Sealing the Strait: an analysis of Iran and the GCC in the Strait of Hormuz

In: http://hdl.handle.net/1885/13952

Open Access

Abstract

The Strait of Hormuz is a relatively unremarkable geographic feature, and to those unfamiliar with its commercial and strategic significance, is little more than a channel of water linking the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Yet this narrow strait is in fact much more than simply a connecting body of water. Indeed, it is a potential site for hostile military confrontation between Iran and its adversaries, namely the United States and its allies. Nearly 40 percent of all global energy supplies traverse the strait to various destinations, rendering the safety of both exports and imports vital to the stability of the global economy. Iran, lying to the north, is acutely aware of the power it yields in the strait. It has certainly made no secret of its readiness to seal the channel, particularly if a US or Israeli military attack on its nuclear facilities (suspected nuclear weapons enrichment sites) was to occur. It is uncertain what policy objective would be fulfilled by this action, given the harm Iran would incur on its own economy, and the high risk of political isolation associated with any disruption of energy exports. Nevertheless, Iran has invoked the threat of blocking the strait as its only real tool of deterrence against the feared political and ideological ambitions of the West. If Iran were to carry out this threat, the US ha s made it clear it would respond with military force . The question then remaining is how the Gulf Arab states would react; a matter riddled with conflicting considerations and far from simple to answer. It is also complicated by the reality that both Iran and the US would hope to entice the GCC states to back their operations through a campaign of intimidation. Th e fact is, the Gulf Cooperation Council is not a coherent strategic body: the member states lack common capacities, attitudes, and inclinations towards a military conflict with Iran . This has proven particularly true in situations short of an all out war in the region. However, as a sub-regional body the GCC would face a number of possible options, including allying with the US against Iran, remaining publicly neutral in an effort to preserve relations with both sides, or stepping out as an individual military bloc in defence of mutual GCC interests. If Iran were to partially close the strait, it is possible that the Gulf states would opt to privately support an international effort whilst projecting a stance of impartiality. Although the GCC members are more readily allied with Washington than with Tehran, they would not want to antagonise Iran as they must live with it as a regional neighbour. And though they are suspicious of Iranian hegemonic ambition, the GCC is deeply aware of Iran's significance as a strategic partner (Dub ai also maintains a substantial trade relationship with Iran). Thu s the Gulf Arab states, given their present military capacities and the absence of a unified defence policy, would support a move to internationalise a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in the hope that international forces would overwhelm Iranian aggression. However, if Iran were to completely close the strait to all non-Iranian shipping, it is most likely that the Gulf states would unite behind the US and its allies. In such a critical scenario, the GCC would have limited option s for the export of their energy supplies out of the Gulf, and it is unlikely that they would remain neutral. Th e small er states might be hesitant to commit too much to a conflict, yet with air and naval bases in the region, the US would be able to respond fast and with vigour. A conflict in the strait might encourage the GCC to reinforce its collective security strategy. The GCC does not have significant deterrent power against Iran , nor does it have the military capacity to enter into a conflict alone. Yet although the prospects for Gulf security cooperation in the next decade are slim at best, the potential for an integrated defence strategy is not an improbable objective. For this to be a reality, the GCC states must first resolve their internal problems, then work to improve and harmonise their military infrastructure. This will be essential if the GCC is to build status on the international stage as a valuable deterrent to Iranian belligerence, and as a body able to influence security in the Gulf region (without being propped up by external military powers).