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International audience ; Why do some societies have political institutions that support productively inefficient outcomes? And why does the political power of elites vested in these outcomes often grow over time, even when they are unable to block more efficient modes of production? We propose an explanation centered on the interplay between political and cultural change. We build a model in which cultural values are transmitted inter-generationally. The cultural composition of society, in turn, determines public-goods provision as well as the future political power of elites from different cultural groups. We characterize the equilibrium of the model and provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of cultural revivals. These are characterized as movements in which both the cultural composition of society as well as the political power of elites who are vested in productively inefficient outcomes grow over time. We reveal the usefulness of our framework by applying it to two case studies: the Jim Crow South and Turkey's Gülen Movement.

ABSTRACT The state of Pará harbors a significant portion of regional vegetation, and this opens the economic gaze towards the profitability - legal and illicit, that the forest can generate through logging. The environmental crimes law was created to combat and punish environmental illicit activities such as illegal logging. In this sense, the general objective is to carry out the environmental economic analysis regarding the seizure of illegal timber of processes processed / finalized and under the jurisdiction of the archives of the Forum of Santarém-Pa, registered in the years 2006-2016. The data come from cataloging carried out in the archive of the Santarém Forum, tabulating: the year of infraction; the type of person who committed the crime; the type of cargo seized - identifying the volumetry and species (s); as well as the fine imposed by environmental agents and the final fine paid. From this, through statistical programs, the methodological technique of estimating the cost-benefit of the illegal logging market was applied, which made the comparison of the estimated value of the environmental economic burden, with the fine that was paid by the offender after the final decision given by the judge. The analysis of the results was based on the specificity of law 9.605 / 98 regarding illegal logging and, in the economic theory of Gary Becker, focused on analysis of criminal activities. In summary, it was observed in the results that the estimated value of the cargo seized, in almost all the cases was greater than the applied fine, the latter being still able to be paid in installments, making the environmental recovery a minimum. Evidently, if the initial penalty were applied, the average profit margin of the offender would be approximately 31.74% in relation to the potential benefit which, according to Becker's theory, would keep the illegal activity in full employment of operation. However, the results indicate that, on average, that profit margin of the potential crime benefit is approximately 67%, which makes illegal logging attractive and rewarding, since the "potential benefit" of the activity has been well above the economic costs of penalties. Therefore, it is necessary to apply more effectively the law on environmental crimes, in addition to governance activities in relation to the hiring of more environmental agents for prevention, combat and seizure of charges that are outside the law, as well as greater activity of the judgment of the proceedings. KEYWORDS: Right; Legislation; Economy of Crime; Marketplace; Wood. ; O estado do Pará abriga uma parcela significativa de vegetação regional e, isso abre o olhar econômico voltado para a lucratividade - lícita e ilícita, que a floresta pode gerar através da atividade madeireira. A lei de crimes ambientais foi criada para combater e punir ilícitos ambientais, como a exploração de madeira ilegal. Neste sentido, o objetivo geral é realizar a análise econômico ambiental acerca da apreensão de madeira ilegal de processos tramitados/julgados e finalizados sob a jurisdição do arquivo do Fórum de Santarém-Pa, registrados nos anos de 2006-2016. Os dados são provenientes de catalogação realizados no arquivo do Fórum de Santarém, tabulando: o ano de infração; o tipo de pessoa que cometeu o crime; o tipo da carga apreendida - identificando a volumetria e a(s) espécie(s); assim também como a multa aplicada pelos agentes ambientais e a multa final paga. A partir disso, através de programas estatísticos, aplicou-se a técnica metodológicas da estimação do custo-benefício da mercado madeireiro ilegal, o qual fez-se a comparação do valor estimado da carga - perda econômica ambiental, com a multa que foi paga pelo infrator após a deliberação final dado pelo juiz. A análise dos resultados baseou-se na especificidade da Lei 9.605/98 quanto a exploração ilegal madeireira e, na teoria econômica de Gary Becker, voltada para análise das atividades criminosas. Em suma, foi observado nos resultados que o valor estimado da carga apreendida, em quase a totalidade dos casos foi maior que a multa aplicada, este último podendo ainda ser pago de forma parcelada, fazendo com que a recomposição ambiental seja mínima. Evidencia-se que, caso fosse aplicado a pena inicial, a margem de lucro média do infrator seria de, aproximadamente, 31,74% em relação ao benefício potencial o que, conforme a teoria de Becker, manteria a atividade ilegal em pleno emprego de funcionamento. Contudo, os resultados apontam que, em média, aquela margem de lucro do valor do benefício potencial do crime é de, aproximadamente 67%, o que torna a atividade madeireira ilegal atrativa e compensadora, pois o "benefício potencial" da atividade, tem sido bastante superior aos custos econômicos das penalidades. Portanto, faz-se necessário a aplicabilidade com mais eficiência na Lei de crimes ambientais, além de atividades de governança em relação a contratação de mais agentes ambientais para prevenção, combate e apreensão de cargas que se encontram fora da ilegalidade, como também maior atividade do judiciário no julgamento dos processos. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Direito; Legislação; Economia; Crime; Madeira.

В статье анализируется научная концепция «безопасность – состояние защищенности». Отмечается, что категория «безопасность» является предметом исследования различных отраслей права, а также политологии, социологии, экономической теории и других наук. Констатируется, что общепризнанное понятие этого явления в настоящее время отсутствует, что объясняется чрезвычайной сложностью и внутренними противоречиями указанного феномена. Обращается внимание на то, что попытки дать определение категории «безопасность» на общем уровне (а не в отношении конкретного предметного исследования) носят декларативный характер или представляют собой не более, чем толкование слова без раскрытия реального содержания понятия, которое этим словом обозначаются. В советский период господствующим был подход к пониманию безопасности как состояния защищенности. После распада СССР многие исследователи начали не только искать новые подходы, но и критически осмысливать господствующую ранее концепцию. На основании проведенного анализа в статье обосновывается, что ни один из приведенных в научной литературе аргументов не убеждает в том, что концепция понимания безопасности как состояния защищенности является устаревшей и несоответствующей сегодняшним реалиям. Поэтому отказываться от ее авторы статьи считают неуместным. В ст. 3 Конституции Украины провозглашено, что человек, его жизнь и здоровье, честь и достоинство, неприкосновенность и безопасность признаются в Украине наивысшей социальной ценностью. В иерархии указанных существенных благ Конституция Украины прежде всего выделяет жизнь и здоровье, которые являются неотъемлемыми свойствами любого человека. О приоритетности защиты жизни и здоровья человека можно судить по тому, что соответствующий раздел находится почти в самом начале Особенной части Уголовного кодекса Украины, сразу после «Преступлений против основ национальной безопасности Украины». Вместе с тем следует отметить, что вред жизни и здоровью человека может быть причинен не только вследствие совершения преступлений, ответственность за которые предусмотрена в разделе II Особенной части УК. Система построения последнего, прежде всего по признаку объектов уголовно-правовой охраны, позволяет выявить, что как дополнительный объект жизнь и здоровье охраняются непосредственно (вместе с основным) или опосредованно нормами почти всех разделов Особенной части. Кроме того, в отдельных случаях, которые корреспондируют соответствующим сферам, создается определенная защитная оболочка, в построении которой задействуются и нормы УК, которая призвана нивелировать (или хотя бы минимизировать, то есть свести вероятность опасности близкой к нулю) возможность причинения вреда жизни и здоровью человека. Речь, в первую очередь, идет об уголовно-правовом обеспечении с помощью уголовно-правовых норм охраны общественной (общественной) безопасности, безопасности производства и безопасности движения и эксплуатации транспорта. Кроме того, на уровне видового объекта отношения безопасности охраняются и в других главах УК. Это касается, в частности, экологической безопасности, которая охраняется нормами раздела VIII Особенной части УК. Доказывается, что функциональная несхожесть между собой уголовно-правовых норм, содержащихся в раздел VIII Особенной части УК, дает основания для выделения в нем менее двух видовых объектов: отношений по сохранности природных объектов и экологической безопасности. ; The article analyzes the scientific concept of «security – a state of safety». It is noted that the category «security» is the subject of research in various branches of law, as well as political science, sociology, economic theory and other sciences. It is stated that there is currently no universally accepted concept of this phenomenon, which is due to the extreme complexity and internal contradictions of this phenomenon. Attention is drawn to the fact that attempts to define the category «security» at the general level (and not regarding a specific case study) are declarative in nature or no more than an interpretation of the word without revealing the real content of the concept that the word denotes. In the Soviet period, the dominant approach was to understanding security as a state of safety. After the collapse of the USSR, a lot of researchers began not only to look for new approaches, but also to critically understand the previously prevailing concept. Based on the analysis, the article justifies that none of the arguments given in the scientific literature convinces that the concept of understanding safety as a state of security is outdated and inconsistent with today's realities. Therefore, the authors of the article consider it inappropriate to refuse. Art. 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine proclaims the human being, his or her life and health, honour and dignity, inviolability and security are recognised in Ukraine as the highest social value. In the hierarchy of these essential benefits, the Constitution of Ukraine first identifies life and health, which are essential properties of any person. The priority of protecting human life and health can be concluded on the basis that the corresponding chapter is located almost at the very beginning of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, immediately after «Crimes against the foundations of national security of Ukraine honour». However, it should be noted that harm to human life and health can be caused not only by the commission of crimes for which responsibility is provided for in chapter II of the Special Part of the Criminal Code. The system of building of this legal act, primarily on the basis of the objects of criminal legal protection, allows us to identify that life and health are directly protected as an additional object (together with the main) or indirectly protected by the norms of almost all sections of the Special Part. In addition, in certain cases that correspond to the relevant areas, a certain protective shell is created, in the construction of which the Criminal Code norms are also used, which is called up to level (or at least minimize, that is, reduce the probability of danger close to zero) the possibility of causing harm to human life and health. First of all, we are talking about criminal law provision through criminal law norms for the protection of public (common) security, occupational safety, traffic safety and safety of transport operations. In addition, at the level of a species object, security relations are protected in other chapters of the Criminal Code. This applies, in particular, to environmental safety, which is protected by the norms of section VIII of the Special Part of the Criminal Code. It is proved that the functional inconsistency of the criminal law norms contained in chapter VIII of the Special Part of the Criminal Code gives grounds for the allocation at least two species objects in it: relations on the preservation of natural objects and environmental safety. ; У статті аналізується наукова концепція «безпека – стан захищеності». Зазначається, що категорія «безпека» є предметом дослідження різних галузей права, а також політології, соціології, економічної теорії й інших наук. Констатується, що загальновизнане поняття цього явища нині відсутнє, що пояснюється надзвичайною складністю і внутрішніми суперечностями зазначеного феномену. Звертається увага на те, що спроби надати визначення категорії «безпека» на загальному рівні (а не щодо конкретного предметного дослідження) мають декларативний характер або являють собою не більше, ніж тлумачення слова без розкриття реального змісту поняття, яке цим словом позначаються. В радянський період панівним був підхід до розуміння безпеки як стану захищеності. Після розпаду СРСР багато дослідників почали не лише шукати нові підходи, а й критично осмислювати панівну раніше концепцію. На підставі проведеного аналізу в статті обґрунтовується, що жоден із наведених у науковій літературі аргументів не переконує у тому, що концепція розуміння безпеки як стану захищеності є застарілою і такою, що не відповідає реаліям сьогодення. Тому відмовлятися він неї автори статті вважають недоречним. У ст. 3 Конституції України проголошено, що людина, її життя і здоров'я, честь і гідність, недоторканність і безпека визнаються в Україні найвищою соціальною цінністю. В ієрархії зазначених найсуттєвіших благ Конституція України насамперед виділяє життя і здоров'я, які є невід'ємними властивостями будь-якої людини. Про пріоритетність захисту життя і здоров'я людини можна судити з того, що відповідний розділ знаходиться майже на самому початку Особливої частини Кримінального кодексу України, одразу після «Злочинів проти основ національної безпеки України». Водночас слід відзначити, що шкода життю і здоров'ю людини може бути спричинена не лише внаслідок учинення злочинів, відповідальність за які передбачено в розділі ІІ Особливої частини КК. Система побудови останнього, передусім за ознакою об'єктів кримінально-правової охорони, дозволяє виявити, що як додатковий об'єкт життя та здоров'я охороняються безпосередньо (разом з основним) або опосередковано нормами майже усіх розділів Особливої частини. Крім того, в окремих випадках, що кореспондують відповідним сферам, створюється певна захисна оболонка, в побудові якої задіюються й норми КК, яка покликана нівелювати (чи хоча б мінімізувати, тобто звести ймовірність небезпеки близькою до нуля) можливість спричинення шкоди життю і здоров'ю людини. Мова, у першу чергу, йде про кримінально-правове забезпечення за допомогою кримінально-правових норм охорони громадської (суспільної) безпеки, безпеки виробництва та безпеки руху та експлуатації транспорту. Крім того, на рівні видового об'єкта відносини безпеки охороняються і в інших розділах КК. Це стосується, зокрема, екологічної безпеки, що охороняється нормами розділу VIII Особливої частини КК. Доводиться, що функціональна несхожість між собою кримінально-правових норм, що містяться у розділі VIII Особливої частини КК, дає підстави для виділення в ньому принаймні двох видових об'єктів: відносин щодо збереження природних об'єктів та екологічної безпеки.

В статье анализируется научная концепция «безопасность – состояние защищенности». Отмечается, что категория «безопасность» является предметом исследования различных отраслей права, а также политологии, социологии, экономической теории и других наук. Констатируется, что общепризнанное понятие этого явления в настоящее время отсутствует, что объясняется чрезвычайной сложностью и внутренними противоречиями указанного феномена. Обращается внимание на то, что попытки дать определение категории «безопасность» на общем уровне (а не в отношении конкретного предметного исследования) носят декларативный характер или представляют собой не более, чем толкование слова без раскрытия реального содержания понятия, которое этим словом обозначаются. В советский период господствующим был подход к пониманию безопасности как состояния защищенности. После распада СССР многие исследователи начали не только искать новые подходы, но и критически осмысливать господствующую ранее концепцию. На основании проведенного анализа в статье обосновывается, что ни один из приведенных в научной литературе аргументов не убеждает в том, что концепция понимания безопасности как состояния защищенности является устаревшей и несоответствующей сегодняшним реалиям. Поэтому отказываться от ее авторы статьи считают неуместным. В ст. 3 Конституции Украины провозглашено, что человек, его жизнь и здоровье, честь и достоинство, неприкосновенность и безопасность признаются в Украине наивысшей социальной ценностью. В иерархии указанных существенных благ Конституция Украины прежде всего выделяет жизнь и здоровье, которые являются неотъемлемыми свойствами любого человека. О приоритетности защиты жизни и здоровья человека можно судить по тому, что соответствующий раздел находится почти в самом начале Особенной части Уголовного кодекса Украины, сразу после «Преступлений против основ национальной безопасности Украины». Вместе с тем следует отметить, что вред жизни и здоровью человека может быть причинен не только вследствие совершения преступлений, ответственность за которые предусмотрена в разделе II Особенной части УК. Система построения последнего, прежде всего по признаку объектов уголовно-правовой охраны, позволяет выявить, что как дополнительный объект жизнь и здоровье охраняются непосредственно (вместе с основным) или опосредованно нормами почти всех разделов Особенной части. Кроме того, в отдельных случаях, которые корреспондируют соответствующим сферам, создается определенная защитная оболочка, в построении которой задействуются и нормы УК, которая призвана нивелировать (или хотя бы минимизировать, то есть свести вероятность опасности близкой к нулю) возможность причинения вреда жизни и здоровью человека. Речь, в первую очередь, идет об уголовно-правовом обеспечении с помощью уголовно-правовых норм охраны общественной (общественной) безопасности, безопасности производства и безопасности движения и эксплуатации транспорта. Кроме того, на уровне видового объекта отношения безопасности охраняются и в других главах УК. Это касается, в частности, экологической безопасности, которая охраняется нормами раздела VIII Особенной части УК. Доказывается, что функциональная несхожесть между собой уголовно-правовых норм, содержащихся в раздел VIII Особенной части УК, дает основания для выделения в нем менее двух видовых объектов: отношений по сохранности природных объектов и экологической безопасности. ; The article analyzes the scientific concept of «security – a state of safety». It is noted that the category «security» is the subject of research in various branches of law, as well as political science, sociology, economic theory and other sciences. It is stated that there is currently no universally accepted concept of this phenomenon, which is due to the extreme complexity and internal contradictions of this phenomenon. Attention is drawn to the fact that attempts to define the category «security» at the general level (and not regarding a specific case study) are declarative in nature or no more than an interpretation of the word without revealing the real content of the concept that the word denotes. In the Soviet period, the dominant approach was to understanding security as a state of safety. After the collapse of the USSR, a lot of researchers began not only to look for new approaches, but also to critically understand the previously prevailing concept. Based on the analysis, the article justifies that none of the arguments given in the scientific literature convinces that the concept of understanding safety as a state of security is outdated and inconsistent with today's realities. Therefore, the authors of the article consider it inappropriate to refuse. Art. 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine proclaims the human being, his or her life and health, honour and dignity, inviolability and security are recognised in Ukraine as the highest social value. In the hierarchy of these essential benefits, the Constitution of Ukraine first identifies life and health, which are essential properties of any person. The priority of protecting human life and health can be concluded on the basis that the corresponding chapter is located almost at the very beginning of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, immediately after «Crimes against the foundations of national security of Ukraine honour». However, it should be noted that harm to human life and health can be caused not only by the commission of crimes for which responsibility is provided for in chapter II of the Special Part of the Criminal Code. The system of building of this legal act, primarily on the basis of the objects of criminal legal protection, allows us to identify that life and health are directly protected as an additional object (together with the main) or indirectly protected by the norms of almost all sections of the Special Part. In addition, in certain cases that correspond to the relevant areas, a certain protective shell is created, in the construction of which the Criminal Code norms are also used, which is called up to level (or at least minimize, that is, reduce the probability of danger close to zero) the possibility of causing harm to human life and health. First of all, we are talking about criminal law provision through criminal law norms for the protection of public (common) security, occupational safety, traffic safety and safety of transport operations. In addition, at the level of a species object, security relations are protected in other chapters of the Criminal Code. This applies, in particular, to environmental safety, which is protected by the norms of section VIII of the Special Part of the Criminal Code. It is proved that the functional inconsistency of the criminal law norms contained in chapter VIII of the Special Part of the Criminal Code gives grounds for the allocation at least two species objects in it: relations on the preservation of natural objects and environmental safety. ; У статті аналізується наукова концепція «безпека – стан захищеності». Зазначається, що категорія «безпека» є предметом дослідження різних галузей права, а також політології, соціології, економічної теорії й інших наук. Констатується, що загальновизнане поняття цього явища нині відсутнє, що пояснюється надзвичайною складністю і внутрішніми суперечностями зазначеного феномену. Звертається увага на те, що спроби надати визначення категорії «безпека» на загальному рівні (а не щодо конкретного предметного дослідження) мають декларативний характер або являють собою не більше, ніж тлумачення слова без розкриття реального змісту поняття, яке цим словом позначаються. В радянський період панівним був підхід до розуміння безпеки як стану захищеності. Після розпаду СРСР багато дослідників почали не лише шукати нові підходи, а й критично осмислювати панівну раніше концепцію. На підставі проведеного аналізу в статті обґрунтовується, що жоден із наведених у науковій літературі аргументів не переконує у тому, що концепція розуміння безпеки як стану захищеності є застарілою і такою, що не відповідає реаліям сьогодення. Тому відмовлятися він неї автори статті вважають недоречним. У ст. 3 Конституції України проголошено, що людина, її життя і здоров'я, честь і гідність, недоторканність і безпека визнаються в Україні найвищою соціальною цінністю. В ієрархії зазначених найсуттєвіших благ Конституція України насамперед виділяє життя і здоров'я, які є невід'ємними властивостями будь-якої людини. Про пріоритетність захисту життя і здоров'я людини можна судити з того, що відповідний розділ знаходиться майже на самому початку Особливої частини Кримінального кодексу України, одразу після «Злочинів проти основ національної безпеки України». Водночас слід відзначити, що шкода життю і здоров'ю людини може бути спричинена не лише внаслідок учинення злочинів, відповідальність за які передбачено в розділі ІІ Особливої частини КК. Система побудови останнього, передусім за ознакою об'єктів кримінально-правової охорони, дозволяє виявити, що як додатковий об'єкт життя та здоров'я охороняються безпосередньо (разом з основним) або опосередковано нормами майже усіх розділів Особливої частини. Крім того, в окремих випадках, що кореспондують відповідним сферам, створюється певна захисна оболонка, в побудові якої задіюються й норми КК, яка покликана нівелювати (чи хоча б мінімізувати, тобто звести ймовірність небезпеки близькою до нуля) можливість спричинення шкоди життю і здоров'ю людини. Мова, у першу чергу, йде про кримінально-правове забезпечення за допомогою кримінально-правових норм охорони громадської (суспільної) безпеки, безпеки виробництва та безпеки руху та експлуатації транспорту. Крім того, на рівні видового об'єкта відносини безпеки охороняються і в інших розділах КК. Це стосується, зокрема, екологічної безпеки, що охороняється нормами розділу VIII Особливої частини КК. Доводиться, що функціональна несхожість між собою кримінально-правових норм, що містяться у розділі VIII Особливої частини КК, дає підстави для виділення в ньому принаймні двох видових об'єктів: відносин щодо збереження природних об'єктів та екологічної безпеки.

ABSTRAKSIPenelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh Return On Equity (ROE) Growht Asset Ratio, dan Current Ratio terhadap Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pada Bank Syariah Indonesia yang terdaftad di Statistik Bank Syariah periode 2012-2017.Populasi dalam penelitian ini sebanyak 11 perbankan syariah dengan berdasarkan teknik pengambilan sampel dengan purposive sampling didapatkan sampel sebanyak sampel sebanyak 6 perbankan syariah yang terdaftar di Statistik Perbankan Syariah periode 2012-2017. Teknik analisis yang digunakan adalah regresi linear berganda. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa: (1) Return On Equity (ROE) berpengaruh positif dan signifikan terhadap Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); (2) Growht Asset Ratio berpengaruh negatif dan siginifikan terhadap Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); (3) Current Ratio berpengaruh positif dan tidak signifikan terhadap Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); dan (4) Terdapat pengaruh Kinerja Keuangan (ROE, Grohwt Asset Ratio, dan Current Ratio) terhadap Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) secara simultan dengan signifikansi sebesar 0,036 dengan nilai R2 sebesar 15,9%.Kata kunci: ROE, Growht Ratio, Current Ratio dan Corporate Social Responsblity DAFTAR PUSTAKA Ahmad, Khurshid. 2003. The challenge of Global Capitalism: An Islamicperspective. (Online), (http://www.ips.org.pk, diakses 2003) Alamsyah, Halim. Membangun Kapasitas dan Memperkuat Kontribusi Perbankan Syariah dalam Percepatan Pembangunan Ekonomi. 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ÖZKüresel ilaç ve biyoteknoloji endüstrisi 2011 yılı sonu itibariyle yaklaşık960 milyar dolar tutarında bir hacme ulaşmış ve önceki beşyıllık dönemde ortalama yıllık % 7,8 seviyesinde bir büyümesergilemiştir. Yeniilaçkeşfi, geliştirmesi ve pazarlaması üstüne kurulu iş modeliyle, ve 20 yıllık patent hakkının sağladığı korumayla bu endüstrikalıcı ve istikrarlı bir büyüme yaşamıştır. Tarihsel olarak civarındabrüt kâr marjı, -50 aralığındafaaliyetmarjı ve sağlıklı serbest nakitakışı sayesinde ilaç endüstrisi kârlı bir endüstri olagelmiştir.Ancak endüstrinin büyümesini sağlayan bu ilaçların patent koruma sürelerininson yıllarda teker teker dolmasıyla endüstri yaklaşık 125 milyar dolar civarında bir satış kaybı yaşamış, vegüçlü bir yeni ürün hattınınolmamasından dolayı bu kaybı telaffi edememiştir. İlaç maliyetleri çoğunlukla devletler tarafından karşılandığından endüstri genellikle olumlu bir ekonomik büyüme ortamından yararlanagelmiştir. Yavaşlayanküresel ekonomive yaşlanan nüfusa bağlı artansağlıkkaynakları kullanımı, özellikleAmerika BirleşikDevletleri veAvrupaBirliğiülkelerinde sağlığa ayrılan fonların ekonomiye oranının artmasına neden olup endüstrinin aleyhinde bir durum yaratmıştır.Sonuç olarak ilaç şirketleri bu olumsuzpiyasa koşullarının üstünden gelmek vebüyümelerinisürdürmek içinyeni büyüme stratejileri arama yoluna gitmiş, vesüratlegelişmekte olan, ve Türkiye'nin de dahil kabul edildiği Yükselen BRIC(Brezilya, Hindistan, ÇinveBrezilya) Pazarlarına öncelik vermişlerdir. Bu ekonomilerin, %5-10 yıllık GSYİH büyüme sergilemeleri, nüfuslarının sağlık hizmetlerine erişiminin ve ihtiyariharcamalarının artması tümküresel ilaç şirketleriiçinumut verici birgörünümsunmuştur.Ancak, hergelişmekte olan piyasakendine özgünsosyo-ekonomik ve politik özellikler gösterdiğindengelişmiş piyasalardabaşarılı olmuş yöntemleri aynen uygulamak aynı başarıyı tekrarlamaya yeterli olmayacaktır. Bir önliteratür taramasıbuaraştırma konusununincelenmediğini ortaya koymuştur. Butezinamacı Yükselen Pazarlarda ilaç ve biyoteknoloji şirketlerininkârlı büyümesini teminen nitelvenicel olarak başarı etmenlerini araştırmaktır.Niteliksel araştırma yöntemi akademik kurumlarca basılmışyayınları, düşüncetankları, yaşam bilimlerisanayidergileri, hükümetlerveyönetim danışmanlıkfirmalarının yayınları taranması ve bahsi geçen başarılı uygulamaların saptanması şeklinde gerçekleştirilmiştir.Retrospektif gözlemselmalianalizigerçekleştirmek amacıyla ise, küresel ölçektefaaliyet gösteren en büyük 14ilaç vebiyoteknoloji şirket verileri yatırımcılara açık kaynaklardan derlenmiş, ve endüstride yaygın olarak kullanılan finansal yaklaşım yöntemi kullanılarak ikiayrı gruptaincelenmiştir.Sermayekârlılığı ve yatırımcılara geri dönüş değişkenleri 2009 den2011'i kapsayanüç yıllık birsüre içindedeğerlendirilmiştir. 2007-2011dönemine de bakılmakla beraber 2008ekonomik krizinin olumsuz ve tekil etkileri dolayısıyla bu dönemi kullanmaktan vazgeçilmiştir. Buçalışma, ilaç ve biyoteknolojişirketleri için bu firmaların ürün portföylerinin farklı olmasından dolayı, ayrı ayrı tekrarlanmıştır.Karşıılaştırmalıçıkarıma gidebilmek içintakvim ve maliyıllarnormalize edilmiştir.Araştırmaya alınan ilaç ve biyoteknoloji firmaları AmerikaBirleşik Devletleri, İngiltereveyaİsviçre merkezli, dünya çapındaoperasyonları olan,yıllık satışları 20 ila61 milyar dolar aralğında ve hisseleri NYSE veya NASDAQ'ta işlem gören firmalar arasından derlenmiştir.Yatırımcıya Geri Dönüşve Yatırılan Sermaye Dönüşü parametrelrini belirlemek için kamuya aşık şirketlerin malikaynaklarıtoplanmış vedaha sonrakarşılaştırmalısonuç eldeedebilmek içintakvim yıllarıyla firmaların maliyıllarıayarlanmak suretiylenormalize edilmiştir.Nitel çalışma ilaç ve biyoteknoloji firmalarının Gelişmekte OlanPazarlarda yatırımcıdeğeri oluşturmak ve rekabetçi kalmak için tez kapsamında bulunan yedibaşarı faktörü aşağıda sıralanmıştır:1. Yerli Üretim Yapabilme Kabiliyeti2. Hızlı ve iyi ilişkilere dayanan Ruhsat ve Düzenleme Yetenekleri3. Ticari Organizasyon ModelininYükselen Pazar Koşullarınahitabedebilmesi4. GenişveVerimli bir Dağıtım Ağına Sahib olabilmek5. Devlet İhalelerinde Dinamik FiyatlandırmaYetenekleri6. Yerel Klinil Çalışma yapan düşünce liderlerini küreselKlinik Çalışma ve ürün geliştirme yapan liderlerlebütünleştirebilen bir Medikal Bölüm kabiliyeti, ve7. Yetkin ve yetenekli yerel personele erişim, işe alma ve işte tutma becerisi.Nicel olaraksa, Amerika BirleşikDevletleri'nde elde edilensatışYatırımcıya Geri Dönüş itibariylepozitif birkorelasyon gösterirken Yükselen Pazarlardakı satış geliri ilepozitif bir korelasyongörülmemiştir. Aynı örneklem için, Yatırılan Sermaye Kârlılığı hemilaç ve biyoteknolojifirmalarının satış gelirleri ilepozitif bir korelasyongöstermiştir. Bu bulgular, firmaların Yükselen Pazarlara girerken Yatırımcıya Geri Dönüş açısından getiri beklememelerini ve Yatırılan Sermaye Geri dönüşübazında da mütevazıbir beklentiiçinde olmalarını ortaya koymaktadır.ABSTRACTThe global pharmaceutical industry generated approximately $960 billion in revenue in 2011 demonstrating a 7.8% compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) for the preceding five years. This industry, with its foundation in discovering, developing and marketing innovative medications had the benefit of patent lives -lasting around 20 years- providing sustenance for the business to grow steadily. It has been historically a profitable business with gross margins around 80% and operating margins in the range of 40-50%.While the industry enjoyed sustained free cash flow, over the last few years, it has been challenged by the expiry of patents of its products leading to massive revenue losses estimated around $125 billion and lack of a robust product pipeline to replace the lost revenue. Since the industry heavily relies on the governments to pay for its medicinal products, it thrives on a healthy economic mega-system. Industry's challenge was further compounded by a slowing global economy and an aging population utilizing more healthcare resources and increasing healthcare costs in developed countries, particularly in the United States and the European Union countries. These unfavorable market conditions pushed the pharmaceutical companies to identify new strategic value levers to sustain its growth, and consequently the industry set out to expeditiously expand its footprint in the emerging markets. As the beneficiaries of the globalizing economy, the BRIC (Brazil, India, China & Brazil) bloc of countries and Turkey had offered the biggest growth platform. These economies have demonstrated a vivid GDP growth in the range of 5-10% annual growth and, thanks to an increase in access to medicine and surge in discretionary spending of their population; offer a promising outlook to all global companies. In this context, products of pharmaceutical companies are well-positioned to address healthcare needs of the growing and aging populations in the Emerging Markets.Nonetheless, each individual emerging market demonstrates unique socio-economic and political characteristics, and even as a bloc do not present characteristics similar to developed markets due to a variety of underlying reasons.A preliminary literature review had indicated that this research topic was not sufficiently examined leaving an opportunity to investigate. Consequently, the objective of the thesis was established to explore this non-trivial Emerging Markets growth challenge on qualitative and quantitative fronts that would link both business strategy and financial outcome aspects to the pressing dilemma of profitably growing in the Emerging Markets.In order to perform the retrospective observational financial analysis, a total of 14 large companies operating on a global scale were identified, and investigated in two distinct groups under pharmaceutical and biotechnology company peer sets.A shareholder value analysis framework was utilized to map out the financial levers of value generation focusing on Total Return on Shareholder Value (TRS) and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). The relationships between the geographic revenue breakdown and the two aforementioned parameters were tested by conducting a correlation analysis. These two parameters were collected over a three year period from 2009 through 2011. Similarly, a five year period ranging from 2007 through 2011 was also initially explored but then later discontinued since the 2008 economic downturn was identified as a disruptive confounding factor to the ability to draw meaningful conclusions.The correlation analysis was performed separately for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. Pharmaceutical companies operate with a more traditional, primary care focused small molecule product portfolio whereas the biotechnology companies discover, develop and market expensive biologics products targeting specialists. Therefore, these two groups of life sciences companies were investigated in separate peer groups.The selected pharmaceutical companies were the largest among their peers by revenue which ranged from $20 to $61 billion. Correspondingly, their market capitalization was also among the highest in their peer set. While these companies were headquartered in the United States, United Kingdom or Switzerland; their common stock were all traded in NYSE. Also, they all recognized revenue through their worldwide operations that would allow to compare performance by geographic denominations. Similarly, seven largest biotechnology companies were all publicly traded in NYSE.Company financials to determine TRS and ROIC were collected through public sources, and later normalized by adjusting their fiscal years to the calendar years to be able to draw comparative conclusions.The qualitative study led to the identification of the following seven key success factors that the pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies need to perform exceptionally well to stay competitive in the Emerging Markets:1.Local Manufacturing Presence2.Building Agile Regulatory Affairs Capabilities3.Commercial Model Addressing Emerging Market Needs4.Broad and Efficient Distribution Network5.Dynamic Pricing and Contracting Capabilities6.Emerging Market Medical Affairs Capabilities Connecting Local Thought Leaders to Global Clinical Development Leaders7.Access to and Retention of Local TalentThe quantitative analysis suggested that TRS did not show a positive correlation with the revenue booked in the Emerging Markets whereas the United States revenue showed a positive correlation. For the same sample set, the ROIC showed a positive correlation with the revenue booked by both pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, suggesting that in the period of this study life sciences companies that enter the Emerging Markets should not expect an appreciation for their stock price while they will gain some modest returns on their invested capitals.

RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAOvih dana konačno smo dočekali dugo očekivanu promjenu na kormilu trgovačkog društva Hrvatske šume d.o.o. O radu i kritici rada dosadašnje Uprave, Hrvatsko šumarsko društvo više se puta decidirano izjašnjavalo, posebice u ovoj rubrici, tražeći odgovore na različita stručna pitanja, no odgovora, a niti stručne polemike nije bilo, već samo bahato ignoriranje i odmazda, sve do otkazivanja pretplate na ovaj časopis.Za svaki novi početak osnovno je utvrditi činjenično stanje kao temelj novoga programa/plana rada. Stoga dobronamjerno savjetujemo novoj Upravi da si kroz odgovore na naša postavljena pitanja, stručne kritike i sugestije, posebice kroz dva teksta iz rubrike Izazovi i suprotstavljanja u br. 11-12/2016. i tekst UO HŠD-a "Kako Hrvatsko šumarsko društvo promišlja šumarstvo Hrvatske" u br. 11-12/2015., olakša uvid u činjenično stanje. Naše dobronamjerne kritike i sugestije išle su u smjeru upozoravanja na ono što je u šumi nestručno rađeno i ono što nažalost nije rađeno, a trebalo je raditi, no to bi onda išlo na uštrb dobiti koja je Upravi bila jedini cilj, bez obzira na posljedice po šumu. Naravno, osvrtali smo se i na potrebe racionalnog korištenja svih benefita šume i šumarstva, što je također izostalo. Zalagali smo se i zalažemo se za decentralistički oblik upravljanja šumskim bogatstvom, očekujući puno veće ovlasti rukovoditelja UŠ Podružnica i nastavno šumarija, pa i revira, kao najboljih poznavatelja odnosnih šumskih resursa i potrajnog gospodarenja istima. Takav način gospodarenja osigurat će sveobuhvatnu korist vlasniku/državi, ali i lokalnoj zajednici, na što se očigledno zaboravilo. Naše stajalište glede stanja u šumarstvu nikada nije bilo deklarativno, nego je počivalo na činjenicama. Tako i ovdje, zagovarajući decentralizaciju upravljanja koristimo podatke iz brošure "Hrvatsko nacionalno blago" u izdanju Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti (HAZU) – iz članka "Šume i šumarstvo", naših akademika Matića i Anića. Kompleksnost gospodarenja šumama u pojedinim dijelovima Hrvatske, koja je jedna od najšumovitijih zemalja u Europi (pola ha po stanovniku), i izbora kvalitetnih šumarskih stručnjaka, ogleda se ponajprije u šumskoj vegetaciji koju tvore 102 šumske zajednice, sa čak oko 260 drvenastih vrsta i 94 vrste drveća. Zagovarajući pak nužne radove koji osiguravaju potrajno gospodarenje šumama i poboljšanje kvalitete naših šuma, a time i njihovih vrijednosti, iz istog članka navodimo kako je njih 5 % vrlo dobre kakvoće, 22 % dobre, 43 % srednje i 29 % loše kakvoće, s time da je 45 % najkvalitetnijih nizinskih šuma ocijenjeno vrlo dobrim. Ulaganje u poboljšanje navedene strukture vidljivo bi se očitovalo u ne samo većoj sirovinskoj osnovici koju je isključivo zagovarala dosadašnja Uprava, nego i ostalim benefitima šume, posebice njenoj općekorisnoj funkciji.Kada smo postavljali pitanja glede kašnjenja ili pak izostavljanja uzgojnih radova i pogubni učinak toga na budućnost sastojine, primjerice u odnosu na našu najvrjedniju vrstu drveća hrast lužnjak, pa i kitnjak (prema odnosnoj brošuri HAZU hrast lužnjak je zastupljen s 14,83 %, a kitnjak s 8,35 %), podsjećamo na ono što smo na Fakultetu učili o toj vrsti drveća, a zaboravljamo ta znanja primijeniti. Koristeći tekstove iz monografije "Hrast lužnjak u Hrvatskoj" navodimo ponajprije uzgojne faze: ponik, pomladak (mlađi i stariji), mladik (mlađi i stariji), mlada, srednjedobna i starija sastojina. Tako je primjerice u starijem mladiku (15-20 god.) kulminacija visinskog prirasta i maksimalni prirast krošnje u širinu, tu se prepoznaju stabla budućnosti, što u mladoj sastojini rezultira diferencijacijom stabala i izdvajanjem u etaže. S gospodarskog stajališta imamo: koljik, letvik, stadij stupovlja i naposljetku stadij pilanske oblovine, gdje od letvika kreću prorjede i dolazi do diferencijacije u visinske, debljinske i vrijednosne razrede. U srednjedobnoj sastojini postepeno opada biološki potencijal glede reagiranja na njegu sastojine (50-70 god.) kada je već formirana struktura sastojine, pa je pitanje kakvi smo stručnjaci i kako smo optimalno iskoristili određeni potencijal šumskog staništa. Na to smo neprestano upozoravali, jer svaki razvojni stadij, a ne samo navedeni, zahtijeva pravovremenu intervenciju, koja doduše predstavlja određeni trošak, ali i korist, posebice u budućnosti.U ovome dvobroju toliko, a u sljedećemu ćemo pozornost sa sličnim podupirućim podacima obratiti na ostalo: o šumi kao infrastrukturnoj kategoriji, općekorisnim funkcijama šume, o odnosima s preradom drva, o odnosu društva i politike prema šumi i šumarstvu i slično. Uredništvo ; EDITORIALThese days we have finally witnessed a long-expected change at the helm of the company Croatian Forests Ltd. The Croatian Forestry Association has on several occasions decidedly expressed its opinion and criticism of the work of the past Management, especially in this column, and has sought answers to various expert issues; however, there has never been any answer, let alone a professional debate. All we received was arrogant disregard and retaliation that went as far as to take the form of the cancellation of the subscription to this journal.For every new beginning it is necessary to establish the factual state of affairs as a basis for a new working programme/plan. For this reason we would advise the new Management to facilitate its insight into the facts by consulting the answers to our questions, criticisms and suggestions (given particularly in the two texts in the column Challenges and Confrontations in No. 11-12/2016 and in the text by the MB of the Croatian Forestry Association entitled "How does the Croatian Forestry Association perceive Croatian forestry" in No. 11-12/2015). Our well-meaning criticism and suggestions were intended to warn the public against inexpert operations in the forest and even more against what has regrettably not been done but should have been done, mostly because this would have conflicted with profit, the only goal of the Management regardless of the adverse consequences for the forest. We have also highlighted the need for a more rational use of all the benefits of forests and forestry, which was also sadly missing. We have advocated and will continue to advocate a decentralised form of management of forest wealth. We also expect managers of forest administrations, forest offices and even forest districts, who are experts in forest resources and their sustainable management, to be given much more power. A decentralized form of management will ensure general benefits for the owner/state, but also for the local community, which is something that has obviously been forgotten. Our attitudes towards the situation in forestry have never been of a declarative nature, but have always been based on facts. By advocating decentralized management, we rely on the data from the article "Forests and Forestry" by Academy members Slavko Matić and Igor Anić, contained in the brochure "Croatian National Treasure" published by the Croatian Academy of Science and Art. The complex nature of forest management in certain parts of Croatia, one of the most forested countries of Europe (half a hectare per person) and the employment of high quality forestry experts is reflected primarily in the forest vegetation composed of 102 forest communities with no less than about 260 woody species and 94 tree species. By endorsing treatments that are necessary to ensure sustainable forest management and an improved quality and value of Croatian forests, we again present data from the mentioned article, in which 5 % of the forests are of very good quality, 22 % are of good quality, 43 % are of medium quality and 29 % are of poor quality. Forty-five percent of the best quality lowland forests were estimated as very good. Investing in the improvement of the mentioned structure would result not only in a greater raw material base, something that was exclusively supported by the former Management, but also in other benefits of the forest and in particular in its non-market functions. When we raise questions related to delayed silvicultural treatments or even their omission and to the adverse effects of this on the future of stands, e.g. with regard to pedunculate oak, the most valuable Croatian tree species, and sessile oak (according to the above brochure, pedunculate oak accounts for14.83 % and sessile oak for 8.35 % of the area), we like to remind ourselves of what we learned about these tree species at the Faculty, but forget to apply this knowledge. Based on the texts from the monograph "Pedunculate oak in Croatia", we list the following silvicultural stages: seedling stage, sapling stage (young and old), young forest (younger and older), young, middle-aged and mature stand. Thus, for example, the older sapling stage (15 - 20 years of age) experiences the culmination of height increment and maximal crown increment in the width. This is where future trees are singled out, which results in tree differentiation and selection into stories in the young stand. From a commercial standpoint there are: prop stage, pole stage, pile stage and finally sawmill roundwood stage, where thinning operations are applied in the pole stage and differentiation into height, diameter and value classes takes place. In a middle-aged stand, when the stand structure is already formed, the biological potential related to a response to stand tending (50 - 70 years of age) gradually decreases. The concluding question is: what kind of experts are we and how have we optimally made use of certain potentials of a forest habitat? This is what we have repeatedly stressed, because every developmental stage, not only the ones mentioned above, requires timely interventions. True, they come at a certain cost, but on the other hand they provide immeasurable benefits, especially for the future. This concludes the current double issue. In the next issue we will focus on other topics of interest and we will accompany them with data. These topics include the forest as an infrastructural category, non-market forest functions, relations with wood processing, attitudes of the society and politics towards the forest and forestry, and similar. Editorial Board

Letter From The Representatives Of France, Kuwait, The Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, The United Kingdom Of Great Britain And Northern Ireland And The United States Of America To The United Nations Addressed To The President Of The Security Council ; United Nations S/PV.8217 Security Council Seventy-third year 8217th meeting Tuesday, 27 March 2018, 11.10 a.m. New York Provisional President: Mr. Blok . (Netherlands) Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán China. . Mr. Wu Haitao Côte d'Ivoire. . Mr. Dah Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu France. . Mr. Delattre Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra Poland. . Ms. Wronecka Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia Sweden . Mr. Orrenius Skau United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce United States of America. . Mrs. Haley Agenda The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 18-08569 (E) *1808569* S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 2/21 18-08569 The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. The situation in the Middle East Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/243) The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to participate in this meeting. In accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, I invite Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to participate in this meeting. Mr. Lowcock is joining today's meeting via video-teleconference from Geneva. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/2018/243, which contains the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017). Recalling the latest note by the President of the Security Council on its working methods (S/2017/507), I want to encourage all participants, both members and non-members of the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes or less. Note 507 also encourages briefers to be succinct and focus on key issues. Briefers are further encouraged to limit initial remarks to 15 minutes or less. I now give the floor to Mr. Lowcock. Mr. Lowcock: As all members of the Council know, the Syrian conflict has now entered its eighth year. When weapons speak, civilians pay the price — a relentless price with horrific violence, bloodshed and unspeakable suffering. The past few months have been some of the worst yet for many civilians in Syria. Today I want to start with the situation in eastern Ghouta. Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018) on 24 February, military operations in eastern Ghouta, in particular air strikes, have reportedly killed more than 1,700 people. Thousands more have been injured. Attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, such as medical facilities, continue to be reported. There have been at least 28 reported attacks on health facilities since mid-February and more than 70 verified incidents since the beginning of the year. The World Health Organization has reported that attacks on health facilities, health workers and health infrastructure were recorded during the first two months of the year at three times the rate that we saw during 2017. In recent weeks in Damascus city, at least 78 people were reportedly killed and another 230 injured by shells fired from eastern Ghouta. That includes reports of at least 35 people killed and scores wounded on 20 March, when Kashkul market in Jaramana, a suburb in the south-eastern part of the city, was struck by a rocket. Tens of thousands of civilians have been displaced from Douma, Harasta, Sagba and Kafr Batna in recent days and weeks. So far, reports indicate that some 80,000 civilians have been taken to places in Damascus city and rural Damascus. Nearly 20,000 combatants and civilians have been transported to locations in north-western Syria. Nearly 52,000 civilians from eastern Ghouta are currently being hosted in eight collective shelters in rural Damascus. That displaced population has endured months of limited access to food, medical care and other essential items. In the words of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Ali Al-Za'tari, who met and spoke to some of them, those people are "tired, hungry, traumatized and afraid". Most of the collective shelters do not have the capacity or infrastructure to accommodate such large numbers of people. They are extremely overcrowded and severely lacking in basic water, sanitation and hygiene facilities. There are a number of serious protection concerns related to risks of gender-based violence, unaccompanied and separated children and restrictions on movement. The United Nations is not in charge of the management of those shelters. However, since 13 March, together with humanitarian partners, we have mobilized a rapid response to provide evacuees with basic support in close coordination with the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and other local partners. So far, more than 130,000 non-food items have been distributed, 130 emergency 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 3/21 toilets have been installed, and water trucking services have been provided to most shelters. In addition, supplies to feed more than 50,000 people and a total of 38 mobile health teams and 18 mobile medical teams are currently providing support to those in need inside the shelters. Humanitarian organizations also need access to the people still trapped within eastern Ghouta, in particular in Douma, where fighting and siege continue. The United Nations and its partners are ready to proceed to Douma with food for up to 16,500 people, as well as health, nutrition, water, sanitation and hygiene supplies, but facilitation letters need to be signed by the Government of Syria. I reiterate the Secretary-General's call on all parties to fully respect international humanitarian law and human rights law in order to ensure immediate humanitarian access and guarantee the protection of civilians, including in relation to displacements and evacuations. The United Nations and its partners require unimpeded access to all those affected by the situation in eastern Ghouta. That means access to the areas where civilians remain, through which they transit and to which they exit, such as collective shelters, in order to ensure that effective protection mechanisms are in place so that we can deter any possible violations and provide remedial protection support. Eastern Ghouta is not the only place in which humanitarian needs continue to increase. In north-western Syria, in recent weeks, an estimated 183,500 people have been displaced by hostilities in Afrin district in Aleppo governorate. The majority — some 140,000 people — have fled to Tell Rifaat and the remainder have gone to Nubl, Al-Zahraa, Manbij, Hasakah and surrounding areas. That massive influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is putting a strain on host communities, which are already overwhelmed. Two days ago, on 25 March, an inter-agency convoy to Tell Rifaat delivered assistance for some 50,000 people. However, overall, humanitarian partners are still struggling to gain sustainable access to the area. Moreover, access to Aleppo city for IDPs from Afrin district is currently restricted. Of particular concern are medical evacuations that are urgently required for severely sick people to receive care in specialized hospitals in Aleppo city. Four deaths due to the lack of proper health care have already been reported. Between 50,000 and 70,000 people are estimated still to be in Afrin city. Humanitarian access to the city and its outer perimeters is possible through cross-border operations mandated by the Council. Today, the Government of Turkey told us that it is positively disposed towards such access, and we plan to run convoys in the very near future. We know that needs are very substantial. In Idlib governorate, the situation remains catastrophic, with almost 400,000 people displaced since mid-December. Local capacity to assist is overstretched. Thousands more people are now arriving there from eastern Ghouta, with no sites or shelters available for the vast majority of them. We have received reports of an increase in violence in Idlib in recent days. According to local sources, on 20 March air strikes hit an IDP shelter on the outskirts of Haas village in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killing at least 10 displaced people and injuring another 15. On 21 March, air strikes on Kafr Battikh village, also in southern rural Idlib governorate, reportedly killed scores more. The next day, the central market in Harim town was hit by an air strike, reportedly killing 35 people, including many women and children. On 12 March, air strikes also resumed in southern Syria, with attacks being reported in and around Dar'a city. There have been no air strikes in those areas since an agreement was reached last year on the establishment of a de-escalation zone for parts of the south of the country. That therefore appears to be a major unwelcome development. Let me turn to Raqqa. On 19 March, we received approval from the Syrian authorities for an assessment mission to Raqqa city by the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Health Organization. As Council members know, we have been seeking agreement to that for some time. That was on 19 March. Three days later, on 22 March, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security deployed a team to conduct a security assessment. They report that while the city is considered calm and stable, considerable risk remains. Raqqa city is still highly contaminated with landmines, unexploded ordnances, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. We hope that access to Raqqa city will be possible for humanitarian aid deliveries via Qamishli, Manbij, Aleppo, Hamah S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 4/21 18-08569 and Homs, depending on operational and logistical arrangements. The United Nations and our partners are now preparing a humanitarian assessment mission, which is likely to take place next week. Next I shall address Rukban, on the Syria-Jordan border. United Nations partners received permission from the Syrian authorities on 8 March to organize a humanitarian convoy from Damascus to reach people in need along the Syria-Jordan border. Last week, on 19 March, the United Nations itself received permission to join that humanitarian mission. Preparations are ongoing, and a first humanitarian convoy is expected to deploy soon. As the Council knows, we have been seeking approval for that for many months. As we sit here today, almost at the end of the month, we have reached some 137,000 people in need through inter-agency convoys — that is, cross-line convoys sent to hard-to-reach and besieged areas — to Tell Rifaat, Al-Dar al-Kabirah and Douma. That is limited, incremental progress, compared to the first part of the year, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the team on the ground and some of those around this table. But we are essentially just given crumbs — an occasional convoy here and there, often, coincidentally, shortly before our monthly briefings to the Council. A total of 5.6 million Syrians in acute need cannot live on crumbs, and with a quarter of the year gone, our level of access is currently far worse than it was this time last year. We need the support of all Council members and members of the International Syria Support Group humanitarian task force to do their part to exert their individual and collective influence over the parties. A few days ago, the Government of Syria and others asked for more United Nations help with humanitarian aid in eastern Ghouta. In response, we have, first, proposed that a team of United Nations emergency response experts be deployed to strengthen efforts on the ground. Visa requests for the team have been submitted. Secondly, we have confirmed a new allocation of $20 million from the Syria Humanitarian Fund, which is managed by my Office, for eastern Ghouta and those displaced from Afrin to provide shelter materials, improve sanitation for displaced people, ensure that safe water is available, provide life-saving medicines and medical services and put in place measures to enhance protection in relocation sites. The United Nations and its partners, on average, reach 7.5 million people every month with life-saving humanitarian assistance across the whole of Syria. Clearly, without that assistance, the situation would be even more catastrophic than it is now and the loss of life even greater. The United Nations has no money of its own to do those things. We can do them only because we receive voluntary contributions from our donors. I want to take this opportunity to thank everyone who has supported our appeal over the last year, including our top donors: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Norway, Canada, Japan, Denmark, Sweden, Qatar, Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Resolution 2401 (2018) was adopted just over a month ago. I ask all in the Council to make the resolution a reality. Whatever the difficulty, the United Nations and its partners remain determined to follow through, for the sake of the Syrian people. The President: I thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Recently, a Dutch photographer working with Save the Children published a photo album featuring 48 Syrian children, all seven years old. Those photos were school portraits, like we all had taken when we were young. The children were born in Syria, but they had to flee. They are as old as the Syrian war, so they have never seen their country at peace. Their memories of their homeland are fading. Sometimes they cannot remember their country at all, nor their family members left behind. But by giving those young children a public face, the photographer has tried to restore some of the dignity sacrificed to a war in which all humanity seems lost. I have here a photo of Nour. Those children were relatively lucky; they were able to escape. At the same time, inside Syria, during seven years of war, thousands of children have been killed. I myself am a father, and I am certainly not the only parent in this Chamber. Images of children affected by war should leave no one unmoved. Despite any differences between us, we should at least have one thing in common: the belief that protecting children should come first. Yet, such protection is lacking. The Syrian crisis is, above all, a protection crisis — a grave violation of the long-established norm to protect civilians and their belongings in the time of war. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 5/21 Together, we — the international community — have expressed our determination to prevent conflict and save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. And where conflict cannot be prevented, we have agreed to regulate the conduct of warfare. One of the very first steps to that end was taken in Russia, almost 150 years ago. In Saint Petersburg, it was decided to forbid weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. Since those first steps, the body of international humanitarian law has grown considerably, including through the adoption of the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The imperative of those laws has always been to protect civilians in conflict, to spare them from disaster, save them from harm and respect their dignity. Sadly, what we see in Syria today is the exact opposite. Every day, many are showing total disregard for civilians. In eastern Ghouta, the Syrian regime and its allies, including Russia, have trapped hundreds of thousands of civilians and are relentlessly continuing their offensive. The United Nations has reported air strikes on densely populated areas, blatant attacks targeting hospitals and medical personnel, the use of starvation as a weapon of war and the use of chemical weapons. Many innocent children, women and men are suffering. They should be protected. Yet instead, families are seeing their homes destroyed, their loved ones killed and their dignity shattered. In Afrin, the effects of the Turkey-led offensive are clear for all to see: a worsening of the already precarious humanitarian situation, with more than 160,000 displaced people and a further obstacle to efforts to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS). I ask Turkey not to extend its military activities to other border regions in Syria or Iraq. Four weeks ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). It is telling that in 2018, the Council should need to spell out that warring parties should immediately lift all sieges in Syria and grant unimpeded humanitarian access to those in acute need. Those are by no means exceptional demands. They are basic obligations under international humanitarian law, developed over decades to instil minimum standards of human decency in warfare. Not even the presence of terrorists is an excuse for disregarding those standards. It is humiliating that the Council is unable to enforce those minimum standards. If the Council is not willing or able to do it, who is? With all that in mind, we should not forget that the responsibility, and indeed the obligation, to execute the Council's decisions lies with individual Member States. So what should be done? First, we should reaffirm these norms and enforce the relevant resolutions. We call on all parties to the Syrian conflict — including the Syrian regime, Russia, Iran, Turkey and armed opposition groups — to respect and implement the Council's decisions. Secondly, we must strengthen resolution 2401 (2018), with United Nations monitoring of the implementation of the ceasefire and with full access for fact-finding missions to sites and collective shelters housing internally displaced persons. These missions are ready to go; we need their impartial information. Thirdly, with regard to accountability, if there is to be any credible, stable and lasting peace in Syria, the current culture of impunity must end. All those guilty of crimes must be brought to justice. The perpetrators of crimes, including ISIS and Al-Qaida, must know that they are being watched, followed and identified. They must know that files are being compiled with a view to prosecuting them for crimes that may include genocide. They must know that one day they will be held accountable. We urge all States to increase their support for the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, which aims to ensure that information about serious crimes is collected, analysed and preserved for future prosecutions. The Netherlands again calls on all Council members to support referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. What will become of the children in the photographs I mentioned? Will they one day be able to return to Syria? Like all children, they long for a normal life, for stability, for safety. The Syrian regime believes in a military solution. But there is none. There are no winners in this war. But it is clear who is losing — the ordinary people of Syria. In these most extreme circumstances we commend the incredible courage and perseverance of the humanitarian aid workers. It is up to us to restore credibility to the Council. It is up to us to ensure a negotiated political process, in which all Syrians and other relevant actors are represented. And it is up to us to end the agony and restore dignity and humanity to the people of Syria. I now resume my functions as President of the Council. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 6/21 18-08569 I give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements. Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): We welcome you, Sir, in presiding over this important meeting. I am delivering this statement on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden. At the outset, I would like to thank the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, for his briefing. Today I will address three main areas: first, the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018); secondly, measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation; and thirdly, the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution. First, on the status of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), we are meeting today one month after its unanimous adoption by the Security Council, calling on all parties to cease hostilities without delay for 30 days following the adoption of the resolution. We deplore the fact that it has not yet been implemented. However, we must continue to do everything in our power to ensure the resolution's full implementation throughout Syria. The increased number of humanitarian convoys entering the besieged areas during the month of March shows that partial delivery was achieved by comparison to the complete deadlock in access in previous months. That indicates that progress can be made in implementing the resolution, and we must build on that progress. We affirm that the provisions of the resolution will remain valid beyond the first 30 days after its adoption. We look forward to continued reports from the Secretariat on the status of implementation through monthly briefings, as stipulated in the resolution. In that regard, we support the proposal for providing the Council with further regular updates. We appreciate the continued efforts of the United Nations to facilitate talks among all parties in eastern Ghouta with the goal of securing a ceasefire. We are particularly concerned about the continued military offensive by the Syrian authorities in eastern Ghouta, as well as air strikes on Dar'a and Idlib. The shelling of Damascus from eastern Ghouta is also a matter of concern. All of those acts of violence have claimed the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. Secondly, on measures needed to improve the humanitarian situation, we must take the necessary measures to protect civilians fleeing eastern Ghouta and to improve the humanitarian situation in collective shelters. As we have said before, implementing the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) is the only way to improve the humanitarian situation and to achieve tangible progress in that regard. Those provisions stipulate that there must be a cessation of hostilities and that access for humanitarian aid to reach the civilian population must be enabled. Regarding the humanitarian situation in eastern Ghouta, we have five points to convey to the relevant parties, which represent our special concerns about the protection of civilians. First, all evacuations must be voluntary. People must have the right to return and to choose safe places to go to. Secondly, any negotiations on the evacuation of civilians should include civilian representatives, such as local councils. Thirdly, humanitarian aid convoys should continue to enter eastern Ghouta for the benefit of those who decided to stay there. Those convoys should occur on a weekly basis, as stipulated in resolution 2401 (2018), according to the United Nations assessment of needs, including medical supplies, and with full access for United Nations staff. Fourthly, human rights violations, including detentions, disappearances and forced conscriptions, must end. Those are serious protection concerns for civilians staying in eastern Ghouta and for those leaving it. We therefore encourage the United Nations to register the names of those evacuated and their destinations and to reinforce its presence in the collective shelters for internally displaced persons, including through the use of monitors to protect them and prevent sexual violence. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant immediate permission for that. Fifthly, the deteriorating situation in the collective shelters for the internally displaced persons should be improved as quickly as possible as the number of new arrivals continues to rise. We are deeply concerned that the United Nations partners are bearing the brunt of a burden beyond their capacity. It will therefore be essential to make the maximum use of the United Nations, its staff and its resources in order to assist in managing the increasingly crowded collective shelters. We welcome the United Nations plans to increase staff on the ground to that end, and we encourage the United Nations to do the same for eastern Ghouta as soon as the security situation allows. We call on the Syrian authorities to grant visas for additional United Nations staff immediately. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 7/21 Thirdly, on the responsibility of the parties to implement the resolution, we have a collective responsibility, as members of the Council and, specifically, as parties with influence, to work with the Syrian authorities and urge them to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018) according to international humanitarian law. We expect the guarantors of the Astana agreement, Russia, Iran and Turkey, to achieve progress towards the fulfilment of the commitments undertaken in the statement they issued on 16 March in advance of their summit meeting, to be held in Istanbul on 4 April. Those commitments include, first, ensuring rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian aid to areas affected by the conflict; secondly, increasing their efforts, as guarantors of the ceasefire agreement, to ensure observance of the respective agreements; and thirdly, pursuing their efforts to implement the provisions of resolution 2401 (2018). In conclusion, we affirm our full commitment to continuing to follow up closely on the status of the implementation of the resolution in the monthly reports to the Council. We will spare no effort to make progress in its implementation. This month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the conflict in Syria. Sadly, there is still a need for an end to the violence, sustained humanitarian and medical aid through weekly convoys across conflict lines, evacuation operations, the protection of civilians and hospitals, and the lifting of the siege. Mrs. Haley (United States of America): I thank you, Foreign Minister Blok, for presiding over this meeting, and I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for once again laying out the facts about what is happening in Syria. I also want to personally welcome Karen Pierce to the Council as the new Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. I know all of us in the Chamber look forward to working with her. Today we have a very difficult subject to address: siege, starvation and surrender. That is the awful, unceasing rhythm of the Syrian war. As we meet today, the third step, surrender, is taking place in eastern Ghouta. After years of enduring siege and starvation, residents are surrendering eastern Ghouta. The terrible irony of this moment must be stated and acknowledged. In the 30 days since the Security Council demanded a ceasefire, the bombardment of the people of eastern Ghouta has only increased and now, at the end of the so-called ceasefire, eastern Ghouta has nearly fallen. History will not be kind when it judges the effectiveness of the Council in relieving the suffering of the Syrian people. Seventeen hundred Syrian civilians have been killed in the past month alone. Hospitals and ambulances are being deliberately targeted with bombs and artillery. Schools are being hit, like the one in eastern Ghouta that was bombed just last week, killing 15 children. Siege, starvation and surrender. I would like to ask my Security Council colleagues to consider whether we are wrong when we point to the Russian and Iranian forces working alongside Al-Assad as being responsible for the slaughter. Russia voted for the so-called ceasefire in Syria last month (see S/PV.8188). More than that, Russia took its time painstakingly negotiating resolution 2401 (2018), which demanded the ceasefire. If we watched closely during the negotiations, we could see our Russian friends constantly leaving the room to confer with their Syrian counterparts. The possibilities for what was going on are only two. Either Russia was informing its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations, or Russia was taking directions from its Syrian colleagues about the content of the negotiations. Either way, Russia cynically negotiated a ceasefire that it instantly defied. Russia even had the audacity to claim that it is the only Council member implementing resolution 2401 (2018). How can that possibly be true when in the first four days after the so-called ceasefire, Russian military aircraft conducted at least 20 daily bombing missions on Damascus and eastern Ghouta, while the people of Syria remained under siege? The so-called ceasefire was intended to allow humanitarian access to sick and starving civilians. Russia even doubled down on its cynicism by proposing five-hour pauses in the fighting. It said that they were necessary to allow humanitarian convoys to get through, but Russian and Syrian bombs continue to prevent the delivery of humanitarian aid. Only after territory falls into the hands of the Al-Assad Government and its allies do they allow food and medicine to be delivered. Russia and Syria's rationalization is that they have to continue to bomb in eastern Ghouta in order to combat what they call terrorists. That is a transparent excuse for the Russians and Al-Assad to maintain their assault. Meanwhile, from the very beginning, the opposition groups in eastern Ghouta expressed their readiness to implement the ceasefire. They told the Council that they welcomed the resolution. Russia's response was to call those groups terrorists and keep pummelling S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 8/21 18-08569 civilians into submission, while the people of Syria continue to starve. Last week, after Syrian civilians had spent years barely surviving, an agreement was reached to allow them to leave eastern Ghouta. Who brokered it? Russia. So we see the cycle being completed. The people of eastern Ghouta are surrendering. That is the ugly reality on the ground in Syria today. Cynical accusations of bad faith from Russia will not stop us from speaking out, and their blatantly false narratives will not keep us from telling the world about Russia's central role in bombing the Syrian people into submission. Fifteen days ago, when it was apparent that the Russian, Syrian and Iranian regimes were utterly ignoring the ceasefire, the United States developed a plan for a tougher and more targeted ceasefire focused on Damascus city and eastern Ghouta. Despite overwhelming evidence that the ceasefire was being ignored, some of our colleagues urged us to give resolution 2401 (2018) a chance to work. Reluctantly, we agreed and put off introducing the resolution. Now, more than 80 per cent of eastern Ghouta is controlled by Al-Assad and his allies. Their deception, hypocrisy and brutality have overtaken the chance of a ceasefire in eastern Ghouta, and for that we should all be ashamed. If we were upholding our responsibility as a Security Council, we would adopt a resolution today recognizing the reality of what happened in eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Syrian authorities, along with Russia and Iran, for launching a military offensive to seize eastern Ghouta the same day that we called for a ceasefire. A responsible Security Council would condemn the Al-Assad regime for deliberately blocking convoys of humanitarian aid during its military campaign and removing medical items from convoys that attempted to reach eastern Ghouta. A responsible Security Council would recognize that the provision of humanitarian aid was never safe, unimpeded or sustained, and that there was no lifting of sieges. A responsible Security Council would express its outrage that at least 1,700 civilians were killed during a military campaign that it demanded to come to a halt — 1,700 civilians who should have been spared in the ceasefire we demanded, but who died on our watch. But we cannot. We cannot take those actions because Russia will stop at nothing to use its permanent seat on the Council to shield its ally Bashar Al-Assad from even the faintest criticism. And we cannot take those actions because instead of calling out the ways in which Al-Assad, Russia and Iran made a mockery of our calls for a ceasefire, too many members of the Council wanted to wait. That is a travesty. This should be a day of shame for every member of the Council and it should be a lesson about what happens when we focus on fleeting displays of unity instead of on what is right. For those who think otherwise, the people of eastern Ghouta deserve an explanation. Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): At the outset, I would like to thank Mark Lowcock for his briefing and to commend him on his tireless efforts and those of his team in their response to the urgent and severe humanitarian situation in Syria. To address that urgency and severity, a month ago almost to the day the Security Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018). We thus collectively and unanimously demanded that all the parties to the conflict cease hostilities throughout the country to allow for sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to civilians in need and for medical evacuations. A month later, what is the situation? Not only has resolution 2401 (2018) not been implemented, but the humanitarian situation in Syria has worsened. The civilian population is living in despair, trapped between bargaining and fighting, particularly in eastern Ghouta. Over the past few weeks, not only has the fighting has not subsided; it has doubled in intensity, with a land offensive launched by the regime, supported by its allies Russia and Iran. The carefully planned offensive was unremitting, using the double strategy of terror and parallel negotiations that was used in Aleppo to obtain the surrender of combatants and the displacement of civilians. For a month there has not been a single day when eastern Ghouta, which has been besieged and starved for years, has not suffered indiscriminate shelling by the regime and its supporters. They have systematically bombed schools and hospitals and killed more than 1,700 civilians, including more than 300 children. Those deaths are the result of a deliberate strategy of the Syrian regime to forcibly bend an entire population, annihilate any form of opposition and remain in power. Nothing should justify breaches of international humanitarian law. Not one humanitarian convoy has been authorized to enter eastern Ghouta since 15 March, and almost no humanitarian assistance has 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 9/21 been delivered in recent weeks. Meanwhile, there are immense needs among those still in eastern Ghouta, the majority of whom are women and children. For several days we have been witnessing forced evacuations of populations from eastern Ghouta, which could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. We have demanded humanitarian access to eastern Ghouta in order to provide assistance to people in their own homes, where they wish to stay as long as the ceasefire allows. That was the reason for the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018). Instead, we have witnessed just the opposite — an escalation of violence to force a massive displacement of civilians. Bombing has forced civilians, approximately 80,000 people, to flee. The displacement of people from eastern Ghouta is an integral part of the military strategy of the Syrian regime to force the opposition to capitulate. Once again, civilians are the primary victims. As I said, those forced displacements could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Evidence of such crimes will be collected, preserved and used. We were clear on that point during the Arria-formula Council meeting with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights a few days ago. Some 55,000 civilians are now in eight collective camps managed by the Syrian regime around eastern Ghouta, without water or electricity and in disastrous sanitary conditions. Their lot has not improved; their hell has simply moved a few kilometres away. We are extremely concerned about the fate of those civilians who now live in overcrowded conditions, with no assurances of protection or security, with no guarantee that they will return home. How do we protect civilians in the situation I have just described? It is absolutely urgent to protect those who can still be protected. Although the 30-day cessation of hostilities demanded by resolution 2401 (2018) has still not been implemented, that demand remains, more urgent and relevant than ever. The resolution is still the framework for our collective action. In that regard, and in line with the briefing just given by Mark Lowcock, I would like to underscore three vital demands. First, it is indispensable and urgent that humanitarian convoys be allowed to enter eastern Ghouta daily and with adequate security. Although humanitarian needs are great, the regime continues to deliberately block aid. United Nations convoys must be able to enter and make deliveries. Fighting must cease long enough to allow for delivery, unloading and distribution of supplies, including of medical assistance. The second demand concerns civilians who remain in Ghouta, who have the right to emergency humanitarian assistance and to protection. Aid must reach them where they are. To that end, the United Nations and its international and local humanitarian partners must be able to work safely on site to assess the needs of those populations. It is an obligation under international humanitarian law, but it is the minimum required to provide tangible assistance to those concerned. The protection that is due them under international humanitarian law must be unconditionally guaranteed. In that regard I call again on the responsibility of all actors with influence on the Syrian regime. The third demand, which has taken on new importance in recent days, is for assistance to be provided to the displaced civilians in camps outside Ghouta. Very concretely, that means that those populations, who have been forced to leave everything behind in order to survive, must be assured of their safety, access to basic necessities and a chance to return home when they so desire. Care must be taken that they are not threatened with retaliation, threats or persecution of any kind. In order to ensure that they are protected, the United Nations and its partners must be able to escort civilians who have been evacuated from their point of departure to their destination in the collective shelters. The United Nations and its partners must be granted continuous access to civilians living in those camps. We hope that the United Nations can strengthen its support to displaced persons who have fled eastern Ghouta. That would call for an increase in the number of international staff on site. We hope that approval will be granted to that end as soon as possible. It would also call for security guarantees for humanitarian workers. The situation in Afrin is also extremely worrisome. A great many civilians are in a critical situation. More that 180,000 people have been displaced. A single convoy was authorized, yesterday, which is insufficient given the tremendous needs of the population. Ongoing fighting in Afrin has forced the Syrian Democratic Forces to halt operations against Da'esh, whose threat, as we all know, has not dissappeared. Our position on the issue is the same. The legitimate concerns of Turkey with regard to the security of its borders cannot in any way justify a lasting military presence deep inside Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 10/21 18-08569 More than ever, we need the fighting to end. We call on all parties on the ground to conclude the negotiations under way and respect a cessation of hostilities. We support the efforts of the Special Envoy for Syria, Mr. Staffan de Mistura, and his commitment to resuming the Geneva process and to reaching a lasting political solution in line with resolution 2254 (2015) that starts with the establishment of an inclusive constitutional committee, under the auspices of Mr. De Mistura. It is the only way to end the Syrian crisis. It is absolutely essential to work on both the humanitarian and political fronts. I appeal on behalf of France, first, to those who can make a difference on the ground, starting with Russia. It is never to late to save lives. Let us be well aware that without urgent, decisive action, the worst is undoubtedly yet to come in the form of a worsening and enlargement of the conflict. The time has come for us to learn seriously the lessons of the Syrian tragedy. This tragedy is the illustration of a new global disorder where the rappelling ropes have disappeared due to a lack of strong international governance, a lack of a power of last resort and a lack of convergence among key actors — to which we add the well-known attitude of Russia. In other words, if we want to avoid other tragedies of this type in future, it is essential to structure the multipolar world in which we now find ourselves around a robust multilateralism embodied by a reformed United Nations. It is the only alternative to the fragmentation of the world and the return to the zones of influence — and our history teaches us all the dangers of that — and it is with the settlement of the Syrian crisis, which is our priority today and which is the emergency before us, one of the other challenges of our generation. Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): I thank you, Mr. President, both for being here today to underscore the vital importance of this topic and, in particular, for your very powerful statement. The United Kingdom supports your call for a referral of the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. I also wish to express our thanks to the Under- Secretary-General for his continued efforts to keep the Security Council informed of the toll that hostilities are having on civilians in Syria. We also thank him for the heroic efforts of all his teams on the ground. Their efforts are much supported by most of us on the Council. The Under-Secretary-General's briefing eloquently underscores why it is essential that the Council comes together to agree on concrete steps to allow the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for everybody who needs it. Ambassador Haley has laid the situation bare, Ambassador Delattre has set out the regime's intentions, and Ambassador Alotaibi has focused on the need for protection and registration. I support their calls. I will not rehearse a catalogue of suffering that we have heard expressed so eloquently today, but that omission should not be taken as any indication that the United Kingdom is not as horrified as others by what is happening on the ground. Specifically, it is diabolical that access is actually worse in the face of such suffering. Diabolical is a strong word, but there are no others to describe what is happening. The worst destruction and suffering has continued in eastern Ghouta. Those who support Al-Assad have not taken steps to help stop the violence. Instead, Al-Assad and his supporters have violated the strong words of the Security Council in resolution 2401 (2018), making mockery of the Council's authority, as Ambassador Delattre stated. Since 11 March, an estimated 100,000 people have left eastern Ghouta and are in makeshift reception sites in rural Damascus. Thousands more have been bused to Idlib. Because there is no independent monitoring nor provisions for civilian safety, those fleeing and those staying remain vulnerable and at risk of mistreatment and abuse by the regime, including being detained, disappeared or separated from their families. Humanitarians, health workers and first responders on the ground report that the regime is deliberately targeting them. That is illegal, and those who help the Al-Assad regime are complicit in that illegality. The situation continues even for those who are left behind. An estimated 150,000 civilians remain in eastern Ghouta. They suffer from acute food shortages and lack of medical supplies. They are afraid, and above all they remember how the regime punished the civilians who fled from eastern Aleppo in December 2016. That is why Ambassador Alotaibi's call for protection and registration is so urgent. We welcome United Nations plans to scale up support to deal with the dire situations in the internally displaced persons camps and collective shelters. We call on Russia to use its influence with the regime to 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 11/21 ensure that the United Nations and its partners can also provide assistance and protection for those who remain in eastern Ghouta. Whether civilians choose to stay or leave, it is essential that they be protected against attack and have access to the essentials to survive. This is not just a plea on the grounds of humanity; it is a requirement under international humanitarian law. It is the job of the Council and all members of the Council to uphold international humanitarian law. Those who side with the regime in its actions are themselves guilty of violating that law. In concluding, I would like to highlight two further areas. The suffering of the Syrian people continues in Idlib, where civilians have been under attack by regime forces for many years. More than a million internally displaced Syrians live there, including those who have fled eastern Ghouta. In Afrin, we recognize Turkey's legitimate interest in the security of its borders, but at the same time we remain concerned about the impact of operations on the humanitarian situation, and my Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have raised the need for protection of civilians and access with President Erdoğan and his Ministers. It was good to hear from the Under-Secretary-General that there may at last be signs of progress in Afrin. After seven years of conflict, over 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance in Syria. The Al-Assad regime has created the situation and is now preventing humanitarian actors from relieving some of the horror it has inflicted. We call on Russia to use its influence to ensure that at a minimum the United Nations can fulfil its mandate to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for Syrians on the basis of need, regardless of any other considerations. I was at Geneva in 2012. I think we all feel that that was a huge missed opportunity, in the light of events. The situation has escalated every year since that time, and, as the Under-Secretary-General said, the level of access is worse. The Council has a small opportunity to put measures in place to reduce the risk of reprisals. As you said, Mr. President, if the Security Council cannot do it, who can? Mr. Umarov (Kazakhstan): I join others in thanking Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. I also wish to welcome the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Mr. Stephanus Abraham Blok, who is presiding over today's meeting. Kazakhstan remains committed to all Security Council resolutions aimed at solving humanitarian issues in Syria. We believe that it is most important to preserve all possible humanitarian-access modalities, including cross-border assistance, which are indispensable in bringing humanitarian aid to millions of people in Syria. Implementing resolution 2401 (2018) is a collective responsibility, with each Council member and State Member of the United Nations playing a significant role. We must all continue to do everything we can to ensure full implementation across Syria. We look forward to continued reporting on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) to the Council through the regular Syria briefings and reports of the Secretary- General, as stipulated in the resolution. Urgent attention must be focused on long-term humanitarian assistance, with the assurance of safe humanitarian access by the United Nations and other aid agencies, and evacuation of the wounded. We commend the sterling contribution of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent for their provision of increased medical supplies and life-saving services, including surgical procedures. In that regard, we welcome the increase in humanitarian convoys gaining access to besieged areas in Syria in March, compared to previous months. It is necessary to take note of the worrisome humanitarian situation in Syria, as fighting in different parts of the country are causing massive displacement. We endorse the appeal of the United Nations to help stem the catastrophic situation for tens of thousands of people, from both eastern Ghouta and Afrin. We look forward to the next round of talks, to be held in mid-May in our capital, Astana, where the stepping up of efforts to ensure observance of the relevant agreements will be addressed. We also believe that the dialogue between Under- Secretary-General Mark Lowcock and the Government of Syria should be ongoing. We reiterate that all obligations under international humanitarian law must be respected by all parties. A further United Nations needs-assessment mission to these troubled areas, similar to that which Under-Secretary-General Lowcock led recently, may be required very soon. The Syrian authorities must cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations in S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 12/21 18-08569 facilitating the unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance and thereby mitigating the suffering. Lastly, we are of the view that the crisis in Syria can be resolved only through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process, based on the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex), subsequent Security Council resolutions and relevant statements of the International Syria Support Group. Mr. Meza-Cuadra (Peru) (spoke in Spanish): We appreciate the convening of this meeting and the briefing by Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary- General for Humanitarian Affairs, on the humanitarian situation in Syria. We also welcome your presence here today, Sir, in presiding over our meeting. Peru deeply regrets that violence and human suffering continue to characterize the situation in Syria, 30 days after the humanitarian ceasefire demanded by the Council. Resolution 2401 (2018) remains in full force, and we consider that the Syrian Government and other actors with the capacity to influence developments on the ground are obliged to ensure its full implementation. The ceasefire should be immediate and enable unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance throughout Syrian territory. While there has been some limited progress in that regard, the delivery of humanitarian assistance must be continuous and unrestricted. In view of the Council's responsibilities in line with international law and international humanitarian law, Peru will continue to advocate for the protection of civilians in all conflicts and humanitarian crises. An indeterminate number of Syrian citizens, including thousands of women and children, have been driven out of eastern Ghouta by the violence. We note with concern that the shelters in the vicinity of Damascus cannot cope and that they lack food, clean water and medical supplies. We must remember that international humanitarian law has mandatory provisions for the evacuation of civilians. It is also compulsory to take measures to safeguard private property from looting and destruction. Syrian citizens must be able to return to their homes and businesses when security conditions improve. We must also protect the majority of the remaining population in eastern Ghouta, who are particularly vulnerable to reprisals, forced recruitment and sexual violence. We are also concerned about the humanitarian situation in Afrin, Idlib and Raqqa, among other areas of Syria. The responsibility to protect civilians cannot be conditional or subordinated to political or strategic interests. We highlight the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies, such as the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, to assist people in such a difficult situation. They have our full support. Given the intensification of violence in recent weeks and its devastating consequences for the population, we must once again reiterate how urgent it is to make progress towards achieving a political settlement on the basis of resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communiqué (S/2012/522, annex). In that regard, we hope that progress will soon be made in the establishment and composition of the constitutional committee agreed on in Sochi. All the Syrian parties, and especially the Government, must engage constructively in this. Mr. Alemu (Ethiopia): We thank Under-Secretary- General Lowcock for his comprehensive briefing. We want to express our appreciation to the United Nations and humanitarian partners for their continued selfless and courageous service in providing assistance to all Syrians in difficult circumstances. We remain concerned about the humanitarian crisis in all the areas of Syria where it is prevalent. As the Under-Secretary-General said, the Syrian war has entered its eighth year, bringing unspeakable suffering to the people of the country. The escalation of violence that we witnessed last month in eastern Ghouta and other parts of the country has been a source of extremely grave concern. According to the statement issued on 21 March by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, shelter, protection, water and sanitation remain the key priority humanitarian needs of the internally displaced. In that regard, we thank the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for providing much-needed assistance. Alleviating the suffering of Syrians requires urgent and coordinated action on the part of all actors, while respecting the relevant resolutions of the Council, particularly resolution 2401 (2018). It was encouraging that the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2401 (2018), demanding a cessation of hostilities throughout Syria for at least 30 days so as to ensure the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and medical evacuations. In that regard, while much remains to be done to fully implement the resolution, compared to the previous month there has been positive 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 13/21 action, including aid delivery to some of the areas that are especially badly affected and difficult to reach. The conflict has also diminished in intensity in some areas, according to the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). However, this does not mean that the action taken has been sufficient. We therefore stress that it is vital to redouble our efforts to do everything possible to fully and comprehensively implement the resolution with a sense of urgency and enhanced political will. We believe that what the people of Syria need is a cessation of hostilities, along with protection and access to basic goods and services. All of those demands are contained and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). All Syrian parties should therefore respect and fully implement resolution 2401 (2018), and all States that have influence over the parties should try to bring the maximum pressure to bear on them, with the ultimate objective of helping to fully operationalize the resolution, which was adopted unanimously by the Council. In that regard, we hope that the Astana guarantors, Russia, Turkey and Iran, will play their role in implementing resolution 2401 (2018), strengthening the ceasefire arrangements and improving humanitarian conditions, as stated in their final statement of 16 March. In addition, while we acknowledge that the United Nations and its humanitarian partners have been able to reach millions of Syrians using all modes of aid delivery, the fact remains that humanitarian access, particularly inter-agency convoys, remains a critical challenge. In that connection, it is absolutely vital to ensure safe, sustained and need-based humanitarian access so that life-saving aid can reach all Syrians in need. Let me conclude by reaffirming that only a comprehensive political dialogue, under the auspices of the United Nations, can ultimately end the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. We reiterate our position that the only solution to the Syrian crisis is a political solution based on resolution 2254 (2015). We support the continued efforts of the Special Envoy and encourage all Syrian parties to engage with him constructively and meaningfully in order to revitalize the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and support the establishment of a constitutional committee, in line with the outcome of the Sochi congress. We fully concur with the Secretary- General, who states, in his report of 20 March, "Political efforts to bring the war to an end must be accorded priority and redoubled by all parties to the conflict." (S/2018/243, para. 48) While the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict lies with the Syrians themselves — a principle that is firmly embedded in resolution 2254 (2015) — the Council also has an important role to play in supporting the efforts in a spirit of unity, which we believe can have a positive impact on the ground in alleviating the suffering of all Syrians. That may be a tall order, in the light of the fragmentation that Ambassador Delattre mentioned earlier. However, the effort must be made. Mr. Inchauste Jordán (Plurinational State of Bolivia) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome your presence, Sir, and the fact that you are presiding over the work of the Security Council today. We would also like to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his briefing. We support him in the difficult work with which he is entrusted. We must once again express our regret that this conflict has continued for eight years and that we are still witnessing the ongoing sieges and violence being endured by the Syrian people, particularly women and children. In addition to living with the psychological consequences of the situation, they urgently need humanitarian assistance. We unequivocally condemn the ongoing bombardment of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, and the military activities in residential areas in the cities of Damascus, Afrin and Idlib, as well as in eastern Ghouta. They have only led to more civilians being killed, wounded and displaced. According to the most recent report of the Secretary General (S/2018/243), between December and February alone, there were 385,000 internally displaced persons and 2.3 million people living in besieged and hard-to-reach areas. We regret that so far there are still obstacles preventing the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We call on all parties involved to make every effort to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution throughout Syria in order to facilitate the safe, sustained and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and services, as well as to enable the medical evacuation of those who are seriously ill or injured. In addition, according to the same report, since October 2017, 86,000 civilians have returned to the city of Raqqa, of whom 20,000 arrived in February alone. Regrettably, 130 civilians have died and 658 have been seriously injured by explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines. In that regard, we would like to highlight the visit by the United Nations mission to Raqqa last week. We reiterate that the work of clearing S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 14/21 18-08569 anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war is crucial to facilitating the safe return of the displaced. While it does not reflect what has gone on throughout Syrian territory, it is important to highlight the recent delivery of humanitarian aid through convoys, of which the first, on 5 March, was to Douma in eastern Ghouta, bringing food for more than 27,000 people. We also believe that cross-border assistance is an important part of the response to the situation, and we highlight the food assistance to 2 million people and the dispatch by the United Nations to areas of northern and southern Syria of 449 trucks carrying aid for 1 million people. We welcome the efforts of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, all the humanitarian agencies concerned and the Russian Federation that have enabled humanitarian assistance to be delivered to various populations, in particular in eastern Ghouta, which three convoys recently entered. We call for that assistance to continue as safely as possible. In that regard, we believe it is important to strengthen the dialogue and coordination among the humanitarian agencies, the United Nations and the Syrian Government in order to facilitate the entry of convoys and humanitarian aid workers, as well as the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons. We emphasize the dangerous work of the personnel of the various agencies and humanitarian assistance bodies, whose staff risk their own lives in carrying out their dangerous work on the ground. We therefore reiterate the importance of full respect for international humanitarian law and international human rights law. We want to take this opportunity to reiterate how important it is to build on the political momentum following the commitments made at the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. That should be the channel for reinforcing the Geneva process, led by the United Nations in the context of resolution 2254 (2016). We hope for the speedy implementation of the Sochi outcome and, as a result, the establishment of a constitutional committee that can facilitate a viable political transition. In that regard, we support the results of the latest Astana meeting, which enabled the agreements establishing de-escalation zones to be strengthened. We hope they will be reflected on the ground so as to reduce the violence and meet the urgent humanitarian needs. We condemn any attempt to foment fragmentation or sectarianism in Syria and believe that it is the Syrian people who must freely decide their future and their political leadership in the context of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Finally, we reiterate that the only way to resolve the conflict is through an inclusive, negotiated and agreed political process, led by and for the Syrian people, and aimed at achieving sustainable peace on their territory without foreign pressure of any kind. Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We would like to welcome you as you preside over the Council today, Sir. We also welcome Ms. Karen Pierce, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who is now here with us. We thank Mr. Lowcock for his briefing. The difficult humanitarian situation continues in a number of areas in Syria. The Russian Federation has been taking active steps to normalize things, including within the framework of the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). While some here may not like it, it is a fact that we are the only ones who have been making concrete efforts to implement resolution 2401 (2018). Since we first established humanitarian pauses, with the assistance of the Russian Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the participation and oversight of the United Nations and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, nearly 121,000 people have been evacuated, on a strictly voluntarily basis — let me stress that — from eastern Ghouta. Many of them have talked about how difficult it has been for them to live under the repressive regime established by the armed group militants. Civilians continue to flee eastern Ghouta through the Muhayam-Al-Wafedin humanitarian corridor. There is real-time video of this running on the Russian Defence Ministry's official website. In just the past few days more than 520 civilians have left Douma. Russian agencies have organized the distribution to them of hot food, food kits and individual food rations, as well as bottled drinking water. Yesterday alone, Russian military doctors treated 111 civilians, including 42 children. At the same time, the Russian Centre for Reconciliation continues to organize the return of residents of Saqba and Kafr Batna. On 24 March, as a result of an agreement reached by the Centre with leaders of illegal armed groups, another checkpoint was opened for fighters and their family members to leave from Harasta, Arbin, Zamalka, Ain Terma and Jobar. In the past few days, militias from the Ahrar Al-Sham 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 15/21 and Faylak Al-Rahman groups and their relatives have been evacuated along the corridor and bused to Idlib governorate. In three days, more than 13,000 people were evacuated from Arbin alone. However, many have decided to remain, taking advantage of the presidential amnesty. Incidentally, there have been active efforts to plant stories about detentions and torture and possibly even executions. They are lies. The Syrian police are ensuring that these operations are safe, under the oversight of specialists from the Russian Centre for Reconciliation and representatives of the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. Yesterday 26 Syrian soldiers and civilians who had been taken prisoner by Faylak Al-Rahman were freed. In our view, those facts clearly attest to the difficulty and extent of the work being done by the Russian specialists on the ground, in communication with the Syrian authorities and the leaders of the armed groups. There are some members of the Security Council who prefer wasting their time on inflammatory speeches and letters making groundless claims about our country, probably to conceal their own unwillingness to do anything constructive to implement resolution 2401 (2018) in cooperation with the groups they sponsor. At the same time, yesterday the fighters from Jaysh Al-Islam who remain in Douma detonated four mines yesterday in several districts in Damascus. Six civilians died and another six were wounded. Al-Mazraa, a residential neighbourhood in the capital was shelled earlier. As a result of mine explosions around the Al-Fayhaa sports complex, a 12-year-old boy died and seven children were injured. Hundreds of people have died from mine explosions in Damascus overall. This is apparently the message that the militants are sending every day about the willingness to implement the ceasefire that they loudly proclaimed in their famous letter to the Secretary-General. I want to again point out the importance of clarifying the data used in the Secretary-General's report (S/2018/138), including on possible attacks on civilian infrastructure and the victims of such attacks. Where does that information come from? The February report has a footnote that mentions various United Nations agencies and departments of the Secretariat. The main source cited is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which does not have a staff presence on the ground. The big question, and what we are trying to get to the bottom of, is who is providing the United Nations staff with this kind of information? Is it the anti-Government groups and terrorist accomplices like the White Helmets? But they are interested parties. So why is there only a sprinkling of the information provided by the Syrian authorities? We call on the United Nations, humanitarian organizations and States to deliver urgent assistance to help the people who are evacuating eastern Ghouta. It is also essential to strengthen the United Nations presence around the humanitarian corridors. The Syrians need immediate assistance with the infrastructure reconstruction that the Syrian Government has begun in the liberated residential areas of eastern Ghouta. We would like to ask Mr. Lowcock to oversee that issue personally. We also hope that as soon as possible the coalition will create the conditions and provide the necessary security guarantees enabling a United Nations assessment mission to be sent to Raqqa and humanitarian convoys to the Rukban camp. The Syrian authorities gave their official consent to this some time ago, as Mark Lowcock confirmed today. We should note that we were shocked by the recent reports that more than 2,000 civilians may have died during the coalition forces' assault on Raqqa. Let me ask it once again — where were the weeping and wailing and calls for humanitarian aid then? We have noted the statistics in the Secretary-General's report on the numbers of people who have returned to Raqqa, but we would like to see similar information on other parts of Syria and the country as a whole. How many people are returning to their permanent homes? We would like to propose to the United Nations representatives that they designate the areas where those indicators are the highest as a priority for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitor how effectively it is being implemented. We also think it would be appropriate to include information on reconstruction assistance in the reports. Resolution 2401 (2018) stipulates that Syrian districts, including those that have been liberated from terrorists, need support in restoring normal functioning and stability. One of the key areas in that regard is mine clearance. We get the feeling that external donors are losing interest in delivering assistance to residents in areas under Syrian Government control. We are seeing signals from some capitals that only opposition-held enclaves should be helped. Such double standards go completely against the core principles of neutrality and impartial humanitarian assistance. We hope that we are wrong about this and that Mr. Lowcock will refute the S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 16/21 18-08569 possibility of such a trend. But if our suspicions are borne out, how does the United Nations intend to deal with the issue? Just the other day a meeting of senior officials was held in Oslo under the auspices of the United Nations and the European Union to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. No representatives of the Syrian authorities were invited. How does Mr. Lowcock view the prospect of another assessment of the humanitarian situation in Syria without the participation of its official representatives? Does he consider that a productive format? That is a very urgent question considering that the forthcoming second donor conference is scheduled for the end of April in Brussels. I would also like to ask Mr. Lowcock what is known at the United Nations about the facts of sexual services being provided in exchange for humanitarian assistance in the context of cross-border operations. There is information about that in the November report of the United Nations Population Fund, and the BBC did a journalistic investigation of the issue. If this issue is known about, why is it avoided in the Secretary- General's reports? And if it is not known about, it should be investigated. We hope that in close cooperation with the Syrian authorities and consideration of their views, the United Nations will agree on an emergency humanitarian response plan for this year as soon as possible, with an emphasis on the delivery of assistance to liberated areas. Ms. Wronecka (Poland): I would like to welcome you here today, Sir, and to commend the presidency's leadership. I would also like to thank Under-Secretary- General Mark Lowcock for his comprehensive but once again alarming update. Like many around this table, we share a sense of urgency on this issue, especially following the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), which we adopted unanimously a month ago. Unfortunately, we have to recognize that it has not been implemented in the first 30 days since its adoption. We are meeting again when there has been no substantial change on the ground and the fighting is far from over. The military offensive in Syria continues and the human suffering is growing as a result. Any action, even against terrorists, cannot justify attacks on innocent civilians and civilian infrastructure, including health facilities. That must stop, and the parties to the conflict must strictly comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law. Accountability for serious violations is a requirement under international law and central to achieving sustainable peace in Syria. As indicated in the last report of the United Nations-mandated Commission of Inquiry, there is a need for the international community to take a broader view of accountability and to take urgent steps to ensure that the needs of Syrian conflict victims for justice and accountability are met both immediately and in the long term. We call upon all parties to alleviate the suffering of the civilians, including children, by granting them free and safe access to humanitarian assistance, including voluntary medical evacuation, which should be strictly overseen by the United Nations and the implementing partners in order to ensure the voluntary character of the process. While discussing evacuations, let me underline that people must have the right to return and to a safe location for settlement. Any evacuation negotiations should also include civilians. Humanitarian aid convoys to eastern Ghouta must continue for those who choose to stay. We would like to stress that all actors should use their full influence to immediately improve conditions on the ground. We urgently call for the cessation of hostilities in the whole of Syria. Attacks against civilians, civilian property and medical facilities must stop in order to alleviate the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. Some small positive steps have taken place, such as a larger number of humanitarian convoys reaching the besieged areas in March, especially when compared to previous months, when humanitarian access was almost completely blocked. That improvement shows that it is possible to make progress, although much more is needed. In that context, we call on Russia, Iran and Turkey — as the European Union did, and as the High Representatives did through their respective ministers after the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union in February — to fulfil their obligations and responsibilities as Astana guarantors. It is also important to note that the cessation of hostilities may also provide a chance for the peace talks under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva to gain momentum so that a political solution may finally be reached. Once again, let me underline that we should seek to reach an intra-Syrian framework political agreement, in line with Council resolution 2254 (2015). In that connection, we strongly believe that the conclusions of the Congress of Syrian 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 17/21 National Dialogue in Sochi could and should be used to advance the Geneva process, especially with regard to the creation of a constitutional committee by United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura. In conclusion, let me stress the necessity of maintaining the unity of the Council on the question of the full implementation of the humanitarian resolution across Syria. The civilian population of Syria has already suffered too much. The adoption of the resolution was just the beginning of the process. We call on all with influence on the ground to take the necessary steps to ensure that the fighting stops, the Syrian people are protected and, finally, our joint humanitarian access and necessary medical evacuations continue. Mr. Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) (spoke in Spanish): We welcome Mr. Stef Blok, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, to New York. We take this opportunity to congratulate him for the commendable presidency of the Netherlands during the month of March. The Republic of Equatorial Guinea is grateful for the holding of this informative meeting, which enables us to once again assess humanitarian resolution 2401 (2018), which we approved one month ago. We thank Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock, who, as he always does, has just given us a very informative and detailed briefing on the developments on the ground in Syria. The 30-day ceasefire throughout Syria, established under resolution 2401 (2018) in order to carry out humanitarian operations, has expired. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the United Nations team in Syria, violence has increased in eastern Ghouta, in Damascus, in Idlib and in Afrin, where there is an ongoing Turkish military offensive. Daily air strikes and bombardments have increased, including in residential areas, among Government forces, opposition forces and non-State armed groups, making it difficult to ensure the protection of all civilians and the immediate, secure and sustained provision of humanitarian aid. That excessive resurgence of violence, orchestrated by the various parties, only serves to exacerbate and aggravate the already grim humanitarian situation in those conflict zones. As we have reiterated, the solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria is tightly linked with a ceasefire. The prolongation of the conflict can only further aggravate the tragic humanitarian situation, which in turn creates greater instability and negatively affects neighbouring countries that take in the millions of refugees fleeing the war. As the Secretary-General underlines in his 20 March report: "Our common objective" — and one of high priority — "should be to alleviate and end the suffering of the Syrian people. What the Syrian people need immediately has been made abundantly clear and affirmed in resolution 2401 (2018). Civilians need a cessation of hostilities, protection, access to basic goods and services" — and access to humanitarian and sanitary assistance — "and an end to sieges." (S/2018/243, para. 48) All parties involved in the Syrian crisis must accept that none of them can achieve a military victory. Government forces, opposition forces and armed groups must accept that no matter how much death and destruction they cause in their country, there will be no victor but rather one single loser — the Syrian people. Similarly, national parties and international partners that have significant political and geostrategic interests and that have the capacity to exercise their influence on their respective allies must redouble their efforts and political commitments in order to bring sustainable peace and stability to the country. Any party that insists on political red lines that block the necessary commitments must also consider the setback caused by the loss of innocent human lives. It is evident that the Council has not entirely reached its goal by unanimously adopting resolution 2401 (2018). The Republic of Equatorial Guinea will support any humanitarian initiative that seeks to definitively put an end to the suffering of the Syrian people. In conclusion, I renew the tribute of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea to Mr. Lowcock and to the entire humanitarian team of the United Nations for their noble and tireless work in Syria to provide relief to the Syrian people living through a humanitarian catastrophe. Mr. Dah (Côte d'Ivoire) (spoke in French): Like others, my delegation would like to welcome Mr. Stef Blok to New York and to congratulate him on the holding of the current meeting in the Security Council. My delegation also wishes to thank Mr. Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, for his informative briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 18/21 18-08569 As we are all aware, the war in Syria has unleashed one of the most serious humanitarian crises in recent history and continues to have a devastating impact on the Syrian people. My country remains particularly concerned about the attacks and bombings, including those against hospitals and civilian infrastructure, that continue to punctuate the daily lives of people subjected to forced displacement in the areas of Afrin, Idlib and eastern Ghouta. Côte d'Ivoire condemns those actions and calls on the parties to take the steps necessary to protect people, civilian infrastructure and humanitarian personnel. More than a month after its unanimous adoption by members of the Security Council, resolution 2401 (2018), on which so much hope was pinned, has fallen woefully short of our expectations, much to our regret. The fact is that the demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities to allow safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian aid and related services, as well as medical evacuation of the seriously ill and wounded, in accordance with relevant international humanitarian law, has still not been adhered to, despite our joint efforts. The ongoing fighting has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps and makeshift shelters where living conditions are extremely difficult. Côte d'Ivoire calls once again for the effective implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) with a view to resuming the delivery of humanitarian aid, including medical evacuations from besieged areas and camps for internally displaced persons, in order to ease the suffering of people in distress. We urge the Council to overcome its differences and to demonstrate unity in order to ensure the effective implementation of the resolution, which is more relevant than ever. My delegation reiterates its belief that the humanitarian situation will not improve unless significant progress is made at the political level, as the two issues are closely linked. We therefore encourage the parties to prioritize political dialogue and resume peace talks in the framework of the Geneva process, in accordance with the road map established by resolution 2254 (2015). Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): I thank Under-Secretary-General Lowcock for his briefing. China commends the active efforts of the relevant United Nations agencies to alleviate the humanitarian situation in some areas of Syria. The conflict in Syria is in its eighth year and has caused terrible suffering for the people of Syria. The humanitarian situation in parts of the country has recently deteriorated. China calls on all parties in Syria to put its country's future and destiny, as well as its people's safety, security and well-being first, cease hostilities and violence without delay, resolve their differences through dialogue and consultation and ease the humanitarian situation in Syria as soon as possible. United Nations humanitarian convoys have now gained access to eastern Ghouta in order to deliver aid supplies to the people there. China welcomes Russia's establishment of temporary truces in eastern Ghouta, opening up a humanitarian corridor for Syrian civilians. As a result of the efforts of the parties concerned, some ceasefire agreements have been reached and a large number of civilians evacuated through the corridor. In the circumstances, it is important to continue to promote the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) so as to alleviate the humanitarian situation in areas such as eastern Ghouta. China welcomes the meeting between Foreign Ministers held by Russia, Turkey and Iran in Astana, and commends Kazakhstan for hosting the meeting. We hope that the upcoming meeting of the Heads of State of the three countries and the next round of the Astana dialogue will contribute positively to restoring the ceasefire momentum in Syria and supporting the Geneva talks. The international community should continue to support the role of the United Nations as the main mediator, and back Special Envoy de Mistura's diplomatic efforts to relaunch the Syrian political process. Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity must be respected, and all Syrian parties must be encouraged to reach a political solution to the Syrian issue, based on the principle of the Syrian-led and Syrian-owned peace process, and in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), with a view to fundamentally easing the humanitarian situation in Syria and continuing to advance the counter-terrorism agenda, as mandated by the Council's resolutions. The Council should remain united on the Syrian issue and speak with one voice. China stands ready to work with the international community and to contribute actively and constructively to a political settlement of the Syrian issue. 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 19/21 Mr. Orrenius Skau (Sweden): As the representative of Kuwait has already delivered a joint statement on our behalf, I will make my remarks very brief. One month ago, the Council adopted resolution 2401 (2018) by consensus, in response to the deafening calls for action to address the horrific humanitarian situation in Syria. Today we have heard around this table a continued commitment to moving forward with the implementation of that important resolution. I wanted to speak last in order to identify some points of convergence. From the discussion today, I believe that there are a number of critical areas where there is broad agreement within the Council. First, we all share a deep disappointment and sense of dissatisfaction and frustration with the lack of implementation. While a limited increase in access for humanitarian convoys shows that progress is possible, much more is needed. The resolution remains in force and all parties remain obliged to comply. Secondly, we have heard a common concern about the continuing hostilities throughout the country, particularly the ongoing military offensive in eastern Ghouta. Those who leave the area should do so voluntarily, with the right to return and a choice of safe places to go to. At the same time, humanitarian aid convoys must continue to support those who choose to remain. Thirdly, we agree that efforts to strengthen the protection of civilians must be stepped up by the United Nations and its partners, both inside eastern Ghouta and for those leaving and in the collective shelters. I want to emphasize that preventing sexual and gender-based violence should be an integral part of those efforts. We condemn the attacks in February that affected health facilities. Many colleagues also reiterated today that resolution 2401 (2018) applies across the whole of the country. I just wanted to mention our concern about the Turkish operation in Afrin and the statements that Turkey has made about expanding its military operations in the north, beyond Afrin. We are also concerned about the protection of civilians fleeing Afrin, as well as the difficult conditions for those remaining. We call on all relevant parties, especially Turkey, to ensure the protection of civilians and facilitate cross-border and cross-line humanitarian aid deliveries, as well as freedom of movement, for internally displaced persons. The need for the full implementation of resolution 2401 (2018) remains as urgent today as when it was adopted. As Ambassador Alotaibi has said, we will spare no effort in making progress on the implementation of resolution 2401 (2018). We will continue to work actively and tirelessly to that end, be creative in considering possible further steps, and remain ready to reconvene the Council at any time should the situation warrant its renewed action. We are convinced that the unity of the Council, as difficult as it may be, is the only way to effectively make a real difference on the ground and alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people. For our part, even when terribly frustrated, we will never give up trying to achieve that change. The President: I now give the floor to the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic. Mr. Ja'afari (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): At the outset, I would like to convey the condolences of the Government and people of my country to my colleague on the Russian Federation delegation in the wake of the tragic incident that claimed children's lives in the commercial centre in Kemerovo. A few minutes ago, I was checking the list of the States members of the Security Council and I realized that two — only two — of its 15 members have embassies in Damascus. That is why the statements made by the representatives of those two countries offered the most accurate description of the humanitarian situation in my country. They were able to provide an objective and fair assessment of the situation there. In late 2016, right here in the Chamber (see S/PV.7834), we announced the good news to our people in Syria that the Syrian Government would liberate eastern Aleppo from armed terrorist groups, and as a Government, an army and a responsible State we have done just that. Today we announce to our people the good news that the time has come to liberate all of eastern Ghouta from these armed terrorist groups. We declare that we will liberate the Golan, Afrin, Raqqa, Idlib and the rest of our occupied territory because, as a State, we reject the presence on our territory of any illegal armed group or occupying Power, regardless of the excuses, just like all other States represented in the Council. Such victories would not have been possible if we had no just cause. They would not have been possible without the sacrifices made by the Syrian Arab Army, the support of our people and the support of our allies and friends. S/PV.8217 The situation in the Middle East 27/03/2018 20/21 18-08569 Facts that have come to light recently with the liberation of eastern Ghouta from armed terrorist groups again prove what we have always told the Council since the first day of the global terrorist war waged by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Israel, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and France against my country. We said that the suffering of Syrians is the result of the practices of armed terrorist groups against civilians. The testimonies of the tens of thousands of our people leaving eastern Ghouta underscore that those groups have continued to deprive them of their freedom, destroy their livelihoods, disperse their families and prevent them from leaving to areas under State control in order to continue using them as human shields. They have seized control of humanitarian assistance in order to distribute it to their supporters or sell it to civilians at exorbitant prices. They have also targeted the safe corridors allocated by the Government with explosive bullets and mortar shelling, which has led to the death of dozens of people, including some Palestinian brethren. We have borne witness to a state of hysteria in recent days and weeks in the Council as the Syrian Government has sought to exercise its sovereign right, combat terrorist groups and eliminate terrorists in Syria in order to restore security and stability to all Syrians and implement Council resolutions against terrorism. That state of hysteria proves that the States supporting those terrorist groups have never sought to end the suffering of Syrians. They have sought only to perpetuate and prolong their suffering in order to blackmail the Syrian Government, at the political and humanitarian levels, and save terrorists from their certain deaths. I would like to assure the supporters of terrorism, some of whom are present in this Chamber, that the plan that they have promoted for the past seven years has failed. Their plan was to deny that the Islamist takfiri groups were terrorists and instead present them as moderate Syrian opposition. That plan has failed. Eastern Ghouta has not fallen, as my colleague the representative of the United States stated. It was liberated in the same way we liberated eastern Aleppo. It is terrorism that has fallen in eastern Ghouta, not civilians. As the representative of the United States said, today should be a day of shame for the supporters and sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups. They have supported those terrorist groups for years in order to topple the Syrian Government by force in favour of Islamist takfiri groups. Such actions have led to considerable suffering among the Syrian people, and I have proof of it. Two days ago, at the Senate Armed Forces Committee, led by Senator Lindsey Graham, the Chief of Central Command, General Joseph Votel, stated that "the change of the Government in Syria by force in favour a number of Islamist opposition groups has failed". The Security Council has to date held 49 formal meetings to discuss the so-called humanitarian situation in Syria and a number of informal emergency and Arria Formula meetings. The Council has read reports and heard briefings that were replete with falsehoods that senior officials of the United Nations sought to present in order to serve the policies of some influential Western countries that are members of the Council and to pressure the Syrian Government. Such reports and briefings were completely devoid of professionalism and objectivity. They have failed to take note of the attacks on the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, including the attacks by the international coalition, led by the United States, and those by the Turkish regime and the Israeli occupying force. Those same parties have also sought to provide all kinds of support to terrorist groups associated with Da'esh, the Al-Nusra Front and other militias fabricated in those countries. After 49 reports and hundreds of meetings, briefings and thousands of working hours, some countries continue to refuse to recognize that the humanitarian crisis in Syria is the result of an external investment in terrorism and unilateral coercive measures. Forty-nine reports have been issued, and I say today that my words are falling on deaf ears. People from the Netherlands say that beautiful flowers have thorns. The Netherlands is famous for its flowers. Perhaps that saying reflects the situation on the ground. Mr. Lowcock stated that the Kashkul was targeted by a missile but he did not specify its origin. He said there are eight shelters for those leaving eastern Ghouta. He did not mention the efforts of the Syrian Government to host the 150,000 civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. He does not know who manages those shelters. Perhaps aliens are taking care of the 150,000 civilians. Mr. Lowcock stated that the United Nations, its partners and the Syrian Red Crescent are helping people from Ghouta. He did not mention the Government at all. If the Government has no role to play, why ask it to help the Council? Why does the Council request its approval for the entry of humanitarian convoys? Mr. Lowcock stated that 153,000 people left Afrin and went to Tell 27/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8217 18-08569 21/21 Rifaat because of military operations. Who forced 153,000 people to leave Afrin? Was it not Turkey that forced them to leave? Was it not the Turkish aggression against Afrin that forced these people to leave? Mr. Lowcock mentioned the Syrian Government only once, saying that it approved the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the Rukban camp. He did not say that the United States was behind the obstacles preventing the deployment of the humanitarian convoy in question. The United States occupies the Rukban camp and the Tanf area. I will not go into detail now for the sake of time. I will not even go into the details of the forty-ninth report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/243). I will give only one example to prove that the report lacks objectivity and impartiality. The report devotes nine paragraphs to the suffering of civilians in eastern Ghouta and the damage to the infrastructure there as a result of Government military operations, as the report claims — nine paragraphs. As for the situation of the 8 million civilians in Damascus, the targeting by terrorist groups of the capital with more than 2,500 missiles, the killing and injury of thousands, and the destruction of homes, hospitals and clinics, the report dedicates only one sentence to Damascus. The report says, "Attacks on residential neighbourhoods of Damascus also continued from eastern Ghouta, resulting in deaths, injuries and damage to civilian infrastructure." (S/2018/243, para. 8) We hope that the United Nations will not adopt in eastern Ghouta the same approach that it has taken in previous situations by not providing support to the areas liberated or achieving reconciliation. We hope that the United Nations will adopt a new approach in line with the Charter and international law, based on full coordination and cooperation with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, which is the only party concerned with the protection and support of Syrians. We hope that the United Nations will not succumb to the dictates of certain influential Western countries in the Council that run counter to humanitarian action, the Charter and international law. During the past week alone, the Syrian Ministry of Commerce has distributed 4,000 tons of food to civilians leaving eastern Ghouta. I am not sure about the sources mentioned by the representative of France, because France does not have an embassy in Damascus. So its sources of information cannot be credible. In conclusion, the States sponsoring terrorism have instructed armed terrorist groups to use chemical weapons once again in Syria. I ask the Council to pay attention to this information. They asked them to fabricate evidence, as they have in the past, in order to accuse the Syrian Government. We sent this information to the President of the Security Council yesterday. According to that information, this theatrical act will be produced by the intelligence agencies of these countries, and the starring roles will be the White Helmets. The production will be directed by foreign media. This theatrical act will take place this time in the areas close to the separation line in the Syrian occupied Golan. Terrorist groups will use poison gas against civilians in Al-Harra. Afterwards, the injured will be moved to the hospitals of the Israeli enemy for treatment there. Council members can already imagine the testimony that will be offered by doctors of the Israeli occupation forces. The information we submitted also refers to another theatrical act in the villages of Habit and Qalb Lawza in the suburbs of Idlib, where a number of satellite transmitters and foreign experts have been spotted. This time, the cast will include women and children from an internally displaced persons camp on the Syrian-Turkish border. Once again, I provide the Council with this serious information. The President: There are no more names inscribed on the list of speakers. I now invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

Timothy Mitchell on
Infra-Theory, the State Effect, and the Technopolitics of Oil










This is the first in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 







The unrest in the Arab
world put the region firmly in the spotlights of IR. Where many scholars focus
on the conflicts in relation to democratization as a local or regional dynamic,
political events there do not stand in isolation from broader international
relations or other—for instance economic—concerns. Among the scholars who has
insisted on such broader linkages and associations that co-constitute political
dynamics in the region, Timothy Mitchell stands out. The work of Mitchell has
largely focused on highly specific aspects of politics and development in Egypt
and the broader Middle East, such as the relations between the building of the
Aswan Dam and redistribution of expertise, and the way in which the differences
between coal and oil condition democratic politics. His consistently nuanced
and enticing analyses have gained him a wide readership, and Mitchell's
analyses powerfully resonate across qualitative politically oriented social
sciences.  In this Talk, Timothy Mitchell discusses, amongst others, the birth of 'the
economy' as a powerful modern political phenomenon, how we can understand the
state as an effect rather than an actor, and the importance of taking
technicalities seriously to understand the politics of oil.







Print version of this Talk (pdf)



What is, according to you,
the biggest challenge / principal debate in current globally oriented studies?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



I'm not myself interested in, or good at, big debates,
the kinds of debates that define and drive forward an academic field. The
reason for that is partly that once a topic has become a debate, it has tended
to have sort of hardened into a field, in which there are two or three
positions, and as a scholar you have to take one of those positions. In the
days when I was first trained in Political Science and studied International
Relations, that was so much my sense of the field and indeed of the whole
discipline of political science. This is part of one's initially training in
any field: it is laid out as a
serious debate. I found this something I just could not deal with; I did not
find it intellectually interesting which I think sort of stayed with me all the
way through to where I am now. So although big debates are important for a
certain defining and sustaining of academic fields and training new generations
of students, it is not the kind of way in which I myself have tended to work. I
have tended to work by moving away from what the big debates have been in a
particular moment. My academic interests always started when I found something
curious that interests me and that I try to begin to see in a different way.



However, I suppose with my most recent book Carbon Democracy (2011), in a sense there was a big debate going on, which was the debate about the resource
curse and oil democracy. That was an old debate going back to the 70's, but had
been reinvigorated by the Iraq war in 2003. But that to me is an example of the
problem with big debates, because the terms in which that debate was argued
back and forth—and is still argued—did not seem to make sense as a way to
understand the role of energy in 20th century democratic politics.
Was oil good for democracy or bad for democracy? The existing debate began with
those as two different things—as a dependent or independent variable—so you
would already determine things in advance that I would have wanted to open up.
In general I'm not a good person for figuring out what the big debates are.



But I think, moving from International Relations as a
field to 'globally oriented studies', to
use your phrase, one of the biggest
challenges—just on an academic level, leaving aside challenges that we face as
a global community—is to learn to develop ways of seeing even what seem like
the most global and most international issues, as things that are very local.
Part of the problem with fields such as 'global studies', the term
'globalization', and other terms of that sort, is that they tend to define
their objects of study in opposition to the local, in opposition to even
national-level modes of analysis. By consequence, they assume that the actors
or the forces that they're going to study must themselves be in some sense
global, because that is the premise of the field. So whether it is nation
states acting as world powers; whether it is capitalism understood as a global
system—they have to exist on this plane of the global, on some sort of
universal level, to be topics of IR and global studies. And yet, on close
inspection, most of the concerns or actors central to those modes of inquiry
tend to operate on quite local levels; they tend to be made up of very small
agents, very particular arrangements that somehow have managed to put
themselves together in ways that allow them take on this appearance and
sometimes this effectiveness of things that are global. I'm very interested in
taking things apart that are local, on a particular level, to understand what
it is that enables such small things, such local and particular agents, to act
in a way that creates the appearance of the global or the international world.



Now this relates back to the second part of your
question, about substantive concerns that we face as a global community. When I
was writing Carbon Democracy there
was all this attention on the problem of 'creating a more democratic Middle
East', as it was understood at the time of the Iraq war. It struck me that when
debating this problem—of oil and democracy, of energy and democracy—we saw it
as somehow specific to these countries and to the part of the world where many
countries were very large-scale energy producers. We were not thinking about
the fact that we are all in a sense caught up in this problem that I call
carbon democracy, and that there are issues—whether it is in terms of the
increasing difficulty of extracting energy from the earth, or the consequences
of having extracted the carbon and put it up in the atmosphere—that we, as
democracies, are very, very challenged by. Those issues—and I think in
particular the concerns around climate change—when you look at them from the
perspective of U.S. politics, and the inability of the U.S. even to take the
relatively minor steps that other industrialized democracies have taken: this
inaction suggests a larger problem of oil and democracy that needs explaining
and understanding and working on and organizing about. I also think there is a
whole range of contemporary issues related to energy production and consumption
that revolve around the building of more egalitarian and more socially just
worlds. And, again, those issues present themselves very powerfully as concerns
in American politics, but are experienced in other ways in other parts of the
world. I would not single out any one of them as more urgent or important than
another, and I do think we still have a long struggle ahead of us here. 





How did
you arrive at where you currently are in your approach to issues?



Well,
I had a strange training as a scholar because I kept shifting fields. I
actually began as a student of law and then moved into history while I was
still an undergraduate, but then became interested in political theory; decided
that I liked it better than political science. But by the time I arrived in
political science to study for a PhD, I had become interested in politics of
the Middle East. This was partly from just travelling there when I was a
student growing up in England, but I also suppose in some ways the events of
the seventies had really drawn attention to the region. So the first important
thing that shaped me was this constant shifting of fields and disciplines,
which was not to me a problem—it was rather that there was a kind of
intellectual curiosity that drove me from academic field to field. And so if
there was one thing that helped me arrive at where I am, it was this constant
moving outside of the boundaries of one discipline and trespassing on the next
one—trying to do it for long enough that they started to accept me as someone
who they could debate with. And I think all along that has been important to
the kind of scholarship I do; yet therefore I would say where I currently am in
my thinking about my field is difficult in itself to define. But I think it is
probably defined by the sense that there are many, many fields—and it is moving
across them and trying to do justice to the scholarship in them, but at the
same time trying to connect insights from one field with what one can do in
another field. I have always tried to draw things together in that sense, a
sense that one can call an interdisciplinary or post-disciplinary sensitivity.



I
think the other part of what has shaped me intellectually was that, in ways I
explained before, I was always drawn into the local and the particular and the
specific and I was never very good at thinking at that certain level of
large-scale grand theory. So having found myself in the field of Middle Eastern
politics in a PhD-program, and being told that it involves studying Arabic which
I was very glad to do, I then went off to spend summers in the Arab world, and
later over more extended periods of time for field research. But to me, Egypt
and other places I've worked—but principally Egypt—became not just a field
site, but a place where I have now been going for more than 30 years and where
I have developed very close ties and intellectual relationships, friendships,
that I think have constantly shaped and reshaped my thinking. And even when I
am reading about things that are not specifically related to Egypt—the work I
do on the history of economics, or the work I have done on oil politics that
are not directly connected with my research on Egypt—I am often thinking in
relation to places and people and communities there that have profoundly shaped
me as a scholar. 



So
traveling across different contexts I'd say I have not developed a kind of set
of theoretical lenses I take with me. Rather, I would say I have developed a way of seeing—I would not
necessarily call it 'meta', I see it as much more as sort of 'infra': much more
mundane and everyday. While I have this sort of intellectual history of moving
across disciplines and social sciences in an academic way, there is another
sort of moving across fields, another sensibility, and that sensibility
provides me with a sense of rootedness or grounding. And that is a more
traditional way of moving across fields, because whether when one is writing
about contemporary politics or more historically about politics, one is dealing
constantly with areas of technical concern of one sort or another, with
specialist knowledge. Engaging with that expert knowledge has always provided
both a political grounding in specific concerns and with a kind of concern with
local, real-world, struggles on the ground. So that might have been things like
the transformation of irrigation in nineteenth-century Egypt, or the remaking
of the system of law; or it might be the history of malaria epidemics in the
twentieth century, or the relationship between those epidemics and
transformations taking place in the crops that were grown; or, more
recently—and more obviously—of oil and the history of energy, and the way
different forms of energy are brought out of the ground. And I should mention
beside those areas of technical expertise already listed, economics as well: a
discipline I was never trained in, but that I realized I had to understand if I
was to make sense of contemporary Egyptian politics—just as much as I had to
understand agricultural hydraulics or something of the petroleum geology as a
form of technical expertise that is shaping the common world.



In
sum, what keeps me grounded is the idea that to really make sense of the
politics of any of those fields, one has got to do one's best to sort of enter
and explore the more technical level—with the closest attention that one can
muster to the technical and the material dimensions of what is involved—whether
it is in agricultural irrigation, building dams or combating disease. And
entering this level of issues does not only mean interviewing experts but
arriving at the level of understanding the disease, the parasite, the modes of
its movement, the hydraulics of the river, the properties of different kinds of
oil... So as you can see it is not really 'meta', it really is 'infra' in the
anthropological way of staying close to the ground, staying close to processes
and things and materials.





What
would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a
global way?



A
couple of things. I think one is precisely the thing I just mentioned in answer
to your last question: that is, the kind of interest in going inside technical
processes, learning about material objects, not being afraid of taking up an
investigation of something that is a body of knowledge totally outside one's
area of training and expertise. So, if I was advising someone or looking for a
student, I would not say there is a particular skill or expertise, but rather a
willingness to really get one's hands dirty with the messy technical details of
an area—and that can be an area of specialist knowledge such as economics, but
also technical and physical processes of, for instance, mineral extraction. I
think to me this is—for the kind of work I am interested in doing—enormously
important.



The
other thing that I would stress in the area of globally-oriented studies, is
that one could think of two ways of approaching a field of study. One is to
move around the world and gather together information, often with a notion of
improving things, such as development work, human rights work, international
security work. This entails gathering from one's own research and from other
experts in the field, with a certain notion of best practices and the state of
field, and of what works, and therefore what can then be moved from one place
to another as a form of expert knowledge. Some people really want that mobile
knowledge, which I suppose is often associated with the ability to generalize
from a particular case and to establish more universal principles about
whatever the topic is. And in this case one's own expertise becomes the
carrying or transmission of that expert knowledge. One saw a lot of that around
the whole issue of democratization that I mentioned before in the Middle East,
around the Iraq war when experts were brought in. They had done democracy
elsewhere in the world and then they turned up to do it in Iraq, and again
following the Arab Spring.



Against
that, to me, there is another mode of learning, which is not to learn about what is happening but to learn from. So to give the example, if there
is an uprising and a struggle for democracy going on in the streets of Cairo,
one could try and learn about that and then make it fit one's models and
classify it within a broader range of series of democratizations across the
world, or one could try and learn from it, and say 'how do we rethink what the
possibilities of democracy might be on the basis of what is happening?' To me
those are two distinct modes of work. They are not completely mutually
exclusive, but I think people are more disposed towards one or the other. I
have never been disposed, or good at, the first kind and do like the second, so
I would mention that as the second skill or attitude that is useful for doing
this sort of work.





In which discipline or field would you situate
yourself, or would we have to invent a discipline to match your work?



I
like disciplines, but I do not always feel that I entirely belong to any of
them. That said, I read with enormous profit the works of historians, political
theorist, anthropologists, of people in the field of science and technology
studies, geographers, political economists and scholars in environmental
studies. There are so many different disciplines that are well organized and
have their practitioners from which there is a lot to learn! But conversely, I
also think, in ways I have described already, there is something to be learnt
for some people from working in a much more deliberately post-disciplinary
fashion. The Middle East, South Asian and African Studies department to which I
have been attached here in Columbia for about five years, represents a
deliberate attempt by myself and my colleagues to produce some kind of
post-disciplinary space. Not in order to do away with the disciplines, but to
have another place for doing theoretical work, one that is able to take
advantage of not being bound by disciplinary fields, as even broad
disciplines—say history—tend to restrict you with a kind of positive liberty of
creating a place where you can do anything you want—as long as you do it in an
archive. I quite deliberately situate myself outside of any one discipline,
while continuing to learn from and trespass into the fields of many individual
disciplines. They range from all of those and others, because I am here among a
community of people who are also philologists; people interested in Arabic
literature and the history of Islamic science; and all kinds of fields, which I
also find fascinating. The first article I ever published was in the field of
Arabic grammar! So I have interests that fit in a very sort of
trans-disciplinary, post-disciplinary environment and I thrive on that.



Yet
doing this kind of post-disciplinary work is in a practical sense actually
absolutely impossible. If only for the simple fact that if it is already hardly
possible to keep up with 'the literature' if one is firmly situated within one
field, then one can never keep up with important developments in all the
disciplines one is interested in. There are some people that manage to do this
and do it justice. My information about contemporary debates in every
imaginable field is so limited; I do not manage to do justice to any field. In
the particular piece of research I might be engaged in, I try to get quickly up
to pace on what's going on, and I often come back again and again to similar
areas of research. I am currently interested in questions around the early
history of international development in the 1940's and 1950's, and that is
something I have worked on before, but I have come back to it and I found that
the World Bank archives are now open and there is a whole new set of
literatures. I had not been keeping up with all of that work. It is hard and
that is why I am very bad at answering emails and doing many of the other
everyday things that one is ought to do; because it always seems to me, in the
evening at the computer when one ought to be catching up with emails, there is
something you have come across in an article or footnotes and before you know
it you are miles away and it has got nothing to do with what you were working
on at the moment, but it really connects with a set of issues you have been
interested in and has taken you off into contemporary work going on in law or
the history of architecture… The internet has made that possible in a
completely new way and some of these post-disciplinary research interests are
actually a reflection of where we are with the internet and with the
accessibility of scholarship in any field only just a few clicks away. Which on
the one hand is fascinating, but mostly it is just a complete curse. It is the
enemy of writing dissertations and finishing books and articles and everything
else!





What role does expertise, which is kind of a central
term in underpinning much of the diverse work or topics you do, play in the
historical unfolding of modern government?



That
is a big question, so let me suggest only a couple of thoughts here. One is
that modern government has unfolded—especially if one thinks of government itself
as a wider process than just a state—through the development of new forms of
expertise, which among other things define problems and issues upon which
government can operate. This can concern many things, whether it is problems of
public health in the 19th or 20th century; or problems of
economic development in the 20th century; or problems of energy,
climate change and the environment today. Again and again government itself
operates—as Foucault has taught us—simultaneously as fields of knowledge and fields
of power. And the objects brought into being in this way—defined in important
ways through the development of expert knowledge—become in themselves modes
through which political power operates. Thanks to Foucault and many others,
that is a way of thinking or field of research that has been widely developed,
even though there are vast amounts of work still to do.



But
I think there is another relationship between modes of government and
expertise, and this goes back to things I have been thinking about ever since I
wrote an article about the theory of the state (The Limits of the State, pdf here) that was published in American
Political Science Review a long time ago (1991). The point I made then, is that
it is interesting to observe how one of the central aspects of modern modes of
power is the way that the distinction between what is the state and what is not
the state; between what is public and what is private, is constantly elaborated
and redefined. So politics itself is happening not so much by some agency
called 'state' or 'government' imposing its will on some other preformed
object—the social, the population, the people—but rather that it concerns a
series of techniques that create what I have called the effect of a state: the very distinction between what appears as a
sort of structure or apparatus of power, and the objects on which that power
works.



More
recently one of the ways I have thought about this, is in terms of the history
of the idea of the economy. Most people think of 'the economy' either as
something that has always existed (and people may or may not have realized its
existence) or as something that came into being with the rise of political
economy and commercial society in the European 18th and 19th
century. One of the things I discovered when I was doing research on the
history of development, is that no economist talked routinely about an object
called 'the economy' before the 1940's! I think that is a good example of the
history of a mode of expertise that exists not within the operations of an
apparatus of government but precisely outside of government.



If
you look in detail at how the term 'the economy' was first regularly used, you
find that it was in the context of governing the U.S. in the 1940's immediately
after the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war there was enormous
political pressure for quite a radical restructuring of American society: there
were waves of strikes, demands for worker control of industries, or at least a
share of management. And of course in Europe, similar demands led to new forms
of economy altogether, in the building of postwar Germany and in the forms of
democratic socialism that were experimented with in various parts of Western
Europe. As we know, the U.S. did not follow that path. And I think part of the
way in which it was steered away from that path, was by constructing the
economy as the central object of government, coupled with precisely this
American cultural fear of things where government did not belong. So this was
radically opposed to how the Europeans related government to economy: European
governments had become involved in all kinds of ways, deciding how the relation
between management and labor should operate in thinking about prices and wages;
instituting forms of national health insurance and health care; and the whole
state management of health care itself... Now this was threatening to emerge in
the U.S., and was emerging in many ways in the wartime with state control of
prices and production. In order to prevent the U.S. from following the European
path after the war, this object outside of
government with its own experts was
created: the economy. And the economists were precisely people who are not in government, but who knew the laws and
regularities of economic life and could explain them to people. It is
interesting to think about expertise both as something that develops within the
state, but also as something that happens as a creation of objects that
precisely represent what is not the
state, or the sphere of government.





Your most recent book Carbon Democracy (2011) focuses on the political structures
afforded, or engendered, by modes of extraction of minerals and investigates
how oil was constitutes a dominant source of energy on which we depend.
Can you give an example of how that works?



Let
me take an example from the book even though I might have to give it in very a
simplified form in order to make it work. I was interested in what appeared to
be the way in which the rise of coal—the dominant source of energy in the 19th
century and in the emergence of modern industrialized states—seemed to be very
strongly associated with the emergence of mass democracy, whereas the rise of
oil in the 20th century seemed to have if anything the opposite set
of consequences for states that were highly dependent on the production of oil.
I wanted to examine these relations between forms of energy and democratic
politics in a way that was not simply some kind of technical- or energy
determinism, because it is very easy to point to many cases that simply do not
fit that pattern—and, besides, it simply would not be very interesting to begin
with. But it did seem to me, that at a particular moment in the history of the
emergence of industrialized countries—particularly in the late 19th
century—it became possible for the first time in history and really only for a
brief period, to take advantage of certain kinds of vulnerabilities and
possibilities offered by the dependence on coal to organize a new kind of
political agency and forms of mass politics, which successfully struggled for
much more representative and egalitarian forms of democracy, roughly between
the 1880's and the mid 20th century. In general terms, that story is
known; but it had been told without thinking in particular about the energy
itself. The energy was just present in these stories as that which made
possible industrialization; industrialization made possible urbanization;
therefore you had lots of workers and their consciousness must somehow have
changed and made them democratic or something.



That
story did not make sense to me, and that prompted me to research in detail, and
drawing on the work of others who had looked even more in detail at, the
history of struggles for a whole set of democratic rights. The accounts of
people at the time were clear: what was distinctive was this peculiar ability
to shut down an economy because of a specific vulnerability to the supply of
energy. Very briefly, when I switched to telling the story in the middle of the
20th with oil, it is different: partly just because oil was a
supplementary source of energy—countries and people now had a choice between
different energy sources—but also because oil did not create the same points of
vulnerability. There are fewer workers involved, it is a liquid, so it can be
routed along different channels more easily; there is a whole set of technical
properties of oil and its production that are different. That does not mean to
say that the energy is determining the outcome of history or of political
struggles, and I am careful to introduce examples that do not work easily one
way or the other in the history of oil industry in Baku,
which is much more similar to the history of coal or the oil industry in
California for that matter. But you can pay attention to the technical
dimensions in a certain way, and the to the sheer possibilities that arise with
this enormous concentration of sources of energy—which reflects both an
exponential increase in the amount of energy but also an unprecedented
concentration of the sites at which energy is available and through which it
flows—that you can tell a new story about democratic politics and about that
moment in the history of industrialized countries, but also the subsequent
history in oil-producing countries in a different way. That would be an example
of how attention for technical expertise translates into a different
understanding of the politics of oil.





This leads to my next question, which is how do you
speak about materials or technologies without falling into the trap of either
radical social reductionism or a kind of Marxist technological determinism? Do
you get these accusations sometimes?



Yes,
I think so, but more so from people who have not read my work and who just hear
some talks about it or some secondary accounts. To me, so much of the
literature that already existed on these questions around oil and democracy, or
even earlier research on coal, industrialization and democracy, suffered from a
kind of technical determinism because they actually did not go into the
technical. They said: 'look, you've got all this oil' or 'look, you had all that
coal and steam power' and out of that, in a very determinist fashion, emerged
social movements or emerged political repression. This was determinist because
such accounts had actually jumped over the technical side much too fast:
talking about oil in the case of the resource curse literature, it was only
interested in the oil once it had already
become money. And once it was money, then it of course corrupts, or you buy
people off, or you do not have to seek their votes. The whole question of how
oil becomes money and how you put
together that technical system that turns oil into forms of political power or
turns coal into forms of political power, does not get opened up. And that to
me makes those arguments—even though there is not much of the technical in
them—technically very determinist. Because as soon as you start opening up the
technical side of it, you realize there are so many ways things can go and so
many different ways things can get built. Energy networks can be built in
different ways and there can be different mixes of energy. Of course most of
the differences are technical differences, but they are also human differences.
It is precisely by being very attentive to the technical aspects of
politics—like energy or anything else, it could be in agriculture, it could be
in disease, it could be in any area of collective socio-technical life—that one
finds the only way to get away from a certain kind of technical determinism
that otherwise sort of rules us. In the economics of growth, for instance,
there is this great externality of technological change that drives every sort
of grand historical explanation. Technology is just something that is kept
external to the explanatory model and accounts for everything else that the
model cannot explain. That ends up being a terrible kind of technical
determinism.



The
other half of the question is how this might differ from Marxist approaches to
some of these problems. I like to think that if Marx was studying oil, his
approach would be very little different. Because if you read Marx himself,
there is an extraordinary level of interest in the technical; that is, whether
in the technical aspects of political economy as a field of knowledge in the 19th
century, or in the factory as a technical space. So, conventional political
economy to him was not just an ideological mask that had to be torn away so
that you could reveal the true workings of capitalism. Political economy has
produced a set of concepts—notions of value, notions of exchange, notions of
labor—that actually formed part of the technical workings of capitalism. The
factory was organized at a technical level that had very specific consequences.
The trouble with a significant part of Marx's theories is that he stopped doing
that kind of technical work and Marxism froze itself with a set of categories
that may or may not have been relevant to a moment of 19th century
capitalism. There is still a lot of interesting Marxist theory going on, and
some of the contemporary Italian Marxist theory I find really interesting and
profitable to read, for example. Some of the work in Marxist geography
continues to be very productive. But at the same time there are aspects of my
work that are different from that—such as my drawing on Foucault in
understanding expertise and modes of power.





How come so many of the social sciences seem to stick
so rigidly to the human or social side of the Cartesian divide? It seems to be
constitutive of social science disciplines but on the other hand also radically
reduces the scope of what it can actually 'see' and talk about. 



I
think you are right and it has never made much sense to me. I suppose I have
approached it in two kinds of ways in my work. First, this kind of dualism was
much more clearly an object of concern in some of the early work I published on
the colonial era, including my first
book, Colonising Egypt (1988), where
I was trying to understand the process by which Europeans had, as it were, come
to be Cartesians; had come to see the world as very neatly defined it into mind
on the one hand and matter or on the other—or, as they tended to think of it,
representations on the one hand and reality on the other. And I actually looked
in some detail, at the technical level, at this—beginning with world
exhibitions, but moving on to department stores and school systems and modern
legal orders—to understand the processes by which our incredibly complicated
world was engineered so as to produce the effect of this world divided into the
two—of mind or representation or culture on the one hand, and reality, nature,
material on the other.



Second,
what were the effects, what were the repetitive practices, that made that kind
of simple dualism seem so self-evident and taken for granted? All that early
work still informs my current work, although I do not necessarily explore this
as directly as I did. One of the things I try to do is avoid all the vocabulary
that draws you into that kind of dualism. So, nowhere when I write, do I use a
term like 'culture', because you are just heading straight down that Cartesian
road as soon as you assume that there is some hermetic world of shared meanings—as opposed to what? As opposed to
machines that do not involve instructions and all kinds of other things that we
would think of as meaningful? So I just work more by avoiding some of the
dualistic language; the other kind would be the entire set of debates—in almost
every discipline of the social sciences—around the question of 'structure
versus agency' which just doesn't seems to me particularly productive. And I
have been very lucky, recently, in coming across work in the fields of science
and technology studies, because it is a field of people studying machines,
studying laboratories and studying people, a field that took nature itself as
something to be opened-up and investigated. In taking apart these things, they
realized that those kinds of dualisms made absolutely no sense. And they have
done away with them in their modes of explanation quite a long time ago. So
there was already a lot in my own work before I encountered Science and
Technology Studies (STS) that was working in that direction; but the STS people
have been at it for a long time and figured out a lot of things that I had only
just discovered.





Can you explain why it seems that perhaps implicitly
decolonization, or the postcolonial moment—which is understood within political
science and in development literature as a radical moment of rupture in which a
complete transfer of responsibility has taken place, instituted in sovereignty—is
an important theme in your work?



I
have actually been coming back to this in recent work, because I am currently
looking again at that moment of decolonization in Egypt. The period after World
War II, around the 1952 revolution and the debacle around the building and the financing of the Aswan Dam,
constitutes a wonderful way to explore questions on how much change
decolonization really engendered and to see how remarkably short-lived that
sort of optimism about decolonization, meaning a transfer of responsibility and
sovereignty, actually was. Of course decolonization did transfer responsibility
and sovereignty in all kinds of ways, but then that was exactly the problem for
the former colonial regimes: because, from their perspective, then, how were
all the people who had profited before from things like colonialism to continue
to make profits? The plan to build the High Dam at Aswan—although there has
always been Egyptians interested in it—initially got going because of some
German engineering firms… For them, there was no opportunity in doing any kind
of this large-scale work in Europe at
the time because of the dire economic situation there. But they knew that Egypt
had rapidly growing revenues from the Suez Canal and so they got together with
the British and the French, and said: let's put forward this scheme for a dam
so that we can recycle those revenues—particularly the income from the Suez
Canal, which was about to revert to Egyptian ownership—back into the pockets of
the engineering firms, or of the banks that will make the loans and charge the
fees. And that is where the scheme came from. Then the World Bank got involved,
because it too had found it had got nothing to do in Europe in the way of
development and reconstruction, so it invented this new field of development.
And it became a conduit to get the Wall Street banks involved as well. And the
whole thing became politicized and led to a rupture, which provided then the
excuse for another group, the militarists, the MI6 people, to invade and try to
overthrow Nasser. So just in the space of barely four years from that moment of
decolonization, Egypt had been reinvaded by the French, the British, working
with the Israelis, and had to deal with the consequences and the costs of
destroyed cities and military spending. That is an example of how quickly
things went wrong; but also of how part of their going wrong was in this
desperate attempt by a series of
European banks and engineering firms trying to recover the opportunities for a
certain profit-making and business that they had enjoyed in the colonial period
and now they suddenly were being deprived of. 






Last question. Has your work helped you make sense of
what is currently going on in Egypt and would you shine your enlightened light
on that a bit? Not on the whole general situation but perhaps on parts which
are overlooked or which you find particularly relevant. 



May
be in a couple of aspects. One of them is this kind of very uneasy and
disjunctive assemblage relationship between the West and forms of political Islam.
It sometimes seemed shocking and disturbing and destabilizing that the
political process in Egypt led to the rise and consolidation of power of the
Muslim Brotherhood. But of course the U.S. and other Western powers have had a
very long relationship going back at least to the 1950's—if not before—with
exactly these kinds of political forces or people who were locally in alliance
with them, in places like Saudi Arabia. I have a chapter in Carbon Democracy that explores that
relationship and its disjunctions. And I think it is important to get away from
the notion that is just a sort of electoral politics and uneasy alliances, but
it is actually the outcome of a longer problem. Both domestically within the
politics in the Arab states, of how to found a form of legitimacy that does not
seem to be based on close ideological ties with the West, but at the same time
operates in such in a way, that in practical terms, that kind of alliance can
work. So that would be one aspect of it, to have a slightly longer-term
perspective on those kinds of relationships and how disjunctively they
function.



The
other thing, drawing it a little more directly on some of the work on democracy
in Carbon Democracy, is that so much of the scholarship on democracy is about
equipping people with the right mental tools to be democrats; the right levels
of trust or interpersonal relations or whatever. There is a very different view
in my book, that the opportunities for effective democratic politics require
very different sets of skills and kinds of actions—actions that are much more
as it were obstructionist, and forms of sabotage, quite literally, in the usage
of the term as it comes into being in the early 20th century to
describe the role of strikes and stoppages. These are, I attempt to show, the
effective tools to leverage demands for representation in more egalitarian
democratic politics. I have been very interested in the case of Egypt, in the
particular places and points of vulnerability, that gave rise to the
possibility of sabotage. For instance, one of the less noted aspects of the
Egyptian revolution in general, was the very important role played by the labor
movement; this was not just a Twitter or Facebook revolution, but that was
important as well. Although the labor movement was very heavily concentrated in
industries—in the textile industry—the first group of workers who actually
successfully formed an independent union were the property tax collectors. And
there is a reason for that: there was a certain kind of fiscal crisis of the
state—which had to do with declining oil revenues and other things—and there
was the attempt to completely revise the tax system and to revise it not around
income tax—because there were too few people making a significant income to
raise tax revenues—but around property taxes.
And that was a point of vulnerability and contestation that produced not just
some of the first large-scale strikes but strikes that were effective enough
that the government was forced to recognize a newly independent labor movement.
This case is an instance of how the kind of work I did in the book might be
useful for thinking about how the revolutionary situation emerged in
Egypt. 



Timothy Mitchell is a political theorist and historian. His areas of research
include the place of colonialism in the making of modernity, the material and
technical politics of the Middle East, and the role of economics and other
forms of expert knowledge in the government of collective life. Much of his
current work is concerned with ways of thinking about politics that allow
material and technical things more weight than they are given in conventional
political theory.  Educated at Queens' College, Cambridge, where he
received a first-class honours degree in History, Mitchell completed his Ph.D.
in Politics and Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University in 1984. He joined
Columbia University in 2008 after teaching for twenty-five years at New York
University, where he served as Director of the Center for Near Eastern
Studies. At Columbia he teaches courses on the history and politics of the
Middle East, colonialism, and the politics of technical things.





Related links:





Faculty Profile at Colombia University
Read
Mitchell's Rethinking Economy (Geoforum
2008) here (pdf)
Read
Mitchell's The Limits of the State:
Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics (The American Political Science
Review 1991) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's McJihad: Islam and the U.S.
Global Order (Social Text 2002) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's The Stage of Modernity (Chapter
from book 'Questions of Modernity', 2000) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's The World as Exhibition
(Chapter from book 'Colonising Egypt' 1991) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)



  

Currently, the jurisdictional model of constitutional justice has been universalized and, at the same time, an increase in its functions has been taking place. This has generated the «counter-majority difficulty» of some doctrinal sectors that question an alleged lack of democratic legitimacy of the constitutional justice bodies. Despite the fact that our Constitutional Court originally enjoyed a high degree of acceptance by all (largely due to the fact that it had been established, like the Tribunal of Guarantees of the Second Republic, after a period of dictatorship) in The last decade has had to face the discredit campaign orchestrated against him by the Catalan independence political class, the lack of prudence (also in the writing of private votes) that some magistrates have recently shown, the denaturation that supposed the functions to he attributed by LO 15/2015, the aggravation of some configuration problems that dragged from its origin (among which stands out the collapse that, from his personal and material means, generates the treatment of all the protection resources that, even after of the approval of LO 6/2007, continue to be registered every year at the headquarters of the Court), and the political-legal problems caused by l way of renewal of magistrates. This paper aims to offer a theoretical and comparative perspective of the challenges of constitutional justice at a global level that serves as a basis for reflection on our Constitutional Court and the possible improvements that, after forty years of operation, it might be advisable to bring finished. Specifically, the political function that, in the sense of protection of political minorities and arbitrator of territorial conflicts, corresponds to the supreme constitutional custodian has been emphasized, since the dominant legal positivism in the constitutional sciences of our country has impeded development of constitutional justice or Constitutional Procedural Law as a scientific discipline, causing the absence of a theoretical body that could serve as a legitimating shield for the Constitutional Court against the attacks recently received. Resolving the most internal issues mentioned above is essential to, a posteriori, face the two most important supranational challenges that our constitutional justice system must face: on the one hand, its insertion into a European system of protection of rights , for which he will have to be more favorable to the dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union than he has done in the past; on the other, redefine its position as guarantor of rights before the new roles (including control of conventionality) assumed by ordinary judges and courts. Summary: I. INTRODUCTION. II. THE PERMANENT DEBATE ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE. III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE JURISDICTIONAL MODEL AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COMPETENCES OF THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. IV. THE (OFTEN FORGOTTEN) POLITICAL FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE. V. THE NEED TO DEVELOP AN AUTHENTIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW IN OUR COUNTRY. VI. CRITICS AND RECELS (INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS) TO THE COURT' ACTIONS. VII. THE PENDING IMPROVEMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. VIII SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERMANENT PROBLEM OF AMPARO. IX. CONCLUSIONS ; Actualmente se ha universalizado el modelo jurisdiccional de justicia constitucional y, al mismo tiempo, se ha venido produciendo un incremento de sus funciones. Ello ha generado la «objeción contramayoritaria» de algunos sectores doctrinales que cuestionan una supuesta falta de legitimidad democrática de los órganos de justicia constitucional. A pesar de que nuestro Tribunal Constitucional gozó en origen de un alto grado de aceptación por parte de todos (en buena medida por el hecho de haberse establecido, al igual que el Tribunal de Garantías de la II República, tras un periodo de dictadura) en la última década ha tenido que enfrentar la campaña de descredito orquestada contra él por parte de la clase política independentista catalana, la falta de prudencia (también en la redacción de votos particulares) que recientemente han mostrado algunos magistrados, la desnaturalización que supuso las funciones a él atribuidas por la L.O 15/2015, el agravamiento de algunos problemas de configuración que arrastra desde su origen (entre los que destaca el colapso que, de sus medios personales y materiales, genera el tratamiento de todos los recursos de amparo que, incluso después de la aprobación de la L.O 6/2007, siguen registrándose cada año en la sede del Tribunal), y los problemas político-jurídicos que provoca el modo de renovación de los magistrados. En este trabajo se pretende ofrecer una perspectiva teórica y comparada de los retos de la justicia constitucional a nivel global que sirva como base a una reflexión acerca de nuestro Tribunal Constitucional y de las eventuales mejoras que, tras cuarenta años de funcionamiento, podría ser recomendable llevar a cabo. En concreto, se ha enfatizado la función política que, en el sentido de protección de las minorías políticas y árbitro de los conflictos territoriales le corresponde al supremo custodio constitucional, ya que el positivismo jurídico dominante en las ciencias constitucionales de nuestro país ha impedido el desarrollo de la justicia constitucional o Derecho Procesal Constitucional como disciplina científica, provocando la ausencia de un corpus teórico que pudiera servir de escudo legitimador al Tribunal Constitucional frente a los ataques recientemente recibidos. Resolver las cuestiones de carácter más interno mencionadas resulta imprescindible para, a posteriori, enfrentar los dos retos más importantes de carácter supranacional a los que debe hacer frente nuestro sistema de justicia constitucional: por un lado, su inserción en un sistema europeo de protección de derechos, para lo que deberá mostrarse más favorable al diálogo con el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea de lo que lo ha hecho en el pasado; por otro, redefinir su posición como garante de derechos ante los nuevos roles (incluido el control de convencionalidad) asumido por los jueces y tribunales ordinarios.

Global warming is one of the most significant problems facing humanity, and reducing emissions from the electricity sector is critical for mitigating global warming impacts. My work here focuses on developing computational tools to plan cost effective mitigation pathways for the electricity sector and using them collaboratively. The complexity and scale of globally transitioning electrical power grids away from fossil fuels over the coming decades will require a large-scale collaborative effort with effective coordination of many actors trained in diverse disciplines. Historically, energy-modeling efforts have tended to be siloed and fragmented between and even within research groups. In my research I have attempted to provide an alternative to that status quo by improving an open source renewable planning model, Switch, increasing its usability and accessibility to interdisciplinary researchers, and collaboratively applying it to mitigation planning.We used the Switch model to conduct detailed research into cost effective mitigation pathways for the Western portion of North America, or the WECC power grid. We found that renewable portfolio standards were insufficient to meet climate stabilization goals, and more targeted policies were needed that specifically focused on emission reductions. We identified investment plans that could lead to dramatic decreases in emissions without significantly increasing electricity costs over the next twenty years by retiring coal and replacing it with natural gas and renewables while evolving the grid to better accommodate variable renewable energy.We found that meeting overall 2050 targets will require concerted action on many fronts, including aggressive efficiency programs, electrification of transportation and heating, and dramatically reducing emissions from the electricity sector. Meeting 2050 emission goals without significantly increasing energy costs also will require additional technological innovation. Two promising technological pathways for long-term cost containment are developing low cost solar in conjunction with low cost storage or demand response, and developing Biomass Energy with Carbon Capture and Sequestration (BECCS) to provide emission offsets during the last stages of emission reductions. We found that the emissions offsets provided by BECCS were much more valuable than the energy, suggesting that other sequestration options such as improved land management that increases soil carbon deposition could be a particularly valuable part of an economy-wide portfolio.We started this research in the early days of the natural gas boom caused by widespread use of hydraulic fracturing. As data emerged on potentially high methane leakage rates in the natural gas supply chain, we investigated how leakage impacts roles Natural Gas (NG) can play in a low emission power grid. We found that leakage rates significantly reduce the use of NG as a direct substitute for coal, but have a smaller impact on the use of combustion turbines for reserves and peaking capacity. Higher leakage rates increase electricity costs in optimal solutions by an average of 1.3% ±0.068 and decrease NG consumption by 18% ±0.55 for each percentage point increase in the leakage rate in the next decade.Increased leakage can increase or decrease the use of NG to complement renewables, depending on the emissions cap context and technological alternatives. In the 2020 and 2030 timeframes under moderate emission caps, higher leakage rates prompt the installation of more renewables and prompt NG Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) to shift from baseload operation to running as-needed to complement renewables. In the 2030 timeframe, higher leakage often prompts installation of new NG Combustion turbines with Compressed Air Energy Storage, which is used to complement variability from renewable resources within a day. Scenarios that include low-cost battery storage or low-emission baseload options of Coal CCS or Nuclear have less Compressed Air Energy Storage installed in the 2030 timeframe because these technologies provide alternate emission reduction paths. In the 2040 and 2050 timeframes with tighter emission caps, NG is already used primarily to complement renewables and higher leakage rates tend to decrease its use in any role.Throughout this process, I made significant advancements to Switch as an analytical tool for collaborative work by interdisciplinary research teams. I initially increased the usability and lowered the learning curve while training colleagues who lacked computer science backgrounds, as well as developing execution workflows to increase reproducibility and leverage high performance workstations and computing clusters. I played a crucial role in developing detailed databases to describe the WECC electricity grid and calculating renewable energy potential at a high geographic and temporal resolution over a large area. I developed new techniques for describing policies and tracking both the renewable fraction and emission intensity of electricity. I developed techniques for simulating grid dispatch of investment portfolios on ~100x as many timepoints to better estimate reliability, costs and emissions. I used that instrumentation ability to improve sampling methods and solution quality. Interviews with current and potential users indicated a need for a completely open source software stack, streamlined workflows for data ingestions and processing, as well as a graphical front-end to complement the command line interface. These usability enhancements are the subject of ongoing and future work.Overall, this open collaborative approach has proven quite successful. We trained four other research teams on two campuses to develop versions of this model for China, Chile and Nicaragua and to conduct a detailed systems-level analysis of Carbon Capture and Sequestration technologies. Those efforts led to recognition by the United Nations during the 2014 Climate Summit. The complete text of this dissertation is freely available online through the University of California Berkeley though other organizations may distribute this text behind a paywall. We have developed partnerships with a second academic campus, a consulting firm and Google who are all contributing to a new implementation of Switch in a completely open source software stack that supports stochastic programming and decomposition (Pyomo). We hope that the new version can serve as a open platform for evaluating and comparing research methodologies as well as supporting investment planning and policy analysis for consulting firms, government agencies, academics, utilities and NGOs.

Our project name is Sustainable Pub: Water, the ultimate goal of this project is how can the water usage of the Koerner Pub be reduced. The stakeholder, Tim Yu, has placed three constraints on the final outcome and conclusion of this project. These constraints are: low capital expenditures, no restructuring of the building and to follow government's health and safety regulations. Due to these constraints, the team has decided to design new water usage practices for the Koerner Pub, by doing so the water usage can be reduced without the need of any new investments other than the necessary training required for the pub employees. The team also agreed that instead of deciding which practices are most suited for the Koerner's Pub, we will present a list of possible practices with their pros and cons to the stakeholder and let him decide whether or not to implement them. All of the team members agreed that the best method to design new water conservation practices was to survey other restaurants and learn if they had any practices that can be implemented at Koerner's Pub. The team believed that in order to get the most accurate results it would be necessary to survey workers in different positions, to ensure that they are familiar with their stations. Therefore, the survey was constructed for three different positions within a pub style restaurant: bartender, kitchen staff and manager. Out of the twelve copies of survey that were sent out, only five restaurants responded. After combining and analyzing the results, the team found that none of the restaurants have water conservation policies and neither do they have sustainability in mind. Albeit these restaurants said that they do not deliberately implement water conservation practices, the restaurant's kitchen staff and bartenders still gave us interesting practices that can contribute to water conservation. There are four practices that our team believes could be implemented by the Koerner's Pub. The first practice is to scrape clean dishes instead of rinsing them before putting them into the dish water. This is a rather simple procedure that has significant impact on water conservation. The positive aspect of this practice is that it is environmentally friendly, while the negative aspect is the requirement of more labour hours The second water conservation practice that our team designed is to serve customers water only when asked. As we learned from the survey, not all customers drink the water that was served. By serving water only when asked there is a higher likelihood that the water will be consumed and not wasted. This will also reduce the number of cups that need to be cleaned. This practice conserves water to two stages, however, one downside is that customers may dislike that fact that they are not immediately served water. A simple solution to this problem is to ensure that waiters ask the customers for their drink orders in a timely manner. The final two water conservation practices are related to the disposal of ice. According to the surveyed restaurants, they all clean up and melt any left over ice cubes in the ice wells before closing every day, this is to prevent any bacteria growth. Simply throwing ice out at the end of the night is clearly a wasteful practice. Therefore, we propose that the ice not be thrown out but put to use in other ways. The first way to use the ice cubes is to water plants. This practice eliminates the need to use fresh water on plants and reduces the amount of ice that is thrown out. The practice has no downside and conserves a noticeable amount of water if performed on a daily basis. If there is still left over ice, then it can be dumped outside beside the plants. In our survey, we found that restaurants tend to dump left over ice into a sink and then turn on hot water to melt the ice faster. Our team finds this practice unnecessary because it creates water consumption that can be avoided. Koerner's Pub can train its employees to clean the ice well only when it is close to the closing time. By dumping the leftover ice outside, nature's energy is used to melt the ice, and the process does not affect the operation of the restaurants at all. The downside of the practice is that it takes more labour hours to transport the unused ice outside, and that the dumped ice creates a potential hazard as the melted ice water might cause people to slip. Therefore, the team recommends that Koerner's Pub to place a "slippery floor" sign next to the dumped ice or to dump the ice in a responsible location. It should be noted that according to the stakeholder, the Koerner's Pub does not have access to the water usage bill. Therefore, it is difficult to do a quantitative analysis of these practices to see exactly what impact they would have on water consumption. However, the team strongly believes that if implemented, these practices will reduce water consumption in the long run. Disclaimer: "UBC SEEDS provides students with the opportunity to share the findings of their studies, as well as their opinions, conclusions and recommendations with the UBC community. The reader should bear in mind that this is a student project/report and is not an official document of UBC. Furthermore readers should bear in mind that these reports may not reflect the current status of activities at UBC. We urge you to contact the research persons mentioned in a report or the SEEDS Coordinator about the current status of the subject matter of a project/report." ; Applied Science, Faculty of ; Unreviewed ; Undergraduate

The term localisation is derived from the word locale, which traditionally means a small area or vicinity. In ancient days, localisation meant navigation -- an art of finding the way from one place to another. Tremendous advancement in the science of navigation dates back to the sixteenth century, when instruments like compasses, sextants and the first ever clock to keep the time exactly were devised. Advancement in navigation brought ways and means to explore the world, be it for expansion of the territories or for promoting trade and business. Since then localisation has been explored for several decades as a classical problem in many disciplines -- including robotics, virtual reality, navigation. Now we are in the era of ubiquitous computing -- a term coined by the visionary Mark Weiser in the early 1990s. Weiser sees technology only as a means to an end, which should take a back seat in order to allow user to fully concentrate on the task at hand. Looking from a technological standpoint, today we are surrounded by a wealth of devices enriched with sensing, computing and communication capabilities which are seamlessly integrated in our daily lives. Knowing the location of an object is an important cornerstone and fertile research area in ubiquitous computing. The growing need of location systems underscores the importance of addressing this problem -- government initiatives to locate emergency call by cellular network providers and the increasing usage of global positioning systems (GPS) in many commercial applications as in navigation are just a few examples. Since the field is active and vibrant, new services and market players are constantly emerging. Google have just launched a new service called Latitude, which lets smart phone and laptop users share their location with friends and allows those friends to share their locations in return. Latitude uses satellites and cell towers to estimate location. The market for GPS products and services alone is expected to grow to USD200 billion by 2015. Real-time location systems (RTLS) in the transport and logistics sector drive the penetration of several location-based solutions. The number of RTLS suppliers is expected to increase from 50 to 200 by 2013, reflecting a market growth from USD 145 million in 2008 to USD 2.7 billion in 2013. Despite the extraordinary advances in outdoor localisation and navigation, indoor localisation still remains an open challenge. Fundamental to any location system are the algorithms used to estimate location. This thesis focuses on formulation of localisation algorithms with the capability of fusing measurements from multiple modalities. We begin by systematically analysing the basic principles of localisation through a review and classification of the state of the art. From our detailed survey, it is evident that no location system is error-free and suited for all situations. For example, pure inertial sensors suffer from drift, ultrasound sensors require clear line of sight and magnetic sensors are affected by ferromagnetic and conductive materials in the environment. Thus, we rationalise "multimodal localisation" as one of the promising ways for improving location accuracy. Apart from improving performance of the location system in limited measurement volumes, fusion of heterogeneous sensing systems will ultimately allow people to move between places covered by different sensing systems without loss of location knowledge. We explore localisation algorithms that use multiple sensing modalities to improve accuracy and robustness. To ground our work, we have chosen three specific applications covering both infrastructure-based positioning and ad hoc-based positioning systems. From our taxonomy, we create a blueprint of location technologies that would meet those three application needs. -Localisation in office environments to facilitate social networking, as a way to help coordination of people and understand social patterns. We leverage the existing wireless local-area networks (WLAN) infrastructure to sense motion and location with the main motivation of building wide-area location services. Our contributions include-- (i) in-depth characterisation of received signal strength (RSSI), (ii) novel algorithms to deduce motion by observing fluctuations in RSSI across all the access points in range, and (iii) performance comparison using real data against common deterministic location algorithms with and without adding motion information. -Transport and logistics operation (e.g. in warehouses), motivating the need of fine-grained location information. We use ultra-wideband (UWB) as it copes with harsh indoor environments better than conventional radio technologies. Our contributions include-- (i) characterisation of heterogeneous observations (pseudoranges and angles) obtained from two deployments, mimicking real-world (low-overhead) vs. ideal deployment (carefully planned and calibrated), (ii) formulation of algorithms to fuse heterogeneous observations and (iii) a thorough evaluation for both static and dynamic tracking. -Emergency response scenarios, motivating the need for ad hoc positioning capabilities. In particular, we use a combination of inertial sensors and ultrasound sensors. The position error in a purely inertial system increases with time and requires correction from external sources. We address this problem by deploying ultrasound sensors as landmarks correcting for the inertial drift. Our contributions include-- (i) characterisation of inertial and ultrasound data, (ii) algorithms to support guidance and tracking and (iii) a thorough evaluation from data gathered from real deployments. While the chosen technologies and applications are not exhaustive, they are representative as they cover a broad spectrum across several dimensions: accuracy -- fine grained to coarse grained, coverage -- room-level to wide-area, dependence -- dense infrastructure to ad hoc, cost -- expensive to minimal cost. In every instance, we have illustrated the benefits of combining multiple modalities. In short, our contributions include algorithms for motion detection and technology independent localisation algorithms that have the ability to fuse readings across different sensing technologies and incorporate motion models to improve accuracy significantly. Another important aspect of the work presented in this thesis is the characterisation of the raw measurement errors of the individual modalities. In all cases, we perform a rigorous evaluation of the presented algorithms by using measurements collected from real deployments.

Conflicto en el Cáucaso: Guerra abierta entre Rusia y GeorgiaOsetia del Sur se había separado de Georgia en 1990 para intentar unirse a la Federación Rusa, pero su estatus independiente no fue reconocido por los EEUU y la UE, aunque sí por Rusia. Georgia y Rusia llegaron a un acuerdo para que tropas rusas ejerzan una labor de vigilancia en Osetia del Sur, mientras su naturaleza politica no estuviera clara.La guerra entre Georgia y Rusia se declaró después de que las tropas georgianas atacaran imprevistamente la provincia de Osetia del Sur, habitado por 70.000 personas, en su mayoría de origen ruso. Moscú reaccionó con un ataque en toda la línea para expulsar a las tropas georgianas de la región y amenazó con bombardear Tiflis, la capital de Georgia, si no se completaba la retirada. Varios medios informan al respecto:"El País" de Madrid:"EE UU acusa a Rusia de querer derrocar al presidente georgiano":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/EE/UU/acusa/Rusia/querer/derrocar/presidente/georgiano/elpepuint/20080810elpepuint_6/Tes"Rusia niega que Georgia haya puesto fin a las operaciones militares: Tbilisi comunica su intención de cesar el fuego y entablar conversaciones.- El Ministerio de Interior georgiano confirma que la aviación rusa ha bombardeado una base militar y el aeropuerto internacional en la capital georgiana.- Moscú hunde una lancha georgiana en el Mar Negro":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Rusia/niega/Georgia/haya/puesto/fin/operaciones/militares/elpepuint/20080810elpepuint_1/Tes "El fin del mundo en la cuna de Stalin: El bombardeo de la ciudad georgiana de Gori por la aviación rusa desata escenas de pánico - Cientos de soldados y civiles se ocultan en los refugios":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/fin/mundo/cuna/Stalin/elpepuint/20080810elpepiint_4/Tes"Concentraciones delante del parlamento georgiano: Los ciudadanos recriminan a los dirigentes su actitud, mientras los principales hospitales del lugar se ven desbordados por el aluvión de heridos":http://www.elpais.com/yoperiodista/articulo/Periodista/Georgia/bombardeo/Georgia/guerra/internacional/Rusia/Concentraciones/delante/parlamento/georgiano/elpepuyop/20080810elpyop_1/Tes"Guerra abierta entre Rusia y Georgia:La aviación rusa bombardea varias ciudades georgianas fuera de Osetia del Sur - Moscú asegura que la ofensiva militar de Tblisi ha provocado 30.000 desplazados":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Guerra/abierta/Rusia/Georgia/elpepuint/20080810elpepiint_1/Tes"Le Monde":"Le conflit en Ossétie du Sud, jour par jour":http://www.lemonde.fr/web/articleinteractif/0,41-0@2-3214,49-1082142@51-1036786,0.html"CNN":Presenta sitio web con links a artículos y fotografías relacionadas al conflicto:http://search.cnn.com/search.jsp?query=Georgia&type=news&sortBy=date&intl=true"Georgian breakaway city in ruins":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/10/georgia.russia/index.html"La Nación":"Georgia retira sus tropas y Rusia toma el control de Osetia del Sur. Lo hizo después de perder el control en la capital de la región separatista; miles de personas se desplazaron por los enfrentamientos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1038419"El Papa pidió el cese de los combates: Benedicto XVI sostuvo que ya causaron "muchas víctimas inocentes"":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1038411"El conflicto saca a la luz otra cara del gobierno ruso: Moscú teme perder las tradicionales alianzas con sus vecinos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1038361"Grave escalada bélica en el Cáucaso: El conflicto se extendió más allá de Osetia del Sur; Tiflis se declaró en estado de guerra; ya habría más de 2000 muertos":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1038360"Time":"Georgia Wants U.S. to Restrain Russia":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831244,00.html"Moscow's Dangerous Game in Georgia":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831243,00.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia:"Ante la ONU, E.U. acusó a Rusia de querer alargar el conflicto para derrocar a presidente giorgiano":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/otrasregiones/relaciones/ante-la-onu-eu-acuso-a-rusia-de-querer-alargar-el-conflicto-para-derrocar-a-presidente-giorgiano_4437921-1"MSNBC":"Russian troops reportedly cut Georgia in half: Towns, military base captured; Moscow to brief NATO on actions":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26116598/"South Ossetians describe escape from fighting: Refugees from breakaway Georgian province seek shelter in Russia":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26125821/"Georgia makes a power play — and a big gamble: Assault on breakaway region doesn't win U.S. support, antagonizes Russia":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26105019/"The Economist":"Calling a halt: Russia says its military operations in Georgia are over":http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displayStory.cfm?story_id=11916337&source=features_box_main"El Mercurio" de Chile:"Alerta en Tiflis ante temor a una arremetida militar: Tropas rusas se adentran en Georgia y Bush afirma que Moscú busca derrocar al gobierno":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/12/internacional/_portada/noticias/71A8D71D-DCF1-442A-8FD4-1F5B503ADE79.htm?id={71A8D71D-DCF1-442A-8FD4-1F5B503ADE79}"Zbigniew Brzezinski, ex asesor de seguridad nacional de Estados Unidos: "Si Rusia continúa así, debe ser aislada"":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/12/internacional/_portada/noticias/EBF1246C-C697-4A27-985C-A9A96BD87A08.htm?id={EBF1246C-C697-4A27-985C-A9A96BD87A08}"New York Times":"Russian Ground Forces Assault Vital GeorgianCity":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/world/europe/11georgia.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin"In Georgia Clash, a Lesson on U.S. Need for Russia":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/world/europe/10diplo.html?ref=world"Times":"Full text of the Georgia peace plan - and obstacles to its implementation":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4522496.eceAMERICA LATINA"CNN" informa: "Pacific hurricane likely to stay over open water":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/08/08/hernan/index.html"The Economist" analiza: "Venezuela: The autocrat of Caracas. Hugo Chávez tightens the state's grip on politics and the economy": http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11885670"The Economist" anuncia: "The Amazon: Paying for the forest. Donations welcome, even from foreigners":http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11885784"El País" de Madrid informa: "Ocho heridos por la explosión de un artefacto de las FARC en Bogotá. La Policía cree que los guerrilleros habían extorsionado a los heridos, trabajadores de un comercio":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/heridos/explosion/artefacto/FARC/Bogota/elpepuint/20080810elpepuint_3/Tes Varios medios informan sobre el referéndum en Bolivia:"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "Morales sobrevive al referéndum revocatorio":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Morales/sobrevive/referendum/revocatorio/elpepuint/20080811elpepuint_3/Tes"Le Monde" publica: "En Bolivie, Evo Morales joue son va-tout dans un référendum sur son mandat":http://www.lemonde.fr/ameriques/article/2008/08/09/en-bolivie-evo-morales-joue-son-va-tout-dans-un-referendum-sur-son-mandat_1081927_3222.html#ens_id=1080276"CNN" informa: "Bolivians vote on fate of Morales":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/08/10/bolivia.referendum.ap/index.html"La Nación" anuncia: "Expectativa por el resultado del referéndum en Bolivia":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1038413"La Nación" publica: "Morales pone hoy a prueba en las urnas su modelo de país. Los sondeos le dan un respaldo del 54%":http://www.lanacion.com.ar/nota.asp?nota_id=1038325"El Tiempo" de Colombia informa: "Con 60 % de votos a favor, Evo Morales es ratificado como presidente de Bolivia, revelan sondeos":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/latinoamerica/home/con-60-de-votos-a-favor-evo-morales-es-ratificado-como-presidente-de-bolivia-revelan-sondeos_4437727-1"MSNBC": "Bolivians back Morales in recall vote. Bold gamble by country's 1st indigenous president appears to pay off":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26127208/"El Mercurio" de Chile anuncia: "Evo anuncia diálogo con prefectos cuando se conozca resultado definitivo del referéndum":http://diario.elmercurio.com/2008/08/12/internacional/_portada/noticias/BF5558EE-4C8C-4142-A0D5-DBA816E0F038.htm?id={BF5558EE-4C8C-4142-A0D5-DBA816E0F038}ESTADOS UNIDOS / CANADA"The Economist" analiza: "Drugs in Canada: Needle match. Harm reduction, or abstinence?":http://www.economist.com/world/americas/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11885792"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "La fatiga del éxito pasa factura a Obama. El 48% de los votantes estadounidenses reconoce que ha oído hablar "demasiado" del candidato demócrata":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/fatiga/exito/pasa/factura/Obama/elpepuint/20080810elpepiint_9/Tes"Time" presenta su sitio con links a artículos sobre las elecciones estadounidenses:http://thepage.time.com/"MSNBC" publica: "Oil ends U.S. trading at a three-month low. Briefly drops below $113 a barrel, as demand in China appears to ease":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12400801/"The Economist" analiza: "Energy supplies:The devil and the deep blue sea. Finding more oil has become the first issue of the campaign":http://www.economist.com/world/unitedstates/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11895159"Times" anuncia: "Bush warns Russia and announces US airlift to Georgia":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4524831.eceEUROPA"CCN" publica: "EU tightens Iran nuclear sanctions":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/08/08/iran.eu.sanctions.ap/index.html"El Tiempo" de Colombia anuncia: "La Unión Europea impone nuevas sanciones a Irán·":http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/europa/home/la-union-europea-impone-nuevas-sanciones-a-iran-_4434967-1"CNN" publica: "France denies role in Rwandan genocide":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/06/rwanda.france/index.html"Times" informa: "Recorded chimes in Italy ring the changes":http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article4517624.eceAsia – Pacífico /Medio OrieNTE"Time" anuncia: "A China Threat From Pakistan?":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831216,00.html"CNN" informa: "19 Indians die as homes collapse in intense rain":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/08/09/india.rain.deaths/index.html"Time" publica: "A Murder Clouds the Olympics":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831074,00.html"MSNBC" anuncia: "Part of Olympic display altered in broadcast: Some aerial footage of fireworks digitally created months in advance":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26139005/"New York Times" anuncia: "Police in Western China Kill 5 Suspected Militants After Bombing Attack":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/sports/olympics/10blasts.html?ref=world"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "Al menos ocho muertos en varios atentados en la provincia china de Xinjiang: La policía ha abatido a siete atacantes que han atentado contra una comisaría - Un policía ha muerto.- La misma región sufrió el pasado lunes un atentado en el que murieron 16 policías":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/muertos/varios/atentados/provincia/china/Xinjiang/elpepuint/20080810elpepuint_2/Tes"The Economist" analiza: "China: Behind the sporting glitz, anxieties about minorities and the economy":http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11893655AFRICA"MSNBC" informa: "Mauritania coup leaders release prime minister: Three others also freed, but president still being held":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26140579/"Time" anuncia: "Mauritania Coup Chief May Campaign":http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1831256,00.html"El País" de Madrid publica: "Un atentado suicida contra un control policial causa ocho muertos en Argelia: El terrorista conducía una furgoneta cargada de explosivos en la provincia de Boumerdes":http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/atentado/suicida/control/policial/causa/muertos/Argelia/elpepuint/20080810elpepuint_4/Tes"CNN" informa: "Eight dead in Algeria car bombing":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/10/algeria.bombs.ap/index.html"New York Times" publica: "Darfur Withers as Sudan Sells Food":http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/world/africa/10sudan.html?ref=world"The Economist" analiza: "South Africa: A future of division, factionalism, stagnation and patronage": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11893529"CNN" anuncia: "Zimbabwe rivals meet for power-share talks":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/08/10/zimbabwe.talks/index.html"MSNBC" informa: "Mugabe: Only 'little hurdles' to Zimbabwe deal: Rival declines to comment on talks aimed at ending political crisis":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26135012/"The Economist" analiza: "Rwanda: The blame game. Exchanging unpleasantries about the genocide": http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11893587ECONOMIA"CCN" publica: "RBS posts record $1.5 billion loss":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/08/08/rbs.losses.ap/index.html"Time" inofrma: "Dollar Stronger, Oil Dips Below $115":http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1830721,00.html"Time" anuncia: "Citigroup: Billion-Dollar Buyback":http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1830349,00.html"MSNBC" analiza: "How much more will gas prices fall?. Also: Can I get insurance to protect myself if Medicare goes broke?":http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26093463/"The Economist" presenta su informe semanal: " Business this week":http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11901783OTRAS NOTICIAS"El País" de Madrid anuncia: "Los aviones volarán más despacio para emitir menos CO2, La normativa europea para ahorrar gases obligará a encarecer los billetes": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/aviones/volaran/despacio/emitir/CO2/elpepusoc/20080810elpepisoc_3/Tes"CNN" informa: "Green homes a growing trend":http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/science/08/04/green.home.ap/index.html"MSNBC" publica sitio con información sobre el desarrollo de las Olimpiadas: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24696691"El País" de Madrid publica: "'Cibermanifestación' por la libertad de expresión en China: Reporteros Sin Fronteras permite protestar por la falta de libertad de expresión en China a través de su web": http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internet/Cibermanifestacion/libertad/expresion/China/elpeputec/20080808elpepunet_1/Tes

Six years after former President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the disastrous consequences of this decision are still adding up. In addition to Iran being closer than ever to a nuclear weapons capability, now we must consider how the declining security situation in the Middle East has raised the stakes significantly. Trump promised a "better deal" but instead we got an increasingly costly blunder that may be impossible to fix.To fully understand the enormity of Trump's decision to leave the Iran deal, consider this: When the U.S. and Iran were complying with the deal, it was estimated that it would take Iran about one year to produce enough fissile material (in this case, weapons grade uranium) for a nuclear bomb (known as the "breakout" time). The states negotiating with Iran (the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany) assessed that this would be enough time to respond to possible violations and prevent Iran from producing a bomb. Even if Iran were to acquire sufficient fissile material, it could still take another year for Iran to make a deliverable nuclear weapon. As of May, 2018, the deal was working and considered (by most) to be a great success.Then President Trump unilaterally left the deal, calling it a "horrible one-sided deal that should have never, ever been made." And now we are in a much worse place. Iran says it has no intent to produce nuclear weapons and U.S. intelligence sees no current efforts by Tehran to weaponize, yet Tehran is believed to be not one year but just weeks from being able to produce enough fissile material for a bomb if it chooses to do so. At the same time, the ability of international inspectors to detect violations in a timely manner has eroded. As one U.S. official said of Iran, "they are dancing right up to the edge."Worse still, relations between the United States and Iran have been so damaged by Trump's withdrawal that it does not appear as though the deal can be resurrected. Any efforts to stabilize the U.S.-Iran relationship have been severely complicated by the recent exchange of direct attacks between Israel and Iran. Just as we need a non-military approach more than ever, the prospects for a diplomatic solution appear distant. What's worse is that increasing tensions may be pushing Tehran closer to a political decision to go nuclear. The danger of an Iranian bomb and the related risk that Israel could attack Iran's nuclear sites could lead to wider military conflict in the region. Of course, it did not have to be this way. The deal was working until Trump abandoned it and, if he had not, it could still be working today.How did we get here?To comply with the Iran deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA, Tehran agreed to significantly limit its nuclear program. Under the deal:Iran agreed to reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98% to 300kg and limit uranium enrichment to 3.67%, suitable for civilian nuclear power but well below highly enriched (20%) or weapons grade (90%). Those limits would have lasted for 15 years.Tehran limited the number of uranium centrifuges in operation by two-thirds and committed not to build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. The Fordow enrichment plant (designed as a secret, underground facility) was prohibited from enriching uranium, and limited enrichment could take place only at the Natanz facility.Iran agreed to redesign another nuclear facility to produce much less plutonium and its spent fuel would be shipped out of country. Iran agreed to provisionally implement additional safeguards under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).A year after President Trump's withdrawal, Iran began to retaliate by incrementally breaching the terms of the deal. Tehran lifted the cap on its uranium stockpile, increased enrichment beyond the allowed 3.67% and resumed and expanded activity at prohibited nuclear facilities.Many of Iran's advances were taken in response to provocative actions from the U.S. and Israel. In early 2020, the Trump administration killed Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani, leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and soon after Tehran announced that it would no longer abide by its enrichment commitments under the deal. But, even so, Tehran said it would return to compliance if the other parties did so and met their commitments on sanctions relief.In late 2020, Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated near Tehran, reportedly by Israel. Soon after, Iran's Guardian Council approved a law to speed up the nuclear program by enriching uranium to 20%, increasing the rate of production, installing new centrifuges, suspending implementation of expanded safeguards agreements, and reducing monitoring and verification cooperation with the IAEA. The Agency has been unable to adequately monitor Iran's nuclear activities under the deal since early 2021.Iran began enriching uranium to 20% in early 2021 at Fordow and then to 60% at Natanz a few months later after an act of sabotage damaged Natanz. Since then, Iran has been steadily increasing the rate of enriched uranium production. The latest IAEA report (February 2024) estimates Iran's enriched uranium stockpile to stand at 5,525kg, more than 27 times the level permitted under the deal, with 833kg enriched to 20-60%.How close to a bomb?Iran is steadily advancing its nuclear program, getting ever closer to becoming a "threshold state" with the ability to make a weapon while making no overt move to build one.The U.S. government estimated in March 2022 that Iran would need as little as one week to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon, according to a State Department official. During a March 2023 congressional hearing, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley testified that Iran could produce this amount of enriched uranium "in approximately 10-15 days."In its 2024 annual threat assessment, the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence concluded that "Tehran has the infrastructure and experience to quickly produce weapons-grade uranium, if it chooses to do so."And in March 2024, France, Germany, and the UK estimated that Iran had acquired enough highly enriched uranium that, if enriched further to 90%, would theoretically be enough for three nuclear explosive devices.There is greater uncertainty about how long it would take Iran to build a nuclear weapon once it has the required weapons-grade uranium. Such steps, referred to as "weaponization," include producing uranium metal and shaping it into bomb parts, producing high explosives and electronics, and fitting it all into a device that could be used for a demonstration test. It would presumably take longer to produce a bomb that could be delivered by aircraft or a warhead small enough to fit onto a ballistic missile.According to official U.S. assessments, Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and has not resumed it. Reportedly, this program's goal, according to U.S. officials and the IAEA, was to develop an implosion-style nuclear weapon for Iran's Shahab-3 ballistic missile. A State Department official stated in April 2022 that Iran would need approximately one year to complete the necessary weaponization steps.We cannot put Humpty Dumpty back together againMuch of Iran's uranium activities can be reversed; centrifuges can be disassembled, facilities can be closed, and uranium stocks can be blended down or shipped out of the country, as was done under the terms of the original deal. However, after years of operating more sophisticated centrifuges, Iran has acquired technical knowledge that cannot be undone.But more importantly, we have lost the political opportunity to reach a comprehensive deal with Iran. The Iran nuclear deal would not have been possible without the active support of Russia and China. Yet these countries are no longer aligned with the West on these issues and Iran is actively supporting Russia in its war with Ukraine and selling oil to China. Iran does not need sanctions relief from the United States as much as it once did.It was often said that although the Iran deal did not solve all the problems in the U.S.-Iran relationship, it solved an important one by taking an Iranian nuclear bomb out of the equation. That even if the myriad problems in the Middle East continued, at least we would not be facing those challenges and Iran on the nuclear threshold. And now that is exactly where we are.The lessons of this tragic tale are clear: a meaningful nuclear agreement is much harder to create than to destroy; if we are lucky enough to get one it should be protected; and if we lose it, we should try to replace it.The Iran deal was a truly remarkable achievement, and we would be much better off today if the United States had rejected the fantasy of a "better deal" and remained in compliance with the one we had. Trump's decision (aided by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-national security adviser John Bolton) to walk away was an historic and utter failure. Now, the prospects of finding a new diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis are daunting. But we must try; the alternatives are worse.