Suchergebnisse

The Situation In The Middle East This Record Contains The Text Of Speeches Delivered In English And Of The Translation Of Speeches Delivered In Other Languages. ; United Nations S/PV.8195 Security Council Seventy-third year 8195th meeting Wednesday, 28 February 2018, 10.35 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Ms. Guadey France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-05507 (E) *1805507* S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 2/22 18-05507 The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/138) The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/138, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: We have received a lot of questions about resolution 2401 (2018), which the Security Council adopted on Saturday, 22 February, and its demand for a cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria. I want to start today by answering the questions we have received. Is the United Nation ready to deliver to people who need humanitarian assistance? Yes. We have convoys ready to go to 10 besieged and hard-to-reach locations, including a 45-truck convoy with aid for 90,000 people to Douma and eastern Ghouta. Are you ready to support medical evacuations from eastern Ghouta? Yes, we are working very closely with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other health partners on that. Has resolution 2401 (2018) been implemented? Is there a ceasefire in Syria? No, and no. Have you got any inter-agency cross-line convoys through to hard-to-reach or besieged areas? No. Have you been given permission to access any of those locations? No. Have you received the necessary facilitation letters for convoys? No. Have there been any medical evacuations? No. Have any civilians left eastern Ghouta? No. Is there any actual improvement in the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta since the adoption of the resolution demanding, as it did, unimpeded access? No. Can you deliver assistance in eastern Ghouta during a humanitarian pause between 9 a.m. and 2 p.m. local time? To quote the ICRC Middle East Director, who spoke about that yesterday: "It is impossible to bring a humanitarian convoy in five hours." Agencies now have years of experience in that area, and it can take a day simply to pass checkpoints, even when the parties have agreed. The goods then have to be offloaded. If there has been no humanitarian access since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, what has happened in the past few days? More bombing, fighting, death, destruction, maiming of women and children, hunger and misery — in other words, more of the same. On 26 February, two days ago, airstrikes, barrel bombs and artillery shelling were reported across eastern Ghouta, including in Harasta, Shafuniyeh, Otaya, Hosh Eldawahreh, Al-Ashari, Jobar, Beit Sawa, Hazerma, Hannnura, Nashabiyeh, Sagba and Douma. Reports indicate that at least 30 civilians, including women and children, were killed. In Shafuniyeh, 14 people, including three women and four children, were reportedly killed and many others injured by airstrikes. Eighteen civilians, including drivers of ambulances, women and children, were reportedly received at health facilities in Shafuniyeh with difficulties breathing, consistent with the use of chlorine. One child reportedly died as a result. On the same day, two workers from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were reportedly killed as a result of shelling on the besieged enclave. It was also reported that two health-care facilities in Saqba were taken out of service by airstrikes. In the past few days, shells have also reportedly continued to fall on Damascus city from eastern Ghouta. Since 18 February, more than 580 people are now reported to have been killed due to air and ground strikes in eastern Ghouta, with many more than 1,000 people injured. At the same time, hundreds of rockets fired from eastern Ghouta into Damascus have reportedly killed 15 people and injured more than 200. I now want to update the Security Council on the situation in other parts of the country. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 3/22 In Idlib, fighting continues to kill and injure civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure and result in large population movements. Since December, an estimated 385,000 people have been displaced, with many civilians moving north. Half of Idlib's population was already displaced. People are being forced to move yet again, with each disruption increasing their vulnerability. Civilians are concentrated in an ever-smaller area. Many are forced to live in makeshift camps or in the open air. Formal camps are overwhelmed, operating at up to 400 per cent of their capacity. The response is being stretched to its limits. We are receiving reports of civilian deaths and injuries and of restriction on the movement of many civilians as a result of military operations in Afrin. Those who risk moving continue to be stopped at exit points by the local authorities in Afrin, preventing them from accessing safer areas. We believe that, so far, approximately 5,000 people have reached the surrounding villages and Aleppo city. Tens of thousands are believed to be displaced within Afrin. The Turkish authorities have emphasized to us their willingness to facilitate humanitarian access. We would like to see aid convoys operated from Damascus. However, to date that has not been agreed by the Syrian side. In Raqqa city, conditions remain unsafe for the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Among those trying to return home, 637 people have been injured and more than 125 killed by unexploded ordinance since last October. Medical and other essential services are absent and access for humanitarian workers to the city remains precariously limited because the conditions are so dangerous. As I have said before, demining activities need to be accelerated as a matter of urgency. Humanitarian access for the United Nations and its implementing partners in Hasakah was limited for much of January due to the increased restrictions placed by the local authorities. United Nations convoys were blocked from travelling to the northeast from elsewhere within the country. The delivery of aid already in local warehouses was also blocked. While an agreement to resume humanitarian deliveries was reached on 30 January, that agreement will end in March. NGO partners continue to deliver goods and services across the north-east. However, sustainable access for the United Nations is critical. Any protracted interruption of humanitarian assistance and services in the IDP sites may drive the displaced people back to areas where they are not safe. Earlier this month, the United Nations received clearance for the first assessment visit to Deir ez-Zor after it had been under the control of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) for three and a half years. More than 100,000 people live in the town despite that fact that it is estimated to be 80 per cent destroyed. The infrastructure is almost completely destroyed, particularly in the central and the eastern areas, where ISIL was in control. In coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, the United Nations has dispatched 78 trucks carrying food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, water and sanitation items since last September, when ISIL was driven out. Finally, we remain concerned about the tens of thousands of people stranded in Rukban, in south-eastern Syria. We continue to seek the necessary agreements for convoys of life-saving assistance to them. As I said last week (see S/PV. 8186), there was a severe reduction, of nearly 40 per cent, in cross-line access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in 2017 as compared to 2016. On average in 2017, over the entire 12-month period, we reached 165,000 people a month with cross-line convoys. That was completely inadequate. So far this year, we have reached a total of only 7,200 people through a single small convoy earlier this month. In other words, we were reaching more than 50 times as many people in besieged and hard-to-reach areas last year as to date this year. The main reason for the reduction in the number of convoys has been the consistent refusal by the Government of Syria to provide the necessary approvals and facilitation letters to support delivery. As the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138) details, while we continue to reach millions of people in urgent need in areas controlled by the Government of Syria and through the cross-border programmes mandated in resolution 2393 (2017), assistance across conflict lines to millions of people in hard-to-reach and besieged areas has completely collapsed in recent months. Unless that changes, we will soon see even more people dying from starvation and disease than from the bombing and shelling. The United Nations remains focused on reaching those most in need throughout the country, including the 5.6 million people considered to be in acute need. The needs-based approach means that the United Nations will continue to seek to deliver aid and to S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 4/22 18-05507 provide services to millions of people in a principled manner regardless of where they are located. More than half of those in need are in Government-controlled areas. However, millions more people are not. What the Syrian people need has been made abundantly clear — protection, access to basic goods and services, an end to sieges and respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The Security Council has unanimously supported all such needs in adopting resolution 2401 (2018). I started today by answering questions that we have received regarding resolution 2401 (2018). I would like to end with a question for the Security Council. When will the resolution be implemented? The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I now give the floor to Mr. Feltman. Mr. Feltman: I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council following the comprehensive briefing by Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock. In two weeks, we will mark the beginning of the eighth year of the Syrian conflict. There are no words to express our frustration over the collective failure of the international community to end this war, but that frustration is nothing compared to the suffering and destruction visited ceaselessly upon the Syrian people. We are here again today because the brief respite that the Council unanimously demanded only days ago in resolution 2401 (2018) has not materialized, as Mr. Lowcock just described. The air strikes, shelling and ground offensives continue. There are even reports of yet another chlorine gas attack. What we need is the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and that is not happening. Nearly seven years since the peaceful protests in Dar'a and the reaction that set in motion what would eventually become all-out war, we are still grasping for a political solution, which is the only way to end the bloodletting. The Secretary-General has called eastern Ghouta a hell on Earth. The United Nations will continue to work with Syrians and the international community to help bring about a durable political solution. We will also continue to demand that all the parties involved in the conflict respect international humanitarian law — the rules of war — and protect civilians. We will continue to demand the release of those who have been arbitrarily detained and the end of enforced disappearances. We will continue to forcefully call for justice and accountability. Those responsible for the catalogue of horrors that mark daily life in Syria, including chemical and terrorist attacks, torture and sexual violence, sieges and attacks on hospitals, schools and other civilian infrastructure, must be held accountable. Those outrages continue in large part because the perpetrators have so far enjoyed impunity. As the Secretary-General said earlier this week, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The United Nations acknowledges Russia's announcement of a daily five-hour pause for eastern Ghouta. In addition to Mr. Lowcock's briefing and what the International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, we respectfully remind all parties that resolution 2401 (2018) demands the sustained delivery of humanitarian aid for a minimum of 30 consecutive days. The Secretariat and relevant agencies are united and pulling in one direction towards the immediate and continuous cessation of hostilities that can be sustained beyond 30 days for unimpeded aid delivery. We also urgently need to get humanitarian aid and services in and the sick and critically wounded evacuated from besieged eastern Ghouta and other locations. We are ready to deliver. The Secretary-General has repeatedly reminded parties of their absolute obligation under international humanitarian law and human rights law to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Earlier this month, Emergency Relief Coordinator Lowcock told the Council (see S/PV.8186) in no uncertain terms that that is an obligation, not a favour. He has just updated us all on the humanitarian situation and provided an update on the United Nations readiness to deliver aid and services, and the tireless efforts of humanitarians to reach all in need, wherever they are. But right now we must address the particular needs of those in besieged eastern Ghouta. Resolution 2401 (2018) affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front, and "all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al-Qaida or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council". (resolution 2401 (2018), para. 2). In our view, that rightly maintains the parameters set out in resolution 2254 (2015), but there must be 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 5/22 a frank assessment of what that means in relation to the humanitarian tragedy that we are witnessing in eastern Ghouta. First, we condemn all violations of international law by all parties, including shelling from eastern Ghouta, which has injured or killed civilians in Damascus. The scale of the Government's indiscriminate military attacks against eastern Ghouta — an area with a civilian population of 400,000 — cannot be justified based on targeting Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Efforts to combat terrorism do not supersede obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law. Secondly, the United Nations has not seen any confirmation by the Government of Syria of its commitment to implement resolution 2401 (2018), although at the resolution's adoption Syria's Permanent Representative to the United Nations said, "As a State, we bear a responsibility towards our citizens and we have a sovereign right to counter terrorism" (S/PV.8188, p. 12). Thirdly, yesterday the Head of the Syrian Negotiations Committee transmitted to the Secretary- General a letter on behalf of the three major non-State armed opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — and civil groups in eastern Ghouta regarding their full commitment to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Specifically, they committed to ensuring the necessary environment for United Nations humanitarian access as well as, "to expel all elements of Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-Qaida and all who belong to these groups from eastern Ghouta". Fourthly, the United Nations has no independent verified reports that those three non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta created a coordination centre, as has been alleged regarding Jabhat Al-Nusra, nor has the United Nations seen any public announcement by those groups of such a centre. Jaysh Al-Islam has denied that claim. What the United Nations can verify is that non-State armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta, over the past 24 hours, have expressed their readiness in writing to evacuate Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters. Previous negotiations on that issue among those groups and key members of the International Syrian Support Group humanitarian task force in Geneva and Damascus have not resulted in success. Alleviating the tragic situation in eastern Ghouta has the Council's full attention. Yet we cannot forget that resolution 2401 (2018) demands a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. Violence continues in Afrin, Idlib and the eastern part of the country. Council members have heard about the humanitarian challenges and suffering of the people in those areas as well. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that developments in those areas will undoubtedly render the situation in Syria even more complex. There will be no sustainable solution if the Council's resolutions are not implemented. That will require that the parties step back from the brink and fulfil their obligations to end the fighting in Syria. All our efforts will be in vain if there is no serious investment in a political solution. As Council members are aware, resolution 2401 (2018) calls on all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations calls for a renewed commitment by all concerned Member States to work seriously to implement the cessation of hostilities. The United Nations also cautions against drawing the Organization into monitoring exercises. That has been tried in the past without success — not for lack of trying — but in the absence of political will among Member States to underpin United Nations efforts. Member States, especially those working within the Astana and Amman arrangements, should use their resources and clear influence over the parties to ensure the implementation of a sustained cessation of hostilities throughout Syria. The conflict in Syria continues to threaten regional and international stability because the warring parties believe there is a military solution. There is not. The United Nations remains convinced that a political solution is the only way forward. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura is pressing forward on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee in Geneva, as part of the overall intra-Syrian political process towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015), for which the United Nations requires the positive and constructive engagement of both negotiating delegations. Special Envoy De Mistura will need the full support of the Council and the international community as a whole if the United Nations efforts are to have a chance of reinvigorating a serious and meaningful political process. I trust that he will have that support. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 6/22 18-05507 The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank Mr. Feltman for his briefing. I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): I make my remarks today on behalf of Sweden and Kuwait as co-penholders for the humanitarian track of the Security Council's work on the situation in Syria. I would like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock once again for a very sobering update. We share his sense of urgency following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) last weekend to fully take advantage of the 30- day pause so that the United Nations and its partners can dispatch life-saving aid convoys and begin medical evacuations. Since the resolution's adoption, we have been asked, as penholders, when the resolution would take effect and to whom it would apply. We are very clear: the resolution took effect upon its adoption and applies to all parties across the entire country. The clock is ticking. There is no time to lose. Let me also sincerely thank Mr. Jeffrey Feltman for his briefing today. We share his deep concern concerning reports of the flagrant lack of compliance with the ceasefire in eastern Ghouta. We would like to extend our sincere appreciation to all members of the Council for their constructive cooperation, which enabled the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). The resolution represents decisive and meaningful action by the Council in response to the calls from the United Nations, the humanitarian community and, above all, the civilian population in Syria. However, the value of a resolution is not in its adoption, but in its implementation. We must now all build on the spirit of cooperation that led to the resolution's adoption and work together to ensure that it is enforced. Compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council is not optional; it is an obligation of all Member States. The humanitarian community stands ready to do its part. Having adopted this resolution, the Council must do its part. For the next few weeks, let us seize the opportunity that this resolution represents and focus on its implementation. We would like to make four concrete recommendations on the way forward. First, existing de-escalation agreements must be complied with most urgently in eastern Ghouta. We call on the three Astana guarantors to spare no effort to achieve this end. Resolution 2401 (2018) clearly demands that all parties cease hostilities; air strikes, the ground offensive and shelling must stop. We take note of the initial positive indications from armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta that they are ready to comply with the resolution. We also note their commitment to expel the Al-Nusra Front from the area. We must build on this, and we call on those with influence over armed opposition groups to secure their commitment to the cessation of hostilities. Clearly the Council has demanded in resolution 2401 (2018) that the Syrian Government cease all military operations without delay. Secondly, as Mr. Lowcock has told us, the United Nations and its implementing partners in the field are ready to commence life-saving convoys and medical evacuations. We urge the Syrian authorities to immediately issue facilitation letters for the convoy to Duma to proceed this week as a necessary first step. It can no longer be business as usual; the Council has demanded weekly convoys to all areas and populations in need. Thirdly, existing structures to strengthen compliance with and monitoring of the cessation must urgently be activated. We look to the Chairs of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group to undertake more frequent meetings, which are needed at least on a weekly basis. The Amman operations room should also be utilized. We see merit in making a clearer link between monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council. Fourthly, the Council must remain actively seized of this matter. Sweden and Kuwait will request an open briefing from the incoming presidency on the Secretary-General's report on implementation and compliance that is due 15 days after the resolution's adoption. We should also stand ready to meet and take appropriate action at any time necessary so as to ensure implementation of this resolution. Finally, we welcome any efforts to de-escalate violence and to allow and facilitate humanitarian access in Syria, but let us be clear — resolution 2401 (2018) demands a 30-day, nationwide ceasefire, with immediate access for weekly convoys and medical evacuations. A five-hour ceasefire does not meet the requirements of the resolution. The resolution is not primarily about the evacuation of civilians, but demands humanitarian access to civilians and medical evacuations. The 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 7/22 cessation of hostilities must be implemented fully and without delay. It is imperative that all parties uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law at all times. Last Saturday's unanimous action reinforced the legitimacy and credibility of the Security Council (see S/PV.8188). Today's briefings demonstrate that there is no time to rest on the laurels of this achievement. We must now move without delay to ensure our action here last Saturday is translated into the relief and assistance expected by the millions of people affected by this conflict. It is now incumbent on all the parties and all those with influence over the parties to spare no effort and use all channels available in order to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): First of all, I want to thank Mark Lowcock and Jeffrey Feltman for their very clear briefings. I would like today to focus my remarks on our shared road map, namely, the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously last Saturday (see S/PV. 8188). On behalf of France, I would like to express three main messages today. My first message is that we must not pay lip service. The situation on the ground remains dramatic and has not improved in recent days. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the offensive against the eastern Ghouta has continued relentlessly. France, of course, strongly condemns these indiscriminate bombings, which affect inhabited areas and civil infrastructure. In this context, the disastrous humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. No United Nations convoy has been able to reach the eastern Ghouta or any of the other besieged areas, no emergency medical evacuation has been carried out, no siege has been lifted. The Syrian regime is maintaining its stranglehold on the civilian population and is methodically pursuing its policy of destruction. More than 400,000 people remain under siege in eastern Ghouta, including 130,000 children. The demand sent by the United Nations to authorize a priority convoy for Duma, the main city in eastern Ghouta, has not received any response from the Syrian authorities to date. My second message is this. The resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 February makes very specific demands on the parties. Hostilities must cease without delay in order to establish a lasting humanitarian truce for at least 30 days, in order to allow both the delivery of humanitarian aid and the evacuation of the wounded and sick. Let me stress this point. These demands are perfectly clear and cannot be distorted or reinterpreted. Contrary to what some would have us believe, the demands made by the resolution are absolutely clear. Our responsibility today is to implement, fully and in their totality, the provisions that we have unanimously adopted. If we do not that, what credibility can be given to our commitments? What credibility can be given to Security Council resolutions? The United Nations and its partners tell us that they are ready to deliver aid to the people of eastern Ghouta and other priority areas. There is therefore not a minute to lose because every minute that passes can turn lives upside down. At the conclusion of difficult negotiations, the Council managed to unite in the face of the gravity of the humanitarian situation and the escalation of the Syrian conflict in recent months. We must now work together, in the same spirit of unity, to effectively implement on the ground the resolution we unanimously adopted. This is my third message. Following yesterday's meeting in Moscow with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, France is putting forward four concrete proposals for making progress and for doing so without delay. The first is to ensure that all parties implement the cessation of hostilities that resolution 2401 (2018) demands. I note that the three main opposition groups present in eastern Ghouta as well as Nassar Al Hariri, head of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition, have written to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Council to state that they would respect the truce. It is therefore urgent in the extreme — if I can put it that way — that the Damascus regime also unambiguously express its willingness to respect the Council resolution and to formalize it in writing. We have taken note of the Russian proposal of a daily five-hour humanitarian truce. It is a positive first step, but it is insufficient. We must go further. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands of the parties a minimum period of 30 consecutive days of cessation of hostilities. Respecting that demand is non-negotiable. That goal requires more than just symbolic declarations or political posturing. At a minimum, it requires that humanitarian personnel be allowed to do their work. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 8/22 18-05507 These workers are used to taking risks on a daily basis, but the parties must allow them to do their work. Given that the opposition groups have formally committed to doing just that, the regime must do so as well, and without delay. To that end, supporters of the regime, beginning with Russia, must bring the necessary pressure to bear. Our second proposal, by way of a demand, pertains to the need to immediately open the relevant, clearly identified checkpoints — beginning with Wafideen — in order to allow the access of priority convoys of the United Nations. We therefore demand that the Syrian authorities submit without delay the necessary letter to facilitate the deployment of humanitarian convoys. Thirdly, it is extremely urgent to allow medical evacuations for the most critical cases, giving priority to children. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent indicates that 1,065 people need emergency medical evacuations. We have not a minute to lose. Finally, France considers it essential to create a monitoring mechanism to ensure the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and compliance with the resolution by the parties. We are working diligently to establishing that mechanism now. Those are the French proposals to address the urgent need to put an end to the bombing and protect civilians, who beyond resolution 2401 (2018), are protected under international humanitarian law. It is also crucial to intensify our efforts to reach a political solution in the framework of the Geneva process and resolution 2254 (2015). It is the only way out of the conflict and the only way to prevent a looming escalation of tensions. France will not deviate from that path. The overall credibility of the Security Council and the responsibility of each of its members are crucially at stake today in the context of the Syrian tragedy. Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-Generals Lowcock and Feltman for their clear, factual briefings and for reiterating to all of us on the Security Council the ongoing horror of the conflict in Syria — and in particular in eastern Ghouta, because that is where it is clear the situation is most dire by a huge order of magnitude. It was five days ago (see S/PV.8188) that we sat in this Chamber and all of us raised our hands in support of a 30-day ceasefire, which we hoped would provide some relief to Syria's people. That was a desperately needed step, one that came too late for many. In eastern Ghouta alone, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that at least 630 people were killed and 3,000 injured in the week before resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, with women and children representing nearly 60 per cent of the wounded and 50 per cent of the deceased. We also continue to condemn attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta. Let us recall the demands of our resolution. It called for at least a 30-day ceasefire without delay to allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuation. "Without delay" means right now, immediately — that there should be no delay. We all voted for those demands and we committed to using our influence to ensure that. In response, Russia has declared a five-hour daily humanitarian window. That is not what the Council demanded, nor what Russia agreed to use its influence to ensure. A five-hour window has not delivered and cannot deliver any meaningful improvement on the ground. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has made clear that the United Nations cannot get humanitarian convoys in and out within that time frame, as has the International Committee of the Red Cross. Humanitarian pauses of a few meagre hours are no substitute for a sustained ceasefire, which is vital to ensuring the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance and medical evacuations. If Russia is able to deliver a five-hour pause, let it deliver a 24-hour pause, as it agreed on Saturday. Let us now take stock of the situation in Syria, and specifically in eastern Ghouta, where the situation is at its most desperate. Let us review if any real change has occurred in the past five days. Has the resolution been implemented? Has there been a ceasefire? Has there been any delivery of humanitarian aid or any medical evacuations? Has the adoption of the resolution brought any relief to the people of Syria? The fighting has not stopped. All of the main armed opposition groups have committed to the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The Al-Assad regime has not, and has in fact ignored the resolution we adopted. Reports of attacks and air strikes by pro-regime forces continue. Twenty-two air strikes reportedly took place even during Russia's so-called humanitarian pause. And, as if it could not get any worse, there have been disturbing reports of the use of chlorine gas. Doctors in eastern Ghouta reported to the Syrian-American Medical Society that 16 patients, including six children, were suffering from symptoms 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 9/22 indicative of exposure to chemical compounds, following an alleged regime attack on Sunday — only one day after the resolution was adopted. Since Saturday not a single aid convoy has been able to access eastern Ghouta to provide relief to the desperate civilians. The World Health Organization estimates that 1,000 people are now in need of medical evacuation from eastern Ghouta. None have been evacuated since the resolution was adopted. The consequences of the failure to implement the resolution are clear: the casualties continue to rise and the horror continues. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports at least 14 civilians, including three children, were killed on Sunday. In short, in the words of one doctor from eastern Ghouta, "Nothing has changed." It is the responsibility of us all to ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is enacted in full. In the words of my Foreign Secretary, the Al-Assad regime must allow the United Nations to deliver humanitarian aid, in compliance with resolution 2401 (2018), and we look to Russia and Iran to make sure this happens, in accordance with their own promises. I implore all those with influence over the Syrian regime to act now to ensure that the ceasefire that they supported in the Chamber is implemented in full and immediately. To do anything less is an affront to the Council, the United Nations and the international system that we live by. We will continue to monitor the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and commit to returning to the Council regularly until we see it respected. Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Every time the Security Council attempts to address the humanitarian crisis in Syria, we take a small leap of faith. I say "we" in reference to the Security Council. I speak of faith because all Council members and most States Members of the United Nations still genuinely try to uphold the responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, including abiding by and fully implementing Security Council resolutions. Despite the grim updates we heard today, we must maintain the hope that we can help the Syrian people. If we do not have that hope, we are wasting our time here. Just four days ago, the Security Council took another leap of faith. We adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a 30-day ceasefire for all of Syria, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access to deliver desperately needed food and medical supplies, and immediate and unconditional medical evacuations based on need and emergency. Our goal was clear and simple. The Al-Assad regime and its supporters have been pummelling eastern Ghouta, where 400,000 people live under siege and constant bombardment. Resolution 2401 (2018) demanded that the assault stop. That was the Council speaking in one, clear voice. The opposition groups operating in eastern Ghouta have made clear their commitment to the ceasefire. The Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, the Al-Rahman Legion and Ahrar al-Sham all committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Against all odds, we hoped that Mr. Al-Assad might respect the resolution, cease hostilities and allow unfettered humanitarian access to all those who need it. Against all odds, we hoped that Russia would use its influence to ensure Mr. Al-Assad's commitment to resolution 2401 (2018). Once again, that hope has been crushed because so far, for the people of eastern Ghouta, nothing has changed. Despite the unanimous call for a ceasefire, the regime's attacks continue unabated. Hundreds of Syrians have been killed or injured since we adopted the resolution on Saturday. What is worse is that less than 24 hours after we demanded the ceasefire, there were reports that the Al-Assad regime again used chlorine gas as a weapon. Such attacks demonstrate Syria's complete and utter contempt for the Council and the United Nations. On Monday one human rights organization reported 18 attacks that defied the Council's demands. On Tuesday another organization reported at least 23 air strikes and four barrel bombs in eastern Ghouta. Syrians on the ground are reporting that Tuesday was worse than Monday with regard to strikes from the regime. How can that be? On the humanitarian front, as Mark Lowcock stated, the Al-Assad regime has allowed no deliveries of assistance into eastern Ghouta — not one. Opposition groups in the area have expressed their commitment to allowing aid in, but the Al-Assad regime still says no. Since we adopted resolution 2401 (2018), Russia has announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the aerial bombing of civilians in eastern Ghouta, which is cynical, callous and in flagrant defiance of the demands of resolution 2401 (2018). The cessation of hostilities is for at least 30 days — every day, all day. Russia does not get to unilaterally rewrite the terms of the resolution. It negotiated it and voted for it. Russia, S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 10/22 18-05507 Iran and the Al-Assad regime are not even trying to hide their intentions. They are asking civilians to leave eastern Ghouta on the false premise that they can then attack anyone left in the area as much as they would like. Let us call the actions what they are. Mr. Al-Assad and his allies want the civilians of eastern Ghouta to walk into the arms of a regime that has been attacking and starving them for the past seven years. That is not a humanitarian gesture. They do not care if the 400,000 people of eastern Ghouta suffer, as long as they can continue to pursue their military and political objectives. We know what Iran, Syria and the Al-Assad regime are doing because they have done the same thing in the past. It is the same playbook they used for Aleppo in 2016. Once again, we, including Russia, demanded in the Security Council Chamber that Mr. Al-Assad stop the bombing, and yet Russia, Iran and Mr. Al-Assad continue their attacks, defying the wishes of the Council and of the international community. Because we have been through this before, we know what Russia will say today. It will say that there are terrorists in eastern Ghouta so that the Al-Assad regime can bomb as ferociously and indiscriminately as it wants and kill as many civilians as it wants. That defies the principles governing the laws of war. The Al-Assad regime should not be allowed to bomb and starve its own people into submission under the guise of counter-terrorism. That Russian argument makes a mockery of the Council and of international law. Russia also accuses the United States of somehow being responsible for humanitarian crises in Syria, but such accusations are ludicrous. The United States does not block humanitarian aid in any area. In fact, the United States has provided more than $7 billion in humanitarian aid in response to the crisis. The Council must not fall for Russia's misdirections. When the ceasefire was adopted unanimously on Saturday, including by the Russians, Ambassador Haley stated that our resolve to stand by our demands in the resolution would be tested. It has come to pass. Despite everything that has happened since Saturday, we are not casting aside the ceasefire in Syria; just the opposite. We would like to redouble our efforts in the Security Council to implement it, but the only way to change the situation on the ground is for all of us — every single one of us — around the table and each State Member of the United Nations to speak the truth about what is happening. The past four days should show us that when it comes to demanding a ceasefire, it is not enough to say that all parties should show restraint or commit to the ceasefire because in eastern Ghouta there is only one party dropping barrel bombs, gassing the Syrian people and denying deliveries of food and medical assistance. It is the Al-Assad regime, operating with the full support of Russia and Iran. On Saturday we stated that the only way to restore the credibility of the Council was to make the ceasefire a reality. Russia, Iran and the Al-Assad regime have not complied with the Council's demands and have not silenced their guns. Unless we take action, they will stop at nothing to destroy eastern Ghouta and we will again fail to help the Syrian people. Mr. Van Oosterom (Netherlands): First, let me thank Under-Secretaries-General Lowcock and Feltman for their briefings. In my statement I will address three points: implementation, implementation and implementation. First, I will speak about the implementation of the cessation of hostilities. Since the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) on Saturday, civilians are still dying in eastern Ghouta and elsewhere in Syria. The humanitarian disaster continues worsen. We need a full, nationwide cessation of hostilities and we need it now. The Russian proposal for a humanitarian corridor and pauses of five hours per day cannot be a substitute for a humanitarian pause of 30 consecutive days, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018). Those five hours do not meet the obligations under the resolution and are not enough for the United Nations to be effective in delivering aid to the entire area of Ghouta, as Under- Secretary-General Lowcock just stated. We call upon the parties to the conflict and on those with influence on the parties to show decisive action and stop the violence. As Under-Secretary- General Feltman stated, three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta have announced that they are committed to fully implementing resolution 2401 (2018). We expect the regime to do the same. The air strikes, the shelling and the shooting must stop. For the credibility of the Council, it is crucial that its resolutions be fully implemented. That is the obligation of all States Members of the United Nations, under the Charter. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 11/22 The Kingdom of the Netherlands repeats the call made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, to the Astana guarantors. She called on the Foreign Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkey to "take all necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and that urgent humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations are taking place". My second point is about the implementation of humanitarian access. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for sieges of populated areas, including eastern Ghouta, to be lifted immediately, and demands safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys. As Under-Secretary-General Lowcock just explained, the United Nations stands ready with 45 trucks to deliver essential aid to eastern Ghouta. But the necessary facilitation letters are still lacking, and the security conditions do not permit those deliveries. At this point, more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical care, but they are still trapped in eastern Ghouta. If they are not given the care they need in hospitals in Damascus or elsewhere, they may die. The United Nations and the Security Council have consistently pleaded for these medical evacuations, and yet there are still no developments with regard to them. We also need to see access to aid for those fleeing the fighting in Afrin. More generally, there should be delivery of humanitarian aid to the areas that are not under Government control. As Mr. Feltman just said, we should reach all who are in need, wherever they are. My third point is about implementing the protection of civilians. The exception on the cessation of hostilities in paragraph 2 of the resolution allows targeted action against terrorists who are designated as such by the Council. However, that does not mean that absolutely anything is allowed. International humanitarian law applies to all military combat operations and counter-terrorism actions. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution must be respected in all circumstances. The civilians in the conflict must be protected. There is talk of humanitarian corridors for civilians who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but evacuations should always be voluntary. We are concerned about the possibility that humanitarian corridors will be used for forced population transfers. Civilians cannot be forced to leave, and neither should they be forced to stay. If voluntary evacuations do take place, we will call on the United Nations to monitor them. Currently, the most urgent humanitarian situation is in eastern Ghouta and Idlib, but needs remain high elsewhere in Syria as well. We welcomed the January delivery of aid to Rukban, but we want to stress the importance of sustained access and a durable solution. As others have said today, the demining activities in Raqqa should be increased, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands is doing its part in that regard. The media coverage of the issue of the exploitation of Syrian women in exchange for aid is very disturbing. There should be no tolerance of such behaviour, as the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have already said. The probity of any United Nations implementing parties should be beyond any doubt. In conclusion, we must ensure that resolution 2254 (2015) is fully implemented. There can be no military solution to the conflict, and we call on all the parties to engage seriously in the United Nations-led political process as a matter of urgency. The suffering of the people of Syria has lasted for more than seven years. For the sake of the millions of women, children and men trapped in this horrendous war, it is high time that all parties started putting the protection, interests and well-being of the Syrian people on the top of their agenda. Yesterday, my Minister, Ms. Sigrid Kaag, said that humanitarian access and the protection of civilians are cornerstones of international humanitarian law. They are part of our shared values and shared humanity. The Security Council must do justice to those values and to our shared humanity. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We thank you for convening today's meeting, Mr. President, and for the briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman on the situation in Syria. On Saturday, when we adopted resolution 2401 (2018) after long and complex negotiations, we highlighted the commitment that Council members have shown to achieving a humanitarian ceasefire in Syria. As we said at the time, it will be crucial to closely monitor its proper implementation and to maintain the Council's unity with regard to its responsibility to protect the civilian population, in line with international law and international humanitarian law. Four days in, we are still being forced to lament and condemn the attacks on civilians and to reiterate S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 12/22 18-05507 our calls for the immediate and comprehensive implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the Secretary-General has pointed out, Council resolutions make sense only if they are effectively implemented. The credibility of the Security Council as a whole, and of those of its members with the greatest potential influence on the ground in particular, is at stake. In the light of this, we want to emphasize that the cessation of hostilities that the Council has demanded clearly covers the whole of Syrian territory, including eastern Ghouta and Afrin, and should last for a minimum of 30 days. If we are to ensure that, in our view we should mobilize the International Syria Support Group's Ceasefire Task Force. It is essential to ensure that all the parties to the conflict comply with the ceasefire provided for in resolution 2401 (2018), and that the Council is able to closely monitor that compliance. In that regard, we support the four recommendations outlined by Sweden and Kuwait. We must remind the Syrian authorities of their responsibility to protect their people, and we firmly condemn the military operations in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country that have continued even after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). However, we welcome the strenuous efforts of the Organization, and of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in particular, to prepare 45 trucks carrying supplies and ready to enter eastern Ghouta as soon as the necessary permits are granted. The first report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) will be presented in less than two weeks, and we hope that it will be able to inform us that the humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian conflict has been alleviated, because we cannot wait any longer. It is the Security Council's duty to continue working relentlessly to achieve what we have all unanimously agreed on. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I very much appreciate today's clear and informative briefings by Mr. Lowcock and Mr. Feltman, and I would like to share a few thoughts from Poland's point of view. Since the Council's adoption on Saturday of resolution 2401 (2018), we have been seeing yet more extremely worrying developments on the ground. As I said in my last statement on the subject (see S/PV.8188), the heavy fighting in Syria has unfortunately not only continued but is increasing. In that context, we should persist in our efforts to take every possible action to ensure the resolution's full and safe implementation. We call on all to work to alleviate the suffering of civilians, including children, by giving them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance. That should include voluntary evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and its implementing partners and based solely on medical need, in order to ensure that the process is genuinely voluntary. We would like to stress that all the relevant actors should use all their influence to help to improve the conditions on the ground immediately. We urgently call for a cessation of hostilities throughout all of Syria for 30 days, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018). In that context, it is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also offer an opportunity for the talks being held under United Nations auspices in Geneva to gain momentum, so that a political solution can finally be reached. For that reason, we call on all parties to fulfil their commitments to the existing ceasefire agreements. It should be emphasized that the implementation of the ceasefire announced by resolution 2401 (2018) should ensure the safe entrance and stay of humanitarian and medical personnel without prejudice to their health or life. When such personnel enter hard-to-reach areas, we should know precisely how long they can stay while delivering assistance under the ceasefire, otherwise their lives could also be in danger. In conclusion, let me stress the importance of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the implementation of humanitarian resolutions. The unanimous adoption of the resolution is just the beginning of the process. We call on all actors with influence on the ground to take all steps necessary to ensure that the fighting stops, that the Syrian people are protected and, finally, that urgent humanitarian access is enabled and that the necessary medical evacuations can take place. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We thank Mr. Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their respective briefings. Once again, we would like to say how appalled we are at the terrible situation suffered by the Syrian people, as the past two months have been the most violent since the start of the conflict, and civilians, primarily women and children, are the ones that are suffering the gravest consequences of this intensification of the war. We call the attention of the Security Council to the continuing 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 13/22 violations of international law, especially international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as these attacks have targeted civilian infrastructure such as hospitals, schools and homes. My delegation would like to express once again its gratitude to the delegations of Sweden and Kuwait for their work in promoting the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which imposes a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria, which is as urgent as it is necessary. We urge the parties to implement the resolution immediately in order to speed up access of humanitarian assistance without any restrictions, allow urgent medical evacuations and the entry of humanitarian convoys, and ensure the protection of hospitals and medical facilities, especially in eastern Ghouta, Idlib and north of Hama. We wish to underscore once again the need for continued cooperation and coordination among the Syrian Government and the various humanitarian assistance agencies, so that the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be effective, especially in hard-to-reach areas, and to prevent administrative obstacles from derailing or negatively affecting the deployment of the required humanitarian assistance. We also stress the need to begin, as soon as possible, humanitarian mine-clearing in areas that require it, in particular in the city of Raqqa, to allow the return in dignified and safe conditions of people who were forced to flee their homes because of the conflict. As we have stated previously, we believe that if our aim is to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people in the face of armed violence, the Security Council has the major challenge of maintaining its unity so as to ensure that this organ's decisions are implemented. We reiterate that the solution to this conflict can be found only through an inclusive political process based on dialogue and coordination, led by the Syrian people and for the Syrian people, that will make it possible to reach a peaceful solution among all parties involved. With this in mind, we wish to highlight the various forums for dialogue, specifically the Astana process, at which de-escalation zones were agreed on that must be respected by all parties. We will be closely following the next round of the process. We wish also to highlight the other opportunities for dialogue that could make it possible to reach further compromises to achieve a definitive end to hostilities, such as the Sochi national dialogue, which is aimed at strengthening the Geneva political process, with respect for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria and its right to choose its own political, economic and social system without any external pressure or interference. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Côte d'Ivoire thanks Mr. Jeffrey Feltman and Mr. Mark Lowcock for their respective briefings on recent developments in the situation in Syria following the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. My delegation commends the Secretary-General for his unstinting efforts as part of the political dialogue among the Syrian parties with the aim of arriving at a lasting solution to the protracted crisis ravaging that country. In that regard, my country welcomes the holding of intra-Syrian peace talks on 25 and 26 January in Vienna in the framework of the Geneva process, followed by the talks held in Sochi on 29 and 30 January. My delegation cherishes the hope that the proposals stemming from the Sochi talks, including the establishment of a committee tasked with drawing up a new constitution, will receive consistent attention from the international community, as part of the concerted quest to find a lasting solution to the crisis in Syria. The situation on the ground is deeply alarming. Military operations that include the use of non-conventional weapons are leading to mass displacements of people, the loss of human lives, injuries and the destruction of public infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. The grave humanitarian crisis spawned by the fighting led to the adoption by the Security Council this past Saturday, 24 February, of resolution 2401 (2018), with a view to the cessation without delay of hostilities for a 30-day period to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need as well as medical evacuations. My delegation notes with regret that the adoption of the resolution did not contribute to restoring calm on the ground. The ceasefire proposed was short-lived, despite the numerous appeals for a cessation of hostilities. Even the very minimum one called for by the Russian Federation, an ally of the Damascus Government, on Monday 26 February did not lead to a positive response. Air raids and rocket launches continue on the ground, thereby obstructing the work of humanitarian personnel. S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 14/22 18-05507 We deplore the ongoing loss of life among humanitarian workers — 22 United Nations personnel and 66 staff members or volunteers of the International Red Cross — and we deplore also the material damage that has been wrought, which includes the destruction of 25 vehicles and 44 facilities, according to the information we have received. Nonetheless, Côte d'Ivoire welcomes the fact that United Nations humanitarian agencies and their partners have managed to assist people in need by conducting 1,567 deliveries. My country reaffirms that a resolution of the crisis in Syria must be part of an inclusive dialogue and political process, as set out in the road map under resolution 2254 (2015). In that regard, my country calls for full compliance with the 30-day ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2401 (2018), which will not only allow humanitarian actors to respond to critical emergencies but also create the conditions for a return to the negotiating table by all parties to the Syrian crisis. To that end, Côte d'Ivoire urges the members of the Security Council to unite and surmount their differences in order to send a message of hope and solidarity of the international community to the Syrian people. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): As usual, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman just gave us detailed briefings on the humanitarian and political situation in Syria. Those were the first briefings to be delivered to the Security Council following the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), on 24 February. I take this opportunity to thank both Under-Secretaries-General, as well as to acknowledge the willingness of the United Nations and its partners to send convoys of trucks with the necessary humanitarian aid and begin medical evacuations as soon as conditions on the ground allow. As Secretary-General António Guterres said two days ago in his statement before the Human Rights Council, "Security Council resolutions are only meaningful if they are effectively implemented". The Republic of Equatorial Guinea hopes resolution 2401 (2018) is meaningful in that way in order to relieve the affected population of the suffering it has endured, especially in eastern Ghouta, that is, we hope for it to be immediately implemented. We want to reiterate that the Syrian conflict has no military solution. The opponents therefore must take a seat at the negotiating table to engage in direct and frank dialogue, without exclusions, however complicated it may be to do so. It must be the Syrians who determine the future they want for their country. The international community must redouble its efforts in making sure the opponents engage in negotiations, and the countries that have influence need to wield it to establish trust, with the ultimate goal of achieving lasting and just peace in Syria. We commend the intention expressed by the largest opposition groups — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham — to respect the ceasefire, and we invite all the other parties involved to take the same decision. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea believes that the only reason that the humanitarian situation remains of concern is because the opponents do not agree on negotiating to reach a peace agreement, which consequently causes more civilian victims, leads to the destruction of hospital facilities and hampers humanitarian aid operations. The conflict has recently intensified around the town of eastern Ghouta and some other parts of Syria, which has resulted in civilian casualties, the destruction of a considerable number of medical and relief facilities and the obstruction of humanitarian relief operations led by the United Nations. Equatorial Guinea is very touched and horrified by the critical situation the Syrian people are experiencing, and we must not show indifference to so much pain and suffering. It is therefore imperative that the parties to the conflict implement and uphold the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the most recent, resolution 2401 (2018), including allowing access to humanitarian aid, halting hostilities and ultimately, cooperating with the United Nations in its efforts to assuage the conflict and make humanitarian operations effective by ensuring aid deliveries reach the affected populations and evacuating the sick and seriously injured so that they can receive the necessary medical care. The international community, while striving to help Syria, must not forget the neighbouring countries that have welcomed refugees and shown a spirit of solidarity worthy of praise. I would like to conclude my statement by expressing well-deserved tribute to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and all those who work with it on the ground for their bravery and determination in fulfilling their humanitarian mission to deliver aid to 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 15/22 those in need. We encourage them to persist in their noble efforts. Mr. Tumysh (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under- Secretary-General Feltman for their comprehensive and sobering briefings. Kazakhstan welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). That document should be urgently implemented to ensure a comprehensive ceasefire in Syria. The ceasefire regime should be implemented fully, especially in the areas of eastern Ghouta, southern Idlib and northern Hama, to resolve their long-accumulated acute humanitarian problems, deliver aid to the most difficult regions and evacuate the wounded and sick. Turning to the situation on the ground in the country, according to our humanitarian colleagues, over the past 78 hours and to our deep regret, military operations continued to be reported in besieged eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, including women and children. Attacks on Damascus from eastern Ghouta are also continuing. To our great disappointment, a Syrian Arab Red Crescent warehouse in a Damascus suburb was reportedly struck by shelling. During the same period, attacks on the city of Damascus and the governorate resulted in 14 deaths and 214 injured. We are glad to know that the United Nations has mobilized and is ready to immediately support life-saving aid convoys in several areas in eastern Ghouta. We therefore call on the Council members and the wider United Nations membership to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in operationalizing the delivery of humanitarian assistance in eastern Ghouta, as well as in carrying out hundreds of medical evacuations. We echo the United Nations calls on all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and take all measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law. It is equally important to ensure, in close coordination with OCHA, the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. We must also insist that parties support United Nation agencies in the fulfilment of their mandates. In that context, Kazakhstan proposes that all-round assistance be provided to the inter-Syrian negotiations through the Astana process and that positive developments be taken advantage of to improve the humanitarian situation. My country stands for a solution in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and agreements on the de-escalation zones reached through the Astana process. We regret the lack of full agreement and close coordination among the key stakeholders in managing the Syrian crisis. We also attach great importance to strengthening the inter-Syrian political dialogue with greater support from the world community. Lastly, Kazakhstan notes the need to establish closer interaction among the leading stakeholders in Syria, in particular between the Russian Federation and the United States, to improve the political process and ensure positive changes on the humanitarian track. Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. China commends the United Nations aid agencies for their humanitarian relief efforts in Syria. The security situation in various parts of Syria, including Damascus and eastern Ghouta, has escalated recently, causing significant civilian casualties. We sympathize profoundly with the suffering of the Syrian people and condemn all acts of violence against innocent civilians. The parties concerned should take immediate measures to de-escalate the tensions in line with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) demonstrates the consensus and unity of its members on the humanitarian issue in Syria. We appreciate the positive efforts of the parties concerned. China welcomed Russia's announcement by Russia that it will implement the ceasefire measures and assist with the evacuation of people from conflict areas. We call on the parties in Syria to put an immediate end to hostilities in accordance with the resolution, actively coordinate with United Nations relief efforts and ensure safe humanitarian corridors in the relevant areas. A political settlement is the only viable solution to the Syrian issue. The Syrian National Dialogue Congress was recently held successfully in Sochi and has had positive results. Special Envoy de Mistura is making ongoing efforts to advance the Syrian political process. The international community should support the Syrian parties in resuming dialogue and negotiations under the auspices of United Nations mediation as soon S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 16/22 18-05507 as possible and in seeking a solution that is acceptable to all parties through a Syrian-owned and -led political process. That is the only way to fundamentally ease the humanitarian situation in Syria and end the suffering of the Syrian people without delay. Terrorist organizations are still launching attacks in Syria, causing significant civilian casualties and impeding United Nations humanitarian relief efforts. The international community should strengthen its cooperation on counter-terrorism, adopt unified standards and resolutely combat all terrorist organizations that are designated as such by the Security Council. Ms. Guadey (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman for their comprehensive briefings. We would like to express our gratitude to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for their continuing efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to millions of Syrians. As Mr. Lowcock said, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to be a devastating one. Military activities in various parts of the country, including eastern Ghouta, have affected the ability of the United Nations to deliver lifesaving assistance to all in need. As the report of the Secretary- General (S/2018/138) says, the conflict and other obstacles have had a disastrous effect on the level of humanitarian access. In order to address those challenges and to alleviate the Syrians' suffering, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding the institution without delay of a cessation of hostilities for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations. As we all emphasized on Saturday after welcoming the resolution's adoption (see S/PV.8186), what is now required is its full and comprehensive implementation with the immediate engagement of all parties and those with influence on them. Of course, we understand and appreciate the fact that the United Nations is ready to provide immediate humanitarian aid across the country. However, as Mr. Lowcock just highlighted, there are still military activities in various areas. In that regard, we call on all the parties to fully implement resolution 2401 (2018) for the sake of the Syrian people, who have continued to bear the brunt of the conflict for almost eight years. We appreciate any measure taken by Member States to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire, including the humanitarian pause and humanitarian corridor announced by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is obvious that more needs to be done to fully implement the resolution. It is therefore imperative to take urgent and coordinated action to bring about an immediate ceasefire, thereby ensuring that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have safe, sustained and needs-based access in order to deliver humanitarian aid to all Syrians in need of assistance. In conclusion, it is ultimately a comprehensive, Syrian-led political solution, facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015), that can sustainably end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock and Under-Secretary-General Feltman for their briefings. By the way, at the outset I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask Mr. Lowcock where the United Nations is getting its evidence and data on deaths in Damascus, for instance. According to the Syrian authorities' information, for example, just since 22 January, 12 people have died in Damascus, while the United Nations figure is 11 for the whole month. Where is he getting his information from? The White Helmets, maybe? Today, as has been usual recently, the United States delegation devoted its statement to Russia. It told us that it knew what we were going to say today, which it does not. And I am pleased about that, because it means that it did not see our statement before the meeting began. On 24 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), in an important decision aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in areas where the danger of military clashes remains or there are obstacles of one kind or another to the civilian population's access to essential assistance. Today many questions have been asked — emphatic questions, rhetorical questions, questions aimed directly at us. We answered the questions asked of us during our discussion at the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). There are a lot of people here who like to pick citations from the resolution that they like and forget the ones that do not suit them. If I may, I will quote two extracts from it, from paragraph 1 and paragraph 10. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 17/22 (spoke in English) "Demands that all parties cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation of this demand by all parties, for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and … medical evacuations". "[U]nderscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria". (spoke in Russian) Has everyone read the resolution? We have said, and we will say it again, that any sustained pause must be preceded by an agreement between the parties on de-escalation. The demands that military activity end overnight are either the result of a misunderstanding of the realities or a deliberate exploitation of this human tragedy. The statement by the United States delegation simply rewrote resolution 2401 (2018). What sort of joint effort, such as the Permanent Representative of France called for today, can we talk about in these circumstances after what we heard today in the United States delegation's statement? Russia has announced the establishment in eastern Ghouta of daily five-hour humanitarian pauses. Everything possible is being done to ensure that they function successfully. Specifically, medical and temporary accommodation posts have been equipped, ambulance teams organized, motor transport provided. We call on the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other recognized humanitarian organizations to join these efforts. However, on the very first day, the militias took advantage of the announcement of the pause to go on the offensive. The same thing happened on the second day. The mortar shelling continued, including in the humanitarian operations corridors. Not a single person was able to leave the danger area. We took note of the relevant letters submitted on behalf of the illegal armed groups. We were told previously that the most convenient way of informing Council members about them was being sought. It has been found and it is indeed highly original — directly through the work e-mail addresses of all the political coordinators, meaning that someone deliberately sent the relevant contact information to dubious individuals from the ranks of the radical Syrian opposition. It is very similar to the situation that occurred when information about the closed negotiations on humanitarian resolutions became available to Western media agencies. However, we hope that the opposition leaders are serious and that their deeds will match their words. We are expecting clear guarantees in that regard from the militias' foreign sponsors, many of whom are seated around this table. The first thing that is needed is a definitive repudiation of the terrorist organizations. It has to be understood that terrorists continue to be a legitimate target of military operations, and we will not stand on ceremony with them. Overall, we have to decide on the most effective way to neutralize Jabhat Al-Nusra in eastern Ghouta. Why can't some members show a willingness to cooperate on that issue? Or do they not want to? The information background to this issue is overheated to the point of no return. If we had not adopted resolution 2401 (2018), it is difficult even to imagine what the Western media outlets would have made of it or how they would have portrayed Russia. But even now, when the resolution has been adopted, our Western partners act as if everything in it pertains solely to Damascus and Russia, and that its successful implementation depends almost entirely on the will of our two countries, while they, the self-styled champions of humanity, somehow imagine that they have an exclusive right to lecture us on the subject. In various media outlets, especially American ones, there have been false allegations that we mock the tragedy of this war and the situation in eastern Ghouta, and that we say that the campaign is exaggerated and fake. I will ask these humanistic gentlemen once again: Where were they when American aircraft blew Raqqa off the face of the Earth? Where were the cries and the hand-wringing? Months have passed since the terrorists were banished from that city and yet it is still uninhabitable. On top of that, there are new reports of 24 civilian casualties from Coalition air strikes in Deir ez-Zor province. Who are they — second-class citizens? Or when innocent people die from democratic bombs, is that somehow immaterial — perhaps even honourable? We urge the United Nations — in fact, we insist — to send an assessment mission to Raqqa as soon as possible, and that the Coalition, which is in de facto control of the area, give it all necessary support. We also expect that instead of establishing quasi- S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 18/22 18-05507 administrations in areas liberated from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, the Coalition leadership will come up with a plan to turn them over to the central authorities, in consideration of the Security Council's repeated affirmations of Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. That would be a great deal more constructive than the relentless quest to find what is a non-existent basis in international law for maintaining its presence on Syrian territory. If Council members have interesting ideas on how to raise the profile of local Government and find effective ways to rebuild the ethnic and religious balance that existed before the war, they should present them to the Syrians in the negotiations in Geneva and let them decide the issues for themselves through the mediation of the United Nations. We also demand that the Coalition open humanitarian access to the territory it is occupying around the Al-Tanf military base in order to bring aid to the residents of the Rukban camp as soon as possible. By the way, that is also a provision of resolution 2401 (2018). It is not for nothing that we keep saying that what is going on is painfully reminiscent of the situation in eastern Aleppo when the West unleashed a wave of monstrous anti-Russian hysteria. We are the only country being asked to implement resolution 2401 (2018). We are being criticized for instituting humanitarian pauses. Some claim that there are not enough of them. Demands, demands, demands. For some reason, someone is always bossily demanding something of Russia. Britain's Foreign Secretary has altogether decided that he is the prosecutor who is threatening to punish our country. Apparently, he called for today's meeting to be convened. He said so himself. The Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic is making daily and hourly efforts to achieve a cessation of hostilities, establish humanitarian pauses and ease the suffering of civilians. May I ask what other members have done to implement resolution 2401 (2018)? Has even one of their countries lifted a finger? Have they brought their influence to bear on those whom they consider the moderate opposition? Have they persuaded them to lay down their weapons and stop taking hostages? The hugely complex issue that the Syrian conflict represents is being used for unscrupulous purposes. The rivers of tears roll down only when the next stronghold where militias and terrorists mingle is threatened, at which point an unheard-of level of action kicks in. The real aim is the regime, as some members like to refer to the lawful Syrian authorities. Any hint of its success in fighting terrorism on its own territory is a thorn in their side. They are ready to use any means to stop it. This is a warning. We know about the chemical evidence being fabricated in order to blame Damascus. We know about the meetings on the subject, where they are being held and who is taking part in them. Today we once again heard unsubstantiated allegations about the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons. I am tired of asking if members understand the futility of Damascus using chemical weapons from both a military and a political point of view, and the completely believable probability of militias using chemical provocations. I think they do understand it perfectly, but they persist in seeking an excuse for military intervention. United States officials, and the head of the Foreign Office and others, have already talked about military strikes against Syria, and it is obvious where that intellectual activity is heading. We urge everyone to stop the dirty tricks and join the concerted efforts to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Syria by implementing the resolution we have just adopted. We hope that the United Nations generally and Mr. Lowcock personally, as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, will rise to the occasion. We have circulated a draft presidential statement on the resolution's implementation. We have placed it under the silence procedure until 1 p.m., and we call on the Council to adopt it. We hope that there will be no objections before one o'clock. I will take the liberty of reading it out. (spoke in English) The Security Council, with reference to its resolution 2401 (2018), urges all parties to implement it and, to this end, further urges all armed groups and all Member States with influence on them to ensure the safety of the announced humanitarian corridors for evacuation from eastern Ghouta. The Security Council calls for the establishment of similar humanitarian corridors in Al-Tanf and Rukban. The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to expeditiously send a mission to Raqqa to assess humanitarian needs there. 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 19/22 (spoke in Russian) And by the way, we, like the other members of the Security Council, believe that there can only be a political solution to the Syrian conflict. We are doing everything we can to achieve that, and certainly somewhat more than those who have been spreading fire and fury today. We propose, as we have always proposed, that they join in these efforts, rather than throw up road blocks in an attempt to serve their own geopolitical agendas. The President (spoke in Arabic): I shall now make a statement in my national capacity. First of all, the delegation of Kuwait aligns itself to the statement made by the representative of Sweden on behalf of our two countries as co-penholders on the issue of Syria. We thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under- Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Mr. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for their briefings. Four days after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties cease hostilities throughout Syrian territory for 30 days, I would like to make the following points. We have said from the outset that resolution 2401 (2018) is only the first step towards improving the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, to date we have not seen the implementation of the provisions of the resolution — not even a partial implementation — as we heard from Mr. Lowcock this morning, in particular in eastern Ghouta. The Council demonstrated unity in adopting the resolution and it is up to us now to ensure that all its provisions are implemented in full and immediately in order to alleviate the suffering of our brethren in Syria and to protect civilians. The resolution is binding on all, in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. Secondly, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is ready to come to eastern Ghouta and other besieged areas so as to deliver all kinds of aid and assistance to those that need them. We call on all the parties to the conflict in Syria to uphold international humanitarian law and abide by the provisions of the resolution, which cover all the various aspects that are causing the daily suffering of the Syrian people. Thirdly, we underscore the importance of members of the Council making their contribution by spurring all the parties to the conflict in Syria to immediately implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), keeping in mind that, as co-penholders, we are committed to closely follow its implementation, including ensuring a briefing by the Secretariat 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. In accordance with to rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): The Syrian Government has examined the forty-eighth monthly report of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and, yesterday morning, as usual, we sent a formal letter to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council setting forth the position of the Syrian Government on the report. We are realistic. We know well that the United Nations is not a charitable organization. That is clear given that it has been unable to implement the principles of the Charter and international law since its inception — and the Palestinian question is a case in point. There have been other failures by the United Nations: in Iraq, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Grenada — for those who have forgotten Grenada — Nicaragua, and the list goes on. However, I hope we can preserve the United Nations as an organization even as it continues to lack charitability. I would now like to make the following points. First, the Syrian Government is fully committed to the principles of international law and international humanitarian law, as well as Syrian law and the Syrian Constitution, all of which stipulate that the Syrian Government has the responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Syrian citizens and protect them from terrorist groups. Secondly, the current report, just like previous reports, has a great flaw, namely, that the authors of the report continue to rely on politicized sources, open sources and unreliable figures. At the same time, the report continues to ignore credible Government sources and even the reports issued by the representatives of the United Nations in Syria. Those representatives, along with the reports they have submitted to the United Nations in New York, acknowledge the efforts S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 20/22 18-05507 of the Syrian Government and its cooperation on the humanitarian issue. However, none of this information that reaches New York appears to be mentioned in the report, as if by miracle. Thirdly, the Syrian Government condemns the authors of the report — the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — especially after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), for their failure to mention the Turkish aggression against the Syrian city of Afrin. That aggression has claimed the lives of many people, including women and children, destroyed public and private facilities and has led to the displacement of the city's inhabitants and a severe shortage of humanitarian goods. However, Afrin is not eastern Ghouta, eastern Aleppo, Fo'ah or Kefreya. Fourthly, the Syrian Government fully rejects the failure of the authors of the report to mention the catastrophic impact of the so-called International Coalition and its members. The Coalition, which has claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians and members of the Syrian forces who are fighting Da'esh, committed two new massacres yesterday that claimed the lives of 29 civilians and injured dozens, most of them women and children, in the villages of Sha'fa and Thahret Allouni in eastern Deir ez-Zor. It appears that the International Coalition is focused on this part of eastern Deir ez-Zor because it is home to civilians who do not host Da'esh or Al-Nusra Front terrorists. The Coalition has also destroyed the city of Raqqa, as my colleague the representative of the Russian Federation just noted. My Government calls once again for dismantling this illegitimate aggressive Coalition and for an immediately stop to its crimes against the Syrian people. The Russian military issued a communiqué today saying that the areas under the control of the allies and agents of the United States in Syria are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis currently in the country. Those areas have become black holes, just like the black holes in outer space. With regard to the situation in eastern Ghouta, the Syrian Government believes that the current deterioration in the situation is due to the fact that terrorist groups there have launched attacks against residential zones and military targets. Up until yesterday, they had launched more than 2,180 missiles and mortars against the city of Damascus. Those attacks claimed the lives of 66 civilians and injured 474 others. Government forces have been forced to respond to those attacks and to carry out their constitutional responsibility in guaranteeing security and safety for the citizens. My Government condemns the use, by the authors of the report, of the term "besieged areas" when considering the situation in eastern Ghouta, in rural Damascus. Under pressure from influential countries in and outside of the Council, they continue to deliberately ignore the fact that people in eastern Ghouta are besieged from within by the various armed terrorist organizations operating there. Those terrorist organizations are exploiting civilians and using them as human shields. They are seizing and monopolizing humanitarian assistance, distributing the aid to their supporters or selling it at exorbitant prices, as was the case in eastern Aleppo. Syria regrets the failure of the authors of the report to refer to the suffering of thousands of kidnapped people who are in eastern Ghouta prisons and other places where the terrorist groups are spread. The kidnapped people include women, children and elderly. These people were kidnapped from their homes and places of work and have been subjected to the worst forms of torture. There are civilians, including from city of Adra and from Latakia, who were kidnapped from their homes five years ago. The Syrian Government also condemns the statements by the Secretariat and reports of the Secretary-General, which continue up till now to disregard the suffering of 8 million civilians in the capital Damascus as a result of hundreds of missiles and mortars launched daily from terrorist groups within eastern Ghouta. The accusations by the authors of the report, like those of the Western countries that have influence on them, that the Syrian Government is allegedly besieging Ghouta have been consistently refuted. They have proven to be unfounded, as we have seen in recent reports noting that the Saudi regime provided "aid" to eastern Ghouta in February. That proves, first, that eastern Ghouta is not besieged and, secondly, that it is possible to access it. In particular, the terrorist groups in Ghouta continue to receive arms and munitions from Governments that support terrorism, including Saudi Arabia's so-called humanitarian assistance. The Syrian Government is more committed than anyone to protecting its citizens across Syria. In that 28/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8195 18-05507 21/22 regard, it has taken all necessary measures to protect its citizens and to respond to the attacks of terrorist groups in eastern Ghouta. We have sought to protect these civilians from the terrorists by establishing a humanitarian corridor to ensure their exit from eastern Ghouta. We announced the humanitarian corridor only hours after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) in order to ensure the safety of civilians — in cooperation with our Russian friends and allies. We have provided them with shelter, food, medicine and medical care at the expense of the Syrian Government, not the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The Syrian Government has also called on members of the armed groups to lay down their weapons, cease their terrorist activities inside residential areas and engage in national reconciliation efforts. However, those terrorist groups, including the Al-Nusra Front, Jaysh al-Islam and Faylak ar-Rahman, have forcibly prevented civilians from reaching the corridor, as some members of the Council may know. They also sought to target the humanitarian corridor after it was announced, through the use of mortars. As for the letter sent by the terrorist Mohamed Alloush, it is a clear indication that he rejects the exit of civilians from Ghouta. It is clear that he wants to use them as human shields. There seems to be a new trend in the United Nations to circulate a letter from a terrorist group as an official document. That is an innovation at the United Nations. There is no respect for the Member States concerned. We have followed closely the way resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted and today's statements and briefings. We can clearly say that the main goal behind the adoption of the resolution is neither to reach a clear truce or ceasefire, as some may claim, nor to protect civilians and meet their needs. The main goal was to use the Security Council once again as a means to prevent any progress by the Syrian army and its allies in the fight against the terrorist groups that are targeting the city of Damascus. I say that for the thousandth time. How else to explain the fact that the resolution fails to refer to any Council resolution on counter-terrorism? Who can explain to us the strong resistance of some States during the negotiations on the draft resolution to any text that excludes Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and the terrorist groups affiliated with them from the supposed ceasefire? For three days, the Council has continued to negotiate the issue of whether to include or exclude them. The false humanitarian propaganda on the situation in eastern Ghouta coincided with another campaign under the supervision of the United States, claiming the use of chemical weapons again in Syria, in areas under the exclusive control of terrorists or, I should say, the White Helmets. Today, The New York Times published a Tin-Tin style, childish report claiming that there is cooperation on the chemical issue between my country and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The article is a full-page report on the front page of The New York Times. It seeks to tarnish the image of the Syrian Government and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It ends by saying that this information is not substantiated. "Though experts who viewed the report said the evidence it cited did not prove definitively that there was current, continuing collaboration between North Korea and Syria on chemical weapons." That is a word-for-word quote from The New York Times. It seems that The New York Times is not up to date on what is going on in the world. It seems that the New York Times does not know that the American vessel, the MV Cape Ray, destroyed the chemical arsenal voluntarily submitted by the Syrian Government after joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as a full member. That is old information, déjà vu, as is said in French. However, it seems that The New York Times has decided to address this issue today. I will read a communiqué that we received just now of information that I think should be taken into consideration when addressing the issue of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. And I can tell the Council that terrorists will use chemical weapons in Syria. On the morning of 20 February, four days ago, three Turkish trucks carrying chlorine entered Idlib governorate through the Bab Al-Hawa crossing. I think that The New York Times should verify that information. Two trucks stopped in the village of Qalb Loze in Idlib, and the third continued its way to Al-Habit village in northern Idlib. Information available to the Syrian Government points to the fact that terrorists are currently preparing for a chemical weapon using the substance of chlorine on a large scale and to then accuse the Syrian Arab Army of using such weapons. Those terrorists have clear instructions from Western and Turkish intelligence to fabricate a chemical attack before 13 March, because S/PV.8195 The situation in the Middle East 28/02/2018 22/22 18-05507 it is on that date that the eighty-seventh session of the Executive Council of the OPCW will be held. According to the information I received just now, the two trucks are currently in the school of Qalb Loze village. Other cars and terrorists are also currently in the school, which they have turned into a warehouse for chemical weapons. As for the third truck, it is currently in a centre belonging to the Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham, which is a Turkish agent, in the north-eastern part of Al-Habit village. A vast number of terrorists are currently unloading the truck there. In providing the Security Council with this information, we affirm that these terrorists, at the instructions of their operators, will use these chemical weapons before 13 March. The main responsibility for ending hostilities lies with those countries that have real influence with terrorist groups in Ghouta and other parts of Syria. They should compel these terrorist groups to stop their terrorist activities and allow civilians to leave those areas, which are used by these groups as a base to launch their terrorist attacks. There is in this Organization a group of five countries that are shedding tears over the humanitarian situation in Syria. Unfortunately, some of them are members of the Council. They have invited Member States to watch a movie about the White Helmets, two days from now in the Economic and Social Council Chamber here at the United Nations. Some members of the Council are advocating for a group that has been designated as a terrorist group by the Council. I hope that the Council will address the information I have provided seriously and appropriately. The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the last scheduled meeting of the Council for the month of February, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of the delegation of Kuwait to the members of the Security Council, especially my colleagues the Permanent Representatives, their respective staff and to the secretariat of the Council for all the support they have given to us. Indeed, February has been a busy month, and one in which we rallied to consensus on several important issues within our purview. We could not have done it alone or without the hard work, support and positive contributions of all the delegations and the representatives of the Secretariat, as well as all the relevant conference service officers, interpreters, translators and security staff. As we end our presidency, I know I speak on behalf of the Council in wishing the delegation of the Netherlands good luck in the month of March. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

In its military campaign in Gaza, Israel faces a seemingly endless list of alleged human rights violations. International monitors argue the Israel Defense Forces have starved Gazans, targeted journalists attempting to cover the carnage, tortured detainees, and attacked hospitals full of wounded civilians.
The U.S. — a passionate backer of civilian protections in Ukraine — has struggled to find the right way to address these claims while still standing by its long-time partner. The bombing has been "indiscriminate," says President Joe Biden, but perhaps it will improve tomorrow. Killing more than 10,000 women and children in two months is not "genocide," argues White House spokesperson John Kirby, but Hamas' brutal Oct. 7 attacks were.
If human rights are fundamentally a matter of world consensus, then what does it tell us that the United States threatens to cast a second veto against a United Nations Security Council resolution begging for a humanitarian suspension of fighting? What does it mean when a supposed champion of human rights seems to jettison them when it becomes inconvenient? For that matter, why should Israel care about human rights when it perceives its fight as existential?
Kenneth Roth has a unique perspective on these questions. Roth, considered by many to be a dean of the human rights movement, spent nearly three decades as the executive director of Human Rights Watch before stepping down last year to become a visiting professor at Princeton University. Under his leadership, HRW drew flak for, among other things, declaring Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories to be apartheid, all while documenting in meticulous detail abuses committed by Palestinian groups, including Hamas.
RS spoke with Roth to get his thoughts on human rights at a time of crisis. The following conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
RS: How would you rate the Biden administration's handling of the Gaza crisis from a human rights perspective?
Roth: The Biden administration has been far too deferential to the Israeli Government, despite the pretty clear commission of war crimes in Gaza. And while the administration has pushed to ameliorate some of those war crimes — by pressing for humanitarian access, by urging greater attention to avoiding civilian casualties — that rhetorical push has not been backed by the use of the leverage that the administration has that might have really put pressure on the Israeli government to stop, whether that would be withholding or conditioning ongoing arm sales or military assistance, or even allowing a Security Council resolution to go forward.RS: What would a better approach look like?Roth: The initial problem was that Biden pretty unconditionally wrapped himself in the Israeli government's response to the horrible October 7 attacks by Hamas. If you look at his initial comments, while there were caveats written in about the need to respect humanitarian law, there was no emotional punch behind them. It was pretty clear that Biden simply stood with Israel and was giving it a green light to proceed with its military response to Hamas without much effort, at least during the first few weeks, to ensure that that response really did comply with humanitarian law. So I think the Israeli government got the message that the references to humanitarian law were necessary for certain audiences, but that the administration's heart was not in them.
RS: Would a more forceful form of messaging at the start have led to different results?
Roth: Obviously, it's hard to know the counterfactual. But the U.S. government, which has the greatest leverage of any external actor, didn't really use that leverage to ensure that its periodic rhetorical commitment to the need to respect humanitarian law was matched by its much more forceful embrace of the Israeli military response to Hamas.
RS: I've seen some reporting that the State Department has done internal inquiries as to whether U.S. officials could be legally complicit if Israel is found to have committed war crimes in Gaza. Do you have any thoughts on that question?
Roth: Well, they could be. Biden's references to the Israeli military conducting indiscriminate bombing were clearly not just a verbal slip. It probably reflected the internal conversations that the administration has. The second one even seems to have been somewhat deliberate. And the significance of that is that indiscriminate bombardment is a war crime. As any administration lawyer would know, continuing to provide weapons to a force that is engaged in war crimes can make the sender guilty of aiding and abetting war crimes.
That is not some crazy, wacko theory. That was the basis on which former Liberian President Charles Taylor was convicted by an internationally backed tribunal, the so-called Special Court for Sierra Leone, for providing weapons to the Sierra Leonean rebel group known as the Revolutionary United Front, a group that was notorious for chopping off the limbs of its victims. Because Taylor kept providing arms in return for the RUF's diamonds while he knew the RUF was committing these war crimes, this internationally-backed tribunal found him guilty of aiding and abetting, convicted him, and sentenced him to 50 years in prison, which he is currently serving in a British prison.
RS: My next question is a little tricky, but I'm curious how you approach it. Israel claims that this war is a fight for its very survival. Why should a country that views itself as being in that position care about respecting human rights?Roth: Well, I think the question is why should it care about adhering to international humanitarian law and protocols. It's worth noting that humanitarian law was not drafted by a bunch of human rights activists and peaceniks. This was drafted by the world's leading militaries. It was designed for war, for situations where governments often feel that they are existentially at risk, and these were the limits that the world's leading militaries imposed on themselves. Israel has signed on to these standards, and it claims to abide by them. It has many capable lawyers who could be applying them. It just isn't applying them.
It probably requires a certain psychological analysis to figure out why, but some of the signals being sent from the top indicate a willingness to disregard the requirements of humanitarian law. When you have Defense Minister [Yoav] Galant referring to the residents of Gaza as "human animals," when you have [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu invoking the biblical story of Amalek in which there's a divine injunction to not spare the men, women, children, or animals, these are not-so-subtle signals that the top political and military leadership in Israel doesn't care that much about civilian casualties. This has seemed to have manifested itself in the indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks that the Israeli military has carried out in Gaza.
RS: It seems to me that focusing on war crimes or potential war crimes can sometimes lead to really bad policy outcomes. In this case, Israel is really spotlighting Hamas' alleged war crimes. You think back to the war in Iraq, where there was a lot of highlighting of Saddam's alleged war crimes. How can advocacy for human rights avoid supporting unfettered militarism?
Roth: First, I think it's important to note that war crimes by one side do not justify war crimes by the other. If a warring party could cite the other side's war crimes, you would quickly have no more Geneva Conventions because allegations of war crimes are often made in the passions of conflict. The fact that some people have committed war crimes — in this case, both sides — doesn't justify that others resort to criminal conduct. Now, in terms of military action, few people contest that Israel had every right to respond to Hamas' military attack. It was an extraordinarily lethal military attack. It was ruthless, with widespread murder, rape, abduction, and indiscriminate bombardment. So with an attack of that sort, no one should be surprised that the Israeli government responds. The only real question was, will it respond consistent with humanitarian law? Or would it flout that law?RS: What does all this mean — especially the fact of the U.S. seemingly taking a step back in advocacy for the protection of human rights — what does all this mean for the state of human rights today?
Roth: It is harmful because the U.S. government is such a powerful voice, and when it does seem to make an exception in its human rights advocacy for a close ally like Israel, it discredits the U.S. as a voice for human rights around the world. Now, I should say this is not the only instance of inconsistency on the part of Washington. We're seeing it as well as the Biden administration tries to build alliances to oppose Russia's invasion of Ukraine or to contain China. So while the administration has spoken numerous times about its fundamental commitment to human rights, it's been a very inconsistent commitment. And that inconsistency is probably most visible in the Middle East, which has been essentially a black hole in the administration's human rights policy. It's very difficult to be so permissive of human rights violations in one region of the world and have a whole lot of credibility on human rights in other parts of the world.
This means that one of those powerful voices we have has weakened itself. It's not the first time that has happened. Under [former President Donald] Trump, the U.S. essentially abandoned any pretense of enforcing human rights. Prior administrations have had comparable inconsistencies. The U.S. still has been able to be a useful voice for human rights, despite these inconsistencies, in some cases, but it is a much weaker voice than if it had really been principled and consistent.
RS: How do you see the future of the push to get states to protect human rights? Are we in a moment of crisis that galvanizes change?
Roth: If you look at the various efforts to uphold human rights, they've been quite vigorous in certain cases. There has been a very strong response to Russian war crimes in Ukraine, complete with multiple General Assembly resolutions, the Human Rights Council standing up a commission of inquiry, the International Criminal Court launching an immediate investigation and actually charging Putin and one of his aides with war crimes.
A place where it's been weaker has been, say, China's crimes against humanity against the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, where we came within two votes of putting on the agenda a discussion of then-UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet's very strong report on what she called possible crimes against humanity. But we didn't even get that agenda item, so that's a place where the world has been much weaker.
But there's been greater mobilization, greater willingness to speak out on a range of other situations, whether that be Myanmar or Iran, Saudi abuses in Yemen for a time, Sudan, Ethiopia for a time, Venezuela, Nicaragua. So the idea that because there's this black hole in U.S. human rights policy, therefore nothing can get done, that's just not true. A lot gets done, but the defense of human rights is weaker because the U.S. has been an inconsistent supporter of the effort.

[spa] La expansión romana continúa siendo, desde la pionera obra de Mommsen, un tema de especial importancia en el amplio campo de conocimiento que supone la Historia Antigua del Mediterráneo. Entre sus implicaciones, la dimensión jurídica de la guerra y su aplicación sobre el terreno adquiere una particular relevancia. Sin embargo, mientras abundan los trabajos centrados en episodios bélicos concretos, no son frecuentes aquellos que abordan esta problemática desde una perspectiva global. En nuestra opinión, es necesario considerar e interconectar cada conflicto en su contexto histórico y, en el caso del estudio del ius belli, se deben aglutinar diferentes escenarios con la finalidad de conseguir un amplio abanico de análisis y unas conclusiones más sólidas. Partiendo de la hipótesis de que existió una norma consuetudinaria que regulaba las actitudes de los generales en relación al enemigo, nuestro objetivo principal es determinar si existió una praxis diferencial en función del grado de urbanización del territorio, de su nivel económico y desarrollo cultural. Para ello, realizamos un amplio recorrido a través de las campañas militares romanas en el período 200-167 a.C. (bloques II y III del trabajo), años en que la potencia itálica mantuvo abiertos varios frentes bélicos en Occidente (Hispania, Galia Cisalpina, Liguria y Córcega-Cerdeña), que combinó con el desarrollo de grandes guerras internacionales en el escenario oriental (II Guerra Macedónica, Antíoco III y III Guerra Macedónica). La identificación de los diferentes episodios de rendición incondicional (deditio) y de asalto armado (oppugnatio) se desarrolla en el bloque IV, y constituye la base para la clasificación de las exigencias que Roma realizó a las poblaciones sometidas, pudiéndose distinguir diferentes cláusulas y represalias en función de la forma de subyugación. Entre las medidas correspondientes a la deditio hallamos la solicitud de rehenes, la rendición del armamento, la colaboración militar, la obligación de albergar tropas y la imposición de una serie de multas económicas. Por su parte, tras el asalto armado, las represalias conllevaron un mayor grado de violencia, pudiéndose identificar actuaciones de carácter económico (el saqueo del núcleo), territorial (la fragmentación territorial, el traslado de poblaciones y el desmantelamiento físico del núcleo) y personal (esclavización de los supervivientes y aplicación selectiva de la pena de muerte). El último bloque de la tesis está dedicado a la comparación de la intervención romana en ambos escenarios del Mediterráneo (Occidente y Oriente), analizando cada una de las medidas adoptadas por Roma en un contexto comparativo de mayor amplitud. Los datos analizados a lo largo del trabajo apuntan a la existencia de una estrategia estatal romana cuyos objetivos fueron variando en función del territorio: en Occidente el dominio territorial directo y en Oriente la sumisión política y diplomática. Así se demuestra en las cláusulas tras rendición incondicional: mientras en Hispania y Galia destacan las medidas de carácter militar, en Grecia las exigencias económicas y personales primaron sobre el resto. En referencia a las oppugnationes, el saqueo aparece documentado en ambas vertientes, pero si comparamos los datos del beneficio económico obtenido detectamos una asimetría claramente favorable al escenario oriental. El recurso a la esclavización se comprende como un método orientado a conseguir mayores ingresos, y se detecta mayoritariamente en Occidente y en zonas orientales con un reducido grado de desarrollo institucional. También la intervención sobre el territorio se presenta como un factor diferencial, ya que mientras en el Levante europeo se recurrió, mayoritariamente, a la destrucción de murallas, en Poniente destaca el arrasamiento de núcleos y los traslados de población, de lo que se colige un mayor interés en el control territorial directo. Finalmente, en todo este entramado, la aplicación de determinadas cláusulas y represalias se vio influida por los objetivos romanos en política exterior. Asimismo, también desempeñaron un papel fundamental los intereses de los generales, de modo que la guerra funcionaba como una herramienta para el acceso a magistraturas de más alto nivel. ; [cat] L'expansió romana es manté, des de la pionera obra de Mommsen, com un tema d'especial importància en l'ampli camp de coneixement que és la Història Antiga del Mediterrani. Entre les seves implicacions, la qüestió jurídica de la guerra i la seva aplicació pràctica adquireixen una especial rellevància. No obstant això, mentre destaquen els treballs centrats en episodis concrets, no són freqüents els que tracten aquest problema des d'una perspectiva global. En la nostra opinió, és necessari considerar i interconnectar cada intervenció en el seu context històric i, en el cas de l'estudi de l'ius belli, cal reunir diferents escenaris per tal d'obtenir una àmplia gamma d'anàlisi i conclusions més sòlides. Partint de la hipòtesi que existia una norma habitual que regulava les actituds dels generals devers l'enemic, el nostre objectiu principal és determinar si va existir una pràctica de diferencial segons el grau d'urbanització del territori, del seu desenvolupament econòmic i cultural. Per això, duem a terme un ampli recorregut a través de les campanyes militars romanes en el període 200-167 a.C. (blocs II i III de l'obra), anys en que la potència itàlica va mantenir oberts diversos fronts bèl•lics a Occident (Hispania, Gàl•lia Cisalpina, Ligúria i Sardenya-Còrsega), que combinava amb el desenvolupament de grans guerres internacionals a l'escenari oriental (II guerra Macedònica, Antíoco III i III Guerra Macedònica). La identificació dels diferents episodis de rendició incondicional (deditio) i assalt armat (oppugnatio) es fa en el bloc IV i constitueix la base per a la classificació de les exigències fetes per Roma a les poblacions sotmeses, entre els quals es poden distingir diferents clàusules i represàlies en base a la forma de submissió. Entre les mesures corresponents a la deditio trobem la petició d'ostatges, el lliurament d'armes, l'obligació de col•laboració militar de les tropes i la imposició d'una sèrie de sancions econòmiques. Per la seva banda, les represàlies després dels assalts tenien un major grau de violència, i es poden identificar en actuacions de caràcter econòmic (saqueig del nucli), territorial (la fragmentació territorial, el trasllat de poblacions i la destrucció de nuclis) i personal (esclavització dels supervivents i aplicació selectiva de la pena de mort). El darrer bloc de la tesi està dedicat a la comparació de la intervenció romana en ambdós escenaris (Occident i Orient), analitzant cadascuna de les mesures adoptades per Roma en un context comparatiu de major amplitud. Les dades analitzades al llarg del treball indiquen a l'existència d'una estratègia estatal, amb uns objectius que eren diferents en funció del territori: en Occident el domini territorial directe, i en Orient la submissió política i diplomàtica. Així es demostra entre les clàusules derivades de la rendició incondicional: mentre que a Hispània i Gàl•lia destaquen les mesures militars, a Grècia es detecten exigències econòmiques i personals. Pel que fa a les oppugnationes, el saqueig apareix documentat en ambdues vessants, però si comparem les dades del benefici econòmic obtingut hi detectem una asimetria clarament favorable a l'escenari oriental. El recurs a l'esclavització es comprèn com un mètode orientat a aconseguir majors ingressos, i es detecta majoritàriament a Occident i a zones orientals amb un reduït grau de desenvolupament institucional. També la intervenció sobre el territori es presenta com un factor diferencial, ja que mentre al Llevant mediterrani es va recórrer, majoritàriament, a la destrucció de les muralles, a Ponent destaca la destrucció de nuclis i als trasllats de població, del que es pot deduir un major interès en el control territorial directe. Finalment, en tot aquest entramat, l'aplicació de determinades clàusules i represàlies va ser influïda pels objectius romans en política exterior. Així mateix, també varen exercir un paper fonamental els interessos dels generals encarregats de les campanyes, de tal manera que la guerra funcionava con una eina per l'accés a magistratures de més alt nivell. ; [eng] Among the many aspects of Ancient History of the Mediterranean, Roman expansion remains a recurring theme. The legal question of war and its implementation on the ground takes on particular importance. We need to consider and interconnect each conflict in their historical context and, in the case of the study of ius belli, should unite different scenarios in order to get a wide range of analysis and stronger conclusions. Assuming that, there was an unwritten law that regulated the general attitudes towards the enemy, the main objective is to determine whether there was a differential praxis based on the degree of urbanization of the territory, economic status and cultural development. We perform an extensive survey on the Roman military campaigns in the period 200-167 BC (Sections II and III of the work), tears which the Italian military power remained open several fronts in the West (Hispania, Gaul, Liguria and Corsica-Sardinia), which combined with the development of major international wars in the East (Second Macedonian War, Antiochus III and Third Macedonian World). The identification of the different episodes of unconditional surrender (deditio) and armed assault (oppugnatio) is performed in Section IV, and serves to classify the demand that Roma made to subjected populations. We can distinguish different clauses and forms of retaliation depending on the conditions of surrender. Measures relating to the deditio are the demand of hostages, surrender of weapons, military cooperation, the obligation to accommodate troops and the imposition of a series of financial penalties. Meanwhile, after the armed assault, general implemented reprisals with a greater degree of violence: plunder, territorial fragmentation, population transfer, physical destruction, the enslavement of survivors and selective death penalty. The last Section of this Thesis is dedicated to the comparison of the Roman intervention in West and East Mediterranean. Data analysed along research assert the existence of a Roman state strategy, whose objectives were varied depending on the territory: the direct control in West and the political and diplomatic submission in the East. This is demonstrated in the terms after unconditional surrender: while un Hispania and Gaul we can identified military measures, in Greece economic and personal demands prevailed over the rest. Referring to the oppugnationes, plunder is documented in both sides, but if we compare the data of economic benefit we can detect an asymmetry clearly propitious to East. The use of enslavement is understood as a process designed to securing increased revenues, and is mainly detected in the West and eastern areas with a low level of institutional development. The intervention on the territory appears also as a differential factor: in the East the destruction of city walls was the most used retaliation, in the West the razing of cores and population transfers is attested. Finally throughout this framework, the application of certain terms and retaliation was influenced by Roman Foreign Policy Objectives. One must also take into account the interests of the general, and the war worked as a tool for access to higher-level magistracies.

Dissertação apresentada à Universidade Fernando Pessoa como parte dos requisitos para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Acção Humanitária, Cooperação e Desenvolvimento ; Este projecto decorre de minha experiência direta: passei seis meses trabalhando com uma ONG em uma escola em uma área rural na República da Guiné. Além do entusiasmo e da paixão, esta experiência deixou-me uma pergunta: porque a maioria das crianças que frequentam a escola primária regularmente têm enormes lacunas de modo a ser muitas vezes praticamente analfabeto? A maioria dos projetos que olhem para questões de educação em África para trazer as crianças para a escola ou para construir a própria escola, se não há. Este projeto concentra a atenção sobre o que acontece quando o aluno já está sentado no banco da escola. O que se segue destina-se a ser um estudo completo, tanto quanto possível, e uma ferramenta necessária para futuras intervenções humanitárias, em qualquer nível neste campo — de uma única escola a uma campanha nacional. Uma compreensão completa e abrangente da intervenção no território e dos destinatários é crucial para os planos para um projeto humanitário eficaz, durável e sustentável. Minha análise começa com um estudo geral sobre Guiné, indicando aspectos histórico-cultural, económico e político, juntando num último ponto minha interpretação. Na segunda etapa faz-se uma análise mais concentrada da educação na Guiné, dos contornos que envolvem o seu âmbito territorial (países de língua francesa da África sub-sahariana) quando necessário, mas também tentando apontar uma distinção que muitas vezes não é detectada entre oportunidades sócio-educativas em áreas rurais e cidades. A partir de problemas objectivos indicados nos relatórios do UNESCO Institute for Statistics, intregro minha experiência pessoal através da detecção de três problemas de base: regras Ministerial, professores, políticas de língua (focando na Guiné como um estudo de caso único e interessante). Na terceira parte, sugerir possíveis estratégias para uma mudança palpável. Para fazer isso, uso minha experiência de dois novos estudos sobre a educação de que tomei conhecimento enquanto estudante em Erasmus em Bruxelas (Université Saint-Louis). Analisando os resultados que tive a possibilidade de encontrar nos alunos que seguiram um curso de alfabetização intensivo de recuperação, detectei que a memorização era a única estratégia de ensino até agora utilizada, com resultados devastadores a nível psicológico e educacional. Através do estudo da formação de especialistas tais como Xavier Roegiers, proponho como possível abordagem a Pedagogia da Integração destinadas a proporcionar à criança conhecimentos e a permitir-lhe de aplicar os seus conhecimentos, deixando de lado a técnica da memorização que, além de causar desconforto nos jovens com insucesso, não conferia nenhuma habilidade real para os que pareciam ter sucesso. ; This project stems from my direct experience: I spent six months as a volunteer in an NGO in a rural school in the Republic of Guinea. Apart from the enthusiasm and passion, this experience has left me with a question: how can we explain that the majority of children who attend regularly primary school often have huge gaps at the point of being virtually illiterate? The majority of projects relating to the issue of education in Africa aim at bringing children to school, or plan to build these schools if they do not exist. This project focuses rather on what happens when the student is already sitting on the bench of the school. This work intends to serve as a comprehensive study, as far as possible, and as a necessary tool for future humanitarian actions, regardless of their level of intervention — it may be targeted at a single school or at a national campaign. An complete understanding and a comprehensive knowledge of the territory and beneficiaries is essential to plan a sustainable, efficient and sustainable. humanitarian project. My analysis begins with a comprehensive study on Guinea, indicating historical and cultural, economic and political aspects, and adding final note on my own interpretation. The second step consists into a more specific analysis on education in Guinea, its sphere of action and its influence at the territorial level (french-speaking countries of sub-Saharan Africa) when necessary. It also underlines a distinction that is not often detected: that between social and educational opportunities in rural areas and in cities. From the objective findings contained in the reports of the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, I have added my personal experience by detecting three fundamental problems: the government rules, the teachers praxis, and language policy (focusing on Guinea as unique and interesting case study). In the third part, I suggest possible strategies for a realistic change. To do this, I use my experience from two new studies on education that I learned on while is Erasmus in Brussels (Université Saint-Louis). I use them to analyze the results that I had the opportunity to collect on students who have followed intensive literacy classes, where I noticed that the memorization was the only strategy of education used up to now, with devastating effects at psychological and educational levels. Through the study of the materials of specialists such as Xavier Roegiers, I propose as one possible approach the Pedagogy of Integration, designed to provide the child knowledge and to enable her or him to apply this knowledge, leaving aside the memorization technique which, in addition to causing discomfort among youth in school failure, not provide any real skill for those who seem to have more success. ; Ce projet découle de mon expérience directe: j'ai passé six mois comme volontaire au sein d'une ONG dans une école en milieu rural dans la République de Guinée. En plus de l'enthousiasme et de la passion, cette expérience m'a laissé une interrogation : comment expliquer que la majorité des enfants qui fréquentent régulièrement l'école primaire ont d'énormes lacunes au point d'être souvent pratiquement analphabètes ? La majorité des projets qui ont trait à des questions d'éducation en Afrique visent à amener les enfants à l'école ou à construire ces écoles, s'il n'y en a pas. Ce projet attire plutôt l'attention sur ce qui arrive quand l'élève est déjà assis sur le banc de l'école. Ce travail est destiné à servir comme une étude complète autant que possible et un outil nécessaire pour les futures interventions humanitaires, quel que soit le niveau dans ce domaine, d'une école unique à une campagne nationale. Une compréhension complète et globale de l'intervention sur le territoire et sur les bénéficiaires est essentielle à une planification pour un projet humanitaire durable, efficace et durable. Mon analyse commence avec une étude globale sur la Guinée, en indiquant les aspects historiques et culturels, économiques et politiques, et en ajoutant en note finale ma propre interprétation. Dans la deuxième étape une analyse de façon plus ciblée l'éducation en Guinée, sa sphère d'action et son rayonnement au plan territorial (les francophones des pays de l'Afrique subsaharienne) quand nécessaire, mais on essaye aussi de souligner une distinction qui n'est souvent pas détectée entre opportunités socio-éducatives dans les zones rurales et dans les villes. À partir des constatations objectives contenues dans les rapports du UNESCO Institute for Statistics, j'intègre mon expérience personnelle en détectant les trois problèmes fondamentaux : les règles ministérielles, les enseignants, les politiques linguistiques (en se concentrant sur la Guinée comme étude de cas unique et intéressante). Dans la troisième partie, sont suggérées des stratégies possibles de changement palpable. Pour ce faire, j'utilise mon expérience de deux nouvelles études sur l'éducation acquises lors de mon séjour en Erasmus à Bruxelles (Université Saint-Louis). J'analyse des résultats que j'ai eu la possibilité de collecter sur des élèves qui ont suivi des cours d'alphabétisation intensifs de récupération, où j'ai détecté que la mémorisation était la seule stratégie d'enseignement jusqu'à maintenant utilisée, avec des effets dévastateurs au niveau psychologique et éducatif. Grâce à l'étude de la matériaux de spécialistes tels que Xavier Roegiers, je propose une approche possible à la pédagogie de l'intégration conçue pour fournir à l'enfant les connaissances et lui permettre d'appliquer ces connaissances, laissant de côté la technique de mémorisation qui, en plus de causer une gêne chez les jeunes en échec scolaire, ne confère aucune compétence réelle pour ceux qui semblent avoir plus de succès. ; Questo progetto nasce dalla mia diretta esperienza: ho passato sei mesi lavorando con una ong in una scuola in una zona rurale della Repubblica di Guinea. Oltre a tanto entusiasmo e passione questo periodo mi ha lasciato un interrogativo: perché la maggior parte dei bambini che frequentavano regolarmente la scuola primaria presentavano enormi lacune tanto da essere spesso praticamente analfabeti? La maggior parte dei progetti che guardano ai problemi dell'educazione in Africa puntano a portare i bambini a scuola o a costruirla qualora non ci fosse, io ho focalizzato la mia attenzione su quello che succede quando lo studente è già seduto al banco. Quello che segue vuole essere uno studio quanto più completo possibile, uno strumento necessario per futuri interventi umanitari a qualsiasi livello in questo campo, dalla singola scuola a una campagna nazionale. Una conoscenza approfondita e globale del territorio di intervento, dei destinatari e dei precedenti piani è fondamentale per un progetto umanitario efficace, duraturo e sostenibile. La mia analisi parte da uno studio generale sulla Guinea inquadrandone l'aspetto storico-culturale, economico e politico, unendo a quest'ultimo punto una mia chiave di lettura. Nella seconda parte passo a un'analisi più mirata dell'educazione in Guinea, inquadrandola nel suo contesto territoriale (paesi francofoni dell'Africa Sub-Sahariana) quando serve ma anche cercando di sottolineare una distinzione che spesso non viene rilevata: quella tra le possibilità socio-educative nelle zone rurali e nelle città. Partendo da problemi oggettivi emersi da rapporti dell'Unesco Institute for Statistics integro la mia personale esperienza rilevando tre nodi principali: le disposizioni ministeriali, gli insegnanti, le politiche linguistiche (che rendono la Guinea un caso di studio unico e interessante). Nella terza parte, suggerisco possibili strategie per un cambiamento tangibile. Per fare ciò utilizzo sia la mia diretta esperienza sia i nuovi studi sull'educazione di cui sono venuta a conoscenza mentre ero studente in Erasmus a Bruxelles (Université Saint-Louis). Analizzando i risultati che ho potuto riscontrare negli allievi che seguivo in un corso di recupero e alfabetizzazione intensivo ho rilevato la memorizzazione come unica strategia d'insegnamento abbia dei risultati a livello psicologico e didattico devastanti. Tramite lo studio di specialisti della formazione quali Xavier Roegiers propongo come possibile approccio la Pedagogia dell'Integrazione, volta a rendere il bambino in grado di conoscere e applicare le sue conoscenze, cancellando la tecnica della memorizzazione che, oltre a causare sconforto per i giovani che fallivano nelle prove di valutazione, non dava reali competenze a chi pareva riuscire.

The theme set for this thesis is composed by several important phases which allow to clearly identifying the way this research has been done in order to achieve the objectives and purposes established. So, once the diagnosis is known, the problem identified is the lack of a management policy in line with Ministerial agreement N° 004-10 which promotes the implementation of kiosk at high schools under a process of a sanitarian and nutritional control of food. This problem has obviously affected on the academic performance of students at the Instituto Superior Guaranda. The Chapter 1, presents the concepts and definitions of terminology used through this research, as well as, the scientific information required to clarify and strengthen the variables that take part of the problem through of a hypothetic- deductive study. That is why, its order contains references relating to the management which is defined as the discipline that guides and integrates the processes of planning, attract, dynamize, organize human talent and manage resources always focusing on the project and the achievement of goals, within a deadline and taking into consideration defined costs. Also explains the monitoring phases of the management policy regarding the scientific criteria of illustrious researchers in the field, such as: Menguzzato, Anthony R., Amat J., M. Gonzalez, F. Taylor, H. Gantt, Gilbreth, F., Farol, H., M. Weber, among others, who think that the administrative process is the outcome achieved from the interaction of its elements such as: planning, organization, execution and control. Finally shows issues related to nutrition, feeding, sanitarian control and school performance among other aspects. The chapter II, presents the methodology and its different types of intellectual research like methods, techniques, processes and procedures used for the development of this scientific inquiry. Also shows the population of the institution used as the universe investigated and the application of research tools. From the problematic identified during the phase of diagnosis, strategies and actions has been set out in order to solve inconsistencies regarding the deficient infrastructure of kiosk, indifference of authorities, intellectual deficiency of students, wrong eating habits, lack of hygiene of the staff in charge of the service, inefficient administration, lack of nutritional studies, political intransigence towards the implementation of non- customary measures at kiosk, and lack of sanitarian and nutritional knowledge of people responsible for the sale of food. It also includes the recognition of the Ministerial Agreement 004 -10, and a variety of nutritional products with food and ancient meals that displays a list of nutrients and indicators of excess, which allows to show the methods of food preservation and the right products for consumption. The Chapter III, presents the analysis and interpretation of results, beginning by a survey focused on teachers from the high school. This process demonstrates that 100% of teachers agree that the products sold at the kiosk does not have labels of quality or sanitarian standards, therefore, a high number of students suffers from obesity, acne and fatigue. These factors have directly affected the students learning process and consequently their academic performance. Moreover, the survey shows that teachers from this high school are aware that the products sold in the kiosk don´t have nutritional compounds and also recognize that are harmful for the health of students. That´s the reason they strongly believe it is necessary to promote a massive campaign in order to change the eating habits of students, replacing organic food instead of junk foods, typical from the region, rich in vitamins and proteins and other substances which are important for an appropriate physical and mental development of students. Concerning the students surveyed, the results reveal that 100% of them know that the products they consume are not nutritious and that damage their health. Also express their disagreement regarding the kind of food sold at high school because they consider it, as one of the factors that could cause multiple health disorders due to the poor nutrition they receive. That´s why they think that the high school authorities must promote health and nutrition measures focused on the construction of a healthy feeding culture and on the intellectual growth of students whose results could be reflected in their scholar performance. On the other hand, it is regrettable to realize that the owners of the kiosk are totally unaware of the rules and policies of management, regulation, measurement and control of their activities. The lack of knowledge with regard to the administrative and management standards of hygiene, health and quality of food preparation and its subsequent organization for sale, once further evidences the need to organize courses, seminars and workshops to train students, kiosk administrators and authorities about the importance of a proper nutrition during the educational process. Meanwhile, the authorities from the Instituto Superior Guaranda agree that it is fundamental take appropriate action to reduce the risks caused by the kiosk in schools. Similarly, the need to eradicate the problem arose once again, through the direct intervention of all those involved in the educational community in order to improve the infrastructure, implement standards of hygiene and the selection of the right food that must be sold at high school. ; El tema expuesto para esta tesis está revestido de varias fases muy importantes que permiten identificar con claridad la manera como se ha realizado la investigación para el logro de los objetivos y propósitos descritos. Es así que una vez establecido el diagnóstico, el problema identificado es la inexistencia de una política de gestión conforme con el acuerdo Ministerial 004-10, el cual promueve la implementación de bares bajo un proceso de control sanitario-nutricional de los alimentos. Este problema ha afectado el rendimiento escolar de los alumnos y alumnas del Instituto Superior Guaranda. En el capítulo I partimos por conocer los conceptos y definiciones de la terminología usada en esta investigación; así como la información científica que se requiere para aclarar y fortalecer las variables que permitan efectuar un estudio intelectivo. Por consiguiente, en su orden consta referencias relacionadas la gerencia o administración definida como la disciplina que guía e integra los procesos de planificar, captar, dinamizar, organizar talentos y administrar recursos con el fin de desarrollar el proyecto y cumplir con los objetivos propuestos, dentro de un tiempo y costo establecidos. También, se puntualizan las fases de control de las políticas de gestión, tomando en cuenta los criterios efectivos de destacados investigadores del área, como: Menguzzato, A. (1998), Amat, J (2002), González, M., Taylor, F., Gantt, H., Gilbreth, F., Fayol, H., Weber M., entre otros; quienes aseguran que el proceso administrativo es el resultado de la interacción de sus elementos tales como: planeación, organización, ejecución y control; se hace mención a temas relacionados con la nutrición, alimentación, control sanitario y rendimiento escolar entre otros aspectos importantes. En el capítulo II, figura la Metodología con los diferentes tipos de investigación intelectiva, los métodos, técnicas, procesos y procedimientos utilizados en el desarrollo de la presente indagación científica. Se presenta la población universo de la institución indagada y la aplicación de los instrumentos de investigación utilizados. A partir de la problemática identificada durante la fase de diagnóstico, se plantean las estrategias y acciones a tomar que permitan dar solución a inconsistencias relacionadas a la deficiente infraestructura de los bares, indiferencia de autoridades, deficiencia intelectiva de estudiantes, malos hábitos alimenticios, falta de higiene del personal que brinda el servicio, exigua administración, inexistencia de estudios nutricionales, intransigencia ante las políticas de implementación de medidas no costumbristas en los bares y desconocimiento de medidas sanitarias y nutricionales por parte de los responsables de la venta de alimentos. Nos muestra también el reconocimiento del Acuerdo Ministerial 004-10, e incluye una variedad de productos nutricionales con alimentos y comidas ancestrales mostrando una lista de nutrientes e indicadores de exceso, lo que permite exponer los métodos de conservación de alimentos y los productos adecuados para el consumo. En el capítulo III, se realiza el análisis e interpretación de resultados, iniciando con una encuesta enfocada en los maestros del establecimiento educativo. Este proceso nos demuestra que el 100% de los profesores está de acuerdo en que los productos vendidos en el bar no poseen sellos de calidad, ni mucho menos estándares de salubridad; por lo tanto, un alto número de estudiantes sufre de obesidad, acné y fatiga. Estos factores han afectado directamente el proceso de aprendizaje de los estudiantes y consecuentemente su rendimiento académico. Por otra parte, la encuesta realizada demuestra que los maestros de esta institución educativa conocen perfectamente que los productos que se venden en el bar no tienen compuestos nutritivos y que son dañinos para la salud de los estudiantes; por lo tanto manifiestan que es necesario promover una campaña masiva en los planteles educativos con el fin de cambiar los hábitos alimenticios de los estudiantes, reemplazando la comida chatarra por alimentos de origen orgánico, autóctonos de la zona, ricos en vitaminas y proteínas y otras sustancias indispensables para el adecuado desarrollo físico y mental de los estudiantes. Con respecto a los estudiantes encuestados, los resultados obtenidos revelan que el 100% de ellos conocen la situación de insalubridad que caracteriza a los espacios de expendio de los alimentos, señala -que conocen- que los productos que consumen no son nutritivos y que deterioran su salud, además su inconformidad con respecto a los productos que se venden ya que consideran que es uno de los factores que puede ocasionar múltiples trastornos en su salud, debido a la deficiente alimentación que reciben. Consideran necesario que las autoridades de la institución educativa promuevan normas sanitarias y de nutrición encaminadas al desarrollo de una cultura sana de alimentación y al crecimiento intelectual de los estudiantes, cuyos resultados se vean reflejados en el rendimiento escolar. Por su parte, es lamentable manifestar que los administradores de los bares desconocen totalmente las normas y políticas de gestión, regulación, medición y control de sus actividades. El desconocimiento de los elementos del proceso administrativo, así como del manejo de estándares de salubridad, higiene y calidad en la preparación de alimentos y su posterior organización para la venta, evidencia una vez más la necesidad de organizar cursos, seminarios y talleres que permitan capacitar a los estudiantes, administradores de bares y autoridades acerca de la importancia de un adecuada nutrición durante el proceso educativo. De igual manera, las autoridades del Insttituto Superior Guaranda, coinciden en que es fudamental tomar las acciones pertinentes que ayuden a reducir los riesgos desencadenados por las falencias de los bares de los colegios. De igual manera, manifiestan la necesidad de erradicar el problema, a través de la intervención directa de todos quienes forman parte de la comunidad educativa con el propósito de mejorar la infraestructura, implementar estandares de higiene y una adecuada selección de los alimentos que deben ser expendidos por los administradores de los bares.

Crisis Financiera mundial"El País" de Madrid:"Vía libre a la compra de Lehman por Barclays en sólo cinco días": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/Via/libre/compra/Lehman/Barclays/solo/dias/elpepueco/20080921elpepieco_4/Tes"Crisis financiera mundial - La gestación del rescate: "Si el plan no se aprueba, que el cielo nos asista"":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/plan/aprueba/cielo/nos/asista/elpepueco/20080921elpepieco_3/Tes"EE UU inyectará 485.000 millones para evitar el colapso financiero": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/economia/EE/UU/inyectara/485000/millones/evitar/colapso/financiero/elpepueco/20080921elpepieco_1/Tes "New York Times":"Shift for Goldman and Morgan Marks the End of an Era": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/business/22bank.html?hp "Bush Urges Democrats to Act Quickly on Bailout Plan": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23paulson.html?hp"Skeptics in Washington, Sellers on Wall Street":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/business/24markets.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1222207347-jKdB9jkUarOxtnUq15xrDg"CNN":"Fed boosts support for Goldman and Morgan: Central bank okays change in status for last two remaining investment banks":http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/21/news/companies/fed_investmentbanks.ap/index.htm?cnn=yes"Markets fall as fears grow over bailout plan": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/23/world.markets/index.html"Bush urges Congress to rubberstamp bailout plan": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/22/world.markets/index.html"BBC":"US banks make shock status switch: The last two major investment banks in the US have changed their status to become bank holding companies, allowing them to take deposits from investors.": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7628578.stm"La Nación":"El fin de una era en Wall Street: adiós a los bancos de inversión: Goldman Sachs y Morgan Stanley se transformarán en bancos comerciales": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052652"Caen las bolsas ante las dudas por el plan: Pese a un fuerte llamado de Bush a aprobar el rescate cuanto antes, los demócratas presentaron una propuesta alternativa": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052651 "Time":"Japan to the Rescue of Ailing US Firms": http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1843534,00.html"El Universal" de México: "La ONU, más necesaria y más urgente que nunca: Bush: En su discurso ante la Asamblea General de la ONU, el último de su mandato, dijo que el organismo internacional debe aprobar más resoluciones que impidan que esos atentados se produzcan": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/540630.html"MSNBC":"Bush to address country about bailout plan: Paulson reportedly compromises, will add limits on executive compensation": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26871338/"Fed plows $30 billion in foreign money markets :Temporary 'swap' arrangements aim to tackle global credit crunch": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26862762/"The Economist":"And then there were none: What the death of the investment bank means for Wall Street": http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12294688&source=features_box_main"The politics of despair: Wall Street's meltdown readjusts the race in unexpected ways": http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12262221"Wall Street's bad dream": http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12273023 AMERICA LATINA "La Nación" informa: "Fuerte crítica de Cristina Kirchner a Estados Unidos en la ONU": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052725"CNN" publica: "Russian navy ships head to Venezuela": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/22/russia.venezuela.ap/index.html"China Daily" anuncia: "Russia sends ships on exercises in US 'backyard'":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-09/22/content_7048551.htm"La Nación" publica: "Chávez inició en China una gira por Asia y Europa: El mandatario venezolano busca fortalecer la cooperación con el país asiático; "en este momento es mucho más importante estar en Pekín que en Nueva York", expresó":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052710"CNN": "Peace talks aim at easing Bolivia tension": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/20/bolivia.talks/index.html"The Economist" analiza: "Bolivia: Now put it back together": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12260915"La Nación" informa: "Antonini Wilson aseguró que en el vuelo había otros US$ 4.200.000 y que estuvo en la Casa Rosada": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052756"La Nación" anuncia: "México, ante un nuevo drama: el narcoterrorismo: Los carteles inician la "colombianización" del país":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052618"El Tiempo" de Colombia publica: "Haití, Venezuela y Ecuador entre los más corruptos de América Latina, según un estudio": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/haiti-venezuela-y-ecuador-entre-los-mas-corruptos-de-america-latina-segun-un-estudio_4548631-1 ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA "New York Times" informa: "2 Candidates Urge Greater Oversight in Bailout Plan": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/us/politics/22campaign.html?ref=business"CNN" publica: "McCain 'deeply uncomfortable' with lack of bailout oversight": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/09/22/campaign.wrap/index.html"BBC" analiza: "The US election nightmare scenario": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7626471.stm"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Palin se reúne con varios mandatarios en apertura de la Asamblea de la ONU": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/09/23/internacional/_portada/noticias/1BCE1474-994A-47C6-A5FE-84CD8B379283.htm?id={1BCE1474-994A-47C6-A5FE-84CD8B379283}"The Economist" analiza: "The election campaign: Heard on the stump":http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12263226"Los Angeles Times": "Times poll shows Barack Obama has slight lead over John McCain": http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-poll25-2008sep25,0,4911734.stor"Los Angeles Times" informa: "McCain seeks to postpone debate because of financial crisis":http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-na-campaign25-2008sep25,0,766973.story"Time" publica sitio con links a artículos sobre las elecciones en los Estados Unidos:http://thepage.time.com/"La Nación" publica: "Bush busca tranquilizar a sus pares en la ONU: Hoy pronunciará su último discurso": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052654"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "George W. Bush afirma que la ONU es más necesaria y más urgente que nunca":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/euycanada/home/george-w-bush-afirma-que-la-onu-es-mas-necesaria-y-mas-urgente-que-nunca_4548370-1 EUROPA "El País" de Madrid informa: "La duda es más grande que Brown: El primer ministro, agobiado por su mala imagen, es incapaz de remontar los sondeos - El laborismo debate si dejar que siga o designar otro líder para un cuarto mandato": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/duda/grande/Brown/elpepuint/20080921elpepiint_1/Tes"CNN" publica: "Car bomb in northern Spain kills soldier":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/09/22/spain.bombs.soldier/index.html"CNN" publica: "Funding crisis may ground Alitalia": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/22/alitalia.license/index.html"Time" informa: "11 Dead in FinlandSchool Shooting": http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1843568,00.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "Estudiante asesinó a diez compañeros en un colegio profesional de Finlandia y luego se suicidó": http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/estudiante-asesino-a-diez-companeros-en-un-colegio-profesional-de-finlandia-y-luego-se-suicido_4546222-1 Asia – Pacífico /Medio Oriente. "China Daily" informa: "China's quality chief steps down in milk scandal":http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/22/content_7048471.htm"The Economist" analiza: "China's baby-milk scandal: Formula for disaster": http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12262271"MSNBC" anuncia: "Typhoon hits southern China, Vietnam next: Hong Kong saw 58 injuries and disruption of schools and airport":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26868696/"New York Times" informa: "Japanese Party Chooses Aso as Leader":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/world/asia/23japan.html?ref=world"Le Monde" publica: "Taro Aso va devenir le premier ministre du Japón": http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2008/09/22/taro-aso-va-devenir-le-premier-ministre-du-japon_1097905_3216.html#ens_id=1097909"BBC" anuncia: "Aso picked to become new Japan PM": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7628495.stm"La Nación" informa: "Un "halcón" será el nuevo primer ministro de Japón: Taro Aso reemplazará a Yasuo Fukuda": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052616"CNN" publica: "N. Korea seeks removal of nuke plant seals": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/22/nkorea.nuclear.seals/index.html"BBC" informa: "N Korea wants nuclear seals off": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7628955.stm"El Mercurio" de Chile informa: "Pakistán persigue a célula de Al Qaeda tras atentado": http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/09/23/internacional/internacional/noticias/99E41C2A-5ED4-4AFA-BA25-4184BA2AD712.htm?id={99E41C2A-5ED4-4AFA-BA25-4184BA2AD712}"New York Times" publica: "Pakistan Leaders Barely Missed Attack": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/world/asia/23pstan.html?ref=world"New York Times" anuncia: "Olmert Quits Post, and Political Maneuvering Begins": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/middleeast/22olmert.html?ref=world"MSNBC": "Livni to form new Israeli government: Foreign minister has 42 days to form coalition": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26839166/"MSNBC" informa: "Car plows into soldiers in Jerusalem; 19 hurt: Palestinian shot dead after ramming car into crowd of soldiers in OldCity": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26841572/"El País" de Madrid publica: "Ahmadineyad vaticina el fin del "imperio americano" y el derrumbe de Israel": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Ahmadineyad/vaticina/fin/imperio/americano/derrumbe/Israel/elpepuint/20080923elpepuint_5/Tes AFRICA "El País" de Madrid informa: "Mbeki, obligado a dejar la presidencia de Suráfrica: Las luchas internas en el partido del Gobierno desembocan en una crisis": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mbeki/obligado/dejar/presidencia/Surafrica/elpepuint/20080921elpepiint_7/Tes"New York Times" publica: "A South African of Charisma and Mystery": http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/africa/22zuma.html?ref=world"CNN" anuncia: "Sudan lobbies to avoid Darfur genocide arrest": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/sudan.un.ap/index.html"BBC" informa: "Eleven tourists seized in Egypt": http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7629171.stm"CNN" publica: "11 tourists kidnapped in Egypt desert": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/egypt.italians.kidnapped/index.html"CNN" analiza: "U.N.: Almost 10 million Ethiopians need food aid": http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/09/22/ethiopia.drought.ap/index.html ECONOMIA "The Economist" analiza: "Airlines and the credit crunch: Shredding money": http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12267383"La Nación" publica: "Fuerte alza de las materias primas; récord del crudo: Tuvo la mayor suba en un día, del 17,8%; la soja aumentó 5,3%":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052656"The Economist" publica su informe semanal: "Business this week": http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12274086"MSNBC" anuncia: "Oil near $108 as investors eye U.S. bailout: Investors await details of $700 billion plan to stabilize Wall Street": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12400801/OTRAS NOTICIAS"New York Times" publica: "At U.N., Bush Reassures Leaders on Economy":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/world/24nations.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin "El Universal" de México informa: "Inicia hoy la Asamblea General de la ONU: El secretario general de la ONU, Ban Ki-moon, y el presidente de la Asamblea General, el ex canciller nicaragüense Miguel D' Escoto, inauguran una sesión en la que se tratarán los Objetivos del Milenio y la pobreza": http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/540594.html"La Nación" informa: "Los discursos en la ONU se concentran en la crisis económica: La mayoría de los presidentes resaltaron en la apertura de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas la delicada situación de los mercados mundiales; Ban Ki-Moon pidió "acción y liderazgo colectivo"": http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1052733"MSNBC" anuncia: "U.N. chief: Rich nations must help Africa: Secretary-General says $72 billion a year needed to fight hunger, poverty": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26839643/"MSNBC" publica: "Russia, China block new Iran nuclear sanctions: Talks among six nations on Iranian program cancelled amid U.S.-Russia rift": http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26859796/

Das Konzept des demokratischen Rechtsstaates, bisher einigendes Fundament und Leitprinzip der europäischen Einigung, steht heute im Zentrum einer kritischen Debatte, die die Grundlagen des europäischen Friedensprojektes zu gefährden droht. Weltweit und insbesondere in Europa wächst die Sorge um den Erhalt der freiheitlich-demokratischen Werte. Populistische Bewegungen gewinnen an Einfluss, indem sie einfache Antworten auf die komplexen Herausforderungen unserer Zeit anbieten. Diese Bewegungen finden vor allem bei denjenigen Anklang, die sich inmitten des raschen gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Wandels nach Sicherheit und Beständigkeit sehnen. Sie neigen dazu, sich Lösungen wie nationaler Abschottung und der Etablierung autoritärer Regime zuzuwenden, um ein Gefühl der Sicherheit zu vermitteln (vgl. Möllers 2018, S. 7).Seit der Flüchtlingskrise 2015 haben populistische Strömungen in verschiedenen europäischen Ländern an Zulauf gewonnen. Ungarn und Polen sind prominente Beispiele, in denen rechtsnationale bis rechtsradikale Parteien an die Macht gekommen sind. Diese Regierungen stehen im Widerspruch zu den Grundprinzipien der Europäischen Union, einschließlich der Achtung der Menschenwürde, der Demokratie, der Freiheit, der Gleichheit und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Der Umbau des Staatswesens in diesen Ländern zeigt sich insbesondere in der Einschränkung der Unabhängigkeit der Justiz, der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und der Medien (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2022).Besonders in Ungarn, wo seit Viktor Orbáns zweiter Amtszeit im Jahr 2010 ein schleichender Prozess des Demokratieabbaus zu beobachten ist, wird die Bedeutung der Medienregulierung für die demokratischen Strukturen und die politische Landschaft offensichtlich. Die vorliegende Arbeit widmet sich dieser Problematik und beleuchtet, wie die Regulierung der Medien in Ungarn demokratische Prozesse und die politische Szenerie des Landes beeinflusst.Die Arbeit beginnt mit einer grundlegenden Definition des Begriffs "Medien" und einer Erörterung ihrer primären, sekundären und tertiären Funktionen im politischen Raum. Anschließend wird die Nutzung der Medien als Instrument der Regierungskommunikation und als Mittel der Machtsicherung untersucht. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Medienlandschaft in Ungarn, einschließlich der Einschränkungen der Pressefreiheit, der Meinungsvielfalt sowie der Kontrolle und Einflussnahme der Regierung auf die Medienorgane, bildet den Kern der Arbeit.Besonderes Augenmerk wird dabei auf die Medienregulierung in Ungarn gelegt. Die Auswirkungen dieser Medienregulierung auf die Demokratie in Ungarn werden untersucht, um zu verstehen, wie Veränderungen in der Medienlandschaft die Grundpfeiler der Demokratie beeinflussen - die Bedeutung der Medien für eine demokratische Gesellschaft, die Einschränkungen der Demokratie durch Regulierungen in der Medienlandschaft und die politischen Auswirkungen auf das demokratische System. Abschließend wird in einem Fazit reflektiert, inwiefern die Medienregulierung in Ungarn als symptomatisch für eine Verschiebung weg von demokratischen Idealen gesehen werden kann.Ziel der Arbeit ist es, ein Verständnis der komplexen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Medienregulierung und demokratischen Prozessen in Ungarn zu erlangen und damit einen Beitrag zur aktuellen Debatte über die Bedeutung liberaler demokratischer Werte in Europa zu leisten.Die Rolle der Medien in der PolitikDer folgende Abschnitt befasst sich mit der Rolle der Medien in der Politik. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die differenzierte Betrachtung der primären, sekundären und tertiären Funktionen der Medien. Mit Hilfe dieser Unterscheidung ist es möglich, ein tieferes Verständnis dafür zu entwickeln, wie Medien die politische Landschaft gestalten und beeinflussen. Durch die Analyse dieser Funktionen wird untersucht, wie Medien Öffentlichkeit herstellen, Informationen verbreiten, politische Akteure kontrollieren und zur politischen Sozialisation und Bildung beitragen. Dies ist von entscheidender Bedeutung, um die komplexen Wechselwirkungen zwischen Medien und Politik vollständig zu erfassen. Primär-, Tertiär- und SekundärfunktionDie Macht der Massenmedien, bestehende Machtstrukturen herauszufordern, darf nicht unterschätzt werden. Durch die Sammlung, Aufbereitung und Verbreitung von Informationen, Wissen und politischen Ansichten wird die öffentliche Meinung wesentlich beeinflusst (Wittkämper, S. 37). Bereits in der Frühen Neuzeit erkannten der Adel und die Kirche als damalige Machthaber die potenzielle Bedrohung, die von den Medien ausging. Sie reagierten schnell und führten nach der Entdeckung des Buchdrucks Zensurmaßnahmen ein, um die zu druckenden Inhalte vorzuprüfen und ihre Herrschaft zu sichern (Strohmeier 2004, S. 69).In der heutigen Zeit spielen die Medien eine zentrale Rolle bei der Gestaltung der politischen Realitäten, da sie in der Lage sind, die politische Macht entweder zu stärken oder zu untergraben (Strohmeier 2004, S. 69). Ziel der folgenden Ausführungen ist die Veranschaulichung des Einflusspotenzials der Massenmedien durch die Darstellung ihrer grundlegenden Funktionen.Gerd Strohmeier weist auf die Bedeutung der primären, der sekundären und der tertiären Funktion der Massenmedien hin. Die Primärfunktion besteht darin, Öffentlichkeit herzustellen, die entsteht, wenn direkte Kommunikationsformen bevölkerungsbedingt nicht ausreichen. Massenmedien ermöglichen eine schnelle und einfache Verbreitung von Nachrichten und füllen so diese kommunikative Lücke (Strohmeier 2004, S. 72).Die Kontrolle der politischen Akteure und die Verbreitung von Informationen gehören zu der Sekundärfunktion. Ziel ist die umfassende und verständliche Vermittlung von Inhalten und damit die Beeinflussung der Meinungsbildung. Zugleich haben Massenmedien die Aufgabe, das Verhalten der politischen Institutionen zu überwachen, Missstände aufzudecken und Kritik zu üben (Strohmeier 2004, S. 72f.).Die Tertiärfunktion der Medien umfasst drei wesentliche Aspekte. Erstens die Förderung der politischen Meinungs- und Willensbildung, zweitens die Integration und politische Sozialisation und drittens die Vermittlung politischer Bildung. Diese Aspekte unterstützen die Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit des Einzelnen und seine Integration in die Gesellschaft, fördern das Verständnis für das politische System und regen zur aktiven Teilnahme am politischen Leben an. Darüber hinaus haben die Massenmedien einen entscheidenden Einfluss auf die Art und Weise, wie über bestimmte Themen nachgedacht und gesprochen wird, oft ohne dass sich die Menschen der Beeinflussung ihrer Meinungen durch die Medien bewusst sind (Strohmeier 2004, S. 73f.).Medien als InstrumentIm nächsten Schritt unserer Analyse konzentrieren wir uns auf die Rolle der Medien als politisches Werkzeug. Dabei unterteilt sich unsere Betrachtung in zwei Schlüsselaspekte. Einerseits die Nutzung der Medien für Regierungskommunikation, durch die Regierungen ihre Botschaften vermitteln, und andererseits die Anwendung der Medien als Mittel zur Machtsicherung, wodurch Einfluss auf die öffentliche Meinung genommen und politische Macht gefestigt wird.Medien als Instrument für RegierungskommunikationDie strategische Nutzung der Medien durch die Regierung wird vor allem in Bezug auf den Einfluss der Mediengesetzgebung auf die Demokratisierungsprozesse und die Politikgestaltung in Ungarn untersucht. Durch die gezielte Verbreitung politischer Botschaften und Entscheidungen interagieren Regierungen direkt mit der Bevölkerung, was nicht nur die Verbreitung von Informationen fördert, sondern auch die öffentliche Meinung prägt und politische Unterstützung generiert.Um den Rechtspopulismus zu verstehen, ist es notwendig, sich mit Cas Muddes Definition des Populismus auseinanderzusetzen, der Populismus als eine Ideologie betrachtet, die die Gesellschaft in zwei homogene und antagonistische Gruppen teilt: "das reine Volk" gegenüber "der korrupten Elite", wobei Politik als Ausdruck des allgemeinen Volkswillens verstanden wird (Mudde 2004, S. 543). Die Tendenz, dass rechtspopulistische Parteien seit den 1980er Jahren Wahlerfolge erzielen und sich etablieren, zeigt sich nicht nur in westeuropäischen, sondern auch in jungen Demokratien Osteuropas, einschließlich Ungarns (Geden 2006, S. 17f.).Rechtspopulisten positionieren sich als Vertreter der "schweigenden Mehrheit" in direktem Gegensatz zu den politischen und kulturellen Eliten und privilegierten Minderheiten, denen sie die Verfolgung partikularer Interessen vorwerfen (Geden 2006, S. 20f.). Ihre politische Rhetorik ist durch Vereinfachung und Komplexitätsreduktion gekennzeichnet, wobei sie sich organisatorisch von den etablierten Parteien abgrenzen, etwa durch die Zusammenarbeit mit außerparlamentarischen Gruppen, die Initiierung von Volksentscheiden oder die Präsenz charismatischer Führungspersönlichkeiten (Geden 2006, S. 22).Ein zentrales Element rechtspopulistischen Denkens ist der "Ethnopluralismus", der besagt, dass sich ethnisch und kulturell homogene Völker nicht vermischen sollten, was eine inhärente Ungleichheit der Völker suggeriert und kulturelle Begegnungen als konfliktträchtig ansieht (Bruns et al. 2015, S. 12f.).Im spezifischen Kontext Ungarns unter der Führung von Viktor Orbán zeigt sich die kritische Rolle dieser Medienstrategien. Die Regierung Orbán hat Medienregulierung bewusst eingesetzt, um ein medienfreundliches Umfeld für regierungsnahe Nachrichtenquellen zu schaffen und gleichzeitig den Raum für kritische Stimmen einzuschränken (Mudde 2004, S. 543). Dies schränkt nicht nur die Vielfalt und Freiheit der Medien ein, sondern hat auch tiefgreifende Auswirkungen auf demokratische Prozesse, indem es die Möglichkeiten für eine offene politische Debatte einschränkt.Diese strategische Nutzung der Medien für die Regierungskommunikation verdeutlicht die Doppelnatur der Medien in der Politik. Einerseits als Kanäle für die transparente Kommunikation politischer Inhalte und andererseits als Instrumente der Machtkonsolidierung, die die demokratischen Grundlagen untergraben können. Diese Dynamik ist entscheidend für das Verständnis der politischen Situation in Ungarn und der Rolle, die die Medienregulierung dabei spielt (Geden 2006, S. 17f.).Detlef Grieswelle betont in "Politische Rhetorik: Macht der Rede, öffentliche Legitimation, Stiftung von Konsens" die bedeutende Rolle der Rhetorik in der Politik. Rhetorik dient nicht nur der Durchsetzung und Legitimation von Macht, sondern auch der Kontrolle und Repräsentation von Interessen, was ihre Bedeutung als Instrument politischer Führung und Einflussnahme unterstreicht (Grieswelle 2000, S. 33). In diesem Zusammenhang ist die rhetorische Strategie des ungarischen Ministerpräsidenten von besonderer Relevanz, da mit ihr versucht wird, politische Legitimität für diese Vision zu schaffen und die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung zu gewinnen (Bruns et al. 2015, S. 12f.).Medien als Werkzeug zur Sicherung von MachtUm zu verstehen, wie die Medien zum Machterhalt beitragen, ist die Rhetorik von rechtspopulistischen Figuren wie Viktor Orbán besonders aufschlussreich. Orbán nutzt plakative und skandalträchtige Kommunikationswege, um mediale Aufmerksamkeit zu generieren die nicht nur seine Präsenz in der Öffentlichkeit stärkt, sondern auch eine Mobilisierung seiner Anhängerschaft bewirkt (Schnepf 2020, S. 5). In seinen politischen Reden kehren bestimmte rhetorische Muster immer wieder, darunter die Verwendung von Antagonismen, die eine Konfliktsituation erzeugen, insbesondere durch die Gegenüberstellung von "Elite" und "Volk". Dabei wird das "Volk" als unterdrückt dargestellt, während die rechtspopulistische Partei als volksnah inszeniert wird (Mudde 2004, S. 543). Eine charakteristische Einfachheit in den Botschaften rechter Parteien wird von Bischof und Senninger hervorgehoben. Je weiter rechts eine Partei steht, desto einfacher ist ihr Programm (Bischof/Senninger 2018, S. 484). Solche Diskurse verwenden prägnante und leicht verständliche Formulierungen für ansonsten komplexe politische Sachverhalte, suggerieren einfache Lösungen und nutzen Dramatisierungen und Metaphern. Insbesondere werden Migrant*innen durch metaphorische Vergleiche abgewertet (Hogan/Haltinner 2015, S. 533) und es wird auf die Bedrohung der nationalen Identität durch ethnische Minderheiten und Migrant*innen angespielt, ein Vorgehen, das Ruth Wodak als "politics of fear" beschreibt (Wodak 2015, S. 2).Diese Elemente rechtspopulistischer Rhetorik finden sich in Orbáns Äußerungen deutlich wieder, wie einige seiner Reden und Interviews exemplarisch zeigen. Besonders deutlich wird dies in seiner Darstellung von Migration als Bedrohung für das ungarische Volk, wobei er einen alarmistischen Ton anschlägt, um die migrationskritische Haltung der Regierung zu untermauern und ein Klima der Angst zu erzeugen: "Europa wird von einer beispiellosen Masseneinwanderung bedroht. (...) Wir sprechen heute von Hunderttausenden, nächstes Jahr werden es Millionen sein, ein Ende ist nicht in Sicht" (Orbán, zitiert nach Mendelski 2019, S. 8). Orbáns Wortwahl, in der er von der "Wahrheit" spricht, verdeutlicht seine Überzeugung von der Legitimität seiner Politik, wobei er durch Übertreibungen wie "Millionen", "massive Integration" oder "unerwartetes Ausmaß" eine Atmosphäre der Panik schafft.In einer Rede anlässlich seiner Vereidigung als Ministerpräsident präsentierte Orbán seine Vision einer Demokratie, die er als "christdemokratisch im 21. Jahrhundert" bezeichnete und damit ein stark von christlichen Werten geprägtes Bild nationaler Identität entwarf, das traditionelle Familienbilder bevorzugt und Homosexualität ausgrenzt. Diese Ausführungen zeigen, wie Orbán die Medien nutzt, um seine politische Botschaft zu verstärken und wie er die Medien als Instrument zur Sicherung seiner Macht einsetzt, indem er sich einer Rhetorik bedient, die sowohl mobilisiert als auch polarisiert, um seine Position zu festigen und Herausforderungen zu kontrollieren.Analyse der aktuellen Medienlandschaft in UngarnDer folgende Teil der Arbeit befasst sich mit der aktuellen Medienlandschaft in Ungarn. In der ersten Amtszeit Orbáns zwischen 1998 und 2002 gab es kaum Eingriffe in die Pressefreiheit, was auf mehrere Faktoren zurückzuführen ist. Da Ungarn in dieser Zeit noch auf den EU-Beitritt hinarbeitete, vermied Orbán bewusst Auseinandersetzungen mit der Europäischen Union über Fragen der Pressefreiheit. Dies änderte sich jedoch in der darauffolgenden Amtszeit ab 2010 drastisch: Ein neues Gesetz wurde eingeführt, das staatlichen Stellen die Einflussnahme auf die Medien ermöglichte und deren Regulierung legitimierte. Fortan nutzte die Regierung Orbán die Medien gezielt für ihre politischen Ziele.Einschränkungen der Pressefreiheit und Meinungsvielfalt in UngarnDas Beispiel Ungarns zeigt den Übergang von einem Demokratisierungsprozess zu einem schleichenden Verlust demokratischer Strukturen. Ursprünglich galt Ungarn aufgrund seiner politischen Fortschritte und wirtschaftlichen Stabilität in den späten 1990er und frühen 2000er Jahren als Vorbild unter den EU-Beitrittskandidaten. Nach dem Fall der kommunistischen Einparteienherrschaft (1949-1989) und der Etablierung einer parlamentarischen Demokratie (ab 1990) unternahm das Land erhebliche Anstrengungen, um eine demokratische Staatsform zu etablieren. Wichtige Reformen dieser Zeit schufen unter anderem eine klare Trennung der Staatsgewalten (Legislative, Exekutive, Judikative) und die neue Verfassung verankerte Prinzipien wie Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Unabhängigkeit der Justiz (Ismayr 2002, S. 310ff.).Seit 2010 hat Viktor Orbán mit seiner Fidesz-Partei jedoch einen politischen Kurs eingeschlagen der den zuvor eingeleiteten Demokratisierungsprozess nicht nur gestoppt, sondern in einigen Bereichen sogar rückgängig gemacht hat. Ein 2010 verabschiedetes Mediengesetz, das es staatlichen Stellen erlaubt, die Medien zu überwachen und bei Verstößen zu sanktionieren, markiert einen Wendepunkt in der Einschränkung der Pressefreiheit und ist ein zentraler Faktor im Demokratieabbau des Landes (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 273ff.). Freedom House hebt hervor, dass von allen Kriterien zur Bewertung des Zustands von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit gerade die Pressefreiheit in Ungarn die dramatischsten Einbußen zu verzeichnen hat (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 273).Die ungarische Medienlandschaft hat sich seit der Regierungsübernahme durch Orbán und Fidesz sukzessive verändert. Die Regierung kontrolliert den öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunk, die staatliche Nachrichtenagentur Magyar Tavirati Iroda sowie einen erheblichen Teil der privaten Medien, die sich im Besitz von Orbán nahestehenden Personen befinden. Im Rahmen einer umfassenden Umstrukturierung wurden 570 leitende Angestellte der Rundfunkanstalten durch der Fidesz-Partei loyale Mitarbeiter ersetzt (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 275f.).Für die regionale Berichterstattung sind seit Sommer 2017 ausschließlich unternehmerfreundliche Medien zuständig. Mit der Schließung einiger kritischer Zeitungen, darunter die überregionalen Blätter Nepszabadsag und Magyar Nemzet, ist die kritische Berichterstattung landesweit nahezu zum Erliegen gekommen. Zudem werden Journalisten, die sich kritisch über Orbán und seine Regierung äußern, nicht selten auf "schwarze Listen" gesetzt, eine Praxis, die offensichtlich darauf abzielt, Kritiker einzuschüchtern (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 280).Kontrolle und Einflussnahme der Regierung auf MedienorganeEin neues Medienpaket mit Änderungen des Medien- und Pressegesetzes trat am 01.01.2011 durch die Regierung Orban in Kraft. Dieses sorgte damals europaweit für Schlagzeilen. Die Rechtsstaatlichkeit des Gesetzes wurde von der EU-Kommission angezweifelt. Auf einige Aspekte soll im Folgenden kurz eingegangen werden.Die Unabhängigkeit der Medien wurde durch das Mediengesetz erheblich geschwächt. Das Mediengesetz sah unter anderem ein Verbot bestimmter Äußerungen vor und legte eine Registrierungspflicht für alle Medien fest. Es drohte die Löschung und der Entzug der rechtlichen Möglichkeit, in Ungarn zu publizieren, wenn der Registrierungspflicht nicht nachgekommen wurde. Dies galt auch für Medienunternehmen, die außerhalb Ungarns in anderen Staaten der Europäischen Union (EU) tätig waren.Die Aufsicht über die Medien wurde nicht mehr von verschiedenen Behörden, sondern von einem einzigen Medienkontrollgremium ausgeübt. Das Medienkontrollgremium war für die Verhängung von Geldstrafen bei "politisch unausgewogener Berichterstattung" (Möllers 2018, S. 47) zuständig. Hinzu kam, dass viele Journalistinnen und Journalisten, die für den staatlichen Rundfunk arbeiteten, entlassen wurden und beispielsweise privaten, regierungskritischen Medien erschwert wurde, eine Rundfunklizenz zu erhalten. Die EU konnte durch die Androhung eines Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens zumindest eine Änderung der "EU-Ausländer betreffenden Aspekte" (Möllers 2018, S. 47) erreichen.MediengesetzgebungNoch bevor Ungarn seine neue Verfassung verankerte, stand die Regierung aufgrund der Verabschiedung eines restriktiven Mediengesetzes unter Beschuss. Das Gesetz, welches im Januar 2011 in Kraft trat, beschränkt deutlich die Freiheit der Medien und Presse (Salzborn 2015, S. 76). Das Hauptziel dieser Maßnahme ist die Dominanz der Regierung Orbáns über das Mediengefüge. Zu diesem Zweck wurde die Nationale Kommunikations- und Medienbehörde ("KESMA") ins Leben gerufen. Diese Behörde und der Medienrat erhielten erweiterte Befugnisse zur Überwachung und Lizenzierung von Medienangeboten. Unter anderem ist die Nationale Kommunikations- und Medienbehörde verantwortlich für die Vergabe von Sendelizenzen und übernimmt Aufgaben im Bereich des Verbraucher- und Wettbewerbsschutzes. Eine der Hauptaufgaben des Medienrates ist die Gewährleistung einer Berichterstattung (Bos 2021, S. 38). Neben der Neustrukturierung des Medienwesens führte die Regierung ein Fördermodell ein, das regierungsnahe Medien durch staatliche Werbeverträge finanziell unterstützt.Nach den Wahlen im Jahr 2014 erwarben Unternehmer, die der Regierung nahestehen, zunehmend Medien der Opposition, die anschließend in die neu geschaffene "Mitteleuropäische Presse- und Medienstiftung" eingebracht wurden (Bos 2021, S. 38). So schaffte es die Regierung Orbán, einflussreiche Medien der Opposition zu marginalisieren oder vollständig vom Markt zu nehmen. Ebenso wurden Online-Nachrichtenplattformen in das System eingegliedert (Bos 2021, S. 39).Samuel Salzborn kritisiert insbesondere den rechtlichen Charakter des neuen Mediengesetzes, das vage Generalklauseln beinhaltet, welche sich auf unbestimmte Konzepte wie "gute Sitten" berufen. Diese Klauseln sind offen für Interpretationen und ermöglichen damit eine gewisse Willkür. Die Definition dessen was als "gute Sitte" gilt kann staatlich bestimmt und gegen kritische Berichterstattung eingesetzt werden, was deren Sanktionierung zur Folge haben kann (Salzborn 2015, S. 77).Auswirkungen der Medienregulierung auf die Demokratie in UngarnNachdem im vorangegangenen Kapitel die aktuelle Medienlandschaft in Ungarn dargestellt wurde, widmet sich der folgende Abschnitt den Auswirkungen der Medienregulierung auf die demokratische Verfasstheit Ungarns. Anhand konkreter politischer Maßnahmen der ungarischen Regierung wird untersucht, wie die Visionen Orbáns umgesetzt wurden. Darüber hinaus wird analysiert, inwiefern die rechtspopulistische Politik die Qualität der ungarischen Demokratie beeinflusst und verändert hat.Bedeutung der Medien für die demokratische GesellschaftIm Zentrum der Debatte um die Rolle der Medien in der demokratischen Gesellschaft Ungarns steht die Transformationspolitik Viktor Orbáns und seiner Fidesz-Partei, die seit ihrem Regierungsantritt eine umfassende Kontrolle über die Medienlandschaft ausüben. Die Regierung nutzt diese Kontrolle strategisch als Instrument der Regierungskommunikation, um eine fast ausschließlich positive Berichterstattung über ihre Handlungen und Entscheidungen sicherzustellen. Regierungskritische Stimmen finden kaum Gehör, stattdessen wird Kritik systematisch unterdrückt und negative Nachrichten werden in einem für die Regierung vorteilhaften Licht dargestellt. Die gezielte Durchführung von Desinformationskampagnen, die Bajomi-Lazar als "Propaganda" bezeichnet, ist ein weiterer Baustein dieser Medienpolitik (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 280f.).Die Verpflichtung von Arthur J. Finkelstein, einem erfahrenen Kampagnenstrategen aus den USA, durch Viktor Orbán unterstreicht den gezielten Einsatz der Medien zur Meinungsbildung. Das Phänomen der Verbreitung von teilweise oder vollständig gefälschten Nachrichten ist zwar kein Alleinstellungsmerkmal der ungarischen Medienlandschaft, die offene Zurschaustellung dieser Praktiken durch die ungarische Regierung ohne den Versuch, ihre Aktivitäten zu verschleiern, stellt jedoch einen klaren Bruch mit demokratischen Normen dar (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 281).Diese Entwicklung wirft grundsätzliche Fragen nach den Auswirkungen der Medienregulierung auf die Demokratie in Ungarn auf. Die Einflussnahme auf die Medien und die damit einhergehende Unterdrückung pluralistischer Diskurse hat unmittelbare Folgen für die demokratische Gesellschaft. Indem die Medien als verlängerter Arm der Regierungskommunikation fungieren und kritische Berichterstattung marginalisiert wird, werden demokratische Grundwerte wie Meinungsvielfalt und Pressefreiheit massiv untergraben. Die strategische Manipulation der Medienlandschaft durch die Regierung Orbán verdeutlicht die Herausforderungen vor denen die Demokratie in Ungarn steht und unterstreicht die zentrale Rolle der Medienfreiheit als Grundpfeiler einer lebendigen und funktionierenden demokratischen Gesellschaft. Einschränkung der Demokratie durch Regulierungen in der MedienlandschaftDie Regulierung der Medienlandschaft in Ungarn durch Viktor Orbán und seine Fidesz-Partei hat weitreichende Folgen für die Demokratie im Land. Durch die systematische Übernahme und Anpassung der Medien an ihre Vorstellungen, insbesondere durch die Besetzung der Führungspositionen in den wichtigsten Medienorganisationen mit Verbündeten der Regierung, haben sie die Medien zu einem Instrument der Machtsicherung gemacht. Die Aufhebung der Unabhängigkeit der Medien ermöglicht es der Orbán-Regierung, die Berichterstattung vollständig für ihre politischen Ziele zu instrumentalisieren. Es dominiert eine einseitige Berichterstattung, die den Bürgern vor allem in den ländlichen Regionen wenig Spielraum lässt die Authentizität und Richtigkeit der präsentierten Nachrichten zu überprüfen. Die Bürger Ungarns stehen vor der Herausforderung, dass sie kaum Zugang zu alternativen Perspektiven oder kritischen Stimmen haben, was sie quasi dazu zwingt, den regierungsgesteuerten Nachrichten Glauben zu schenken (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 281/282).Diese Einschränkung der Medienfreiheit und die Manipulation der Informationslandschaft durch die Regierung Orbán untergraben grundlegende demokratische Prinzipien, indem sie den freien Zugang zu Informationen einschränken und eine fundierte öffentliche Meinungsbildung verhindern. Durch die gezielte Meinungsmache und die Abschottung gegenüber kritischen Debatten werden die natürlichen demokratischen Kontrollmechanismen geschwächt und die Bevölkerung als Kontrollinstanz der Regierung faktisch entmachtet. Die Strategie, die Macht über die Medien zu festigen und dafür zu sorgen, dass keine Gegenmeinungen an die Öffentlichkeit gelangen oder Widerstand gegen politische Entscheidungen leisten können, ist ein deutliches Zeichen für den Missbrauch von Medienmacht zur Festigung autoritärer Strukturen.Diese Entwicklungen in Ungarn verdeutlichen die zentrale Bedeutung einer unabhängigen und pluralistischen Medienlandschaft für den Erhalt einer gesunden Demokratie. Die Einschränkung der Pressefreiheit und die gezielte Manipulation der Medien durch die Regierung stellen eine ernsthafte Bedrohung für die demokratischen Prozesse und die politische Freiheit im Land dar. Politische Auswirkungen auf das demokratische System UngarnsDie politischen Auswirkungen der Regulierung der Medien auf das demokratische System in Ungarn sind tiefgreifend und haben zu einer Verschlechterung der Qualität der Demokratie im Land geführt. Diese Veränderungen spiegeln sich in verschiedenen internationalen Indizes wider, die die demokratische Stabilität Ungarns bewerten. Der "Freedom in the World Index" von Freedom House stuft Ungarn als "teilweise frei" ein, da die Fidesz-Partei die Kontrolle über unabhängige Institutionen erlangt hat, was zu einer Schwächung der Aktivitäten von Oppositionellen, Journalisten, Universitäten und NGOs geführt hat (Freedom House 2021). Der "Nations in Transit Index" bezeichnet Ungarn sogar als "Transitional or Hybrid Regime" mit einem Wert von 49 von 100 Punkten, wobei 100 Punkte für eine funktionierende Demokratie stehen (Freedom House 2021b). Der Bertelsmann Transformationsindex beschreibt Ungarn als "defekte Demokratie", in den demokratischen Institutionen zwar existieren, aber eingeschränkt und ineffektiv sind (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020, S. 13).Deutlich verschlechtert hat sich zudem die Platzierung Ungarns in der Rangliste der Pressefreiheit von "Reporter ohne Grenzen", wo das Land nur noch auf Platz 92 von 180 Ländern rangiert und die Situation der Pressefreiheit als problematisch eingestuft wird (Reporter ohne Grenzen 2021). Der "Rule of Law Index" des World Justice Project weist Ungarn den niedrigsten Wert in Osteuropa zu, weltweit liegt es auf Platz 60 von 128 (World Justice Project 2020).Diese Indizes und Bewertungen zeigen, dass die von Viktor Orbán vorangetriebene politische Transformation direkte negative Auswirkungen auf die Qualität der Demokratie in Ungarn haben. Einige Autoren wie Attila Ágh sprechen von der "ungarischen Krankheit" als antidemokratischer Herausforderung für die EU und beschreiben das Land als "worst case scenario" einer "elected autocracy" (Ágh 2015, S. 4, S. 16). János Kornai sieht in der Entwicklung seit Orbáns Amtsantritt eine Abkehr von Demokratie und Errungenschaften des Systemwechsels Ende der 1980er, einen "U-Turn" (Kornai 2015, S. 1). Samuel Salzborn identifiziert eine transformatorische Entwicklung hin zu einer Diktatur, bedingt durch rechtliche Veränderungen und eine zunehmende Ethnisierung der Innenpolitik (Salzborn 2015, S. 81).Andere Forscher sprechen von einem "hybriden Regime" und positionieren Ungarn in einer Grauzone zwischen Demokratie und Autokratie. András Bozóki und Dániel Hegedüs betonen, dass hybride Regime eine eigenständige Kategorie darstellen, die weder als Unterform der Demokratie noch der Diktatur zu verstehen ist (Bozóki/Hegedüs 2018, S. 1183). Attila Antal betont, dass das Orbán-Regime seine politische Anhängerschaft gezielt repolitisiert und den Rest der politischen Gemeinschaft depolitisiert hat (Antal 2017, S. 18).SchlussfolgerungDas Phänomen des Demokratieabbaus, beobachtet nicht nur in Ungarn, sondern weltweit und innerhalb Europas, unterstreicht eine kritische Herausforderung für die demokratische Ordnung vieler Staaten. Die systematische Einschränkung der Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit in Ungarn seit Viktor Orbáns zweiter Amtszeit im Jahr 2010 zeichnet ein beunruhigendes Bild der Degradierung demokratischer Werte, das weit über die Grenzen Ungarns hinausreicht und die europäische Gemeinschaft insgesamt betrifft (Möllers 2018, S. 7; Ismayr 2002, S. 309ff.).Die zentrale Rolle der Medien in einer Demokratie, hervorgehoben durch ihre vielfältigen Funktionen wie die Schaffung von Öffentlichkeit, Informationsvermittlung, Kontrolle der Macht, soziale Integration und Bildung, unterstreicht die Bedeutung der Medienfreiheit für das Funktionieren einer demokratischen Gesellschaft (Strohmeier 2004, S. 69ff.). Die Kontrolle über die Massenmedien zu haben bedeutet, einen entscheidenden Einfluss darauf zu besitzen, welche Informationen die Bevölkerung erhält und wie sie die politische Realität wahrnimmt.Ungarns Entwicklung seit 2010 unter der Fidesz-Regierung ist besonders alarmierend, da sie zeigt, wie gezielt Propaganda eingesetzt wird, um die Regierungsperspektive zu stärken und oppositionelle Stimmen effektiv zum Schweigen zu bringen. Die offene Ausführung dieser Maßnahmen und das scheinbare Desinteresse der Regierung, ihre Aktionen zu verbergen, verdeutlichen eine besorgniserregende Gleichgültigkeit gegenüber demokratischen Standards (Bajomi-Lazar 2018, S. 281f.). Trotz der Transparenz dieser Aktivitäten hat die Europäische Union bisher wenig Einfluss auf eine positive Veränderung nehmen können, was den Demokratieabbau in Ungarn weiter vorantreibt.Die Situation in Ungarn ist nicht isoliert zu betrachten, sondern stellt ein ernstes Problem für die EU dar, da es die konstitutionellen und demokratischen Grundlagen der Gemeinschaft untergräbt. Die aktuellen Entwicklungen in Ungarn sind ein Warnsignal und erfordern eine dringende und koordinierte Reaktion auf europäischer Ebene, um die Demokratie zu schützen und zu fördern. Die Frage, wie die Medienregulierung in Ungarn die demokratischen Prozesse und die politische Landschaft des Landes beeinflusst, lässt sich klar beantworten: Sie führt zu einer erheblichen Einschränkung der Demokratiequalität, indem sie die freie Meinungsäußerung untergräbt, die politische Pluralität einschränkt und die Kontrollfunktion der Medien schwächt.Die Hoffnung liegt nun darauf, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft und europäische Institutionen wirksame Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die demokratischen Prinzipien in Ungarn zu stärken und einen weiteren Demokratieabbau zu verhindern. Die Bewahrung der Medienfreiheit und die Sicherstellung einer pluralistischen und unabhängigen Medienlandschaft sind essenziell für die Aufrechterhaltung einer lebendigen und gesunden Demokratie, nicht nur in Ungarn, sondern in allen demokratischen Staaten. LiteraturverzeichnisÁgh, Attila. 2015. De-Europeanization and De-Democratization trends in ECE: From Potemkin Democracy to the elected autocracy in Hungary. Journal of Comparative Politics 8 (2): 4-26.Albertazzi, Daniele. 2007. Addressing 'the People': A Comparative Study of the Lega Nord's and Lega dei Ticinesi's Political Rhetoric and Styles of Propaganda. Modern Italy 12 (3): 327-347.Antal, Attila. 2017. The political theories, preconditions and dangers of the governing populism in Hungary. Politologický Casopis 24 (1): 5-20.Bajomi-Lazar, Peter/Kedesdi-Boldog, Dalma, Zurück in die Zukunft, Autoritäre Medienpolitik in Ungarn, in: Osteuropa 3-5, Berlin 2018, S. 7-19. Beger, Paula. 2021. Die Asyl- und Migrationspolitik Ungarns: Wandel in drei Etappen. In Das politische System Ungarns – Nationale Demokratieentwicklung, Orbán und die EU, hrsg. Ellen Bos und Astrid Lorenz, 209-228. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH.Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2020. BTI 2020 Country Report – Hungary. https://www.bti-project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_HUN.pdf. Zugegriffen: 12.08.2021.Bischof, Daniel/Senninger, Roman. 2018. Simple politics for the people? Complexity in campaign messages and political knowledge. European Journal of Political Research 57: 473-495.Bos, Ellen. 2021. Politisches System und Demokratieentwicklung in Ungarn: Funktionsdefizite und Instrumentalisierung demokratischer Verfahren durch die Regierungspartei. In Das politische System Ungarns – Nationale Demokratieentwicklung, Orbán und die EU, hrsg. Ellen Bos und Astrid Lorenz, 25-56. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH.Bozóki, András. 2014. Free and Unfair: The Hungarian Elections. http://publications.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/publications/bozoki-free-unfair-transitonline-2014.pdf. Zugegriffen: 13.08.2021.Bozóki, András/Hegedüs, Dániel. 2018. An externally constrained hybrid regime: Hungary in the European Union. Democratization 25 (7): 1173-1189.Bruns et al. 2015. Rechte Kulturrevolution – Wer und was ist die Neue Rechte von heute? Hamburg: VSA Verlag.Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2022): Titel I: Gemeinsame Bestimmungen, bpb.de, [online] https://www.bpb.de/themen/europaeische-union/eu-vertrag/44179/titel-i-gemeinsame-bestimmungen/.Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2020. 10 Jahre Fidesz-Regierung: Lage der Demokratie in Ungarn. https://www.bpb.de/politik/hintergrund-aktuell/308619/demokratie-in-ungarn. Zugegriffen: 17.07.2021.Freedom House. 2021. Freedom in the World 2021 – Hungary.https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2021. Zugegriffen: 12.08.2021.Freedom House. 2021b. Nations in Transit 2021 – Hungary.https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2021. Zugegriffen: 12.08.2021.Geden, Oliver. 2006. Diskursstrategien im Rechtspopulismus – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs und Schweizerische Volkspartei zwischen Opposition und Regierungsbeteiligung, 1. Auflage. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.Grieswelle, Detlef. 2000. Politische Rhetorik: Macht der Rede, öffentliche Legitimation, Stiftung von Konsens. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH.Hogan, Jackie/Haltinner, Kristin. 2015. Floods, Invaders, and Parasites: Immigration Threat Narratives and Right-Wing Populism in the USA, UK and Australia. Journal of Intercultural Studies 36 (5): 520-543.Ismayr, Wolfgang (2002): Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften eBooks, [online] doi:10.1007/978-3-322-96396-3.Juhász, Attila; Krekó, Péter; Szabados, Krisztián. 2015. Fidesz und der Nationalpopulismus in Ungarn. In Rechtspopulismus in Europa: Gefahr für die Demokratie?, hrsg. Ernst Hillebrand, 96-106. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz.Kornai, János. 2015. Hungary's U-Turn. Corvinus Economics Working Paper 21/2015: 1-60.Mendelski, Bruno. 2019. The Rhetoric of Hungarian Premier Victor Orban: Inside X Outside in the Context of Immigration Crisis. In The Palgrave Handbook of Ethnicity, hrsg. Steven Ratuva, 1-24. Singapur: Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.Möllers, Christoph/Linda Schneider (2018): Demokratiesicherung in der Europäischen Union: Studie zu einem Dilemma. Im Auftrag und in Zusammenarbeit mit der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Mohr Siebeck.Mudde, Cas. 2004. The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 2004 (4): 541-563.Orbán, Viktor. 2014. Viktor Orbáns Rede auf der 25. Freien Sommeruniversität in Baile Tusnad (Rumänien) am 26. Juli 2014. https://pusztaranger.wordpress.com/2014/08/01/viktor-orbans-rede-auf-der-25-freien-sommeruniversitat-in-baile-tusnad-rumanien-am-26-juli-2014/. Zugegriffen:29.07.2021.Orbán, Viktor. 2018. Viktor Orbáns Rede nach seiner Vereidigung zum Ministerpräsidenten.Budapest, 10. Mai 2018. https://munchen.mfa.gov.hu/assets/93/39/67/f418faa298d2dbf8333dc394fa0be45addfc4edd.pdf. Zugegriffen: 28.07.2021.Orbán, Viktor. 2018b. Viktor Orbáns Festrede zum 62. Jahrestag der Revolution und des Freiheitskampfes von 1956. 23. Oktober 2018, Budapest.https://munchen.mfa.gov.hu/assets/42/28/75/2cde4e57dd48deb8d926232e8e63f013a9dab580.pdf. Zugegriffen: 28.07.2021.Orbán, Viktor. 2019. Viktor Orbáns Rede auf dem 28. Parteitag des Fidesz – Ungarischen Bürgerbundes. 29. September 2019, Budapest. https://www.miniszterelnok.hu/viktor-orbans-rede-auf-dem-28-parteitag-des-fidesz-ungarischen-burgerbundes/. Zugegriffen: 29.07.2021.Orbán, Viktor. 2019b. Viktor Orbáns Rede auf der Veranstaltung "Atreju 2019" der Partei Brüder Italiens (FdI). 21. September 2019, Rom (Roma).https://munchen.mfa.gov.hu/assets/46/22/92/c9308a6baa0404725d4b50222fab36592151df0b.pdf. Zugegriffen: 28.07.2021.Reporter ohne Grenzen. 2021. Rangliste der Pressefreiheit – Pressefreiheit weltweit 2021.https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/rangliste/rangliste-2021. Zugegriffen: 12.08.2021.Salzborn, Samuel. 2015. Schleichende Transformation zur Diktatur. Ungarns Abschied von der Demokratie. Kritische Justiz 48 (1): 71-82.Schnepf, Julia. 2020. "Heimatliebe statt Marokkaner Diebe!" – Rechtspopulistische Rhetorik und ihre Effekte auf In- und Out-Group-Ebene. Conflict & Communication Online 19 (1+2): 1-9.Strohmeier, Gerd (2004): Politik und Massenmedien: eine Einführung.Wittkämper, Gerhard W. (1992): Medien und Politik.Wodak, Ruth. 2015. The politics of fear – What right-wing populist discourses mean. Los Angeles: Sage Publications Ltd.World Justice Project. 2020. WJP Rule of Law Index – Hungary. https://www.worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Hungary.

The Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017) ; United Nations S/PV.8201 Security Council Seventy-third year 8201st meeting Monday, 12 March 2018, 11 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Van Oosterom. . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Skoog United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-06756 (E) *1806756* S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 2/23 18-06756 The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I would like to warmly welcome the Secretary- General, His Excellency Mr. António Guterres, and to give him the floor. The Secretary-General: I am here to report on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which the Council adopted unanimously on 24 February. But I am keenly aware that I am doing so just as the bloodletting in Syria enters its eighth year. I would like to highlight just one stark fact on this grimmest of anniversaries, which is that in 2017, more children were killed in Syria than in any other year since the war began. I am deeply saddened by the immense loss and cascading suffering of the Syrian people. And I am deeply disappointed by all those who, year after year, by action or inaction, design or indifference, have allowed this to happen. My grief and frustration are compounded by all that I know of the people of Syria. As United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the aftermath of the Iraq war, I saw the remarkable hospitality of the Syrian people in hosting 1.5 million Iraqi refugees — not in camps, but in their communities across the country. Syria was a place where refugees could live in security as they tried to rebuild their lives and raise their families. Today, so many of those generous Syrians who shared so much have themselves been forced from their homes, becoming refugees or internally displaced. In neighbouring countries — whose enormous hospitality I have also witnessed, but who are burdened by overwhelming needs — the vast majority of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line. Many of the Syrians who journeyed even farther from home in search of safety have found the doors that they once opened to others in need shut in their faces. A country known for its ancient civilization and a people known for their rich diversity have been betrayed, and Syria is bleeding inside and out. There should be one agenda only for all of us — ending the suffering of the Syrian people and finding a political solution to the conflict. And the Council has a particular responsibility in that regard. Let me now turn to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and the issue of the compliance of all the relevant parties in Syria. I do so with a caveat. The United Nations is following developments closely, but we do not have the full picture, owing to our limited presence and restricted access on the ground. Resolution 2401 (2018) demands that all parties "cease hostilities without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full and comprehensive implementation . for a durable humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria", while still countering Da'esh and other groups designated as terrorists by the Council. It is true that in some areas, such as Deir ez-Zor and Douma, where there has been a recent ceasefire that I will address later, the conflict is diminishing in intensity. Yet there has been no cessation of hostilities. Violence continues in eastern Ghouta and beyond, including in Afrin, parts of Idlib and into Damascus and its suburbs. In eastern Ghouta in particular, the air strikes, shelling and ground offensives have intensified since the resolution's adoption and have claimed hundreds of civilian lives. Some reports even put the toll at more than 1,000. The resolution further demands the enabling of "the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services". Despite some limited convoy deliveries, the provision of humanitarian aid and services has been neither safe, unimpeded or sustained. The resolution calls on "all parties to immediately lift the sieges of populated areas, including in eastern Ghouta, Yarmouk, Fo'ah and Kafraya". No sieges have been lifted. The resolution demands medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded. To our knowledge, not one critically sick or wounded person has so far been evacuated. But I will come back to that later in relation to a recent announcement. The resolution reiterates its demand "reminding in particular the Syrian authorities, that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, as applicable, and international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians". And I remind all involved that even efforts to combat groups identified as terrorists by the Council do not supersede those obligations. Yet we 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 3/23 see egregious violations, indiscriminate attacks and a failure to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), my Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and I have been focused on helping to create the conditions for a cessation of hostilities in eastern Ghouta, where, as I said to the Council two weeks ago, people have been living in a hell on Earth (see S/PV.8185). As the Special Envoy told the Council a few days ago, eastern Ghouta is the most urgent situation, because it is where we have the clearest potential to try to support the de-escalation in concrete ways, and because we have been concretely approached. On 26 February, the Russian Federation announced a five-hour daily humanitarian pause in eastern Ghouta. I will speak to that later in my remarks. On 27 February, the President of the Security Council and I received a letter from the Syrian National Committee conveying another letter from the three armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta — Jaysh Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham. They expressed their commitment "to the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially resolution 2401 (2018)", and to expelling from eastern Ghouta "the armed groups of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaida and all of those belonging to them". They also promised to ensure humanitarian access and the facilitation of the work of United Nations agencies. On receiving the letter, the Office of the Special Envoy opened channels with all three groups, inside and outside the enclave. The respective commanders issued further letters, expressing the groups' readiness to negotiate with the Russian Federation in Geneva. In parallel, both I and my Special Envoy engaged with the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation. My team on the ground did likewise, and also engaged with the Government of Syria. We offered the good offices of the United Nations to facilitate and observe any meeting between the representatives of the armed opposition groups, the Syrian Government and the Russian Federation. Despite our best efforts over the course of a few days, it was not possible to schedule any meeting. Meanwhile, on 6 March, the Syrian Government addressed a letter to me and to the President of the Security Council. That letter stated that Syria positively welcomed resolution 2401 (2018), as it "stresses firm commitment to the Syrian State's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and calls for implementing a humanitarian truce across Syria to ensure a safe, sustainable and unhindered access of humanitarian aid." That same day, my Special Envoy informed the Russian Federation of his intention to invite the three armed opposition groups to a meeting with the Russian Federation in Geneva three days later. On 7 March, his interlocutors replied that they did not think a meeting in Geneva was the best option and were pursuing contacts on the ground with the relevant armed opposition groups. As those diplomatic efforts were taking place, fighting went on. The Syrian Government and its allies intensified air strikes and launched a ground offensive, progressively gaining control of parts of eastern Ghouta from about 10 per cent of the enclave on 3 March to more than 60 per cent today. The offensive initially took place in less populated areas, steadily moving to urban centres and forcing large-scale displacement. In the follow up to the efforts I have described, it was possible on 8 and 10 March to convene two meetings between Russian officials and Jaysh Al-Islam in the outskirts of eastern Ghouta, with the United Nations as an observer. In those meetings, progress was made in relation to the removal of a number of members of the Al-Nusra Front, as well as other aspects, including the potential for a ceasefire and improved humanitarian access. The first group of Al-Nusra Front fighters and their families were since evacuated from eastern Ghouta. Nevertheless, it has not been possible to facilitate contact between the Russian authorities and Faylak Al-Rahman. The group insisted that the meeting take place in Geneva. The Russian Federation insisted that the meeting take place on the ground. On 10 March, Government forces intensified their offensive, capturing the city of Misraba in a movement aiming at dividing the enclave into three separate areas. On the evening of that same day, the Russian Federation informed the United Nations that a unilateral ceasefire would take place at midnight, in relation to Jaysh Al-Islam in Douma. It was agreed that a meeting would be held on 11 March with the facilitation of the United Nations. On that day, with the ceasefire between the Government S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 4/23 18-06756 and Jaysh Al-Islam forces largely holding in Douma, the meeting took place, followed by a meeting today. As I speak to the Council now, I have not yet received a full report on the results of today's meeting. But I was informed by our people in Damascus as I was entering the Chamber that there has been progress with regard to civilian evacuations and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, I take note of a statement issued today by Jaysh Al-Islam: "[i] n the context of Security Council resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2401 (2018), an agreement was reached with the Russian side through the United Nations for a humanitarian medical evacuation of the wounded for treatment outside of eastern Ghouta." We are also hearing reports of tentative initiatives, both by tribal leaders and the Russian Federation, for contact with other groups on the ground. I wish to underscore the urgency of seeing medical evacuations, civilian protection and full, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access as soon as possible. Meanwhile, attacks on other parts of eastern Ghouta continue, with the enclave now split into three separate pockets. During this whole period, the shelling from eastern Ghouta to Damascus was also ongoing, causing dozens of civilian deaths and injuries, with some reports putting the number close to 100. My Special Envoy and I have remained apprised at each step of the diplomatic engagement, offering support and guidance to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of the resolution. In short, as my Special Envoy has said to the Council, we are leaving no stone unturned in trying to bring all major stakeholders to the table and contribute in a concrete fashion to find a sustainable solution for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). As the situation continues to unfold, the Turkish offensive in Afrin — pursued with armed opposition group allies — intensified with air strikes and ground advances against Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat/People's Protection Units fighters, reinforced, in turn, by elements coming from eastern Syria, where they were combating Da'esh. Pro-Syrian Government forces have also deployed inside of Afrin. The fighting resulted in significant civilian displacement, with reports of numerous casualties and damage to infrastructure. With the cooperation of Syrian armed opposition groups, Turkish forces established a so-called buffer zone inside Syrian territory, linking northern rural Aleppo and Idlib, and surrounding Afrin from three sides. The offensive is now pushing ever closer towards the city, with its large civilian population. Allow me to now turn to our efforts to address the humanitarian crisis. When resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, the United Nations and its humanitarian partners stood ready to deliver. Plans were in place for multiple convoys each week to agreed-upon locations, in response to independently assessed needs. Unfortunately, the actual delivery did not match our plan. Let me describe what it was possible to do in the past two weeks. On 1 March, humanitarian organizations delivered assistance to some 50,000 people in the hard-to-reach areas of Afrin and Tell Rifaat, north of Aleppo. On 4 March, a convoy of 19 trucks organized by the United Nations, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and partners reached Dar Kabira, in northern Homs. It provided assistance to 33,500 people of the requested 40,250. However, the Government of Syria did not allow the delivery of life-saving medicines, such as insulin, nor key items, including solar lamps, syringes and paediatric scales. As I mentioned earlier, in eastern Ghouta, the Russian Federation unilaterally announced a daily five-hour humanitarian pause in the fighting, starting from 27 February, to prevent civilian victims and to enable civilians to leave the enclave. In reality, few civilians left. On the one hand, sufficient protection standards were not in place for voluntary movement. Moreover, armed groups prevented others from leaving. In that context, even though the five-hour window was insufficient to enable the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as demanded in the resolution, on 5 March the United Nations sent an inter-agency convoy of 46 trucks to Douma, in eastern Ghouta, with food for 27,500 people, along with health and nutrition supplies. Yet those 27,500 represented only a third of the requested beneficiaries, all in desperate need. And most of the health supplies were removed by the Syrian authorities, including basic medicines, dialysis treatments and trauma and surgical materials, such as burn dressings and adrenaline, despite the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 2401 (2018). According to the World Health Organization, only about 30 per cent of medical supplies in the convoy 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 5/23 were allowed in. United Nations personnel from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs accompanying the convoy were also denied access to eastern Ghouta. Violence rendered the operation extremely perilous, despite prior assurances from the parties to the conflict. The insecurity forced the team to reluctantly halt unloading and to return to Damascus with a large share of the food aid still on the trucks. On 9 March, a convoy of 13 trucks reached Douma, delivering the remaining food assistance that could not be offloaded four days earlier. Once again, shelling occurred nearby, despite assurances having been provided by all parties. In those difficult circumstances, I commend the valiant humanitarian workers risking their lives to provide assistance and protection to people in need. But we are obviously far from safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid, as demanded in resolution 2401 (2018), as well as other relevant Security Council resolutions. And so the humanitarian and human rights situation is becoming more desperate by the day. In Douma, relief workers who reached the city last week described conditions as shocking and overwhelming. People are sheltering in overcrowded basements. Access to food, water and sanitation is limited. In relation to Douma, we have a convoy ready that I hope will be allowed to proceed in the coming days, especially after the results of today's meeting. As in all conflict settings, the specific needs of women are not receiving sufficient attention, including access to safe spaces, critical health services, medicine and baby formula for their children. In eastern Ghouta, health partners on the ground advise that more than 1,000 people are in urgent need of medical evacuation. The United Nations is ready to support these medical evacuations, in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other partners. A prioritized list of those in greatest need, mostly children, has been shared with the Syrian authorities. I urge a positive response, hoping that today's meeting will allow these actions to take place in the immediate future. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent has announced its intention to send a relief convoy to Afrin as soon as security conditions allows. A United Nations humanitarian mission is awaiting Government authorization to immediately deploy to Raqqa for assessments of security and needs. There are also new disturbing allegations of the use of chlorine gas. Even if we cannot verify them, we cannot ignore them. I continue to urge the Council to find unity on this issue. Having said what I said, I believe that despite all the difficulties, lack of trust, mutual suspicions and cold calculations, it should be possible to implement resolution 2401 (2018). It should be possible to have a cessation of hostilities. It should be possible to deliver aid. It should be possible to evacuate the sick and wounded. It should be possible to lift the sieges. It should be possible to accelerate humanitarian mine action throughout Syria. It should also be possible to remove Security Council-listed terrorist fighters from conflict zones without massive and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure. We cannot give up, for the sake of the Syrian people. I appeal to all parties to ensure the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout the whole of Syrian territory. The United Nations is ready to assist in any effort to make that happen. I call on all States with influence to exercise it in support of the efforts of the United Nations and the implementation of the resolution. I hope that this week's Astana ministerial meeting, which will gather the guarantors of de-escalation, will concretely restore de-escalation arrangements, and take real steps on detainees, abductees and missing persons. The dramatic situation I have described — the calamity across the country, the rivalries, the cynicism, the cruelty — highlight the need for a political solution. My Special Envoy continues to work towards the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). On Thursday, the conflict will enter its eighth year. I refuse to lose my hope to see Syria rising from the ashes. To see a united, democratic Syria able to avoid fragmentation and sectarianism and with its sovereignty and territorial integrity respected, and to see a Syrian people able to freely decide their future and choose their political leadership. The President: I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing. I now give the floor to those Council members who wish to make statements. Recalling the Security Council's latest note 507 on its working methods (S/2017/507), I wish to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 6/23 18-06756 Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I deliver this speech today on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting at the request of the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden, pursuant to resolution 2401 (2018). I also thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his presence here today and for his briefing about the implementation of this resolution. Fifteen days have passed since the Security Council's unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which demands that all parties implement a 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria without delay in order to deliver humanitarian assistance to those in need and to end the siege of residential areas. It is with great regret that we continue to witness a clear failure to implement the resolution's provisions while military operations across Syria continue to prevent humanitarian and medical assistance, particularly in eastern Ghouta and specifically on the part of the Syrian authorities. This has prevented United Nations teams and their humanitarian partners from safely providing humanitarian assistance to eastern Ghouta, which has been a primary locus among Syrian areas in need of assistance ever since its siege began in 2013, and which is home to about 400,000 people. In this regard, we would like to make a number of observations, as follows. First, we have followed with deep concern the inability of the United Nations and its humanitarian partners to enter the besieged areas, and the obstacles and impediments that they have faced during their operations in some areas. In that regard, we would refer to events in Douma, eastern Ghouta, on 5 March, which proved to be the deadliest day since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), with at least 100 people having been killed on that day alone. On that day, the hopes of civilians hinged on receiving lifesaving humanitarian aid, and we looked forward to that first positive initiative reaching 90,000 people in need of assistance in eastern Ghouta. However, what happened was that the number of beneficiaries dropped to less than half due to the Syrian authorities having removed necessary medical supplies from the convoy's load without clear justification, despite the fact that they had been given prior notification, based on standard operating procedures, of the entirety of the humanitarian convoy's content. It is also a matter of deep concern that convoys administered by the United Nations and its partners were compelled to cease their operations before completely unloading their cargo due to continued aerial bombardment on Douma. We demand that the Syrian authorities give immediate permission for two convoys per week to eastern Ghouta and other destinations, at the request of the United Nations. We call on all parties to provide appropriate security guarantees for these convoys and to permit United Nations staff to accompany the convoys. In this regard, we reaffirm the need for all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to assume their responsibilities to protect all humanitarian workers, including United Nations agencies and their relevant partners. We welcome the entry of the remaining humanitarian convoys provided by the Red Cross and the World Food Program into Douma on 9 March to deliver the remaining food assistance. This was the second time such convoys had been allowed to enter Douma in one week. There is a need to build on this so as to increase the number of weekly convoys to eastern Ghouta in a sustainable manner. Secondly, we reiterate the Council's demand for immediate unconditional medical evacuations based on medical need, starting this week, and we call on the Syrian authorities to give permission and work with the United Nations and its implementing partners to that end. Thirdly, the continued fighting in eastern Ghouta, particularly the incessant air strikes, prompts us to again call specifically on the Syrian authorities to comply with the provisions of the resolution and of international law in order to facilitate humanitarian assistance to reach those in need. We believe that a daily five-hour truce in eastern Ghouta does not support the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Fourthly, the United Nations has confirmed that the number of combatants associated with terrorist groups designated by the Security Council in eastern Ghouta does not exceed 350. We cannot accept continued military operations under the pretext of combating terrorism when they effectively prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance, contrary to the requirements of the resolution. Resolution 2401 (2018), which was adopted unanimously, took effect immediately and is applicable to all parties. In that regard, we note the willingness of certain opposition groups in eastern Ghouta to abide by the provisions of the resolution and to expel terrorist groups designated by the Security Council. We express our support for the 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 7/23 efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to operationalize this matter without delay. Fifthly, listening to the Secretary-General's briefing today on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) constitutes one of the monitoring tools included in the resolution. But the main mechanisms remain the existing ceasefire agreements between the parties to the conflict, most notably the Astana accord with Russia, Turkey and Iran as its guarantors, and the agreement supervised by the United States and the Russian Federation that emanated from the International Syria Support Group. The resolution stresses the need to activate those agreements in order to reach a 30- day ceasefire aimed at allowing sustainable access to humanitarian assistance in all regions in Syria. We call again on the parties to those agreements to redouble their efforts in order to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). The unanimous position that the Security Council conveyed to the Syrian people and to the world by adopting resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February must be built on in a speedy and effective manner, especially as the resolution is primarily of a humanitarian nature. There is a collective responsibility on us as members of the Security Council, specifically on influential parties, to maintain our credibility before the world and work to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). We would like here to stress that the provisions of the resolution are valid even after 30 days from the date of its adoption. We affirm our full commitment to continue to closely follow the status of the implementation of the resolution in the Council monthly reports. We will spare no effort to make progress on its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for the violence to cease, for sustained humanitarian access through weekly cross-line convoys, for medical evacuations, for the protection of civilians and hospitals and for lifting the siege. We cannot let the Syrian people down, and we will continue to strive to implement the joint demands that we have set out. Finally, we recall that the lack of a political settlement to the conflict in Syria based on resolution 2254 (2015) will lead to further deterioration of the humanitarian situation. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I would like to congratulate the Netherlands and your team, Mr. President, on having assumed the presidency of the Security Council for this month. I also want to thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing and for all of his efforts on behalf of peace in Syria Sixteen days ago, we sat around the negotiating table with our Security Council colleagues and agreed to a 30-day ceasefire in the brutal bombardment of civilians in Syria. The negotiations were long and difficult. Every minute we delayed meant more innocent people were killed. But the Russian delegation stalled and drew out the talks. They had conditions they insisted on before they would allow the killing to stop. The United States was reluctant to accept those conditions. But, in order to stop the killing in Syria, we accepted them. We attempted to work with Russia in good faith to end the violence in Syria. As a result, 16 days ago we came to an agreement. Russia cast its vote in favour of the agreement (see S/PV.8188). With that vote Russia promised its support for a 30-day cease-fire, as did the rest of the members of the security Council. With that vote Russia said that it too wanted to create the conditions for food and medicine to reach starving Syrian families. With that vote Russia told us it would use its influence with the Syrian regime to silence the guns in Syria. It told us that the Russians would themselves honour the ceasefire they voted to demand. With that vote Russia made a commitment to us, to the Syrian people and to the world — a commitment to stop the killing in Syria. Today we know that the Russians did not keep their commitment. Today we see their actions do not match those commitments, as bombs continue dropping on the children of eastern Ghouta. Today we must ask whether Russia can no longer influence the Al-Assad regime to stop the horrific destruction of hospitals, medical clinics and ambulances and to stop dropping chemical weapons on villages. Has the situation in Syria reversed, and Russia is now the tool of Al-Assad — or worse, Iran? We must ask those questions because we know the Russians themselves have continued their own bombing. In the first four days following the ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions in Damascus and eastern Ghouta. The Russians negotiated the wording of the ceasefire down to the commas and the periods. They voted for the S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 8/23 18-06756 ceasefire. And they immediately disregarded it. In the past 16 days, over 500 civilians have died. Some reports put the death toll even higher. That is unacceptable. Thousands of Syrians are in desperate need of medical care. But none of the United Nations list has been evacuated. We have heard the conversations are ongoing with the regime to medically evacuate 25 people in the coming weeks. While those civilians should be rushed to medical care, we ask why it took so long. When will the more than 1,000 identified medical cases be evacuated? There have been almost no deliveries of medicine or surgical equipment, because the Al-Assad regime remove them from the United Nations humanitarian convoys. The convoy that made it to eastern Ghouta on 5 March had to navigate around constant regime airstrikes. The bombing was so severe that the United Nations could barely unload the food the trucks were carrying. And in the past 16 days, there have been three separate allegations of chlorine-gas attacks. This is no ceasefire. This is the Al-Assad regime, Iran and Russia continuing to wage war against their political opponents. And there is another reason we know the Syrians and Russians never intended to implement the ceasefire: they planned for it. Over the past two weeks, the Russian and Syrian regimes have been busy labelling every opposition group in eastern Ghouta a "terrorist group". Why? So they can exploit a provision in the ceasefire resolution (resolution 2401 (2018)) that allows for military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Al-Qaida. There are terrorists in Syria, but the Russian and Syrian regimes label anyone as terrorists who resist their absolute control. In the eyes of Russia, Iran and Al-Assad, the neighbourhoods of eastern Ghouta are full of terrorists. The hospitals are full of terrorists. The schools are full of terrorists. The Syrian and Russian regimes insist that they are targeting terrorists, but their bombs and artillery continue to fall on hospitals and schools and on innocent civilians. They have deliberately and with premeditation exploited a loophole they negotiated in the ceasefire to continue starving and pummelling hundreds of thousands of innocent Syrian civilians. They have made a mockery of this process and this institution. For the sake of the Syrian people and the integrity of the Council, we must respond and take action. During the negotiations, the United States put all parties on notice that we needed to act if the ceasefire was not honoured. Members of the Security Council agreed. Now that day has come. The ceasefire has failed. The situation of the civilians in eastern Ghouta is dire. The United States is acting. We have drafted a new ceasefire draft resolution that provides no room for evasion. It is simple, straightforward and binding. It will take effect immediately upon adoption by the Council. It contains no counter-terrorism loopholes for Al-Assad, Iran and the Russians to hide behind. And it focuses on the area the Secretary-General has identified and that the world can see holds the greatest urgency for the lives of innocent civilians, that is, Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. If Russia, Iran and Al-Assad cannot agree to stop the bombing in that limited part of Syria for that limited amount of time, they will not agree to anything that is worthwhile. If they will not keep their word once they have agreed to a ceasefire, then how can we trust them? In the end, that is what makes the work of the Council possible: trust. If we cannot count on the members of the Council to honour their agreements, we cannot accomplish anything. If we cannot act when children are dying, we have no business being here. If we cannot save families that have not seen the sun for weeks because they have been hiding underground to escape barrel bombs, then the Security Council is as impotent as its worst critics say it is. Almost a year ago in the aftermath of the Syrian regime sarin gas attack on Khan Shaykhoun, the United States offered a warning to the Council. We said that when the international community consistently fails to act, there are times when States are compelled to take their own action. The Security Council failed to act, and the United States successfully struck the air base from which Al-Assad had launched his chemical attack. We repeat that warning today. We welcome all nations that will work together to finally provide relief for the Syrian people, and we support the United Nations political process that seeks to end the war in Syria. However, we also warn that any nation that is determined to impose its will through chemical attacks and inflicting human suffering, most especially the outlaw Syrian regime, the United States remains prepared to act if we must. It is not the path we prefer, but it is a path we have demonstrated we will take. We are prepared to take it again. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 9/23 Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and, through him, may I thank all of those trying to supply the desperately needed humanitarian response on the ground. They are indeed valiant. Sixteen days ago, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We did so because we and the world were sickened by the slaughter of innocents in Syria, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Russia used every tactic in its playbook to weaken the resolution and buy time for its ally, the Al-Assad regime, to bomb indiscriminately. But when it raises its hand in support, we hope that Russia and its clients would keep their word and implement the resolution. Sadly, as the Secretary-General's briefing has made clear, our resolution has not been implemented. What has happened? First, has there been a ceasefire? No. The violence continues and civilian deaths continue to rise. In those 16 days, 607 people have reportedly been killed, including 99 children and 79 women. The opposition armed groups committed to implementing resolution 2401 (2018) in full, but the Al-Assad regime's air strikes continue. Despite voting for a ceasefire, between 24 and 28 February, Russian military aircraft conducted 20 bombing missions in eastern Ghouta and Damascus every day. Russia has failed to confirm that it is only conducting air strikes against groups that are listed as terrorist groups by the Council. During the so-called daily humanitarian pause, over 56 air strikes hit eastern Ghouta between 27 February and 7 March, including at least six air strikes by Russian aircraft, according to monitors on the ground. Let us recall that only last year Russia declared the whole area to be a de-escalation zone. It has claimed that its bombardments are about fighting terrorists. That is manifestly not the case. There is one terrorist group recognized by the Security Council in eastern Ghouta, which accounts for less than not even 1 per cent of the population of the enclave. The other fighters are members of the opposition armed groups, which Russia has itself invited to the Astana meetings. Those groups have written stating their readiness to expel Al-Nusra Front from the enclave. Instead, Russia bombs them, undermining the political process that it is a part of. We are pleased that the members of the High Negotiations Committee of the Syrian opposition will be able to discuss the situation in Syria with Council members later today. I repeat my consistent condemnation of attacks against Damascus. What about our resolution's second demand, that is, safe, unimpeded and sustained access for humanitarian convoys, including medical and surgical supplies? Only one convoy has been able to enter besieged eastern Ghouta in the past 16 days, in two movements following shelling. They delivered supplies for 27,500 people — a fraction of the 400,000 civilians besieged in eastern Ghouta. What is stopping the aid from getting to the people that so desperately need it? Again, it is the regime. The ongoing violence that it perpetrates is an important factor, and its failure to grant access is another. On 5 March, the regime removed nearly 70 per cent of the medical supplies from a humanitarian convoy destined for 90,000 people. That happened at a time when the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is warning that malnutrition and disease are so prevalent that people will soon die from hunger and sickness even more than from air strikes. Finally, have there been any medical evacuations for the approximately 1,000 people who need them? Not a single one. Again, it is the regime that will not permit its civilians to reach urgently needed medical care. Some may point to an aid convoy or an announced pause in air strikes as a sign of improvement, and claim that those actions implement the resolution. They do not. Our resolution was clear: a ceasefire without delay, humanitarian access and medical evacuations. None have happened. Instead, the truth is that the regime will continue to pound eastern Ghouta until it has a complete military victory there, and Russia will continue to protect its ally, whatever the cost to the people of Syria and its own reputation. As we sit here, watching Al-Assad inscribing eastern Ghouta, again, on the roll call of atrocities and war crimes that he has committed over the eight years of the bloody conflict, let me say clearly that there will be future accountability for those crimes, and Russia's role, bombing alongside him and protecting him from accountability, will never be forgotten. There is still time. If Russia is able to announce a five-hour ceasefire, it can announce a full ceasefire. If it can get one aid convoy through, it can get more through. I urge Russia to give its unconditional support to resolution 2401 (2018) and a ceasefire to enable the delivery of humanitarian S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 10/23 18-06756 assistance, respect international humanitarian law and protect civilians. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I would first like to thank the Secretary-General for his strong and particularly enlightening briefing, as well as for his personal commitment, in addition to that of the staff of the Secretariat and Mr. Staffan de Mistura, to spare no effort in implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Allow me, on behalf of France, to especially commend the United Nations teams and all the humanitarian actors working under extremely difficult conditions in Syria. Two weeks ago, we unanimously adopted a text calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities of at least 30 days, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access and medical evacuations in Syria. I would remind those present that those demands apply to the whole of Syria and all parties. We negotiated the text together for several weeks and, I repeat, unanimously adopted it. Each member of the Council around this table has therefore endorsed the content by deciding to assume responsibility. That responsibility fell particularly on Russia, as a permanent member that voted for resolution 2401 (2018), sponsor of the Astana talks and a Power engaged in the Syrian situation, as it claims to be. We had agreed to a clause to meet 15 days later to review its implementation. The Secretary-General has just provided us with a very clear picture of that. Since 24 February, civilian casualties have continued to climb into the hundreds every week. The regime is pursuing, in defiance of its people and the Council, an air and land offensive that it has never intended to halt, with the support of Russia and Iran. However, let us not be deceived that civilians are not the "collateral victims" of those military operations. Rather, they are themselves being targeted by the regime, deliberately and methodically to starve and rape, destroy their health centres, kill and sow terror and death. The hell on Earth experienced by eastern Ghouta is not just the effect of the regime's policy; it is the very purpose of the regime's murderous madness, with its daily tally of war crimes and crimes against humanity, for which the regime will have to answer. Let us call a spade a spade: Who can stop the Syrian regime? Everyone knows that, apart from a military operation, it is Russia that is in the best position to do so today. It is therefore legitimate that today, more than ever before, everyone looks expectantly towards Russia, which has so far been unwilling, or unable, to exert sufficient pressure on the regime. Two weeks after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), we are here in the Chamber to face the facts. First, what has happened since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018)? In the light of the inexorable worsening of the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, the Security Council has rallied around a cessation of hostilities and made every effort to seek consensus, and finally did reach consensus on 24 February. We knew then, and we said so, that this result was only a precondition, and that the longest and most difficult part of the path towards a humanitarian truce was still before us. However, every day since 24 February the fighting has continued. In the days that followed, despite Russia's unilateral announcement of a daily five-hour truce — well below what resolution 2401 (2018) requires — the intensity of the fighting has increased. Since resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted, there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, an enclave that has been starved and besieged for months, has not been bombed by the regime and its supporters. The fight against terrorism — and this cannot be repeated enough — cannot be used as a pretext for such a bloodbath of civilians or for such contempt for international humanitarian law. Eastern Ghouta is now a textbook case of war crimes, and even of crimes against humanity. It cannot be ignored: the Syrian regime, with the support of Russia and Iran, is engaged in a war of total submission against its people. Violations of the ceasefire by the Damascus regime, with the support of Russia and Iran, have been massive and ongoing, and I would like to thank the Secretary-General for clearly exposing those violations. Let me briefly review some of these violations. Between 24 and 27 February, 72 attacks by the Syrian regime and its Russian and Iranian allies, from more than 14 locations, were reported. Between 24 and 28 February, Russian military aircraft carried out no fewer than 20 bombing missions in Damascus and eastern Ghouta. Between 27 February and 2 March, field observers documented at least 25 air strikes by the regime and Russia during the five-hour humanitarian breaks declared by Moscow. Since 18 February, more than 29 hospital have been hit, and few health facilities are still in operation. On 8 March, a health care facility in Mesraba was completely destroyed by bombardments. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, as of 11 March, 607 people, including 99 children and 79 women, had been killed since the adoption of resolution 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 11/23 2401 (2018). I would repeat: 607 people have been killed. In addition to the dead, there are many injured persons, arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, rapes and many other intolerable violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Finally, further credible allegations of the use of chemical weapons have been made since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). As the highest French authorities have pointed out, France will brook no compromise when it comes to the use of those abject weapons. The humanitarian needs are immense, yet the regime deliberately continues to block the entry of aid, despite the presence of Russian soldiers at the crossing points, as what happened to the convoy on 5 March shows. Indeed, the population continues to be deprived of relief and of any possibility of medical evacuation, even if more than 1,000 people need it. Still, we cannot give up. On behalf of France, I would like to make a new and urgent appeal to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. France is not posing; it is taking action. My country has been and remains one of the countries most committed to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Right after the resolution's adoption, France stepped up its contacts and efforts at the highest level so as to contribute to the resolution's swift implementation, so that the Astana guarantors would assume their responsibilities and so that the commitments made collectively would be respected. President Macron has met with Presidents Putin, Erdoğan and Rouhani, as well as with the Secretary-General on several occasions. Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Moscow and then Tehran. To Russia, we proposed concrete measures for implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Although our efforts aimed at reaching out have been ignored, we stand by our proposals. Let us not deceive ourselves: without an immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), the worst is yet to come. After the regime has conquered the rural zones of eastern Ghouta, the worst would be a conquest — street by street, house by house — in a torrent of fire, for the urban zones of the region, which are by definition the most densely populated areas. It is of the highest urgency, therefore, for us to come together to ensure that the resolution is fully implemented before the street battles promised by the regime's military planners begin. I would like to highlight three essential elements in that regard. The first is implementing a monitoring system to ensure maximum pressure on the parties. The main reason resolution 2401 (2018) has not been not implemented is that the Syrian regime has been engaged in its murderous folly and the regime's supporters have been unable or unwilling to stop it and prevent a worsening of the humanitarian situation. But the failure to implement resolution 2401 (2018) is also the result of our not being able to put in place a sufficiently targeted follow-up mechanism to the resolution in the Council. This must be our priority, and I am convinced that it is our only chance to compel the Syrian regime to comply with its international obligations. France therefore calls for appropriate decisions to be taken in the coming days. It is essential and urgent that humanitarian convoys reach eastern Ghouta in adequate security conditions and carry out their delivery of aid, and that medical evacuations be allowed. For that to happen, the truce must be sustainable and flexible in order to take into account delays in the delivery, discharge and distribution of aid. Medical authorizations must not only be delivered in an expedited manner; they must also come with all the security guarantees needed by patients, their families and the humanitarian actors who assist them. Indeed, the protection due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. The second element I would like to highlight is the departure of terrorist fighters from Ghouta as proposed by armed groups. In their letter to the Security Council, the three armed groups in eastern Ghouta, upon the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), indicated their commitment to upholding the resolution, made concrete proposals for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and committed themselves to taking combatant members of their groups out of Ghouta. The United Nations offered its assistance in those exchanges and carried out important work along those lines, to which the Secretary General just referred. I call on Russia today to conclude and implement the relevant agreements without delay. This is one of the keys to implementing the resolution. The third element is political negotiation. A lasting cessation of hostilities in Syria requires a political process consistent with the terms of resolution 2254 (2015), our shared road map for ending the conflict. Staffan de Mistura has our full support in bringing this mission to a successful conclusion and swiftly convening negotiations in Geneva, which is the only legitimate forum for a credible solution. In order to S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 12/23 18-06756 achieve results, United Nations mediation requires that necessary pressure be exerted on the parties. We therefore call once again on Russia, as well as Iran, to fulfil their responsibilities, as we are fulfilling our own. Collectively we have the capacity, if we so wish, to stop the endless descent into the abyss that characterizes the Syrian tragedy, and finally create a real political dynamic. On behalf of France, I therefore call once again for all members of the Council to finally rally their words and action in the service of this shared objective, which matches to our interests and responsibilities. It is never too late to save lives, and it is our responsibility — if we accept it — to end the tragedy of Syria, on which our generation, and the credibility of the Security Council, will be judged. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing and his detailed information on what we asked for. We particularly appreciated his words when he said that there should be only one agenda for all of us — ending this crisis. Russia supported the Security Council's adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), guided by the priority of improving the humanitarian situation in various parts of Syria. We not only believe that its effective implementation is extremely important, we have also proposed concrete ways of achieving that, something that was discussed in today's briefing. And that is unlike various capitals whose representatives have settled comfortably for doing nothing while vilifying the Syrian regime, as they call it, and making endless accusations about Russia. In out last meeting on the subject (see S/PV.8188), I promised to count the number of times that Ambassador Haley mentioned Russia in the next meeting. The answer is 22. France came second, with 16 mentions, and the United Kingdom was third, with 12. This matters not just for the record but for the context in which it occurs. What is going on is a political policy, and it does not have to do merely — indeed, not much at all — with concern for Syrians' humanitarian needs. It is important that everyone understands that resolution 2401 (2018) is not about an immediate ceasefire, which is a utopian notion, but a preliminary agreement between the parties as a condition for achieving sustainable de-escalation in all the contested areas of Syria, not just eastern Ghouta. That is the only realistic way. The resolution contains an unequivocal demand in that regard, and we are trying to make that happen. The Council has heard about that today and will hear more. The authorities in Damascus have expressed their satisfaction with the resolution and their willingness to implement its provisions. However, they have also rightly demanded an immediate cessation of attacks on the capital and of all infringements on Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The counter-terrorist operation that the Syrian armed forces are conducting does not contradict resolution 2401 (2018). The Government of Syria has every right to work to end threats to its citizens' security. The Damascus suburbs cannot continue to be a breeding ground for terrorists. It is the terrorists' persistent attempts to disrupt the ceasefire that serve to maintain the tensions in Syria, and of course the most problematic area is in eastern Ghouta. The July 2017 Cairo agreements on the eastern Ghouta de-escalation zone gave the militants a chance to be included in the political settlement. They did not take advantage of it and have still not dissociated themselves from the terrorists. Even now the groups' activities are coordinated from the joint headquarters run by Jabhat Al-Nusra. We have reliable information that they are in active radio contact, discussing plans for shelling the humanitarian corridors, among other things. Why are they only now talking about being willing to drive Al-Nusra's members out of eastern Ghouta? And why are we the only ones asking that question? We have answered it a number of times ourselves when we have spoken about suspicions that Al-Nusra is being preserved for particular political purposes, in this case to maintain a dangerous hotbed of armed resistance in the immediate vicinity of Syria's capital. Even now they continue to lull us with fairy stories about how few terrorists there are in eastern Ghouta. And who is going to monitor the armed groups' implementation of the resolution? Who will be responsible for that? Just please do not keep saying the so-called regime, and Russia, and Iran. Such ideological attitudes are simply not serious in the context of the professional discussions that we conduct in the Security Council. What responsibility will the members of the Council take for the implementation of the resolution? How will they implement it? How will they influence the militias they support? 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 13/23 Following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), with Russia's participation, daily five-hour humanitarian pauses were established and the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin checkpoint was opened for use by both civilians and militants with families. They were guaranteed security, transportation and protection along the entire route. The Syrian authorities then opened another checkpoint, Jisreen-Mleha, in the southern area of eastern Ghouta. Medical posts have been set up, distribution points organized for hot meals, buses are standing by. However, the insurgents continued to subject the central areas of Damascus and its outskirts to massive shelling. Dozens of mines have been laid for days, resulting in deaths and injuries as well as major damage. Since the day the resolution was adopted more than 100 people have died, and many more been injured, as a result of the shelling in the capital. The Tishrin and Al-Biruni hospitals and a medical centre in Al-Rihan have been hit more than once. These are real hospitals, not the militants' field offices that are frequently disguised as hospitals. They are making active use of snipers. We know this for a fact. It is a tragedy when any civilians die during an armed conflict. But my delegation has always been interested in the origin of the statistical information being used in the United Nations. In a highly politicized situation this subject is extremely important. Frequent assessments are pronounced about civilian losses in eastern Ghouta. We hope that future reports will be required to indicate where their data is from, how reliable it is and who exactly is meant by "reliable sources on the ground". Every day that has passed, the extremists have forbidden civilians to leave the areas they have blocked and have severely suppressed attempts to resist arbitrary action, including through exemplary executions. We have reliable information about that too. Strikes on corridors and exit checkpoints are constant, including during the humanitarian pauses. On 9 March a convoy of refugees was shelled, once again disrupting an evacuation. Tunnels are being used for attacks on the Syrian army, and the exits from underground installations are located in neighbourhoods where there are public institutions, mainly mosques, hospitals and markets. They have inflated food prices and at the same time have been taking away the people's food, water, medicines and mobile phones. They are setting up firing positions in residential buildings and using people as human shields. They are laying mines in neighbourhoods that are adjacent to the line of contact. They are conducting searches and confiscating permit papers distributed by Government forces. The residents are trying to resist this repression, organizing spontaneous rallies and clashing with the militias. On 1 March, in north-eastern Douma, Al-Nusra terrorists shot four people who participated in such a demonstration. Today there was a major protest in Kafr Batna. The first major exodus of civilians took place on the night of 11 March, when 52 people, 26 of them children, left the village of Misraba with the assistance of the Russian Centre for the Reconciliation of Opposing Sides and the Syrian army. There are also militants who want to leave eastern Ghouta, but their field commanders threaten potential defectors with reprisals. For the first time, on 9 March, after long and tense negotiations, with the participation of officers from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation, 13 militants were evacuated from the enclave through the humanitarian corridor at their own request. Talks have been held with Jaysh Al-Islam on reaching an agreement on the withdrawal of a second group of fighters. A meeting was also held with the leaders of Faylaq Al-Rahman, at which it was demanded that they dissociate themselves from Jabhat Al-Nusra immediately. However, according to information received, the militants of the group decided to continue their armed resistance, forcibly recruiting ordinary citizens into their ranks. To turn to the subject of the humanitarian convoy entering Douma on 5 March, the convoy received comprehensive support from the Syrian Government and the Russian military. A humanitarian corridor was established, security ensured for its passage and the situation was monitored. However, there was a great deal of evidence of disorganized activity on the part of the humanitarian actors. According to our information, United Nations staff needlessly delayed the convoy operations, creating real security risks. While the convoy was being put together, they attempted to load it with undeclared medical supplies — and the fact that not all of them were declared was mentioned today — and wasted around two hours in a meeting with the leaders of the so-called local councils. They spread unreliable information about aerial strikes in the trucks' unloading area, and today some delegations seized on that joyfully, although what actually occurred was one instance of mortar fire from the armed groups' positions. They did not respond to local residents' S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 14/23 18-06756 request to help them leave the enclave. Nonetheless, 13 people, five of them children, were evacuated. Afterwards, it was curious to read a report that one of Ahrar Al-Sham's field commanders had, in a tone of irony, expressed his appreciation for the humanitarian pause on 5 March, which enabled the militias to regroup, recover their strength and a number of lost positions and prepare ambushes for the Syrian military. A 9 March action was successfully carried out with the Russian military providing a truck convoy with safe conduct. However, the scope of resolution 2401 (2018) is not limited to eastern Ghouta. We should note that in the past two weeks, the terrorists of Al-Nusra and associated militia groups have repeatedly shelled villages in Hamah province. As a result of new strikes there are been deaths and injuries in blockaded Fo'ah and Kafraya in Idlib. Armed clashes between illegal groups in that province have led to threats of a number of medical facilities being closed. Al-Nusra has become more active in the southern de-escalation zone, which could be related to the fact that they continue to be supplied with weapons from outside. The situation in Afrin remains very difficult. The Syrian authorities have given permission for humanitarian aid to be delivered to the residents of Rukban camp, in the area illegally held by the Americans around the Al-Tanf military base. We would like to know what the United Nations is doing about that. Needless to say, we assume that the distribution of humanitarian assistance will be undertaken by a trustworthy entity such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. We are also awaiting the speedy dispatch of a United Nations humanitarian needs assessment mission to Raqqa, which was bombed out by the coalition. There should be no pointless delays with this, so I would like to ask the United Nations when that mission will take place. We understand very well the unspoken motives for the current disinformation campaign, whose aim is to create a public perception that the Syrian authorities use toxic substances. In fact, both we and the Syrians have well-founded fears that provocations are being planned with the aim of accusing the Syrian authorities of carrying out chemical attacks. According to information received, Al-Nusra used a chlorine-based substance in eastern Ghouta on 5 March, affecting more than 30 local residents. This is all being done in order to prepare the ground for unilateral acts of force against sovereign Syria. We heard hints of that in the statements made by some delegations today. Essentially, steps are being considered that could deliver yet another heavy blow to regional stability. Meanwhile, on territory formerly controlled by illegal armed groups, there have been more new discoveries of stores of chemicals, but the relevant bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons have been very slow to react to the appeals of the Syrian authorities. Russia will continue its efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018), but we demand that some of our colleagues do their part and exert genuine pressure on the groups that they support or sponsor, instead of constantly calling on Russia and creating the false impression that the resolution applies only to us. In conclusion, I would like to say that this afternoon four Security Council will be holding an unofficial Arria Formula meeting with the declared intention of making opposition voices heard on the humanitarian issue in Syria. This is going to be widely covered in the media. First and foremost, we want to point out the fact that is unacceptable to use United Nations resources for politicized purposes, and that is certainly not what Arria Formula meetings were conceived for. This event conceals the desire of its organizers to exert informational pressure on the Syrian Government and those who are helping it fight terrorism. In our view, to get the full picture, it would not be a bad idea to listen to the residents of Raqqa and Rukban camp, not to mention eastern Ghouta, where there are quite a few people who would be glad of the opportunity to appeal for their deliverance from the presence of extremists. Mr. Ma Zhaoxu (China) (spoke in Chinese): I should like at the outset to thank Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing. China appreciates the positive efforts made by the United Nations and the Secretary- General to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the Syrian regions affected. China sympathizes with the suffering of the Syrian people and has consistently been working hard to help them. Last month we channelled assistance through the International Committee of the Red Cross, sending water, food, medical services and shelter to internally displaced persons in Syria. We are extremely concerned at the fact that the people of Syria are suffering from the conflict. No act 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 15/23 of violence against innocent civilians can be tolerated. This situation must end. On 24 February, the members of the Security Council, leaving aside their differences, unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018). This upheld the unity of the Council and provided a rare opportunity for a ceasefire, halting the violence and easing the suffering of the Syrian people. After the resolution was adopted, we saw that United Nations humanitarian relief convoys had overcome difficulties of all kinds and entered eastern Ghouta, delivering much-needed assistance to the people there. With Russia announcing the implementation of the temporary ceasefire, a humanitarian corridor was opened for the Syrian people. We saw that some civilians, including children, had already entered the safe area through the humanitarian corridor and received relief and assistance. It has also come to our attention that the parties to the conflict continue to attack each other and that owing to the shelling the humanitarian corridor has not been able to serve its full purpose. We urge all parties concerned to make joint efforts, exert their influence and ensure that resolution 2401 (2018) is effectively and earnestly implemented. All members of the Security Council should maintain their unity and jointly stay on track to find a political solution to the Syrian issue, support the early resumption of the Geneva peace talks and urge all parties in Syria to achieve a solution acceptable to all as soon as possible, through a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process, in order to ease the suffering of the Syrian people. China will continue to make unremitting efforts to that end. Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Secretary-General António Guterres for his briefing. We welcome the efforts of the United Nations, its system and the International Committee of the Red Cross to render immediate life-saving services, conduct hundreds of medical evacuations and send convoys to the besieged and hard-to-reach areas, especially eastern Ghouta, despite the potential danger to the lives of their personnel. We therefore urge the members of the Security Council to assist the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in operationalizing those emergency programmes and to ensure the protection of medical and humanitarian workers. Likewise, we also urge the parties to support United Nations structures in fulfilling their mandates. We echo the United Nations calls to all parties to facilitate unconditional, unimpeded and sustained access to all people in need throughout the country and to take the necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure, including schools and medical facilities, as required by international law and human rights standards. Kazakhstan considers that it is equally important to further promote the Syrian settlement and believes that the Astana process has great potential for guiding intra-Syrian talks towards long-term peace. In that context, we propose that all sides, including stakeholders, provide all-round assistance, making use of the positive developments to improve the humanitarian situation on the ground. Astana continues to support resolution 2254 (2015), as it always has, and repeatedly calls on the International Syria Support Group and other countries to help the conflicting parties to implement the measures stipulated in the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex) and the Vienna statements. We express concern over the existing difficulties in Syria, which seriously impede the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), and we call on the international community to influence the conflicting parties to cooperate with the United Nations. The only way to truly resolve the crisis is through negotiations, predicated on mutual trust and understanding, together with confidence-building measures. In practical terms, we are convinced that expelling terrorist groups from eastern Ghouta may calm the situation in that sector. Let us be frank: removing the Al-Nusra Front and other affiliated terrorist groups from the area, as stated in a letter from three parties, must be pursued in order to end hostilities. The implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member playing a significant role. Finally, Kazakhstan supports solutions in Syria on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué, as well as the agreements on the de-escalation zones reached during the Astana process. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting and to welcome the presence of Secretary-General António Guterres, who reminded us of the responsibilities of the international community, S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 16/23 18-06756 in particular the Council, given the serious and terrible developments in Syria. Peru follows with great concern the humanitarian situation in that country. We must express our sorrow and solidarity to the victims of the conflict, most of whom are children. We deeply regret that, two weeks after the ceasefire was unanimously adopted by the Council through resolution 2401 (2018), there has not been sufficient progress in its implementation. As the Secretary-General noted, a sustained cessation of hostilities has not materialized. The conflict continues to claim civilian victims. The much-needed humanitarian assistance has been provided in a very limited way. International law and international humanitarian law continue to be violated with impunity. The bleak outlook requires us to redouble our efforts. The Security Council must remain united in its responsibility to protect the Syrian population by promoting all actions conducive to ensuring the full and immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The responsibility to act is clearly greater for the countries with the greatest capacity for influence in the field, in particular the guarantors of the de-escalation zones agreed in Astana. The situation is particularly serious in eastern Ghouta, where, among other emergencies, more than 1,000 people need to be evacuated for medical reasons. It is also serious in Idlib, Afrin, Rukban and Raqqa, among other places. We need to remember that the ceasefire must cover the entire Syrian territory and allow humanitarian assistance in a sustained, safe and unhindered way. The Syrian Government must comply with the ceasefire immediately and fulfil its responsibility to protect the population and its obligation to cooperate with the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). The fight against terrorism cannot be used as an excuse to violate human rights and international humanitarian law. Peru supports the proposal of Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura to promote dialogue with the opposition groups that have expressed their willingness to comply with the ceasefire and to expel members of terrorist organizations linked to the Al-Nusra Front from eastern Ghouta. Peru remains committed to achieving a political solution to the conflict that ends the ongoing humanitarian disaster, ensures accountability for the atrocious crimes committed in that country, including the use of chemical weapons, supports regional stability and achieves sustainable peace in Syria. We would like to conclude by expressing our support for the Secretary-General in his call for the immediate implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and for his tireless efforts and those of his team on the ground. We also wish to highlight the professionalism, the courage and the sense of duty of the United Nations humanitarian personnel and of the humanitarian agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, among others deployed in Syria. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): At the outset, I would like to express my gratitude to Secretary-General António Guterres for his informative briefing. I also thank him for his leadership and all his support, in particular his tremendous efforts, as well as those of his Special Envoy, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and of the entire United Nations team, to achieve the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) and a definitive resolution of the Syrian conflict. Today's meeting should be another milestone in the international response to the humanitarian crisis prevailing in Syria. However, unfortunately, that is not the case. As the Secretary-General underscored in his briefing, in recent weeks, the parties involved at all levels have intensified their fighting in eastern Ghouta despite the humanitarian ceasefire agreed through the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) exactly 16 days ago. Nevertheless, we welcome with satisfaction reports that the United Nations and Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy was finally able to reach eastern Ghouta last Friday to complete the delivery of food that could not be unloaded on 5 March for security reasons. However, the delivery of all necessary humanitarian supplies, including the medical and health-care supplies that were seized in the first attempt by convoys to the besieged areas, continues to be urgent and must be carried out without delay. We also welcome the news that the Secretary- General has just provided to us with regard to some improvements in the situation on the ground in eastern Ghouta. We hope that today's meeting will lead to greater improvement or a definitive resolution of the situation in that part of Syria. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 17/23 We read the letter dated 9 March that the co-penholders — France, the United Kingdom and the United States — addressed to the Secretary-General and the Council. We have also read very carefully the many letters that the Syrian Government has addressed to the members of the Security Council through its Permanent Representative. Basically, we note in those letters the repeated mutual accusations that have been a characteristic of this long conflict since its beginning. We are talking about a 30-day ceasefire, and time is gradually running out. We have had enough of mutual recrimination. The only collective task that we should focus on is finding a coherent peace mechanism to stop this endless and heinous war. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea remains deeply concerned about the developments in the situation in Syria. We reiterate the urgent need for Council members who have influence over the national parties to the conflict to redouble their diplomatic initiatives with a view to reaching a common understanding on how to find a political solution to the tragic crisis in Syria, the effects of which are a threat to the region and the international community, in particular because of the humanitarian implications posed by the millions of Syrians who are currently being displaced within the country or seeking asylum and because of the security risks caused by the expansion of Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other terrorist entities. We also express our deep indignation at the continuing fighting in the province of Idlib, which, for seven consecutive days, has been subject to attacks and rocket fire from Islamic factions in areas of the cities of Kafraya and Fo'ah. Those events, like many others, demonstrate the need for a common front that will expel from Syria the Islamic State, Al-Qaida, the Al-Nusra Front and all other associated entities that threaten peace and security in the region. In conclusion, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea calls on the guarantors of the Astana process — Russia, Iran and Turkey — to ensure that the rounds of negotiations to be held on 15 and 16 March — to which the Special Envoy of the United Nations for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, was invited — serve not only to plan future actions and strategies, but also to give genuine impetus to finding a solution to the Syrian crisis once and for all. During my statement after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), I said that we had partially spared ourselves from embarrassment (see S/PV.8188). However, since 16 days have passed since the adoption of the resolution without it being implemented. I think we remain completely shamed. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): Let me thank the Secretary­General for his comprehensive, but again very worrying and alarming, update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). We also see how difficult it is to implement resolution 2401 (2018) on the ground. Small steps, such as sending an aid convoy to eastern Ghouta last Monday, are still mere drops in the ocean of people's needs. Even with a unanimously adopted resolution, we are still lacking any substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from being over. We therefore call for the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We understand that the solution is not entirely in our hands, but still we should try to do our utmost to find possible ways to ensure that the life-saving aid convoys might reach those in need and medical evacuations might begin. Unfortunately, the situation in eastern Ghouta, but also in Idlib and Aleppo provinces, does not allow the suffering of ordinary Syrians to be alleviated. Let me once again stress our full support for the Secretary-General, as well as his Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura, in finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis. A political solution to the conflict remains the only viable way to end the suffering of Syrian people. Let me also underline that the role of the Security Council remains crucial, but it is up to the Syrian people to decide their own future. We agree that fighting against terrorist groups designated as such by the Security Council is crucial, but, at the same time, such designations cannot justify the attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. Those attacks must stop and parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. In that context, let me once again strongly underline that any response to violence should be proportionate. We need full compliance with the ceasefire agreed in resolution 2401 (2018). The Russian proposal for a daily five-hour pause is simply not enough to allow humanitarian workers to deliver aid and to evacuate those who cannot be treated on the ground. The international community, and especially the Council, S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 18/23 18-06756 bear a huge responsibility to protect civilians. Allow me to share a couple of concrete ideas, which I hope will be useful, on how to improve the situation on the ground. As the Security Council, we should demand United Nations access in order to monitor designated de-escalation zones to ensure the well-being of civilians. All States Members of the United Nations should fully cooperate with the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism set up last year and facilitate its work. Parties engaged in the conflict must cease enabling the crimes on the ground and withhold all their support to armed groups that target civilians. Parties conducting air strikes against terrorist groups must ensure that all necessary precautionary measures are taken into consideration in order to avoid civilian casualties and that all military operations are fully consistent with international law. All potential violations, including possible war crimes, must be investigated, and the perpetrators must be held accountable. In conclusion, let me underline that, from our perspective, we in New York sometimes lack feedback on our actions. With regard to actions taken at Headquarters, it is for the Syrian people themselves to tell us what would be the most effective way to support them. Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): My delegation thanks the Secretary-General for his briefing on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), on the humanitarian situation in Syria. Two weeks after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), which had inspired a great deal of hope, has not been implemented as planned, much to our regret. The requirement of an immediate cessation of hostilities for a period of at least 30 days, provided for by resolution 2401 (2018), to enable the safe and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuation of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law, has not yet gone into effect. The humanitarian and security situation remains worrisome because it is impossible for humanitarian convoys that endure indiscriminate attacks and bombings perpetrated by various hostile groups to reach besieged areas. In addition, attacks are carried out against medical and humanitarian personnel and health-care infrastructure. According to the World Health Organization, such attacks are on the rise. The deterioration of the humanitarian situation within Syria's borders due to increased fighting makes for dangerous living conditions for thousands of internally displaced persons and obliterates the hope of restoring security and dignity to millions of refugees in neighbouring countries living in extremely difficult conditions. Given the dire situation, Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the second international conference on supporting the future of Syria and the region, to be held in Brussels on 24 and 25 April at the initiative of the European Union, will result in pledges of increased humanitarian aid and development support. In accordance with the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018), Côte d'Ivoire again calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities in order to enable the safe, sustained and unimpeded access of humanitarian convoys delivering basic necessities to hundreds of people in dire need in eastern Ghouta and other areas of the country. My delegation welcomes reports that, for a few days, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent was able once again to enter the city of Douma in eastern Ghouta to deliver the aid necessary, including food and non-food items. My delegation encourages all Syrian stakeholders to create conditions that would allow the United Nations to make scheduled deliveries in eastern Ghouta, throughout the entire country and on Syrian borders. Côte d'Ivoire reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve without significant progress on the political landscape because the two issues are inextricably linked. Therefore, it invites hostile groups and all stakeholders to engage in political dialogue in order to achieve a peaceful solution to the crisis in Syria. In that regard, it welcomes the holding of a meeting in Geneva between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. De Mistura, and the three Astana guarantors — Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey — with a view to relaunching the Syrian political process. The delegation of Côte d'Ivoire hopes that the next meeting to be held in Astana, at the initiative of the three guarantors of the Astana process, will enable us to reach a lasting ceasefire in Syria and to calmly resume the intra-Syrian peace talks pursuant to resolution 2254 (2015). 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 19/23 Mr. Llorentty Solíz (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): My delegation would like to thank the Secretary-General for his briefing on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Once again we take this opportunity to pay tribute to humanitarian workers who risk their lives daily as they carry out their duties. We join other colleagues in congratulating the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, on his efforts to find a political solution to the serious situation in Syria, which, as the Secretary-General recalled, is in its eighth year. Bolivia deplores the challenges to the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) that the Secretary-General outlined in his briefing today. We condemn all deliberate attacks on civilians and demand respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We call on the parties involved to focus primarily on protecting hospitals, medical facilities, schools and civilian residences, and the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance organizations whose employees put their own lives at risk as they carry out their work on the ground. We call on the parties to cooperate and enhance coordination efforts with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, provide unhindered humanitarian access and allow urgent medical evacuations to be carried out, in particular in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We call upon the parties to work together to achieve the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout Syria as soon as possible and in accordance with agreements reached in the Astana process and on the de-escalation zones. We underscore the importance of unity within the Security Council when implementing resolution 2401 (2018). Such unity must be present if our goal is to fully implement it. We also call on the members of the Council and all parties involved to depoliticize the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and ensure that its actions are in line with international law. We highlight a few forums for dialogue that could assist with reaching consensus on a definitive cessation of hostilities, such as the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi, whose outcome is geared towards strengthening the political process in Geneva. We hope that that forum will allow for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) as soon as possible. In conclusion, we reiterate that there is no military solution to the crisis. The only solution is through an inclusive political dialogue ordered and led by and for the Syrian people. We extend our best hopes for the outcome of the next meeting to be held in Astana. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank the Secretary- General for his comprehensive, up-to-date and very useful briefing on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). Two weeks after the adoption of that resolution, the humanitarian situation in Syria continues to cause serious concern. The United Nations and its humanitarian partners have failed to ensure safe, sufficient, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access for populations in need of life-saving assistance due ongoing fighting, in particular in eastern Ghouta. Nonetheless, we are mindful of the fact that resolution 2401 (2018) applies to all parts of Syria. We note that the Secretary-General did not overlook that aspect of the resolution in his briefing. We had all emphasized the importance of the effective implementation of the resolution in order to make positive changes on the ground and alleviate the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Given the increasingly complex situation on the ground, we knew that it would not be an easy task. After the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018), we recognized that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners could deliver aid to eastern Ghouta and other affected areas. No doubt, there remain serious challenges to ensuring the full implementation of the resolution. Although it demands the cessation of hostilities without delay for at least 30 consecutive days throughout Syria, with the immediate engagement of all parties to ensure safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations, there have been ongoing military activities resulting in civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian facilities. Here, one should also not overlook the damage being caused by the shelling of Damascus. Therefore, it is clear that much more remains to be done and all parties should be committed to the full implementation of the resolution. As the United Nations and its humanitarian partners are ready to deliver more aid to all Syrians throughout the country, it is absolutely critical that all the parties provide them safe, unfettered and sustained humanitarian access. In that regard, all those who have influence over the parties S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 20/23 18-06756 should exert the necessary pressure to contribute to saving lives. It is also imperative to use all existing arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the resolution, particularly the cessation of hostilities. In that connection, we look forward to the Astana meeting, scheduled to take place on 15 and 16 March, which we hope will contribute to the full implementation of the resolution. Finally, as the Secretary-General stated, we are entering into the eighth year since the start of the Syrian crisis. While we look forward to seeing the Syrian people, as a sovereign State, find a comprehensive political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015), the Council also has a responsibility and an indispensable role in resolving the Syrian crisis. Therefore, we hope that the spirit of cooperation and consensus that the Council demonstrated during the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) will be sustained not only to respond to the humanitarian tragedy, but also to ensure progress in the political track with a view to finding a lasting solution to the crisis. Most importantly, the cooperation of relevant countries that have influence is key. Without those countries, there will be no solution in sight. The President: I will now make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. I would like to thank Secretary-General Guterres for his briefing. Through him, I would also like to thank all United Nations and other humanitarian personnel on the ground. They work under extreme circumstances. Sixteen days ago (see S/PV.8188), the Security Council showed a rare example of unity regarding Syria when it adopted resolution 2401 (2018) . I recall the glimmer of hope that day in the Chamber. All of us agreed that all parties to the Syrian conflict must cease hostilities in order to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the evacuation of the critically sick and wounded. Yet one day after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), the Syrian regime, supported by Russia and Iran, launched a most violent ground offensive to conquer the enclave of eastern Ghouta. That offensive came on top of a relentless air campaign that had started one month ago. Resolution 2401 (2018) calls for a cessation of hostilities, without delay. Unfortunately, it is the military offensive that continues without delay. Elsewhere in Syria, including in Idlib and Afrin, violence continues to threaten the civilian population as well. The Council must do everything in its power to advance the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). In that regard, I would like to stress the importance of humanitarian aid, the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and accountability. With regard to my first point, the immediate delivery of humanitarian aid, last week we were deeply shocked to hear reports that medical supplies, including surgical supplies, insulin and even trauma kits, had been removed from convoys by the Syrian regime. Medical supplies save lives and provide relief to the inhumane suffering that too many Syrians are going through. Medical supplies cannot be used as weapons by terrorists. There is no justification for denying medicine and medical supplies to the wounded and sick. The first humanitarian convoy that received authorization from the Syrian regime to deliver aid to eastern Ghouta was not able to fully unload because of resumed fighting. The convoy that arrived last Friday was finally able to deliver aid, including medical supplies, for 27,500 people. However, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is still waiting for authorization to complete the delivery to Douma for all 70,000 people, as initially approved by the Syrian authorities. We call on all parties to immediately allow sustained and unimpeded access to deliver supplies to people in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. That applies to eastern Ghouta and to all in need throughout the country. On my second point, the cessation of hostilities and the need for monitoring, resolution 2401 (2018) calls for an immediate nationwide cessation of hostilities. A strong monitoring mechanism is needed urgently in order to ensure implementation. We agree with the French proposal in that regard. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), air strikes have continued, even increased, especially on eastern Ghouta. We hear the Russian Federation say that those strikes are targeted at terrorists. However, we underline once more that the exemption to the ceasefire for attacks directed at United Nations-listed terrorist groups does not provide an excuse to ignore the basic principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. According to the latest report of the Commission of Inquiry, the siege of eastern Ghouta continues to be characterized by the use of prohibited weapons and attacks against civilian and protected objects, which we condemn in the strongest terms. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 21/23 We also condemn the shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta. We call upon all parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law at all times. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura should facilitate negotiations between armed opposition groups, the Syrian regime and Russia in order to advance the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). One concrete and helpful step is to evacuate United Nations-listed terrorist groups from eastern Ghouta. A first evacuation of 13 imprisoned terrorist fighters reportedly took place last Friday. It is crucial that any evacuation of armed fighters take place in a safe and orderly fashion. We call on the United Nations to prepare for putting in place the necessary monitoring mechanisms in that regard. We call on Russia to accept the offer of the Special Envoy to facilitate further evacuation of United Nations-listed terrorist groups from eastern Ghouta. Civilians should never be forced to leave against their will. Forced displacement may constitute a war crime. On my third point, the credibility and accountability of the Council, despite the unanimous adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) we have seen no cessation of hostilities. We have seen no significant improvement in the humanitarian situation on the ground in Syria. This also has a negative impact on the credibility of the Council. It is vital for the functioning of the rules-based international order that decisions of the Council be respected and implemented. As a Council, we have a collective responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. However, we should not forget that the responsibility and, indeed, the obligation to execute its decisions lies with individual Member States. The human suffering in Syria, especially in eastern Ghouta, must end now. We need a full cessation of hostilities in all of Syria, including eastern Ghouta, Idlib and Afrin. And we call on the Russian Federation in particular to use its influence and to do its utmost to achieve that, thereby also upholding the Council's credibility. In conclusion, the siege of eastern Ghouta is entering its fifth year. The war in Syria will enter its eighth year later this week, on 15 March, as others have noted. One wonders how the Syrian regime thinks to ever achieve the legitimacy to govern the people it now pounds into submission or death. As the High Commissioner for Human Rights stated during the thirty-seventh session of the Human Rights Council, "what we are seeing in eastern Ghouta are likely war crimes and potentially crimes against humanity". The perpetrators of these crimes must know they are being identified, that dossiers are being built up with a view to their prosecution, and that they will be held accountable for what they have done. We thank the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic for its important work to date. We recall the resolution of the Human Rights Council of 5 March, which calls on the Commission to investigate the situation in eastern Ghouta. We call on all Council members to support the referral of the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria to the International Criminal Court. We also urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for the Syrian Arab Republic. For now, however, our common efforts should be directed at securing immediate relief for those millions in Syria in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. For that, we need the cessation of hostilities to be implemented immediately and in a sustained manner. We need a continuous pause in the fighting of 30 days, as demanded by resolution 2401 (2018). If its implementation continues to fail, that will require a response from the Council that goes beyond where we stand now. We thank the Secretary-General for his perseverance and endless efforts to uphold the norms and values of the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as well as to promote compliance with resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all Council members to follow his example. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. I wish to again remind all speakers to limit their statements to no more than five minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): I will not begin by commenting on the procedural point that you have raised, Mr. President, but rather I will focus on the essential issues that S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018 22/23 18-06756 are supposed to be of interest to the members of the Security Council. I welcome the Secretary-General and note the statement at the outset of his briefing that the Secretariat does not have all the necessary information to carefully access the situation on the ground because the United Nations does not have a presence in all areas. The Secretariat humbly and politely said those words, noting that it does not have full, relevant information pertaining to the Syrian situation, although the United Nations has a branch of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Damascus and there are dozens of United Nations agencies operating in Syria, in addition to 13 international non-governmental organizations also operating there. However, some of our colleagues in the Security Council, who have shut down their embassies in Damascus and are now completely disconnected from credible information, instead rely on information from what is known as open sources. They have provided a vast amount of information that would never serve the interests of the Syrian people or of those present in such an important and significant discussion. That information is misleading and could poison the atmosphere and fuel sedition regarding the role of the Security Council, which is mandated to maintain international peace and security. The Syrian Government stands ready to engage seriously with positive international initiatives that serve the interests of the Syrian people, especially in ending the bloodshed throughout Syria, as stated in resolution 2401 (2018). My country has expressed its satisfaction with resolution 2401 (2018), particularly the positive provisions contained therein. In that regard, my country confirms that it has taken all the following procedures to relieve the suffering of our people in eastern Ghouta. First, immediately after the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), hostilities were ceased on a daily basis from 9 a.m. until 2 p.m, Damascus local time, and remain so to this very moment, with the aim of delivering humanitarian aid and ensuring the unimpeded and safe exit of civilians from the areas controlled by terrorist groups. Secondly, two safe humanitarian corridors have been opened for civilians wishing to exit the area. Thirdly, two joint United Nations-International Committee of the Red Cross convoys, in collaboration with the Syrian Red Crescent, were sent to eastern Ghouta on 5 and 9 March. Notwithstanding the foregoing, all those procedures have been countered by the terror of armed organizations present in Ghouta. Incited by their masters — some of them, unfortunately, members of the Security Council — these organizations have targeted civilians in Damascus since the beginning of the year, firing more than 2,499 missiles and mortars that have claimed the lives of 70 civilian martyrs and injured 556 people. Those organizations have prevented our people in eastern Ghouta from leaving in order to continue to use them as human shields and material for humanitarian and media blackmail. They have even targeted those who managed to escape towards the two corridors by firing bullets and missiles. The latest incident in Syria occurred on 8 March, when the so-called Faylaq Al-Rahman — one of the terrorist arms of the petty State of Qatar in Syria — targeted a civilian convoy heading towards one of the corridors, leading to high casualties among civilians. By the way, that terrorist organization, Faylaq Al-Rahman, has been hailed by some of those present because of its readiness to implement resolution 2401 (2018). They presented it as a part of the moderate Syrian opposition, and distributed a letter signed by that and other terrorist organizations, addressed to the Secretary-General. That is the modus operandi of the Security Council with terrorist groups. The procedures taken by the Syrian Government are not limited to eastern Ghouta. Over the past few days, the Government has undertaken a number of other procedures. First, we have requested that the United Nations and a number of humanitarian organizations immediately send a mission to investigate the humanitarian situation in Raqqa, which was destroyed by the International Coalition led by the United States of America. Secondly, we have requested approval to send humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp, provided that the aid is delivered and distributed by the Syrian Red Crescent and the Red Cross exclusively, and not by the United States occupation authorities or the terrorist groups in Rukban camp and Tanaf area. Thirdly, two days ago the Syrian Red Crescent obtained Government approval to send convoys to Ghouta, Raqqa, Afrin and Rukban. To date, it has not sent the convoys to Rukban and Afrin because the United Nations failed to ensure the necessary safeguards from the United States and Turkish occupation forces. That is the reason. 12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201 18-06756 23/23 With every advance by the Syrian Army against terrorist groups in any given area, the States sponsoring terrorism launch heated disinformation campaigns to distract the world from the terrorism, aggression and occupation against Syria. The inference is that those countries have never been keen to protec the lives of civilians, but prefer to protect their investments in terrorism after they have spent billions of dollars on it, as was said by the previous Prime Minister of Qatar, in order to recycle terrorism elsewhere in Syria. The behaviour that I have mentioned is not limited to State-sponsored terrorism, unfortunately. It has even been demonstrated by some senior officials of the Secretariat. We had hoped that the Secretariat, especially in the light of the second preambular paragraph of resolution 2401 (2018), would provide an unequivocal legal description of the crimes committed by the so-called International Coalition led by the United States against our Syrian people in Raqqa and other places, and the procedures to ensure the end of that aggression. We had also hoped that the Secretariat would provide us with an unequivocal legal description of the acts of invasion by Turkish forces of a precious part of our national territory, especially against our civilian people in Afrin, and the procedures to ensure the end of the Turkish aggression. We had also hoped for an unequivocal legal description of the presence of the United States forces on Syrian territory without the approval of the Syrian Government and the procedures to ensure the end of that occupation. The government of my country affirms its right to defend its citizens and combat terrorism in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions, especially the second preambular paragraph of resolution 2401 (2018); fight all those who practice, fund and support terrorism; work towards restoring security stability and peace; and rebuild all that has been destroyed by terrorists and their masters. Finally, I have listened to my colleague the representative of the United States, who levels charges again and again against my country before all who are present and says that her country will take military actions against my country outside the legitimacy of the Council if chemical substances are used, just as its administration in Washington, D.C., did when it bombarded Al-Shayrat air base in my country last year. These irresponsible and provocative statements, which run counter to the Charter of the United Nations, are direct incitement to terrorist groups to use chemical weapons and fabricate anew all the evidence needed to accuse the Syrian Army, as they have done in previous times. I remind the representative of the United States that the former Joint Investigative Mechanism refused to take samples from Al-Shayrat air base because if it had done so it would have been categorically proved that the Syrian Government is not responsible for the incident in Khan Shaykhun. In fact, what the United States perpetrated against that Syrian air base was a full-fledged aggression. I call on the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to put an end to their violations of Security Council resolutions related to fighting terrorism, and on their Governments to stop supporting the terrorist groups in my country and cease providing them with a political umbrella to pursue their crimes against the Syrian people. It is high time that the United States Administration learn from its mistakes and stop repeating them. Is it not enough what they have done in Viet Nam, Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Yemen, invoking very cheap lies that have already been condemned and denounced by international public opinion? In this regard, I recall the words of Naguib Mahfouz, the Nobel laureate: "They are liars, they know they are liars, and they know that we know that they are liars. However, they still lie, and very loudly so." In conclusion, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic issued a statement a few minutes ago that street battles have begun in Ghouta, following the demands for the separation of the aforementioned Faylaq Al-Rahman and Jabhat Al-Nusra. This current street fighting impedes the evacuation of civilians who are forced to find safe haven underground in Ghouta. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

In many low and middle income countries, dismal failures in the quality of public service delivery such as absenteeism among teachers and doctors and leakages of public funds have driven the agenda for better governance and accountability. This has raised interest in the idea that citizens can contribute to improved quality of service delivery by holding policy-makers and providers of services accountable. This proposition is particularly resonant when it comes to the human development sectors - health, education and social protection - which involve close interactions between providers and ci

The Kamagayan Comprehensive Care Center (KC3) clients report being very satisfied with the comprehensive package of health services offered under the BCP and they feel welcome and accepted at the KC3. Community members in Kamagayan, including family members of the KC3 clients, also praise the service as an excellent intervention. Virtually all key stakeholders interviewed noted that the KC3 team had performed especially well in building trust between clients and their health service providers, families, and community. In that sense, community-based advocacy efforts were successful at generating an enabling environment for service delivery. The KC3 clients, family members, and community representatives also appreciated efforts from the KC3 team to promote demand reduction through counseling, Narcotics Anonymous (NA) sessions, and privileged access to the Argao Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (TRC). There is great demand and genuine interest among the KC3 clients and patients' clients to become peer educators and provide support to PWID. The professionalization of PWID through peer educator roles has also reportedly reduced stigma and discrimination and increased acceptance of PWID in the community. Should services for PWID be scaled up in Cebu and beyond, recruiting a workforce of peer educators should not be a critical challenge, an important lesson learned for future harm reduction projects in the Philippines.

International audience ; Pour le sens commun, entretenu par un lectorat très typé, Joseph de Maistre représente bien évidemment l'apôtre de la Contre-Révolution la plus intransigeante. Au risque du poncif puisqu'avec lui peut être plus nettement encore qu'avec tout autre polémiste de pareille envergure, se pose le problème de la réception d'une œuvre paradoxale, à travers laquelle d'aucuns s'emploient depuis près de deux siècles avec une belle obstination à reconnaître l'une des sources homogène, flagrante, de théories politiques ou d'idéologies totalitaires parmi les moins recommandables.Parmi d'autres, ces dernières années, le politiste Jean Zaganiaris s'est fort heureusement astreint à l'exercice de dénonciation de telles lectures systématiquement partiales ou biaisées du corpus maistrien. Dans essai publié en 2005 il s'efforce même de rappeler comment le Maistre apparemment figé à jamais dans cette sombre posture a cependant pu être étonnamment associé à de tout autres courants de pensée, jadis, y compris de manière incidente et fugace. Il s'y attache notamment à reconstituer l'argumentaire de nos jours totalement tombé dans l'oubli visant, par exemple, à reconnaître en Joseph de Maistre non seulement un précurseur de certaines idées libérales mais aussi, avec des arguments discutables et de ce fait assez peu convaincants, de certaines propositions politiques revendiquées avec constance depuis près de deux siècles par la tradition républicaine accommodée à la mode française et parlementaire.Maistre libéral ? Vraie fausse révélation pour celui que nombre de biographes ont souvent surnommé le Montesquieu savoyard afin de rendre compte avec justesse de la posture intellectuelle, au cours d'une morne première partie d'existence de notable provincial, selon ses propres dires. Il convient pourtant d'être clair : Maistre n'est pas et n'a jamais été libéral au sens aujourd'hui parlementaire et connoté du terme. Pas plus avant 1789 qu'après ! Quand bien même il incarne sa vie durant une espèce de prototype de penseur des Lumières en magistrat éclairé dédaigneux de cet amas d'institutions d'un autre âge, issues de « lois gothiques » parasitant le fonctionnement idoine des monarchies d'Ancien Régime. Si Joseph de Maistre devient un temps la fugace égérie de militants libéraux, ce n'est donc que très indirectement, ainsi que l'a fort bien compris Jean Zaganiaris. Au surplus dans le contexte très particulier de la dissolution dans l'acide corrosif du Risorgimento, au milieu du XIXe siècle, de ce Royaume de Sardaigne dont il fut au-delà du raisonnable un serviteur fidèle et loyal, aux heures pénibles de l'exil. Curieusement, celui qui a entretenu sa vie durant des rapports particulièrement complexes — pour ne pas dire ambigus — avec son prince, voire avec sa contrée natale d'un duché de Savoie plus excentré que jamais à l'Ouest des Alpes au sein des possessions sardes dites de « Terre ferme », le cœur d'Etats de Savoie en sursis depuis 1815 et de plus en plus déroutants dans leur facture ou, tout au moins, leur logique géopolitique révélatrice de l'Ancien Régime, devient en effet sur le tard la soudaine coqueluche des courtisans ou affidés de la figure incontournable du personnel gouvernemental turinois, au cours de la décennie 1850-1860, en la personne haute en couleur du Comte Benso Camillo di Cavour. Se fondant sur la correspondance de nature diplomatique officielle, de très loin la part la plus méconnue de l'œuvre maistrienne, cette poignée de jeunes gens proposent ainsi une lecture iconoclaste de « vieux papiers » de prime abord sans grands liens, il faut le reconnaître, avec la somme devenue classique de la production spéculative légitimement passée à la postérité. C'est sur cet épisode oublié, longtemps oblitéré par la confiscation anhistorique d'un Joseph de Maistre désincarné, presque éthéré par la vénération partiale de ses dévots lecteurs de la droite légitimiste du XIXe siècle puis par son héritière nationaliste d'Entre-deux-Guerres, principalement en France, qu'il convient cependant de revenir à l'heure où, à la célébration du cent cinquantième anniversaire en Savoie de la disparition des Etats éponymes répond, sur l'autre versant des Alpes occidentales, celle de l'Unità italiana. Sans prétendre évidemment concurrencer la globalité d'une analyse éclairante à plus d'un titre, puisse ainsi le cadre monographique limité de cette étude parvenir à enrichir le propos imprécis de Jean Zaganiaris sur ce point, en dépit de son mérite d'avoir exhumé, loin de ces considérations anniversaires transalpines, le débat suscité il y a cent cinquante ans par l'interprétation polémique d'un pan toujours aussi sous-estimé de la prose maistrienne.

This Action Plan is based on the World Bank's Technical Note on Consumer Protection and Financial Literacy in Azerbaijan published in June 2009. The Action Plan focuses on the Legal and Regulatory Issues of the Technical Note's Key Findings and Recommendations, proposing specific actions for Azerbaijani authorities, financial institutions and consumer organizations so that consumer protection is strengthened and made more effective and efficient. The Action Plan should be the base upon which specific legal changes should be drafted and against which their implementation should be evaluated. Beside the Technical Note itself, the Action Plan draws on best international practices and experiences of regulators and supervisors that have tried to introduce improved consumer protection in their countries. It should also be noted that a well-balanced consumer protection regime serves also the interest of financial institutions as it provides them with better informed clients and also makes sure that clients understand their obligations under the contracts they signed. The Action Plan is divided into five parts that cover the key areas based on the recommendations of the Technical Note: (a) Legal Mandate, (b) Effective Supervision and Regulation, (c) Disclosure of Information, (d) Business Practices, and (e) Dispute Resolution.

International audience ; Pour le sens commun, entretenu par un lectorat très typé, Joseph de Maistre représente bien évidemment l'apôtre de la Contre-Révolution la plus intransigeante. Au risque du poncif puisqu'avec lui peut être plus nettement encore qu'avec tout autre polémiste de pareille envergure, se pose le problème de la réception d'une œuvre paradoxale, à travers laquelle d'aucuns s'emploient depuis près de deux siècles avec une belle obstination à reconnaître l'une des sources homogène, flagrante, de théories politiques ou d'idéologies totalitaires parmi les moins recommandables.Parmi d'autres, ces dernières années, le politiste Jean Zaganiaris s'est fort heureusement astreint à l'exercice de dénonciation de telles lectures systématiquement partiales ou biaisées du corpus maistrien. Dans essai publié en 2005 il s'efforce même de rappeler comment le Maistre apparemment figé à jamais dans cette sombre posture a cependant pu être étonnamment associé à de tout autres courants de pensée, jadis, y compris de manière incidente et fugace. Il s'y attache notamment à reconstituer l'argumentaire de nos jours totalement tombé dans l'oubli visant, par exemple, à reconnaître en Joseph de Maistre non seulement un précurseur de certaines idées libérales mais aussi, avec des arguments discutables et de ce fait assez peu convaincants, de certaines propositions politiques revendiquées avec constance depuis près de deux siècles par la tradition républicaine accommodée à la mode française et parlementaire.Maistre libéral ? Vraie fausse révélation pour celui que nombre de biographes ont souvent surnommé le Montesquieu savoyard afin de rendre compte avec justesse de la posture intellectuelle, au cours d'une morne première partie d'existence de notable provincial, selon ses propres dires. Il convient pourtant d'être clair : Maistre n'est pas et n'a jamais été libéral au sens aujourd'hui parlementaire et connoté du terme. Pas plus avant 1789 qu'après ! Quand bien même il incarne sa vie durant une espèce de prototype de penseur des Lumières en magistrat éclairé dédaigneux de cet amas d'institutions d'un autre âge, issues de « lois gothiques » parasitant le fonctionnement idoine des monarchies d'Ancien Régime. Si Joseph de Maistre devient un temps la fugace égérie de militants libéraux, ce n'est donc que très indirectement, ainsi que l'a fort bien compris Jean Zaganiaris. Au surplus dans le contexte très particulier de la dissolution dans l'acide corrosif du Risorgimento, au milieu du XIXe siècle, de ce Royaume de Sardaigne dont il fut au-delà du raisonnable un serviteur fidèle et loyal, aux heures pénibles de l'exil. Curieusement, celui qui a entretenu sa vie durant des rapports particulièrement complexes — pour ne pas dire ambigus — avec son prince, voire avec sa contrée natale d'un duché de Savoie plus excentré que jamais à l'Ouest des Alpes au sein des possessions sardes dites de « Terre ferme », le cœur d'Etats de Savoie en sursis depuis 1815 et de plus en plus déroutants dans leur facture ou, tout au moins, leur logique géopolitique révélatrice de l'Ancien Régime, devient en effet sur le tard la soudaine coqueluche des courtisans ou affidés de la figure incontournable du personnel gouvernemental turinois, au cours de la décennie 1850-1860, en la personne haute en couleur du Comte Benso Camillo di Cavour. Se fondant sur la correspondance de nature diplomatique officielle, de très loin la part la plus méconnue de l'œuvre maistrienne, cette poignée de jeunes gens proposent ainsi une lecture iconoclaste de « vieux papiers » de prime abord sans grands liens, il faut le reconnaître, avec la somme devenue classique de la production spéculative légitimement passée à la postérité. C'est sur cet épisode oublié, longtemps oblitéré par la confiscation anhistorique d'un Joseph de Maistre désincarné, presque éthéré par la vénération partiale de ses dévots lecteurs de la droite légitimiste du XIXe siècle puis par son héritière nationaliste d'Entre-deux-Guerres, principalement en France, qu'il convient cependant de revenir à l'heure où, à la célébration du cent cinquantième anniversaire en Savoie de la disparition des Etats éponymes répond, sur l'autre versant des Alpes occidentales, celle de l'Unità italiana. Sans prétendre évidemment concurrencer la globalité d'une analyse éclairante à plus d'un titre, puisse ainsi le cadre monographique limité de cette étude parvenir à enrichir le propos imprécis de Jean Zaganiaris sur ce point, en dépit de son mérite d'avoir exhumé, loin de ces considérations anniversaires transalpines, le débat suscité il y a cent cinquante ans par l'interprétation polémique d'un pan toujours aussi sous-estimé de la prose maistrienne.

Transcript of interview with Francis Dubois about his experience in the U.S. Army Air Service (later the United States Army Air Corps) during World War I. He discusses his experiences during basic training, the war, being shipped to England and Ireland, and problems after the war with re-assimilation. He also discusses his opinions on subsequent wars and treatment of veterans. ; WWI Transcriptions Francis Dubois Transcriber: John Pino Date Started: 2/28/18 (Interview Begins) Fred Holder (Interviewer): This interview is taking place in the home of Mr. Francis Dubois, and I was wondering how old were you when you entered the service? Francis Dubois (Interviewee): 21 years old. Holder: And did you live in Fitchburg? Dubois: In Fitchburg, I lived on 48 Main St. at the time. Holder: What branch of service did you enter? The Army? Dubois: I was in the signal corps, forerunner of the air corps. I was in the aviation section of the signal corps. Holder: You live in Fitchburg all your life? Dubois: Born and brought up here. Holder: Were you drafted or did you volunteer? Dubois: I volunteered. Holder: When you entered the service, what did you think, you know, did it turn out to be what you expected? Dubois: Well I didn't know what to expect so I wasn't disappointed or disillusioned either. Either way, I just accepted it as it came. Holder: What was your family's attitude what was your parents' feelings about you going off to the war? Dubois: To be frank with you I don't know what their attitude might have been, I did not consult with them. I merely enlisted and that was it. Holder: Where'd you do your basic training? Dubois: Basic training was down in Waco, Texas, 3 months down there. Holder: What kind of- what did it consist of mostly? Dubois: Well drilling, that was entirely drilling. In the mud fields down there. Holder: What'd you do before the war? Dubois: I was in business at 748 Main St. as a photographer. Holder: And when you came back did you go back into photography? Dubois: I went back into photography. Holder: When you were um, when you went into the service, you went in as a private obviously, what was the pay like then? (Dubois and a person in the background start laughing) Dubois: Well I was fortunate, I got in when the pay was raised from 15 to 30$ for private. Holder: Is that a month? Dubois: That's a month, and there was a 10% increase if you served overseas. Holder: Did you serve overseas? Dubois: I did. Holder: Where sir? Dubois: From April to December, I went to England and Ireland. I did not get to France. Holder: When you went overseas, did you go over in the big transports? Dubois: I went over in an English ship, the Armadale Cassilan. It was a converted cruiser. Holder: When you um, when you were in England, what was the feelings of the people towards you? Dubois: When we got there it was very poor. They complained that we came over there after the war had been lost (intense depression and nihilism felt in England?). Holder: When was that? Dubois: In April (1917?). Holder: As you were there, over time did peoples' impressions improve? Dubois: What I told these people is "just wait a few months and see!" (Laughter) Dubois: "And by August things will turn and change." Holder: What rank were you by the time you were overseas, were you still a private? Dubois: No I was a corporal, that was as high as I got. Holder: That's as high as you got. How long were you in the service? Dubois: A year and 3 days. Holder: What type of food did you have when you were overseas? Dubois: In England well… not too hot, not too good. Our best meal over there was New Zealand rabbits. (Laughter) Dubois: And this may sound corny to you but uh, we would scrape the maggots off of them before we ate them. Holder: (Disgusted groan) (Man laughing in background) Dubois: Well, before we cooked them and ate them let me put it that way. In their raw state we scraped them first. Holder (somewhat bewildered by the previous conversation): Umm… The equipment that you were supplied with was it good? Dubois: Uhh, the "equipment?" What do you mean the "equipment?" Holder: Umm, well, like during your basic training were the rifles more or less new or were they old or the uniforms? Things of this nature. Dubois: The uniforms were alright, they were woolen uniforms. But as far as equipment or rifles and armaments go, I had a gun strapped to my waist for 48 hours. Two 24 hour stretches and I handled a rifle for about 30 seconds. Never drilled with a rifle. Holder: Now umm, your officers, how did they treat you? Dubois: Hm? Holder: The officers, how did they treat you sir? Dubois: We had American officers, they were alright. Holder: How did you feel towards them? Dubois: They were there and they used me alright so I can't complain. (Chuckles in background) Holder (chortling): You were one of the lucky ones I guess. Before you went overseas and you didn't enlist in the war what did you think you were going to fight for? Dubois: Well to put down the Kaiser (Kaiser Wilhelm II, emperor of Imperial Germany). And that was about it. To put an end to his uhh, well his aggressiveness. Holder: What was your view, well, how did you feel towards the German people? Was there animosity built up or? Dubois: Well, I can't say that I held any animosity toward them. Any more than I suppose they held for the American people. Holder: Now how about um… you said you didn't make it to France, did you meet any French officers maybe in England or any in Ireland? Dubois: No, I didn't meet any of em', but I was informed that had it lasted two weeks longer; I would have been in France. Holder: Um, when you came back- Dubois: I went to Ireland before I came back I went to Ireland from England. Holder: Did you like the Irish people better than the English? Dubois: Oh it was great over there! We could do anything and get away with anything! (Laughter) Dubois: The food was great over there! Good meat and everything else! Holder: What'd you do in Ireland? Dubois: I was training there also, continued training they tried to make and airplane mechanic out of me. But I am not mechanically inclined, but they said "You're a mechanic," so I was a mechanic! Of sorts… (Laughter) Holder: Were you married during this time? Dubois: No I was single. I wasn't married until 2 years after I got back. Holder: Did you know the missus before you married here? Dubois: This is the missus (gestures over to his wife, who starts chuckling), she was a lady friend at that time. Holder: What was her feelings towards you being overseas? Dubois: I dunno, she never told me! (Dubois and his wife laugh) She could answer that for herself! Holder: Um, when you came back, what was the attitude of people upon your return? Were you a conquering hero or were they just happy to see you back or? Dubois: We received a nice welcome in New York harbor. They had all the fireboats squirtin' water up, I dunno how high but uh, a great welcome back. The only thing is that when you try to get back to where you were when you left. Assume the role that you have been in when you left, it was not so nice. You were a great guy when you went, but you were one of those fellas when you come back. Try to assume your place. Holder: Did you have trouble getting back to your photographer's job when you got back or things of this nature? Dubois: Uhh, slightly. Slightly. Holder: How about when you came back uhh, to Fitchburg and tried to set up your photography and- Dubois: Well that's what I'm talking about. Holder: Did the veterans' office help you at all? Dubois: The veterans were alright towards me but the uhh, competition I had left behind, they weren't so nice. They expected me to stay over there. Holder: So um, when you did come back though, the veterans' office at that time did they help you out in perhaps- Dubois: Well in WWI, the veterans didn't get much help from the government (important point) or anything else. Holder: You didn't receive your bonuses, how did you feel about that? Dubois: I uhh, I received a bonus… uhh. I forget how many years it was after I was discharged. But I did get a bonus. Holder: At the time you were supposed to get it, I dunno, very soon afterwards. How did you feel when you didn't get them, like a number of veterans didn't when they marched on Washington? (reference to the Bonus Army, when 4,000 disgruntled WWI veterans marched on Washington in 1932 to get their promised bonus in the immediate aftermath of the war) Dubois: We didn't anticipate we were gonna get em' so we weren't disappointed. Holder: So you weren't very surprised when you didn't get it after all. Dubois: No. Holder: What other benefits did you receive from the service? Dubois: What benefits? Holder: Yeah. Dubois: Well I dunno I think it toughened my body a little bit. It taught me a lot of things, I met a lot of different people. And I think that uhh, that's about what I got out of it. Holder: Now what kind of benefits did you get from say umm, in a monetary way from the government after you got out? Dubois: Oh I didn't… (Dubois thinks for a moment) I think we were given on discharge a ticket home and $60. Now I won't swear to the $60, I'm not too sure about it now. But afterwards I did get $950 when they paid the bonus. Holder: Um, in World War II did you see any service there sir? Dubois: World War II I was on the draft board in Fitchburg. Holder (sarcastically): Ehh that must have been a fun job. (Dubois wife laughs) Dubois: It was a good job. Holder: Was that more difficult than actually going over? Dubois: Much more, much more abuse too. And, it was an expense to anybody that was on the draft board. You paid for your own expenses, your own transportation. They gave you about a gallon of gas a month which you had to pay for, to get to and from the meetings. And that's about it. Holder: Now your chapter of the local legion, when did you join that organization? Dubois: I joined the American legion in 1919. And in 1948 I started the Cloygon(?) post 429. As first commander, I have been in office for quite a few years. I've been on the executive board, I've been the finance officer. Then I've pulled out for a while and now I'm back in again. Holder: What's the role of your organization now? Dubois: Well they try to uhh, induce patriotism. Watch out for the benefits of the veterans, their wives and children, the widows. It's a service organization. (Holder adjusts the microphone) Holder: Um, when you look back on the war, when you went over and everything, did you think it did you a lot of good going overseas like that? Dubois: Going overseas? Holder: Right. Dubois: Well it broadened my perspective of the world and its people. Cause' I met people on their own standing ground so to speak. I met the English in England, I was at camp Naughtyash. And I was at Sheffield airdromes. Holder: Would you ever go overseas again? Dubois: No. Holder: No? Huh. Did you ever meet any of those people overseas, did they come over to the United States? Dubois: There was one couple I met over there and they came to Boston. And I met them in Boston. And they came to Fitchburg once, that's the extent of it. Holder: Now um, when you look back on World War I, and you look back at World War II do you think that World War I really accomplished what you set out to do? Dubois: It's very evident we did not, World War I was supposed to be "the war to end all wars" (very popular phrase at the time of the war, coined by H.G. Wells), and I don't have to tell you any more of what's happened since. Holder: Now does it leave you disillusioned or disheartened or anything of that nature? Dubois: Oh no, that's life, that's the world. We're not all of the same mind so where's there a difference of opinion… sometimes it gets a little. well. a little "belligerent" if you wish. Holder: Umm, when you look back again at World War I, what experience sticks out most in your mind? Dubois: Nothing in particular now, not at this time. It's all in the dim past now all the edges have worn off, there's nothing that stands out now. Holder: When you came back to Fitchburg ya know, the general people, not the competition you said you were having trouble with, the average people, where they very helpful to you? Dubois: They were all nice to me. Except the competition. Holder: Right. Dubois: I can't complain about them. Holder: You're retired now I assume? Dubois: Yes. Holder: Umm, you've lived in Fitchburg all your life, you ever thought you'd like to, go over again? Dubois: Well I have had that thought but uhh, I dunno I like to stay at home now. My traveling days I feel are all behind me. The desire to travel has left me. Holder: Now, again, you know, when you look back at World War I and it was the "war to end all wars" and it failed and then World War II, um, when you look at World War I compared to World War II, does anything stick out in your mind there? Anything at all that you were thinking of? Dubois: Well one thing that does uhh, is the comparison of the treatment of the boys, what they get and what we got. When we got out, you're on your own and that's about it. When the World War II come along, they get all kinds of compensation, they get the education. They want to buy a house, they're helped to do that. Those are the things, the contrast that stands out in my mind. And as yet, the World War I veteran has not got a bonafide pension! You get a disability pension but not a right pension, they never gave it! And 20 years after the Spanish-American War, the Spanish-American War veterans got a pension (interesting, why no pensions for WWI vets? Can't be an issue of time period as pensions existed even before the Great War). An outright pension! World War I are the ones that the government forgot. Holder: Is that- now, Woodrow Wilson was president then and do you hold it against the Democrats that you never got a pension? Dubois: Well I can't say that the Democrats or the Republicans if one is as bad as the other. When it comes to giving it to the veterans, one is as bad as the other. Although I think the Democrats have been a little more liberal. But they've put the lid on too. Holder: Do you think that the American Legion should campaign more actively to get their- Dubois: It's pretty hard I think for them to campaign more actively than they are doing. Holder: What type of things are they doing to try and get it for em'? Dubois: Well they have a lobby in Washington and then there's a lot of literature that's spread around. A lot of the articles you read in the newspaper originate with the American Legion. And also with other veterans' organizations. We're not alone in this. Holder: Now, what do you think about other organizations? Why did you join the American Legion instead of one of the other ones? Dubois: It was the first one that I was able to join when I got out of the service. I did not join the veterans of foreign wars for, well… particular reasons that I didn't like at the time when it was available. But I have since joined the DAV, and I am a member of the Veterans of World War I. I belong to 3 organizations. Holder: Now, are you active in all 3? Dubois: No. Holder: Just the American Legion? Dubois: Just the Legion. Holder: The American Legion is famous for sponsoring things like baseball and baseball teams and what not and things like Flag Day and things of this nature, what other types of things do they do? Dubois: Well there are a lot of things that are not shown on the surface. We sponsor a lot of things, we've got 3 Eagle Scouts coming up, that we sponsor. We pay for their badges and so forth. A school needs a flag, we give it to them. Any new troop that starts, they come to the Legion for a flag or whatever they need. There's donations made to all these… call em' charities if you wish, the Christmas Seals, Easter Seals, you name em' all those things. We contribute to them and we sponsor different things. We have the Sally League coming up in Fitchburg. Where the Cloygon post is going to sponsor the entire league! Not just a part of it. We have sponsored the uhh, Little League at times. But we've discontinued that. We did have a team in the Legion baseball, but due to lack of interest by the players we've discontinued that. Holder: When you were overseas, did any of your friends get sent over into France and actually get wounded? Dubois: Yes, some of them got killed. Holder: Besides the obvious pain and loss, what was your reaction to that? Did it give you any doubts of why you should be there? Dubois: I never gave it any thought. Holder: You never gave it any thought? Dubois: No, I never gave a thought about it. Holder: Were any friends of yours or anybody you happened to know highly decorated? Dubois: Yes, there is one, here in Fitchburg. A fella by the name of Bouchet. He'd been highly decorated. Holder: Now you were not with him when he got the decorations obviously? Dubois: No I was not with him at all in the service. Holder: What was your reaction when you see him compared to you, when he got into the action, did you want to get into the action? Dubois: Its uhh, it's one of the things that you hanker for a little bit when you're in the service. You feel that you're being left out of the show. But, that's the way it was. I never wanted to be in the infantry, that's for sure. And this fella was in the infantry. I was in the aviation part, I had hoped to be an aerial photographer. But, that's the army you know, they put you where they feel like it. So many names down the list and you're that, regardless of what you were doing before, unless you had a lot of political influence, you just went where they sent you. Holder: Now what about when you were being transported overseas on the British ship there, were you worried about the U-boats? Dubois: You always looked out for them but during the last 2 days they were right with us. 2 days out from England, there were 2 U-boats in the pack of transport ships of 13 boats, and we were in the center, and there was a U-boat on each side. On each side of the boat, now at that particular time I had been on watch all night, so I was sleeping down at the bottom of the boat, until they started to throw out depth charges. Then I got up in a hurry like everybody else. We got up on deck hoping to see some action but all we saw was when they throw over the depth charges.

The twentieth century (characterized by the gruesome and haze of horror of two World Wars, the Cold Wars-CW, dictatorships, civil wars, genocides, etc.) has seen a great transformation in warfare but to the expense of the innocent civilians and yet in the full view of regulatory internationally recognized war-laws. So, if at one point in history, civilian populations hardly suffered war directly, the order of the state of affairs has now changed. Many civilians perish simply because warlords so desire; extremes of violence, killings and destruction of property is predominantly preferred. As if that is not enough, the indifference of the majority of the public in tranquil zones of the world towards the fate of the civilians in zones under by fire kind of provide implicit licenses to violence planners to do whatever it takes to "win". Consequently, great numbers of survivors are seen trying to escape from situations of assured death to that of probable death. It is against this background that we feel moved to take on this dissertation. Bearing in mind the generally complex and challenging contemporary conflicts that acutely breeds volatile security environments (for civilians), our thesis is that there needed to be an increased, noteworthy and continued applicable innovation of approaches to civilian protection. To be precise, as a strategy to sustainable peace, we have aspired after a world where the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (UNPKD) is not singly considered the sole custodian of the concept of civilian protection but (based on contexts and cases) as one but a leader among other stakeholders (local and foreign) able and ready to contribute to the common-pool of operational arenas. Thinking about these other stake holders, we have in this work stood by those that: firstly, move towards more civilian-centered operations that are; secondly, carried out by (a mixture of grassroots and international) unarmed civilians by means of; thirdly, engages nonviolent approaches and practices that in themselves anticipate the basic constituents of successive bottom-up Peacemaking (PK) and Peacebuilding (PB) in the hic et nunc of their Peacekeeping (PK) initiatives and applications. All these basics, in our view, do not just add up to drawing a continuous line that intersects the just mentioned Three Approaches to Peace (PK, PM, PB) coined by Johan Galtung way back in 1975; they also open avenues to sustainability. The thesis is taken on through three different parts; each subdivided into two chapters. With due attention to intrastate contemporary violent conflicts, the first part tries to demonstrate the reason why in PK there has been indeed need for rethinking the protection of civilians (PoC) and/or for enriching the methods until now employed in bringing it about. In the first chapter of the part, we kind of gave a sketchy attention to the historical journey that the patterns of violent conflicts in relation to the fate of non-combatants have made. It emerges that, unlike in the past, the pattern of contemporary violent conflict, especially with reference to the CW (especially in third-world countries) and post-CW periods, have become severely complex to handle. Wars have continued and proved to be very hot especially on the populations on the periphery; on those who are minimally directly concerned with and honestly ignorant of its objectives. In the period in question, these innocent men, women and children are more than ever struck hard not just by its direct consequences but also the indirect ones and their hopes are constantly put at the brink of mere survival and of the grave. Mores so the lucky ones who manage to escape these snares, continue to unwaveringly hope for bread, freedom, justice and peace, instead of iron that kills and destroys. In chapter II of the same part, looking at the commitments borne by the UN right from its early years in keeping, initially, the interstate and successively also the intrastate peace (of those tormented by reign of violence and terror), we acknowledge the strides gradually taken along the years. These strides has better late than never embraced a multidimensional point in time where civilian protection counts as a primacy. Accordingly, we recognize that the UN military PK is certainly capable of reducing the level of tension in conflicts but we also negated that, by so doing, it is able to guarantee a durable peace not only because of the application of the non-peaceful means which is limited to separating the conflicting parties but also because it lacks the strategic concern of fostering an active citizenship which is a basic ingredient to democratic populace. In Part Two, we have concentrated on the vision and the peculiar picture of the practitioners of the alternative way, particularly; the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) which operates on a benchmark of bottom-up strategic empowerment of local civilian unarmed and nonviolent efforts by international unarmed and nonviolent civilians to protect civilians, prevent, reduce and stop violent conflicts. The first chapter of this second part begins by singling out some of the nuts and bolts (Like: The centrality of sustainability; strategic, local and multilevel capacity and relational empowerment and mediation for peace; conflict transformation as the adequate language; nonviolence and nonpartisanship as a philosophy) that make Unarmed Civilian Protection (UCP) stands out faithfully to the above stated aspirations. Without giving importance to the chronological specifics and with a particular reference to the assessment of the practicality of the project that, on a later date, would organizationally become the NP, an extensive attention is paid to the vicissitudes that surrounded the founding of this UCP protection agency and especially to the foundations of the formative elements entailed. Chapter II does not only build on the findings and stimuli of Chapter I, it supersedes it and makes real a new and distinct reality. Herein, a unique place is devoted to the formative components reserved to the practitioners as a strategy for guaranteeing the competencies and high professionalism needed for the successful execution of field strategies attached to the NP UCP objectives, principles, key methods and practices. Through the analysis of the UCP Training Course entitled "Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect Civilians; A joint UNITAR- Nonviolent Peaceforce online Course" the chapter tries to show how the activities of the organization intrinsically flow from its very being; from elements which define it. And this is illustrated in how the very life of the NP UCP is blended with its formative spirit and content; a sort of transformative training that seeks to promote transformative operational frameworks that applicable to situations and contexts. The third part of the work is an applied one. It is dedicated to our chosen case study, namely, NP's intervention in the longtime violence-stricken Republic of South Sudan; in a country which (Thomas Hobbes would say) has once again reverted to its natural state; a harsh reality of hand to mouth living and a never ending search for sustenance in an ambiance virtually challenging to change. In chapter I, the pragmatic implementation of NP UCP in strengthening the local civilians' capacity, security and sense of safety in situation of violent conflict is marked out. Here, some concrete instances of this intervention are presented to exemplify the claim that a multiple base of actors (UCPs, the inviting civil society and/or local NGOs of an UCP presence and local partners) can sustainably and strategically provide the PoC work that for a long time was and is still largely entrusted to the military. And at the end of the day PK, PM, PB resources are considered to consist in not only financial and material supports, but also, and (in the same way) importantly, the socio-cultural resources of the affected people. And in this way people in conflict settings are seen as resources rather than recipients. Even though we evidently confirmed that the alternative way counts exceptionally big in strategically promoting, developing, and implementing sustainable unarmed civilian PK as a tool for preventing, reducing and stopping violence and protecting civilians in situations of violent conflict, we also acknowledge that it is not without challenges. These are actually what chapter two of the part extensively dwells on. The second chapter is instead dedicated (at length) to looking at the challenges that NP faces not only with regard to its missions lands but also in general. We have gone about this in the form of a comprehensive assessment and in some humble recommendations are advanced. Among these challenges we have particularly paid attention to issues like: The meager UCP funding and the dominant top-down mentality; the violent bully character of some major world power wielders; the need for more practitioners to carry out UCP; the dynamicity and complexity of conflict nature as a challenge; conflict prevention challenges like delays in capturing the signs of time so as to effectively intervene; the presence of spoilers as a challenge; the challenge of effective sustainable credibility. Recommendations proposed include among others: Investing in systematic reflections on the extent of the progress and failures so far registered in efforts to involve the UN, regional bodies and other donor agencies or individuals in the cause of NP (UCP) and reflecting on the philosophy that underpins the reasons why financial assistance to UCP and NP in particular is founded; more emphasis on the already existing engagement with political leaders and other influential people and embarking on popular campaigns to propagate a concretely evidenced knowledge of the feasibility of the alternative way, instituting and investing in "School Project" (dedicated to preferably to high schools) within the NP Advocacy and Outreach office and insisting on the positives of volunteers' contribution; enriching a little more the content of the just elaborated online UCP training course; etc. Hereafter, the general conclusion of our dissertation will be drawn. A profound acknowledgement of the UNPK pivotal role with its actual multidimensional fronts in PK basically intended as PoC specifically in the contemporary intrastate violent conflicts. It is also observed that, thanks to the appropriate blending of local and international capacities giving priority to the former, UCP's strategic approach to PK (which is not limited to the PoCs but is also anchored to preventing, reducing and ending not just those that are already on but also lays for standing up to the future possible ones) could be counted on. Thus far, it is on one hand, admissible that, despite all the challenges that there may be, NP (UCP) mechanisms is already proffering a great deal to this end, and on the other, it is evident that it can and should still do more. The ability of its interventions to stand the test of time and to stand up to the future conflicts (i.e. its sustainability) resides in a time which is not yet at hand and in the continuous involvement and inventiveness of many. As per now, if the Italian proverb "Il buongiorno si vede dal mattino" (Meaning: You can tell how something will go by how it begins) holds, then it is, up till now, realistic to count on NP as one of the most outstanding Bottom-up UCP organizations in the PoC in (selected) contemporary violent conflict situations. All that is needed is the building and the consolidation of international interest and support for UCP that presents the hope and reality of alternatives to over dependence on armed intervention; alternatives that chances the revitalization of local communities and the restoration of the social fabrics and capital of the affected people.