Suchergebnisse

Der Nato-Generalsekretär gibt einen aktuellen Überblick über die verschiedenen bündnispolitischen Probleme. Es werden insbesondere die Rolle der USA, die Politik der Abschreckung in Zusammenhang mit SDI und konventioneller Verteidigung sowie die Möglichkeiten sicherheitspolitischer Kooperation der Westeuropäer im WEU-Kontext erörtert. (SWP-Rbg)

IntroductionIn the coming weeks, the Department of Defense will unveil its first National Defense Industrial Strategy, the intent of which is to shape a "generational change" in defense policy development, programs, and investment in the defense industrial base. Understandably, the proximate causes for this Strategy are the significant disruptions to global supply chains throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Both events are comingled with simmering geopolitical tensions and military modernization in the Asia-Pacific.As yet, the Strategy's topline is to create a "resilient" supply chain that can produce defense items and technology "at speed, scale, and cost" while "ensuring workforce readiness" and delivering "flexible acquisitions".[1] It is difficult to imagine that either the Department or the companies comprising the defense industrial base want the opposite, and yet, many Department and industry studies of the defense industrial base over the past decade characterize the industrial base precisely this way.[2]How, then, are the Department and industry to square this circle?This piece attempts to address the question by retuning to first principles. Namely, the priority of the U.S. defense industrial base is to deliver the military products, services, and technologies that U.S. Armed Forces require in combat. Defining the latter, though, is the sole purview of the Department of Defense, and fundamental disagreements on the nature of armed conflict lie at the foundation of the industrial outcomes we see today.Short War and Long War ThesesFrom the close of the Korean War to the present, a central question for defense spending priorities is a heated debate on the duration and intensity of a conflict involving U.S. Armed Forces. These perspectives can be reduced to two ideal-types: the "short war" school and the "long war" school.During the Cold War, the short war school argued that a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union may have little to no prior-warning, and this conflict would be characterized by extremely high losses of war materiel, equipment, and people in the opening phases. If either side's conventional force failed, then nuclear weapons use was likely. Thus, the core focus of U.S. Armed Forces should be deterring a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.In its post-Cold War evolution, the short war school notes that the U.S. sustained a large army that could overwhelm any minor power. Similarly, for those handful of states that also maintained large armies since the fall of the Berlin Wall, regular investment in training and cutting-edge technology provides the U.S. with an incredible conventional overmatch. These combined advantages are so great that any conflict is likely to end within weeks or months.The long war school, on the other hand, contends that the nature of armed conflict is unknowable. This uncertainty drives the long war school to consider a range of scenarios. At their worst, U.S. Armed Forces may be engaged in a protracted, high-intensity conflict that would require the mobilization of the entire U.S. economy. In its historical context, the long war school noted a range of alternative military conflict scenarios, besides a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. A handful of examples include an indirect conflict between proxies or a direct conflict with a Communist or Communist-aligned adversary other than the Soviet Union. Given the high cost of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation, especially with a nuclear exchange, the long war school cited these alternative cases as more likely for planning purposes.In its contemporary iteration, the long war school acknowledges the conventional strength and technological overmatch of U.S. Armed Forces, demonstrated in the First Gulf War, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and elsewhere. However, this school contends that the demonstrated resilience of U.S. adversaries in the face of military strikes, sanctions, and more often leaves short war proponents unprepared.The Industrial Policy SynthesisTaking the next step, each of these schools of thought suggests very different allocations of resources, and even in an organization as large as the Department of Defense, funding, people, and time are finite. Thus, these schools can have outsized, if quiet, impact on the industrial base. Both the legacy and contemporary short war arguments arrive at the same preferred defense industrial base outcome. Namely, limited defense dollars are better allocated to projects that directly support current, fielded forces and leap-forward conventional capabilities. Greater combat power, today, deters the protracted fight that the long war school so fears and prevents any potential rival from catching-up.Honing this technological edge means that the defense industrial base will need to specialize, chasing the next incremental enhancement. Specialization, in turn, drives consolidation, as those companies without contracts for current systems lose or never develop the know-how to compete. Furthermore, since an anticipated conflict is expected to end rapidly, the potential harm from a limited pool of suppliers or overseas sources — even adversarial ones — is unlikely to be borne.In the long war construct, the uncertainty associated with a future conflict drives hedging behavior. In brief, defense dollars must be balanced between the current force and preparedness and response programs, particularly the civilian component that implements them. Focusing on achieving speed to scale, as threats emerge, delivers deterrence across a broader array of contingencies.From time immemorial, military spending has increased during conflict, and so the core of preparedness and response is creating connective tissue with the lower tiers of the defense industrial ecosystem that feed military production. Single-point failures and vendor concentration become targets for competition and contingency contracting, to maintain a diverse vendor base with similar capabilities. In anticipation of a potentially lengthy conflict, Government has an active role in the market to ensure material and component sourcing is resilient to strategic interference. A Path ForwardAs ideal types, neither the short war nor the long war schools are wholly "right" or "wrong"; instead, each provides valuable insight, and an internal counterbalance, as the security environment changes over time. With the National Defense Industrial Strategy waiting in the wings though, the first test for the Strategy is whether it clearly states its war-fighting context, followed by what the Department expects the defense industrial base to do and when that capability is expected within that context. Absent such vision, implementation — even if resourced — may be muddled.Regardless of whether one is a proponent of the short or long war school, two areas should come into immediate focus for the Department's implementation efforts:Deliver Civilian Staff for Mobilization Programs: The programs to implement the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.) (DPA) at the Department of Defense reside within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (IBP), the author of the Strategy. According to an IBP presentation to industry at the end of Fiscal Year 2023, only three (3) Federal employees execute all DPA activities.[3] This staffing level is wholly inadequate to meet the nation's needs, and Department leadership must take immediate action to correct this longstanding shortfall.Integrate Industry and Industrial Base Planning into War-Fighting Scenarios: Notwithstanding its numerous reports, the Department regularly models only two sectors of the industrial base for defense needs in a military conflict: critical minerals[4] and conventional ammunition[5]. Results from the latter are not available publicly, but in the Strategic and Critical Materials 2023 Report on Stockpile Requirements, the Department expects defense shortfalls of 69 materials worth $2.4 billion.[6] These modeling practices should be adapted elsewhere (e.g., shipbuilding, aircraft) to begin uncovering the stress these sectors are likely to experience, and as appropriate, industry should participate in defense planning, so industrial expectations are clear and lines of communication are open before the fight.[1] D. Vergun, "DOD Aims to Publish 1st National Defense Industrial Strategy," Department of Defense (20 October 2023), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3564112/dod-aims-to-publish-1st-national-defense-industrial-strategy/[2] See "Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress" at the Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (https://www.businessdefense.gov/resources.html); National Defense Industrial Association, Vital Signs (10 February 2023), https://www.ndia.org/policy/publications/vital-signs[3] J. Sopcisak, "Manufacturing Capability Expansion & Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) Overview, Dist. A" Refractory Metals Association (27 September 2023)[4] 50 U.S.C. 98h-5 "Biennial report on stockpile requirements", https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/98h-5[5] HQDA, Army Munitions Requirements, Prioritization, and Authorizations Management Policy (March 2021), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30355-AR_5-13-000-WEB-1.pdf[6] C. Keys, "Emergency Access to Strategic and Critical Materials: The National Defense Stockpile," Congressional Research Service – R-47833 (14 November 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47833

IntroductionIn the coming weeks, the Department of Defense will unveil its first National Defense Industrial Strategy, the intent of which is to shape a "generational change" in defense policy development, programs, and investment in the defense industrial base. Understandably, the proximate causes for this Strategy are the significant disruptions to global supply chains throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Both events are comingled with simmering geopolitical tensions and military modernization in the Asia-Pacific.As yet, the Strategy's topline is to create a "resilient" supply chain that can produce defense items and technology "at speed, scale, and cost" while "ensuring workforce readiness" and delivering "flexible acquisitions".[1] It is difficult to imagine that either the Department or the companies comprising the defense industrial base want the opposite, and yet, many Department and industry studies of the defense industrial base over the past decade characterize the industrial base precisely this way.[2]How, then, are the Department and industry to square this circle?This piece attempts to address the question by retuning to first principles. Namely, the priority of the U.S. defense industrial base is to deliver the military products, services, and technologies that U.S. Armed Forces require in combat. Defining the latter, though, is the sole purview of the Department of Defense, and fundamental disagreements on the nature of armed conflict lie at the foundation of the industrial outcomes we see today.Short War and Long War ThesesFrom the close of the Korean War to the present, a central question for defense spending priorities is a heated debate on the duration and intensity of a conflict involving U.S. Armed Forces. These perspectives can be reduced to two ideal-types: the "short war" school and the "long war" school.During the Cold War, the short war school argued that a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union may have little to no prior-warning, and this conflict would be characterized by extremely high losses of war materiel, equipment, and people in the opening phases. If either side's conventional force failed, then nuclear weapons use was likely. Thus, the core focus of U.S. Armed Forces should be deterring a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.In its post-Cold War evolution, the short war school notes that the U.S. sustained a large army that could overwhelm any minor power. Similarly, for those handful of states that also maintained large armies since the fall of the Berlin Wall, regular investment in training and cutting-edge technology provides the U.S. with an incredible conventional overmatch. These combined advantages are so great that any conflict is likely to end within weeks or months.The long war school, on the other hand, contends that the nature of armed conflict is unknowable. This uncertainty drives the long war school to consider a range of scenarios. At their worst, U.S. Armed Forces may be engaged in a protracted, high-intensity conflict that would require the mobilization of the entire U.S. economy. In its historical context, the long war school noted a range of alternative military conflict scenarios, besides a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. A handful of examples include an indirect conflict between proxies or a direct conflict with a Communist or Communist-aligned adversary other than the Soviet Union. Given the high cost of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation, especially with a nuclear exchange, the long war school cited these alternative cases as more likely for planning purposes.In its contemporary iteration, the long war school acknowledges the conventional strength and technological overmatch of U.S. Armed Forces, demonstrated in the First Gulf War, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and elsewhere. However, this school contends that the demonstrated resilience of U.S. adversaries in the face of military strikes, sanctions, and more often leaves short war proponents unprepared.The Industrial Policy SynthesisTaking the next step, each of these schools of thought suggests very different allocations of resources, and even in an organization as large as the Department of Defense, funding, people, and time are finite. Thus, these schools can have outsized, if quiet, impact on the industrial base. Both the legacy and contemporary short war arguments arrive at the same preferred defense industrial base outcome. Namely, limited defense dollars are better allocated to projects that directly support current, fielded forces and leap-forward conventional capabilities. Greater combat power, today, deters the protracted fight that the long war school so fears and prevents any potential rival from catching-up.Honing this technological edge means that the defense industrial base will need to specialize, chasing the next incremental enhancement. Specialization, in turn, drives consolidation, as those companies without contracts for current systems lose or never develop the know-how to compete. Furthermore, since an anticipated conflict is expected to end rapidly, the potential harm from a limited pool of suppliers or overseas sources — even adversarial ones — is unlikely to be borne.In the long war construct, the uncertainty associated with a future conflict drives hedging behavior. In brief, defense dollars must be balanced between the current force and preparedness and response programs, particularly the civilian component that implements them. Focusing on achieving speed to scale, as threats emerge, delivers deterrence across a broader array of contingencies.From time immemorial, military spending has increased during conflict, and so the core of preparedness and response is creating connective tissue with the lower tiers of the defense industrial ecosystem that feed military production. Single-point failures and vendor concentration become targets for competition and contingency contracting, to maintain a diverse vendor base with similar capabilities. In anticipation of a potentially lengthy conflict, Government has an active role in the market to ensure material and component sourcing is resilient to strategic interference. A Path ForwardAs ideal types, neither the short war nor the long war schools are wholly "right" or "wrong"; instead, each provides valuable insight, and an internal counterbalance, as the security environment changes over time. With the National Defense Industrial Strategy waiting in the wings though, the first test for the Strategy is whether it clearly states its war-fighting context, followed by what the Department expects the defense industrial base to do and when that capability is expected within that context. Absent such vision, implementation — even if resourced — may be muddled.Regardless of whether one is a proponent of the short or long war school, two areas should come into immediate focus for the Department's implementation efforts:Deliver Civilian Staff for Mobilization Programs: The programs to implement the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4501 et seq.) (DPA) at the Department of Defense reside within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (IBP), the author of the Strategy. According to an IBP presentation to industry at the end of Fiscal Year 2023, only three (3) Federal employees execute all DPA activities.[3] This staffing level is wholly inadequate to meet the nation's needs, and Department leadership must take immediate action to correct this longstanding shortfall.Integrate Industry and Industrial Base Planning into War-Fighting Scenarios: Notwithstanding its numerous reports, the Department regularly models only two sectors of the industrial base for defense needs in a military conflict: critical minerals[4] and conventional ammunition[5]. Results from the latter are not available publicly, but in the Strategic and Critical Materials 2023 Report on Stockpile Requirements, the Department expects defense shortfalls of 69 materials worth $2.4 billion.[6] These modeling practices should be adapted elsewhere (e.g., shipbuilding, aircraft) to begin uncovering the stress these sectors are likely to experience, and as appropriate, industry should participate in defense planning, so industrial expectations are clear and lines of communication are open before the fight.[1] D. Vergun, "DOD Aims to Publish 1st National Defense Industrial Strategy," Department of Defense (20 October 2023), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3564112/dod-aims-to-publish-1st-national-defense-industrial-strategy/[2] See "Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress" at the Office of the Assistance Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy (https://www.businessdefense.gov/resources.html); National Defense Industrial Association, Vital Signs (10 February 2023), https://www.ndia.org/policy/publications/vital-signs[3] J. Sopcisak, "Manufacturing Capability Expansion & Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) Overview, Dist. A" Refractory Metals Association (27 September 2023)[4] 50 U.S.C. 98h-5 "Biennial report on stockpile requirements", https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/98h-5[5] HQDA, Army Munitions Requirements, Prioritization, and Authorizations Management Policy (March 2021), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN30355-AR_5-13-000-WEB-1.pdf[6] C. Keys, "Emergency Access to Strategic and Critical Materials: The National Defense Stockpile," Congressional Research Service – R-47833 (14 November 2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47833

The Strait of Hormuz is a relatively unremarkable geographic feature, and to those unfamiliar with its commercial and strategic significance, is little more than a channel of water linking the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Yet this narrow strait is in fact much more than simply a connecting body of water. Indeed, it is a potential site for hostile military confrontation between Iran and its adversaries, namely the United States and its allies. Nearly 40 percent of all global energy supplies traverse the strait to various destinations, rendering the safety of both exports and imports vital to the stability of the global economy. Iran, lying to the north, is acutely aware of the power it yields in the strait. It has certainly made no secret of its readiness to seal the channel, particularly if a US or Israeli military attack on its nuclear facilities (suspected nuclear weapons enrichment sites) was to occur. It is uncertain what policy objective would be fulfilled by this action, given the harm Iran would incur on its own economy, and the high risk of political isolation associated with any disruption of energy exports. Nevertheless, Iran has invoked the threat of blocking the strait as its only real tool of deterrence against the feared political and ideological ambitions of the West. If Iran were to carry out this threat, the US ha s made it clear it would respond with military force . The question then remaining is how the Gulf Arab states would react; a matter riddled with conflicting considerations and far from simple to answer. It is also complicated by the reality that both Iran and the US would hope to entice the GCC states to back their operations through a campaign of intimidation. Th e fact is, the Gulf Cooperation Council is not a coherent strategic body: the member states lack common capacities, attitudes, and inclinations towards a military conflict with Iran . This has proven particularly true in situations short of an all out war in the region. However, as a sub-regional body the GCC would face a number of possible options, including allying with the US against Iran, remaining publicly neutral in an effort to preserve relations with both sides, or stepping out as an individual military bloc in defence of mutual GCC interests. If Iran were to partially close the strait, it is possible that the Gulf states would opt to privately support an international effort whilst projecting a stance of impartiality. Although the GCC members are more readily allied with Washington than with Tehran, they would not want to antagonise Iran as they must live with it as a regional neighbour. And though they are suspicious of Iranian hegemonic ambition, the GCC is deeply aware of Iran's significance as a strategic partner (Dub ai also maintains a substantial trade relationship with Iran). Thu s the Gulf Arab states, given their present military capacities and the absence of a unified defence policy, would support a move to internationalise a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in the hope that international forces would overwhelm Iranian aggression. However, if Iran were to completely close the strait to all non-Iranian shipping, it is most likely that the Gulf states would unite behind the US and its allies. In such a critical scenario, the GCC would have limited option s for the export of their energy supplies out of the Gulf, and it is unlikely that they would remain neutral. Th e small er states might be hesitant to commit too much to a conflict, yet with air and naval bases in the region, the US would be able to respond fast and with vigour. A conflict in the strait might encourage the GCC to reinforce its collective security strategy. The GCC does not have significant deterrent power against Iran , nor does it have the military capacity to enter into a conflict alone. Yet although the prospects for Gulf security cooperation in the next decade are slim at best, the potential for an integrated defence strategy is not an improbable objective. For this to be a reality, the GCC states must first resolve their internal problems, then work to improve and harmonise their military infrastructure. This will be essential if the GCC is to build status on the international stage as a valuable deterrent to Iranian belligerence, and as a body able to influence security in the Gulf region (without being propped up by external military powers).

In the article considered one of the most intensive developing threat for civilian and military spheres – hostile use of Low, Slow and Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (LSS UAVs). The classification of the LSS UAVs is given. World tendencies of hostile use of LSS UAVs – attack and ISR – are considered. Three categories of existing threats of using LSS UAVs are distinguished. Special attention is paid to the third category of threats, the main feature of which is a high level of training of the operator that can independently assemble Plug and Fly model using COTS or military technologies and finalizing its hardware and software tools for specific tasks. Main advantages and weak sides of LSS UAVs is distinguished. Determined that the best strategy is therefore to employ a hierarchy of countermeasures including regulatory (prevention, deterrence, denial), passive (detection and interruption) and active countermeasures (destruction). State of the art and current problems of possible countermeasures is analyzed. The most promising LSS UAVs` defeat technologies is described. Most attention is paid to specialized sensors and modern active defeat means such as programmable air burst munition (PABM) and high energy laser (HEL) systems. ; В статье рассматривается одна из наиболее интенсивно растущих мировых угроз – использование неправительственными организациями маловысотных, низкоскоростных и малоразмерных (МНМ) беспилотных летательных аппаратов (БпЛА) для осуществления атак по объектам критической инфраструктуры. Проведена классификация МНМ БпЛА, рассмотрены их главные преимущества и слабые стороны. Рассмотрены мировые тенденции враждебного использования МНМ БпЛА для проведения атак и ведения разведки, выделены три категории существующих угроз их применения. Особенное внимание уделено третьей категории угроз, которая характеризуется высоким уровнем подготовленности оператора, способного самостоятельно собрать БпЛА с использованием коммерческих или даже военных технологий, а также доработать его аппаратные и программные средства под конкретные задачи. Проанализировано современное состояние и существующие проблемы относительно организации противодействия МНМ БпЛА. Установлено, что наилучшей концепцией является применение иерархического комплекса мероприятий по противодействию БпЛА, который включает регулирующие (предупреждение, сдерживание, запрет), пассивные (выявление и постановка помех) и активные контрмеры (уничтожение). Описаны перспективные технологии противодействия МНМ БпЛА. Наибольшее внимание уделено специализированным средствам обнаружения и современным системам активного противодействия МНМ БпЛА, таким как боеприпасы с программируемым воздушным подрывом и мощные лазеры. ; У статті розглядається одна з найбільш інтенсивно зростаючих світових загроз – використання неурядовими організаціями маловисотних, низькошвидкісних і малорозмірних (МНМ) безпілотних літальних апаратів (БпЛА) для здійснення атак по об'єктам критичної інфраструктури. Проведена класифікація МНМ БпЛА, систематизовані їх головні переваги і слабкі сторони. Розглянуто світові тенденції ворожого використання МНМ БпЛА для проведення атак і ведення розвідки та виділено три категорії існуючих загроз їх застосування. Особлива увага приділена третій категорії загроз, яка характеризується високим рівнем підготовленості оператора, здатного самостійно зібрати БпЛА з використанням комерційних або навіть військових технологій, і допрацювати його апаратні і програмні засоби під конкретні завдання. Проаналізовано сучасний стан та існуючі проблеми щодо організації протидії МНМ БпЛА. Встановлено, що найкращою концепцією є застосування ієрархічного комплексу заходів з протидії БпЛА, який включає регулюючі (попередження, стримування, заборона), пасивні (виявлення та постановка перешкод) та активні контрзаходи (знищення). Описані перспективні технології протидії МНМ БпЛА. Найбільша увага приділена спеціалізованим засобам виявлення та сучасним системам активної протидії МНМ БпЛА, таким як боєприпаси з програмованим повітряним підривом і потужні лазери.

In the article considered one of the most intensive developing threat for civilian and military spheres – hostile use of Low, Slow and Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (LSS UAVs). The classification of the LSS UAVs is given. World tendencies of hostile use of LSS UAVs – attack and ISR – are considered. Three categories of existing threats of using LSS UAVs are distinguished. Special attention is paid to the third category of threats, the main feature of which is a high level of training of the operator that can independently assemble Plug and Fly model using COTS or military technologies and finalizing its hardware and software tools for specific tasks. Main advantages and weak sides of LSS UAVs is distinguished. Determined that the best strategy is therefore to employ a hierarchy of countermeasures including regulatory (prevention, deterrence, denial), passive (detection and interruption) and active countermeasures (destruction). State of the art and current problems of possible countermeasures is analyzed. The most promising LSS UAVs` defeat technologies is described. Most attention is paid to specialized sensors and modern active defeat means such as programmable air burst munition (PABM) and high energy laser (HEL) systems. ; В статье рассматривается одна из наиболее интенсивно растущих мировых угроз – использование неправительственными организациями маловысотных, низкоскоростных и малоразмерных (МНМ) беспилотных летательных аппаратов (БпЛА) для осуществления атак по объектам критической инфраструктуры. Проведена классификация МНМ БпЛА, рассмотрены их главные преимущества и слабые стороны. Рассмотрены мировые тенденции враждебного использования МНМ БпЛА для проведения атак и ведения разведки, выделены три категории существующих угроз их применения. Особенное внимание уделено третьей категории угроз, которая характеризуется высоким уровнем подготовленности оператора, способного самостоятельно собрать БпЛА с использованием коммерческих или даже военных технологий, а также доработать его аппаратные и программные средства под конкретные задачи. Проанализировано современное состояние и существующие проблемы относительно организации противодействия МНМ БпЛА. Установлено, что наилучшей концепцией является применение иерархического комплекса мероприятий по противодействию БпЛА, который включает регулирующие (предупреждение, сдерживание, запрет), пассивные (выявление и постановка помех) и активные контрмеры (уничтожение). Описаны перспективные технологии противодействия МНМ БпЛА. Наибольшее внимание уделено специализированным средствам обнаружения и современным системам активного противодействия МНМ БпЛА, таким как боеприпасы с программируемым воздушным подрывом и мощные лазеры. ; У статті розглядається одна з найбільш інтенсивно зростаючих світових загроз – використання неурядовими організаціями маловисотних, низькошвидкісних і малорозмірних (МНМ) безпілотних літальних апаратів (БпЛА) для здійснення атак по об'єктам критичної інфраструктури. Проведена класифікація МНМ БпЛА, систематизовані їх головні переваги і слабкі сторони. Розглянуто світові тенденції ворожого використання МНМ БпЛА для проведення атак і ведення розвідки та виділено три категорії існуючих загроз їх застосування. Особлива увага приділена третій категорії загроз, яка характеризується високим рівнем підготовленості оператора, здатного самостійно зібрати БпЛА з використанням комерційних або навіть військових технологій, і допрацювати його апаратні і програмні засоби під конкретні завдання. Проаналізовано сучасний стан та існуючі проблеми щодо організації протидії МНМ БпЛА. Встановлено, що найкращою концепцією є застосування ієрархічного комплексу заходів з протидії БпЛА, який включає регулюючі (попередження, стримування, заборона), пасивні (виявлення та постановка перешкод) та активні контрзаходи (знищення). Описані перспективні технології протидії МНМ БпЛА. Найбільша увага приділена спеціалізованим засобам виявлення та сучасним системам активної протидії МНМ БпЛА, таким як боєприпаси з програмованим повітряним підривом і потужні лазери.

America's commitment to arm Israel and Ukraine while attempting to stockpile large quantities of weapons for a potential war with China is putting strains on America's weapons manufacturing base, leading many influential policy makers and corporate officials to suggest measures that would super-size this nation's already enormous military-industrial complex.This argument is taken to the extreme in a new piece in The National Interest by Arthur Herman of the arms contractor-funded Hudson Institute, entitled "Three Cheers for the Military-Industrial Complex." The article repeats many of the stock arguments of current advocates of higher Pentagon spending while throwing around misleading statistics and dubious assumptions along the way.Myth number one routinely put forward by today's proponents of throwing more money at the Pentagon is that the U.S. military has somehow been neglected over the past few decades, and that therefore we need to inject hundreds of billions of dollars in additional spending into the arms sector to restore our defenses to an acceptable level. This argument has appeared in a recent report by Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) on the need for a renewed policy of "peace through strength," as well as in an analysis from a congressional commission charged with assessing the state of America's defenses. Both reports — as well as Herman's article — are based on a false premise.The Pentagon budget is rapidly spiraling towards $1 trillion per year, one of the highest levels since World War II. And once other military-related items are taken into account — from military aid and veterans' affairs to the nation's vast intelligence gathering network — the figure for total national security spending is more like $1.5 trillion. This comes after a decade in which the Pentagon received well over $6 trillion, roughly the same as was spent during the 10 years that included the peaks of the Iraq and Afghan wars. The above-mentioned numbers are mind-boggling, but the main point is that recent and proposed spending is far more than enough to defend the United States and its allies, if it is spent more wisely and managed more effectively.The bottom line is that the Pentagon needs more spending discipline, not more spending. For example, it is the only federal agency that is unable to pass an audit, a sad state of affairs that means that the department doesn't even have an accurate count of how much equipment or spare parts it possesses, or in some cases even where these items are being stored. Nor, according to former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, does the Pentagon know how many private contractors it employs, although rough estimates suggest that the number is well over half a million people. These management failures waste untold billions of dollars, year in and year out.Another source of waste is the Pentagon's penchant for building dysfunctional weapons systems at exorbitant prices. Cases in point are the F-35 combat aircraft and the Littoral Combat Ship, systems that are so riddled with flaws that they frequently can't carry out basic functions. Both systems have required billions of dollars in expensive retrofits and have spent large chunks of time out of commission due to needed downtime for repairs and maintenance. The two systems are the poster children for what is wrong with the Pentagon's system for developing and buying new weapons, from seeking extreme and overly complex performance characteristics to giving away the store to contractors in negotiations over price and performance.In the meantime, the most expensive element of the Pentagon's $2 trillion, three decades-long nuclear modernization plan, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, has undergone cost growth of 81% in the past few years alone.These weapons development fiascos do absolutely nothing to promote the defense of the United States, but they still manage to enrich the major weapons contractors charged with building them, whether or not they are effective or affordable. Absent reforms in the system that produces these dismal outcomes, simply giving the Pentagon more money is no guarantee of more defensive capability.Poor management is one thing, but the real pressure to spend more on the military-industrial complex is America's overly ambitious, outmoded view of the global role of the U.S. military. Current U.S. strategy calls for the ability to beat Russia or China in a conflict, project decisive force against adversaries like Iran and North Korea, quietly continue a global war on terrorism that involves dozens of overseas operations by U.S. forces every year, a massive program to build a new generation of nuclear weapons, and a surge of investment in high-tech, high-speed, pilotless weapons that incorporate artificial intelligence and can operate with little or no human input. A truly realistic defense strategy would scale back current plans to be prepared to fight wars in any corner of the globe on short notice, pursue a deterrence-only nuclear strategy that would eliminate the need for a costly nuclear modernization plan, and limit military aid to nations engaged in defending themselves or holding off aggressive neighbors.On the aid front this would mean continuing to arm Ukraine while exploring a diplomatic resolution of the conflict there. But it would involve cutting off assistance to Israel, whose brutal war in Gaza has gone far beyond any reasonable definition of defense, killing 40,000 people in an operation that has involved the commission of numerous war crimes which, according to a growing number of independent human rights and international law experts, may amount to genocide.It is notable that many proponents of making America a garrison state have little to say about the non-military challenges we face, from climate change to epidemics to political and economic inequality, much less how to address these problems. And if they reference diplomacy at all, it is often as an adjunct to the use or threat of force, not a tool for preventing conflict in the first place.Advocates like Herman need to step back and question the basic assumptions underpinning their calls for a new military buildup. First, we need to craft a viable strategy. Only then can we have an intelligent discussion about what size budget is required and what sort of manufacturing base is needed to sustain it. But as long as official Washington clings to the illusion that military buildups and arms racing are the magic key to peace, stability, and global dominance, we will waste large sums of scarce resources while increasing the risks of unnecessary conflict.