Logical Modality and Unity of Thought -- 3 Postulates of Empirical Thinking -- a) Status of Modal Principles -- b) Possibility Postulate -- c) Actuality Postulate -- d) Necessity Postulate -- 4 Absolute Modality -- Chapter 5 Hegel's Logos of Actuality -- 1 Actuality and Language that Speaks -- 2 Contingency and Its Formal Interpretation -- 3 Relative Necessity or Actuality of Content -- 4 Absolute Necessity -- 5 Absolute Relation -- a) Substantiality -- b) Causality -- c) Reciprocity -- 6 Science of Absolute Form -- Bibliography -- i Primary Sources -- ii Other Cited Texts and Secondary Literature -- Name Index -- Subject Index.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Approaching (Legal) Argumentation: A Historical Background -- The Book's Content -- 1 Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation, Jung's Psychological Typology, and the Extension of Multi-Modality to Law -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation -- 1.3 Multi-Modality and Jungian Psychological Typology -- 1.4 The Four Modes and Law -- 1.4.1 Introduction -- 1.4.2 The Logical Mode -- 1.4.3 Facing Legal Institutional Constraints -- 1.4.4 The Kisceral Mode -- 1.4.5 The Visceral Mode -- 1.4.6 The Emotional Mode -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 Multi-Modal Arguments in Judicial Decisions -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Three Models of Legal Argument -- 2.2.1 The Dialectical Model -- 2.2.2 The Rhetorical Models -- 2.2.2.1 The Legal-Systemic Level -- 2.2.2.2 The Meta-Legal Level -- 2.3 The Dialectical and Rhetorical Dimensions of Multi-Modality in Law -- 2.4 Models and Types of Legal Argumentation and Multi-Modality -- 2.5 The Four Modes and Traces of Multi-Modality in Court Cases -- 2.5.1 The Dialectical and Rhetorical Dimensions of the Legal Logical Mode (Legal Logos) -- 2.5.2 The Dialectical and Rhetorical Dimensions of the Kisceral Mode (Values and Legal Ethos) -- 2.5.3 The Dialectic and Rhetoric of Emotions in Law (Legal Pathos) -- 2.5.4 The Power of Visceral Argumentation (Legal "Physis") -- 2.5.4.1 The Dialectical Dimension -- 2.5.4.2 The Rhetorical Dimension -- 2.5.4.3 Visual Arguments -- 2.5.4.4 Arguments of Sounds -- 2.5.4.5 Arguments of Scents and Tastes -- 2.6 Multi-Modal Arguments and Arguments About Multi-Modality -- 2.7 Conclusion -- 3 Visual as Multi-Modal Argumentation in Law -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Visual Arguments in Legal Argumentation -- 3.2.1 Visual Arguments as Legal Evidence -- 3.2.2 Semiotic "Translation".

Plural logic has become a well-established subject, especially in philosophical logic. This book explores its broader significance for philosophy, logic, and linguistics. What can plural logic do for us? Are the bold claims made on its behalf correct? After introducing plural logic and its main applications, the book provides a systematic analysis of the relation between this logic and other theoretical frameworks such as set theory, mereology, higher-order logic, and modal logic. The applications of plural logic rely on two assumptions, namely that this logic is ontologically innocent and has great expressive power. These assumptions are shown to be problematic. The result is a more nuanced picture of plural logic's applications than has been given so far. Questions about the correct logic of plurals play a central role in the last part of the book, where traditional plural logic is rejected in favor of a "critical" alternative. The most striking feature of this alternative is that there is no universal plurality. This leads to a novel approach to the relation between the many and the one. In particular, critical plural logic paves the way for an account of sets capable of solving the set-theoretic paradoxes.

This anthology opens up new stimulating perspectives on a broad variety of Barcan Marcus's concerns ranging from quantified modal logic, identity, extensionality, direct reference, substitutional and objectual quantification, essentialism and possible worlds to epistemic and deontic modalities, belief, rationality and moral dilemmas. The contributions demonstrate that her philosophy has had a formative influence on current philosophical debates.

Although Gloria Anzaldúa's critical categories have steadily entered discussions in the field of philosophy, a lingering skepticism remains about her works' ability to transcend the particularity of her lived experience. In an effort to respond to this attitude, I make Anzaldúa's corpus the center of philosophical analysis and posit that immanent to this work is a logic that lends it the unity of a critical philosophy that accounts for its concrete, multilayered character and shifting, creative force. I call this an "affective logic ofvolverse una." Starting with the understanding of a situated modality of all subjectivity, Anzaldúa's work exhibits a logic of three moments distinguished by states of awareness. Each state of awareness is characterized by the generative degree of the subject's responses to its conditions: critical, individuating, and expansive. Led by her late concepts of conocimiento and nepantlera, I return to her earlier works and trace Anzaldúa's innovative exploration of undoing the oppressive condition of marginal subjectivities from "La Prieta" throughBorderlands/La Fronterato her final published essay "now let us shift." I find a liberatory schema ofvolverse una/becoming whole that is grounded in an active receptivity of sensibility and facilitated by affective technologies for transformation.

This book describes extensions of deontic logic. Deontic logic is a branch of philosophical logic involving reasoning with norms, obligations, prohibitions and permissions. The extensions concern the logical structure of legal rules and legal reasoning. Their function is to improve the representation of legal knowledge and enhance deontic logic through increased expressibility. The resulting formulas acquire new meanings, not expressible in standard deontic logic, which are subject to fresh interpretations. The author offers an extensive analysis of the representation of actors, to whom the norms are directed, and authorities who enact the norms. Moreover, a distinction is made between enactment and applicability. A modality of enactment can be used to express inconsistent enacted norms in a consistent way. An authority-hierarchy is introduced to filter out the applicable norms from the set of enacted norms. Some related philosophical questions will be discussed regarding the applications of formalisms that are intrinsic to practical science with respect to `consistency' and `universality'. The formalisms and applications considered here are relevant for law, philosophy and computer science, with a special focus on the improvement of legal expert systems and intelligent support for legal professionals

Intro -- ‎Contents -- ‎Preface -- ‎Analysis -- ‎Introduction -- ‎Chapter 1. The Neo-Scholastic Background -- ‎1. The Tasks of Logic -- ‎2. Concept -- ‎3. Judgment -- ‎4. Syllogism -- ‎5. Concluding Remarks -- ‎Chapter 2. Definition and Value of Logic -- ‎1. The Relevant Manuscripts -- ‎2. Logic as the Art of Judging -- ‎3. Logic, Psychology, and Philosophy -- ‎4. The Value of Logic -- ‎5. Psychologism -- ‎6. Language -- ‎7. Dialectic -- ‎8. Concluding Remarks -- ‎Chapter 3. Concept -- ‎1. Presentations and Names -- ‎2. Distinctions among Concepts -- ‎3. Distinctions among Modes of Presentation -- ‎4. Distinctions among Names -- ‎5. Relations among Presentations -- ‎6. Definition -- ‎7. Concluding Remarks -- ‎Chapter 4. Judgment -- ‎1. Critique of Kant's Table -- ‎2. Complexity and Simplicity -- ‎3. Form -- ‎4. Form and Matter -- ‎5. Intensity -- ‎6. Motive -- ‎7. Modality -- ‎8. Expression of Judgments -- ‎9. Relations between Judgments -- ‎10. Evidence -- ‎11. Syllogism -- ‎12. Concluding Remarks -- ‎Materials -- ‎Preparatory Note to Materials -- ‎Chapter 5. Franz Hillebrand, Die elementare Logik und die in ihr nötigen Reformen nach den Vorlesungen des Dr. Franz Brentano (Wintersemester 1884/85, Wien) -- ‎Chapter 6. Franz Hillebrand, Elementary Logic and the Reforms Necessary in It according to the Lectures of Dr. Franz Brentano (Winter Semester 1884/85, Vienna) -- ‎Chapter 7. Hillebrand, The New Theories of Categorical Inferences -- ‎Bibliography -- ‎Index of Names.

Der ontologische Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit ist eines der zentralen Probleme sowohl der klassischen als auch der modernen Metaphysik. In der analytischen Philosophie wird dieses Problem zumeist als Frage der Interpretation von möglichen Welten aufgefasst: ein Konzept, das (unter anderem) auf den amerikanischen Logiker und Sprachphilosophen Saul Kripke zurückgeht. Zur Interpretation dieses Konzepts leistet das vorliegende Buch einen entscheidenen Beitrag, in dem es aus Kripkes vage Andeutungen eine deflationäre Metaphysik möglicher Welten entwickelt und in den Zusammenhang von sprachphilosophischer Referenztheorie, formaler Logik und metaphysischem Essentialismus einbettet. Dabei leistet Sebastian Krebs nicht nur die erste deutschsprachige Einführung in Kripkes Metaphysik, sondern bietet eine ausführliche Auseinandersetzung mit David Lewis' modalem Realismus und anderen wichtigen Positionen der analytischen Metaphysik. Sein modalmetaphysischer Deflationismus klärt schließlich nicht nur das Konzept der möglichen Welten, sondern entwirrt die metaphysisch "aufgeblasene" Debatte um den ontologischen Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit durch eine konsequente Rückbindung an den gesunden Menschenverstand

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Tables and Illustrations -- Abstract -- Keywords -- Introduction -- 1 Knowledge through Grammar: A Preamble -- 1.1 Evidentiality: Grammatical Expression of Information Source -- 1.2 Egophoricity: Grammatical Expression of Access to Knowledge -- 1.3 Mirativity: Grammatical Expectations of Knowledge -- 1.4 Epistemic Modality: Grammatical Expression of Attitude to Knowledge -- 2 Links between the Four Groups of Grammatical Categories Related to Knowledge -- 2.1 Evidentiality → Egophoricity -- 2.2 Evidentiality → Epistemic Modality -- 2.3 Evidentiality → Mirativity -- 2.4 Egophoricity → Evidentiality -- 2.5 Egophoricity → Epistemic Modality -- 2.6 Egophoricity → Mirativity -- 2.7 Epistemic Modality → Evidentiality -- 2.8 Epistemic Modality → Egophoricity -- 3 How Evidentials Are Special -- 3.1 The Scope of Evidentials -- 3.2 Double Marking of Information Source -- 3.3 Independent Time Reference of Evidentials -- 3.4 Ability to Be Negated Independently from the Predicate -- 3.5 Ability to Be Questioned Separately from the Predicate -- 3.6 Correlations with Speech Genres and Social Environment -- 3.7 How Evidentials Are Special: Interim Conclusions -- 4 Access to Information and Information Source: Evidentiality Meets Egophoricity -- 4.1 'General Knowledge': A Term in an Evidentiality System -- 4.2 Access to Information Source and Knowledge Sharing in Evidentials -- 4.3 Shared Knowledge and Shared Information Source: What Everyone Knows -- 5 Unequal Relations between Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality -- 6 Dependencies between Evidentiality and Other Grammatical Categories -- 6.1 Dependencies between Evidentiality, and Clausal and Sentential Categories -- 6.2 Diachronic Links between Evidentiality and Other Categories.

AbstractThis paper analyzes the findings of a preliminary, controlled efficacy study conducted by the National Philosophical Counseling Association of a prominent modality of philosophical counseling, Logic-Based Therapy (LBT). In this study, the latter modality was compared to a mindfulness activity. The study included 20 caretakers randomly divided into experimental and control groups. The hypothesis investigated was that a one-hour LBT session is more effective in reducing the level of (state or trait) anxiety and/or depression in family caregivers than a one-hour mindfulness session. Utilizing data compiled from study participants' responses to the State Trait Anxiety Inventory and Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-2), two-way mixed ANOVA tests on three variables (state anxiety, trait anxiety, and depression (BDI-2) scores) were performed as well as paired analyses yielding the preliminary conclusion (pending a more extensive study) that LBT shows promise as an effective intervention for reducing state anxiety as compared to the control condition, the mindfulness activity.

Abstract. Employment can only be understood from different approaches, such as the social, economic, and legal approach. To model employment using logic, it is necessary to take into account that these approaches are usually modeled with different logics, e.g., legality is modeled using deontic logic. Furthermore, each of these approaches intrinsically contains indeterminacy. This paper proposes to use plithogenic sets to combine the different logics used to model employment approaches that also include indeterminacy. This idea responds to the definition of Plithogeny as the concept that combines dissimilar entities of different origin to form new entities as a result of their contradictory or non-contradictory interactions. In this article, the social approach is used as the most important attribute within the plithogenic sets. Although plithogenic sets have been used successfully in solving decision-making problems, as far as the authors know, they had never been used to combine different logics on the same concept. Specifically, we link the neutrosophic modal logic in particular neutrosophic deontic modality to describe the social and legal approaches with neutrosophic logic to describe the economic and political approaches.

The Foundations of Modality and Conceivability in Descartes and his Predecessors -- Hobbes's System of Modalities -- Was Leibniz's Deity an Akrates? -- Hegel on Modalities and Monadology -- Plenitude and Contingency: Modal Concepts in Nineteenth Century French Philosophy -- Frege and his German Contemporaries on Alethic Modalities -- From Possibility to Probability: British Discussions on Modality in the Nineteenth Century -- The Failure of Logical Positivism to Cope with Problems of Modal Theory -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.