Since 2011, under the Thein Sein government, Myanmar has started to build financial institutions almost from scratch. Japan has played a leading role in this transition, writing off debt, opening the Yangon Stock Exchange, vying for the entry of Japanese banks, and laying out finance-related laws. As in other Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar's oligopolistic economic structure and colonial past present considerable challenges. There is a rich literature on the relationship between well-functioning financial institutions and economic growth, but the causality of this relationship remains inconclusive. This paper examines the preconditions for financial institutions to be a vehicle for Myanmar's development.
The objective of this report is to assess the usefulness of providing guidance for scaling up good practices in core ARD business lines, and to test the prospects for doing so. The output of the document is a guide for a systematic discussion on scaling up of Competitive Grant Schemes (CGSs) for agricultural research and extension at key decision points during the life of an ARD project. This report addresses the other end of the state-of-practice spectrum - good practices and beyond. The preparation of this report entailed five main activities: An overview of scaling up concepts and approaches; the selection of a particular sub-area within one of ARD s core business lines - scaling up CGS for agricultural research and extension; application of the IFAD/Brookings framing questions to five World Bank projects that were identified as addressing that business line - using information provided by the project's task team leaders (TTLs) or other member of the project team; the development of sub-area specific guidance for a systematic discussion on scaling up based on the findings from a series of five case studies; and validation of the scaling up guidance for CGSs for agricultural research and extension by World Bank practitioners and other internal consultations.
Introduction: After the Second World War, the political and economical block that today we call European Union started when six countries sought to ensure the peace among them. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands put their heavy industries under a common management, with the Coal and Steel Treaty, so no one could build weapons or develop its war industry without the others knowing it. This experience led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and 50 years later the ideas of people, goods and service freedoms continue spreading around, and the European Union has become one of the best examples of economical, political and cultural integration, and a reference around the world to encourage other regions to group. Therefore, among others, the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) appeared in 1960, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 1967; the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), in 1991; and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993. In the case of South America , in spite of their good intentions, the huge asymmetries between LAFTA members caused the apparition of sub-regional blocs: the Andeans Community (CAN) founded in 1969, and now grouping Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) founded in 1991, between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Nowadays, after more than 40 years of integration processes, there are still strong problems inside both sub-regional blocs. CAN Member States have several diplomatic discussions regarding their political models; and Peru, Ecuador and Colombia have or are negotiating independent Free Trade Agreements with external blocs, including USA and the EU. In the other side, MERCOSUR's main players -Argentina and Brazil- have commercial disputes at the World Trade Organization, surrounding their own sub-regional bodies . Nevertheless, these two sub-regional associations were the basis for the South American Community of Nations (CSN on Spanish) in 2004, and from that point, the present attempt to unify South-America: the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR, 2008), with the participation of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela. The integration levels in political and economical affairs in this latter group are expected to change the way international relations will be conduit in the future of South-America. This new regional bloc has an extension of 17 658 Km² and 383 million inhabitants (2007) . With a general GDP of $2348 953 (2007) and a GDP per capita of $6126 (2007), it is one of the regions with more perspectives of development, but it is also one of the regions with the highest degrees of economic asymmetry. While in 2007 Chile, Venezuela and Brazil had a GDP per capita (2007) of $9865, $8601 and $6819, there were other countries like Paraguay and Bolivia, with a GDP per capita (2007) of $1669 and $1342. These asymmetries have leaded to strong disagreements between South American countries during previous integration process. An example that just pooling economies is not the whole solution for development is the case of Paraguay, in the middle of MERCOSUR and with barely a quarter of the MERCOSUR's GDP $6642 (2007). 'Integration' will not always mean international governmental organizations where Member States have decided to transfer competitions and empowerment of supranational institutions; in this Master Thesis, the South American integration processes will be defined as '(...)the creation and maintenance of intense and diverse patrons of interaction between previously autonomous units.' Furthermore, 'Integration' in the context of the South American reality included two concepts: 'Regionalism' and 'Regionalization'. The first is related to the wave of thinking, the interaction projects and the political initiatives (the processes) and the second, to the institutions or the agreements that represent the integration (the result). This Master Thesis tries to be oriented to describe the processes more than the institutions or the agreements; nevertheless, it is not possible to present the first without the second and vice versa. What kind of integration can be expected in South America? What kind of goals, challenges and success can South-American Nations find in their way to a social, political and economical integration? Whereas the EU is -since its very beginning- a supranational initiative, South American regional and sub-regional blocs are characterised for being mostly, the result of intergovernmental agreements. Will this difference be determinant in the integration processes? In this thesis of Master in European Studies, the South American integration -processes and institutions- will be review under the framework of six dimensions that give the EU its character of integrated regional bloc and are advocated to deep the South America Integration. Three of them related to structural bodies: executive, judicial and legislative; and the other three related to the policies that defines a Union: Monetary Policy, Foreign and Security Policy; and, Social and Development Policy. In order to do not miss the main emphasis, the description and analysis of the executive supranational body will be deeper than the corresponding to judicial and legislative bodies and the three common policies. In addition, two cases of the South American Integration will be modeled, to present the best possible scenarios to foster the integration. By the comparison of the structures and policies, and by the scenario modeling; this Master Thesis attempts to demonstrate that the lack of supranational authority and law enforcement power will play a determinant role in the success or failure in the South American integration process. The analysis in this thesis can be divided in two sections, the descriptive part and the analysis of Case Study. The information for the descriptive part is mostly from published books, research papers, journals and case studies, the information for the Case Study comes mostly from News and Newspaper articles. The technique used in the analysis of the Case Studies is the Theory Game: a shared-decision model with two players that have different priorities for the same decision. The methodology for that is described more widely in section 4.1 Fundamentals of Game Theory. This Master Thesis presents the South American integration as a whole, and the UNASUR as the present meeting point of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. Therefore, wherever South American Integration is mentioned, it is not limited to UNASUR, CAN or MERCOSUR analysis, because they coexist and overlap each other at the same time. Instead, time framework and integration approaches are considerations that need to be undeniably included. To write about the integration processes in South America is to review almost 40 years of history and political agreements and disagreements of twelve countries and the influence that they received from external factors, like Central-, North America and Europe. Nowadays, the remaining sub-regional blocs face the opportunity to pool agreements in a new attempt, together with the risk of breaking-off of the Treaties, by the influence of external agreements of Member States with third parties around the world. For reasons of space, and to focus in the present regional integration process, those external agreements, like the NAFTA or the negotiations between the CAN and the EU, and their influence in the South American regional integration process are not going to be covered in this Master Thesis. That does not mean that their influence is negligible, rather than that, in some cases, like the Free Trade Agreements between the USA and Colombia, or Peru, it means the risk of the end of the CAN as a sub-regional economic bloc. In addition, a commercial developments analysis of the South American integration process requires a separate review of each commercial category and each bilateral agreement and therefore, a deeper description of those topics is not included. Other issues that are not going to be covered in this Master Thesis are those integration processes or commercial agreements that are not part or do not lead to the South American Union of Nations, like the 'Bolivarian Alternative for Our Americas' (on Spanish ALBA) or the 'Commercial Agreement of the Peoples' (on Spanish TCP). Their own dynamic and priorities are quite interesting; nevertheless going deeper in these issues could mean to reduce attention in the main topics of this Master Thesis. This Master Thesis uses study cases to describe two facets of the South American Integration process under the Two-Person Model of the Game Theory. The model used in this Master Thesis is characterised for the intersection of two players with mutual influence and different priorities. Game Theory is a useful analysis tool with many applications in mathematics, economics and political fields; nevertheless, as a model, it is a simplification of the reality and therefore, some details like the simplicity of its initial assumptions, the deep of the analysis, outsider players and feedback, are limited, further details of these limitations are presented in section 4.2. The analysis of a play of a Game, under the Game Theory can also be made by a mathematical approach. That mathematical approach is not going to be considered in this Master Thesis in order to keep the focus in the integration process.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Content: Dedicatory and Acknowledgementsii Abstractiii List of Contentsiv List of Tablesv List of Figuresvi List of Acronymsvii I.INTRODUCTION1 1.1Introduction2 1.2Methodology4 1.3Remarks4 II.SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT6 2.1Political Framework Development towards the South-American Union of Nations7 III.SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION UNDER THE EU FRAMEWORK26 3.1'New Regionalism' and the functional approach of South American integration.27 3.2South American- and EU- Integration Structures and Policies34 3.2.1A Supranational Executive Body37 3.2.2Supranational judicial functions41 3.2.3Supranational legislative functions43 3.2.4Common Currency and Supranational Monetary Institution46 3.2.5A Common Foreign and Security Policy47 3.2.6A Common Social and Development Policy48 IV.GAME THEORY AND SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION CASE STUDIES50 4.1Game Theory51 4.1.1Fundamentals of Game Theory51 4.1.2Limitations of Game Theory54 4.2Case Studies55 4.2.1Case Study 1: Political Integration, the creation of the South American Energy Council (2007)55 4.2.2Case 2: Economical Integration, the Ecuadorian safeguards settlement (2009)62 V.CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS67 REFERENCES71 APPENDIXES Appendix A: South American figures78 Appendix B: Game Theory Glossary82 Appendix C: Combined priorities84 DISCLAIM89Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.2.1, A Supranational Executive Body: Regarding the legal order, Supranationalism means that sovereign states agree to abide by norms which are adopted at a higher level of organization. In the case of the European Union, Supranationalism is not referred to the transfer of sovereignty; it is only the transfer of the power to exercise that sovereignty. Together with that, the supremacy of the Community law and the principle of direct effect present that the legal system of the Community has a federal nature. Thence, a Supranational Institution has competences to exercise powers that belong to sovereign States. In addition, the exercise of this power should be in line with the principles of proportionality, i.e. No action shall go beyond that it is necessary; and subsidiarity, i.e. In competences that Supranational Institution shares with Member States, it does intervene only if the objective of the action cannot be achieved by the Member State. The interaction between national governments and EU Institutions, together with the freedom to act according to those competences, is the basis for the adoption of the EU rules. Beyond the legal order, Supranationalism may be employed in decision-making, monitoring and enforcement. Supranationalism can also be divided in decisional (pooling sovereignty) and normative (delegation of power). Decisional Supranationalism is referred to those decisions taken by voting procedures other than unanimity, and when governments decided to act either jointly or not at all. Normative Supranationalism refers to the delegation of power to autonomous institutions that are created by the Member States. Therefore, a Supranational Executive Body will be an Institution with the right to adopt normative decisions directly based on the Treaties, with the autonomy to execute those decisions, and without the need of approval by the Member States. Supranational actors contribute to the integration by different means and reasons. Moravscik presented that pooling or delegation in the EU, are means to assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation or enforcement in issue-areas, where joint gains are high and distributional conflicts are moderate, and where there is uncertainty about future decisions. Other contribution of supranational bodies to integration process is that they might reduce the transaction costs by institutionalizing the integrative dynamic and negotiating procedure; and, it may assist national governments in issues area in which there are reasonably clear added benefits working according to the rules, but with predictable temptations to chat in response to short-term pressures. In addition, supranational institutions bring mutual confidence; smaller countries, which want their interests taken in account, especially in multinational scenarios where there is not veto power, can relay in the impartiality of supranational actors, instead of intergovernmental decision-making procedures, where the most powerful Member States shape the process. Probably the best example of the contribution of a Supranational Executive Body to Regional Integration is in Competition Policy: The Commission received decision powers in the sphere of state aid, based on the EEC Treaty provisions, due to the necessity of an impartial and independent body to apply agreed rules to face national pressures. One of the earliest Community Regulations fixed the modalities by which the Commission would exercise that power directly to ensure that undertakings respected antitrust rules. A supranational executive body can also shape the process and foster the integration. An example is the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Monetary union was neither the uncontested solution to economic problems, nor an easily obtainable response to German reunification. Nevertheless, Commission officials successfully disseminated the notion that EMU altogether provided a coherent solution to the problems created by financial globalization and the end of the Cold War; furthermore, they were leading actors in the sudden proliferation of governmental initiatives in France, Italy and German in favour of the EMU. By doing that, they fostered solid political momentum behind an originally lukewarm and unfocused demand for monetary integration. There are several reasons and examples of the benefits of a Supranational Executive Body; nevertheless, South American Nations still working with Intergovernmental Structures. During the negotiations for the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, its former General Secretary, Rodrigo Borja, presented a proposal for the authority and competences of UNASUR. In that document, member states, '(...) in exchange of the economical, political and geopolitical advantages that a common order can offer; agreed in the limitation of some of their sovereign faculties and will form the Union with common decision and executive multinational bodies'. The proposal was not accepted and finally, was part of the reasons of Borja's resignation. While in the case of the EU, the presence of a Supranational Executive Body is one of the strongest driving forces of the integration process, in the South American context, there is not yet a political will to pool sovereignty. Solón, pro-tempore General Secretary of UNASUR from 2006 to 2008, affirms 'Nobody doubts that in the future it will be necessary to move to supranational authorities (...) but today they want an agreement where everybody shall count with the other to have a meeting point'. Behind that attitude, the reasons that can be drawn are the political will of member states, driven by governments or national monopolies, which do not want to lose control over the process and the stagnation of the over-institutionalism in the past (Central America Common Market and the CAN). The stagnation of over-institutionalism drives member states to appeal to external bodies in the dispute settlement, continuing the weakening of the idea of a supranational body; the political will of member states, or its absence, could be explained for the existence of strong national political elites, allowed for the late trade liberalizations of national monopolies. Rajagopal refers to studies of how MERCOSUR member states have been primarily driven by domestic political considerations when they have furthered the integration process. This it could lead to conclude that they are not likely to develop the kind of supranational governance institutions present in the European Union; as policy elites in MERCOSUR, member states desire to maintain a great deal of domestic policy autonomy. In addition of its intergovernmental character, the faculties of the UNASUR Secretariat as Executive body are restricted by its small budget of 3 million US$/year, much more limited than the 5,4 million US$/year of the CAN General Secretariat ; and by the denial of the proposal of pooling the executive bodies of CAN and MERCOSUR. Another issue to consider is that the feasibility for South American countries to pool sovereignty or to delegate power varies from one Member State to another, according to their own constitutive and legal framework. In some cases, Constitutional texts are quite clear in stimulating regional integration and stressing the prevalence of regional law, like the Venezuelan Constitution that allows to 'confer on supranational organisations (...) the exercise of the powers necessary to carry out these integration processes (...)'(Art. 153, Venezuelan Constitution 1999). The Colombian external relations 'are based on national sovereignty (...) and on recognition of the principles of international law accepted by Colombia' and 'The State shall promote economic, social and political integration with other nations(…)', (Art. 19 and Art. 227, Colombian Constitution 1991). There are, however, other Member States whit Constitutions that needs amendment to pool sovereignty; like the Bolivian Constitutions which states 'The public authorities may not delegate the powers conferred on them by this Constitution, or confer on the executive branch powers other than those expressly conferred on them by it' (Art. 30, Bolivian Constitution). Therefore, the creation of a supranational executive body could not be totally accepted until the totality of the national Constitutions were in line with it. In addition to the considerations presented above, Chapter IV presents two Case Study based on the Game Theory to demonstrate the strong influence of an executive body with supranational competences in the integration process. Nevertheless, it is likely to expect that present integration structures will remain tied to intergovernmental political intentions, and the integration process will loose the benefits of a Supranational Executive Body.
Die Inhalte der verlinkten Blogs und Blog Beiträge unterliegen in vielen Fällen keiner redaktionellen Kontrolle.
Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Biden administration officials trekked to Seoul in late May to discuss a path toward a new "Special Measures Agreement" (SMA) that will define the parameters of military cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea for years to come.The talks, said the U.S. embassy, "underline the enduring vitality of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which remains the linchpin of peace, security, and prosperity for Northeast Asia, the broader Indo-Pacific, and beyond." The South Koreans have a more practical goal of holding down costs, taking "the position that our defense burden sharing will come at a reasonable level to ensure conditions for a stable stationing of" U.S. troops.The U.S. presidential election is still more than five months away, but Washington officials and their foreign friends are already preparing for the possible victory of former President Donald Trump. Their goal is to lock in what amount to "America last" policies that Trump is most likely to challenge.So it is with those devoted to the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea. Then-President Trump's policies and rhetoric caused much distress in Seoul and resulted in an impasse over cost sharing. South Korean officials welcomed the return of the status quo after Trump's defeat, with the Biden administration allowing the ROK's cheap ride to continue.However, South Korea now faces the possibility of Trump's return. At best, it would mean a repeat of his insistence that South Koreans pay more for America's protection. At worst, it would mean a withdrawal of U.S. forces. The result has been much wailing and gnashing of teeth in both capitals.In response, the Biden administration has accelerated negotiations over the next SMA. The new accord won't take effect until 2026 but would bind the incoming administration. The State Department claimed to have disinterested motives, but it's hard to ignore the fact that concluding the deal before the next president is inaugurated would deny Trump the opportunity to set policy.Unsurprisingly, the talks have reportedly been going well, since both sides have an incentive to finish before the campaign heats up. Today, South Koreans pay about $1.2 billion annually to underwrite the U.S. military presence. The two governments are likely to set a small increase in the ROK's payment.Some alliance advocates argue that Washington is getting a good deal. For instance, Troy University's Dan Pinkston cited "the amount that Korea contributes by paying for all the electricity used by US forces here, the land used for military drills, the salaries of civilian workers on the bases and so on." As a result, Pinkston contended "that it is actually cheaper for the US to have these troops based here in Korea than to ship them back to the US."Pinkston also pointed to "the intangibles at the heart of the alliance that benefited the US, such as support from Korea in cyber warfare, anti-piracy operations around the world, counter-terrorism campaigns, support for Washington in the UN and others."In reality, the arrangement is a sweet deal for South Korea by any measure. In exchange for a billion dollars and change — 90% of which is spent in the ROK — Seoul gets a guarantee that the world's superpower will use military force, including nuclear weapons, to protect it from any and all enemies. South Korean payments are not a contribution to the U.S., which is maintaining its garrison for the South's benefit. American forces act as a tripwire to ensure that Washington political leaders have no practical choice but to go to war for the ROK, irrespective of America's interests. The troops perform no other effective role, certainly not in confronting China, the most obvious East Asian challenge for U.S. influence.Moreover, contrary to Pinkston's view, South Korea does not offer a cheap location for U.S. military personnel. Force structure does not exist for its own sake but is based on security commitments. If Washington cuts its support for Seoul, it should eliminate corresponding units, personnel, and hardware rather than relocate them.Nor does the alliance as such offer extra benefits for Americans. Washington is defending the ROK; Seoul is not defending the U.S. Moreover, Washington and Seoul can work together on other issues of mutual interest even without an American security guarantee.Nevertheless, the Biden administration appears determined to prevent any debate over Washington's commitment to South Korea. However, Trump could thwart this expensive cooperation by moving beyond host nation support and reconsidering America's force presence altogether.There are a range of good reasons to consider such a move. For one, the alliance's costs and risks are growing. The Korean war was terrible, but American liability was limited to the battlefield. Washington fought ferociously without risking the homeland.That would no longer be the case today. In years past, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea hoped that its conventional threat to Seoul, which sits uncomfortably close to the border, offered sufficient deterrent to allied military action, including preventive U.S. strikes. Now, Pyongang possesses a nuclear arsenal expanding in size and a missile force increasing in range. The Asan Institute and Rand Corporation warned that, in a few years, "North Korea could have 200 nuclear weapons and several dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and hundreds of theater missiles for delivering the nuclear weapons."Although a preemptive attack from the DPRK would be suicidal, Pyongyang is likely more interested in deterring U.S. involvement in a Korean conflict. Should war occur, would a U.S. president be prepared to risk one or more American cities in defense of the South? Should a US president do so?Such a conflict would be a human tragedy. The ROK is a worthy friend and ties between the American and South Korean people—family, cultural, economic, and more—are strong. Nevertheless, such interests do not warrant risking America's very survival.In reality, the South is capable of defending itself. Trump sensibly asked: "They're a very wealthy country, so why wouldn't they want to pay?" In 1953, South Korea was an economic wreck, its people impoverished and its politics authoritarian. Absent American support, the North's Kim Il-Sung probably would have absorbed the South. However, the ROK soon began to race past the DPRK economically. Two decades later, Seoul embraced democracy, and it has now achieved a major international presence.Although the ROK's military has lagged behind the country's resources, the force is capable. One U.S. military official traveling to the ROK described the latter's military "as among the best in the world.""From a person who has worked with a lot of different countries, I put them at the high-end of capability," the official said — not as "an absolute replacement for a U.S. capability, but combined it is very strong." And that is without them seeking to replace U.S. forces. (Ironically, some South Koreans worry more about losing American money than troops, fearing fewer sales and jobs.)The prospect of a U.S. withdrawal is not without concerns. A transfer of defense responsibility raises the possibility that South Korea could seek nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the North. The thought horrifies the usual suspects and has led U.S. policy makers to work desperately to convince South Koreans that US "extended deterrence" remains strong.That was reflected in last year's so-called Washington Declaration, which assumed Washington would continue to risk the destruction of American cities and slaughter of American people to protect the South. Even if South Koreans believe that Americans would do so, why should we? An ROK bomb might not be a good solution, but it might be the best among several bad options.The SMA negotiations pale in importance compared to such issues. Why should Washington risk its people's future to protect a nation capable of handling its own defense, irrespective of the price the latter is willing to pay? American personnel should not be rented out to even the best of friends, especially when the U.S. has no vital interests at stake.Instead of arguing about host nation payments, the two governments should refashion the relationship and limit America's role. The current treaty should become a blueprint for mutual cooperation. Then the U.S. troop presence should be phased out, thus terminating host nation support after the withdrawal is complete.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Benjamin Netanyahu's government has responded with extreme rhetorical and military harshness to the brutal Hamas attack inside southern Israel on October 7, 2023. The Israeli army has so far killed more than 21,000 people in Gaza – including 8,800 children —. However, Western leaders and media have all too often given the impression of blanket support for the indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza. European leaders' equivocation over the Israeli onslaught against Palestinians is undermining the EU's "principled" stand on Ukraine and standing in the Global South. It is also fuelling populism and threatening democracy in Europe. "We are sons of light, they are sons of darkness". Thus, the Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu summed up his view of Israelis and Palestinians in a state broadcast in early November 2023, a month after the brutal Hamas attack inside southern Israel had claimed an estimated 1200 lives and 240 hostages, many of whom are still held by Hamas. His peers in government were equally uncompromising. The deputy speaker of the Knesset, Nissim Vaturi tweeted that Israel should "Burn Gaza now, nothing less!" (The Times of Israel 17th November 2023) while the minister of Heritage, Amihai Eliyahu suggested Israel could "drop a nuclear bomb on Gaza" (The Times of Israel, 5th November 2023). Such harsh words have surprised some western observers. Yet, anyone familiar with the context in which the state of Israel was created by the United Nations in 1948 will not be surprised. "Israel had been established by Jews from Europe and prided itself on being part of the West, of what was at the time commonly called the Free World. It saw itself and presented itself to the rest of the world, as an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism." These words from Avi Shlaim, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Oxford, in his book "Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab Jew" (2023), are drawn from a biography which is a reflection on the "other victims of Zionism". It refers to these Jews who were exiled "from their old Arab homelands where they were well integrated and transplanted to Israel, to serve as a subaltern class of the Hebrew settler nation" in the words of Moshe Machover, founder of the radical organisation Matzpen which disappeared in 1983. The flourishing Jewish community of Bagdad, which Avi Shlaim brings back to life so vividly, has all but vanished. So have the Jewish communities in other Middle East countries and across North Africa. An exception confirming the rule is the small community founded after the second destruction of the Temple in 79 AD that remains around the Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Jerba. From its very birth in late 19th century Vienna, Zionism emphasized the historic connection of the Jewish people to their ancestral homeland in the Middle East but it spawned a state whose cultural and geopolitical orientation identified itself exclusively with the West. When they reached Israel in the 1950s, members of these Jewish communities from Arab countries found the new state "despised Arabic (as) the language of 'the enemy'… One key factor which shaped my early relationship to Israeli society [was] an inferiority complex. I was an Iraqi boy in the land of the Europeans", writes Avi Shlaim, reflecting many other Sephardic (Arab) Jews' feelings vis a vis the Ashkenazi Jews from Europe who dominated the Zionist movement and the new state. The Palestinians, 700,000 of whom were forced out of Israel after 1948 and the broader Arab world, regarded Israel as an extension of European colonialism. It was in the Middle East but not of it. David Ben Gourion (Israel's first prime minister) referred to Israel's immigrants from the east as "savage hordes". Another purveyor of this arrogance was foreign minister Abba Eban, who stated that "the goal must be to instil in them a 'Western spirit', and not let them drag us into an unnatural Orient". The Israeli establishment has always regarded the creation of the modern state of Israel as compensation for the Holocaust – one of the greatest crimes in history. This makes Israel an extension of the West and a reliable ally. It is a paradox of history that Israelis feel closer to European countries who for centuries practised a virulent form of antisemitism which culminated in the Holocaust, than Muslim countries who afforded them the status of dhimi, or protected minority and never demonised them however violent relations could be at times. As Vichy France stripped French Jews of their nationality in 1940, Algeria's ulamas preached respect for their Jewish brothers and told Muslims not to acquire any Jewish properties that might have been spoliated by the French. Algeria was then part of France. King Mohamed V of Morocco, then a French colony, refused to play the Vichy game. Thousands of Jews were helped by their Muslim brothers as the Nazi general Erwin Rommel retreated across Tunisia, another French colony, after his defeat at the hands of Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery at El Alamein in the Libyan desert. The risk of Tunisian Jews being deported to concentration camps in the winter of 1942- 1943 was real. The monarch Moncef Bey and the leader of the nationalist Neo Destour party Habib Bourguiba would have no truck with Nazi ideology and practises. Breathing life into an almost forgotten world will not bring that world back. That is true of Bagdad as it is of Cairo and Tunis. One of the greatest paradoxes in Israeli politics since the 1970s is that Sephardic Jewish votes have underpinned the hold on power of the right-wing Likud and its successive leaders from Menachem Begin to Benjamin Netanyahu. Likud's leadership has always been Ashkenazi and its neoliberal economic policies have never served the interests of the underprivileged sectors of society. Shlaim argues that "Sephardic Jews brought with them to Israel a deep hatred and mistrust of the Arabs and therefore naturally gravitated towards the overtly nationalistic, Arab scorning parties of the right". According to him, Menachem Begin was one of the first Israeli politician to resort to the manipulation of anti-Arab feelings, even if the tactic was not a monopoly of the Israeli Right. Since the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, Western leaders and media have all too often given the impression of blanket support for the indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza. The critical Israeli daily Haaretz has been much freer and more daring than its western counterparts. The efforts Israel has made over the decades to redefine its ethnic cleansing of the Arab population of Palestine in 1948 as being a consequence of the Arabs voluntarily departing from their homes appears to have paid dividends. Israelis succeeded in undermining the accusation that their state was built on the foundations of what some observers consider to be a crime against humanity. Yet today the transfer of the Palestinian population out of Gaza is being openly discussed as an official solution by the most senior Israeli leaders and former officials. The West's equivocation on Gaza exposes a global order facing mutiny over its domination of the international discourse. The US double standards on Israel plays into a dangerous game, in which the EU follows suit. As David Levy notes: "For much of the Global south and in many cities in the West, Palestine now occupies a symbolic space. It is a line of avatar of a rebellion against western hypocrisy, against an unacceptable global order, and against the post- colonial order." In February 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West rediscovered itself and was proud of how it responded, with unprecedented solidarity, to Vladimir Putin's aggression. The liberal order, tattered by defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq had revived itself. Two years later, such pride died in the ruins of Gaza. It is also worth noting that massive American, French and British arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies have hugely increased instability in Yemen and Soudan, thus encouraging Iran to build up proxy forces, notably in Lebanon and Yemen and further eroding EU and US influence in the broader Middle East. These very same weapons are also destabilising Europe. This growing instability is all to the benefit of Russia and China: the West seems to have turned shooting oneself in the foot into an art form. Recent history lies at the root of the widespread feeling of a "decline of the West" and its inevitable consequence, the rise of right wing populism. If Western leaders cannot stand up to the values which underpin the world they built after 1945, if they are tempted to consign to the dustbins of history the ideas of "liberté, égalité, fraternité" inherited from the French Revolution and just race to sell ever more weapons to despotic regimes, why should their own voters, let alone people across the world, believe in them? Keywords: Israel, Gaza, Hamas, Palestine, Zionism, Global South, Europe, WestAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Benjamin Netanyahu's government has responded with extreme rhetorical and military harshness to the brutal Hamas attack inside southern Israel on October 7, 2023. The Israeli army has so far killed more than 21,000 people in Gaza – including 8,800 children —. However, Western leaders and media have all too often given the impression of blanket support for the indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza. European leaders' equivocation over the Israeli onslaught against Palestinians is undermining the EU's "principled" stand on Ukraine and standing in the Global South. It is also fuelling populism and threatening democracy in Europe. "We are sons of light, they are sons of darkness". Thus, the Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu summed up his view of Israelis and Palestinians in a state broadcast in early November 2023, a month after the brutal Hamas attack inside southern Israel had claimed an estimated 1200 lives and 240 hostages, many of whom are still held by Hamas. His peers in government were equally uncompromising. The deputy speaker of the Knesset, Nissim Vaturi tweeted that Israel should "Burn Gaza now, nothing less!" (The Times of Israel 17th November 2023) while the minister of Heritage, Amihai Eliyahu suggested Israel could "drop a nuclear bomb on Gaza" (The Times of Israel, 5th November 2023). Such harsh words have surprised some western observers. Yet, anyone familiar with the context in which the state of Israel was created by the United Nations in 1948 will not be surprised. "Israel had been established by Jews from Europe and prided itself on being part of the West, of what was at the time commonly called the Free World. It saw itself and presented itself to the rest of the world, as an island of democracy in a sea of authoritarianism." These words from Avi Shlaim, Emeritus Professor of International Relations at Oxford, in his book "Three Worlds: Memoirs of an Arab Jew" (2023), are drawn from a biography which is a reflection on the "other victims of Zionism". It refers to these Jews who were exiled "from their old Arab homelands where they were well integrated and transplanted to Israel, to serve as a subaltern class of the Hebrew settler nation" in the words of Moshe Machover, founder of the radical organisation Matzpen which disappeared in 1983. The flourishing Jewish community of Bagdad, which Avi Shlaim brings back to life so vividly, has all but vanished. So have the Jewish communities in other Middle East countries and across North Africa. An exception confirming the rule is the small community founded after the second destruction of the Temple in 79 AD that remains around the Ghriba synagogue on the Tunisian island of Jerba. From its very birth in late 19th century Vienna, Zionism emphasized the historic connection of the Jewish people to their ancestral homeland in the Middle East but it spawned a state whose cultural and geopolitical orientation identified itself exclusively with the West. When they reached Israel in the 1950s, members of these Jewish communities from Arab countries found the new state "despised Arabic (as) the language of 'the enemy'… One key factor which shaped my early relationship to Israeli society [was] an inferiority complex. I was an Iraqi boy in the land of the Europeans", writes Avi Shlaim, reflecting many other Sephardic (Arab) Jews' feelings vis a vis the Ashkenazi Jews from Europe who dominated the Zionist movement and the new state. The Palestinians, 700,000 of whom were forced out of Israel after 1948 and the broader Arab world, regarded Israel as an extension of European colonialism. It was in the Middle East but not of it. David Ben Gourion (Israel's first prime minister) referred to Israel's immigrants from the east as "savage hordes". Another purveyor of this arrogance was foreign minister Abba Eban, who stated that "the goal must be to instil in them a 'Western spirit', and not let them drag us into an unnatural Orient". The Israeli establishment has always regarded the creation of the modern state of Israel as compensation for the Holocaust – one of the greatest crimes in history. This makes Israel an extension of the West and a reliable ally. It is a paradox of history that Israelis feel closer to European countries who for centuries practised a virulent form of antisemitism which culminated in the Holocaust, than Muslim countries who afforded them the status of dhimi, or protected minority and never demonised them however violent relations could be at times. As Vichy France stripped French Jews of their nationality in 1940, Algeria's ulamas preached respect for their Jewish brothers and told Muslims not to acquire any Jewish properties that might have been spoliated by the French. Algeria was then part of France. King Mohamed V of Morocco, then a French colony, refused to play the Vichy game. Thousands of Jews were helped by their Muslim brothers as the Nazi general Erwin Rommel retreated across Tunisia, another French colony, after his defeat at the hands of Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery at El Alamein in the Libyan desert. The risk of Tunisian Jews being deported to concentration camps in the winter of 1942- 1943 was real. The monarch Moncef Bey and the leader of the nationalist Neo Destour party Habib Bourguiba would have no truck with Nazi ideology and practises. Breathing life into an almost forgotten world will not bring that world back. That is true of Bagdad as it is of Cairo and Tunis. One of the greatest paradoxes in Israeli politics since the 1970s is that Sephardic Jewish votes have underpinned the hold on power of the right-wing Likud and its successive leaders from Menachem Begin to Benjamin Netanyahu. Likud's leadership has always been Ashkenazi and its neoliberal economic policies have never served the interests of the underprivileged sectors of society. Shlaim argues that "Sephardic Jews brought with them to Israel a deep hatred and mistrust of the Arabs and therefore naturally gravitated towards the overtly nationalistic, Arab scorning parties of the right". According to him, Menachem Begin was one of the first Israeli politician to resort to the manipulation of anti-Arab feelings, even if the tactic was not a monopoly of the Israeli Right. Since the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, Western leaders and media have all too often given the impression of blanket support for the indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza. The critical Israeli daily Haaretz has been much freer and more daring than its western counterparts. The efforts Israel has made over the decades to redefine its ethnic cleansing of the Arab population of Palestine in 1948 as being a consequence of the Arabs voluntarily departing from their homes appears to have paid dividends. Israelis succeeded in undermining the accusation that their state was built on the foundations of what some observers consider to be a crime against humanity. Yet today the transfer of the Palestinian population out of Gaza is being openly discussed as an official solution by the most senior Israeli leaders and former officials. The West's equivocation on Gaza exposes a global order facing mutiny over its domination of the international discourse. The US double standards on Israel plays into a dangerous game, in which the EU follows suit. As David Levy notes: "For much of the Global south and in many cities in the West, Palestine now occupies a symbolic space. It is a line of avatar of a rebellion against western hypocrisy, against an unacceptable global order, and against the post- colonial order." In February 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West rediscovered itself and was proud of how it responded, with unprecedented solidarity, to Vladimir Putin's aggression. The liberal order, tattered by defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq had revived itself. Two years later, such pride died in the ruins of Gaza. It is also worth noting that massive American, French and British arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies have hugely increased instability in Yemen and Soudan, thus encouraging Iran to build up proxy forces, notably in Lebanon and Yemen and further eroding EU and US influence in the broader Middle East. These very same weapons are also destabilising Europe. This growing instability is all to the benefit of Russia and China: the West seems to have turned shooting oneself in the foot into an art form. Recent history lies at the root of the widespread feeling of a "decline of the West" and its inevitable consequence, the rise of right wing populism. If Western leaders cannot stand up to the values which underpin the world they built after 1945, if they are tempted to consign to the dustbins of history the ideas of "liberté, égalité, fraternité" inherited from the French Revolution and just race to sell ever more weapons to despotic regimes, why should their own voters, let alone people across the world, believe in them? Keywords: Israel, Gaza, Hamas, Palestine, Zionism, Global South, Europe, WestAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The 2023 EU-China summit on December 7 in Beijing ended without a dramatic clash of views but also without much agreement. The summit did not do any harm, it seems, but it did not lead to any major results either. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Charles Michel, President of the European Council, probably expected as much. In her opening statement von der Leyen asked Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman, Xi Jinping, for a "frank and open exchange" of views and it seems that is what she got, once the doors closed for the two-part meeting. The EU pair, accompanied by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, first met with Xi and then after lunch with the new premier Li Qiang. At both meetings the elephants in the rooms were the United States and Russia. In what has almost become a tradition by now, the Chinese leaders attempted to do their best to drive a wedge between the transatlantic allies by warning the EU leaders against "all kinds of interference" from outside powers, such as the United States and its latest export curbs on high-end artificial intelligence chips and chipmaking tools. In turn, the two EU presidents tried to persuade Xi to drop his support for Russia's war against Ukraine and persuade Putin to withdraw his troops. China's position regarding Russia's aggression would define the EU's relationship with China, von der Leyen told a news conference after the summit but Xi remained unswayed, as far as we know. China buys huge amounts of Russian oil at discounted prices and is providing Moscow with drones, microchips, and other dual-use goods, which may well classify as military aid. Wang Luton, the director-general for European affairs in the Chinese foreign ministry, suggested at a later press conference that the EU countries should talk to Putin themselves, if they wanted to bring about an end to the war.Trade and market access matters were at the core of the first EU-China summit to be held in four years. After all, both Europe and China are in economic difficulties and both sides know that they need each other. Europe is under increasing pressure due to the financial and military demands of the Ukraine war, increasing social policy expenditures and declining industrial creativity. Xi is greatly upset about the difficulties caused by US and European high-tech export controls and grapples with very high youth unemployment (which is still increasing), a looming demographic crisis, and not least the collapse of the property bubble. Just before the summit meeting Xi learned that the government in Rome had pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a humiliating blow as Italy was the only G7 country which had ever joined the BRI.In their meetings with the Chinese leaders, von der Leyen and Michel bitterly complained about the massive EU trade deficit with China, which ran at almost 400 billion euros in 2022. They told them that this was not sustainable and the very fact that the trade deficit had doubled during the last two years showed that irregularities were at play. Beijing needed to fix this situation as a matter of urgency. Not surprisingly, Xi dismissed this. Many exports to the EU actually originated from European-owned factories in China. Moreover, the trade deficit in 2023 had already declined by some 17 percent compared to the previous year. China's industries were developing rapidly due to their high innovation abilities and there was no overcapacity and no unfair subsidies of EV vehicles in China. These products were needed and would help the green transition in Europe. And in any case the EU was heavily subsidizing the European battery industries. The EU fears, however, that China will soon flood the EU countries with even more low-cost goods such as solar panels, wind turbines, medical devices, and more subsidized electric cars. EU trade experts are convinced that low consumer demand in China, enormous state subsidies for these goods, and the re-direction of massive bank lending from the property sector to EV vehicles as well as a great lack of fair market access for EU companies have led to a significant overcapacity which China now needs to export. The EU estimates that the Chinese state makes a loss of up to $30,000 for each China-made EV vehicle sold in Europe. Last September, von der Leyen initiated an EU investigation into Chinese subsidies for EV cars. The high tariffs imposed by the US and other non-EU countries, makes the EU the only sizable market available for the Chinese low-cost export drive regarding EV cars.While the EU "prefers to have negotiated solutions," von der Leyen indicated that the Europeans had "tools to protect our market." The European Commission President, whose first term in office is ending soon, was clearly referring to the imposition of tariffs. "Politically, European leaders will not be able to tolerate that our industrial base is undermined by unfair competition," she told Xi. She repeated that the EU was not interested in de-coupling from China – but "de-risking" and "diversifying" supply chains was necessary to make the EU economies more resilient. Outgoing European Council President Michel referred to Beijing's export curbs on critical minerals, such as graphite which is essential for the EU defense industries. Upholding European "sovereignty and strategic autonomy" thus made a "de-risking" policy utterly necessary. And incidentally Beijing had started this trend, the two EU leaders pointed out, when China announced its "dual circulation strategy" some three years ago. With this policy, China had tried to rely more on domestic consumption and home-made technology rather than on exports and high-tech goods from abroad.Michel and von der Leyen also presented details of 13 Chinese companies to Xi which sell EU-made dual-use products to Russia and thus avoid the European sanctions put on Moscow. They expect Beijing to take "appropriate action" otherwise these Chinese companies will also be sanctioned as part of the 13th sanctions package on Russia, which is currently being debated in the European Parliament. The meeting was indeed quite "candid" as Beijing later expressed. Von der Leyen and Michel also raised serious human rights issues in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong though they were delighted that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue had commenced again. The two EU leaders expressed their concern about the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait but also reiterated the EU's consistent One China policy. The Israel-Hamas War was also discussed.And both sides were also able to agree on a number of issues, such as their mutual interest in the continued cooperation on climate change and the environment, and Beijing's commitment to deal with the rising emission of methane. They also agreed to cooperate on global health issues and working out global rules and standards for AI. Both sides welcomed the establishment of working groups on exports controls, wines and spirits, cosmetics, food safety, intellectual property rights, and financial regulation. China had pressed for the relaunching of High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (HPPD) next year and this was agreed. First initiated in 2012, the HPPD consists of meetings of decision-makers and practitioners in various civil society and cultural fields. Agreement was also reached regarding the controversial issue of the ambiguous Chinese rules for data transfers. Beijing agreed to publish guidelines to provide greater transparency regarding how western companies can transfer their data out of China without running the danger of breaking any laws and rules. Nevertheless, this was a difficult and contentious summit. Regarding the essential topics such as how to deal with the continuing lack of market access for EU companies, the EU's huge trade imbalance with China, and Beijing's dubious support for Russia's war on Ukraine (China has still not condemned Moscow's aggression), no agreement was reached. There was no joint communiqué at the end. Both sides merely held separate press conferences. Yet, among all the tension and distrust of the last few years the summit did take place and both sides engaged and spoke to each other quite openly, and without falling out with each other. It is questionable, however, whether this will be enough to bring about "the foundation of a constructive relationship," which von der Leyen stated to Xi Jinping as the goal with a degree of polite optimism at the outset of the 2023 EU-China summit.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
The 2023 EU-China summit on December 7 in Beijing ended without a dramatic clash of views but also without much agreement. The summit did not do any harm, it seems, but it did not lead to any major results either. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Charles Michel, President of the European Council, probably expected as much. In her opening statement von der Leyen asked Chinese President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chairman, Xi Jinping, for a "frank and open exchange" of views and it seems that is what she got, once the doors closed for the two-part meeting. The EU pair, accompanied by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, first met with Xi and then after lunch with the new premier Li Qiang. At both meetings the elephants in the rooms were the United States and Russia. In what has almost become a tradition by now, the Chinese leaders attempted to do their best to drive a wedge between the transatlantic allies by warning the EU leaders against "all kinds of interference" from outside powers, such as the United States and its latest export curbs on high-end artificial intelligence chips and chipmaking tools. In turn, the two EU presidents tried to persuade Xi to drop his support for Russia's war against Ukraine and persuade Putin to withdraw his troops. China's position regarding Russia's aggression would define the EU's relationship with China, von der Leyen told a news conference after the summit but Xi remained unswayed, as far as we know. China buys huge amounts of Russian oil at discounted prices and is providing Moscow with drones, microchips, and other dual-use goods, which may well classify as military aid. Wang Luton, the director-general for European affairs in the Chinese foreign ministry, suggested at a later press conference that the EU countries should talk to Putin themselves, if they wanted to bring about an end to the war.Trade and market access matters were at the core of the first EU-China summit to be held in four years. After all, both Europe and China are in economic difficulties and both sides know that they need each other. Europe is under increasing pressure due to the financial and military demands of the Ukraine war, increasing social policy expenditures and declining industrial creativity. Xi is greatly upset about the difficulties caused by US and European high-tech export controls and grapples with very high youth unemployment (which is still increasing), a looming demographic crisis, and not least the collapse of the property bubble. Just before the summit meeting Xi learned that the government in Rome had pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a humiliating blow as Italy was the only G7 country which had ever joined the BRI.In their meetings with the Chinese leaders, von der Leyen and Michel bitterly complained about the massive EU trade deficit with China, which ran at almost 400 billion euros in 2022. They told them that this was not sustainable and the very fact that the trade deficit had doubled during the last two years showed that irregularities were at play. Beijing needed to fix this situation as a matter of urgency. Not surprisingly, Xi dismissed this. Many exports to the EU actually originated from European-owned factories in China. Moreover, the trade deficit in 2023 had already declined by some 17 percent compared to the previous year. China's industries were developing rapidly due to their high innovation abilities and there was no overcapacity and no unfair subsidies of EV vehicles in China. These products were needed and would help the green transition in Europe. And in any case the EU was heavily subsidizing the European battery industries. The EU fears, however, that China will soon flood the EU countries with even more low-cost goods such as solar panels, wind turbines, medical devices, and more subsidized electric cars. EU trade experts are convinced that low consumer demand in China, enormous state subsidies for these goods, and the re-direction of massive bank lending from the property sector to EV vehicles as well as a great lack of fair market access for EU companies have led to a significant overcapacity which China now needs to export. The EU estimates that the Chinese state makes a loss of up to $30,000 for each China-made EV vehicle sold in Europe. Last September, von der Leyen initiated an EU investigation into Chinese subsidies for EV cars. The high tariffs imposed by the US and other non-EU countries, makes the EU the only sizable market available for the Chinese low-cost export drive regarding EV cars.While the EU "prefers to have negotiated solutions," von der Leyen indicated that the Europeans had "tools to protect our market." The European Commission President, whose first term in office is ending soon, was clearly referring to the imposition of tariffs. "Politically, European leaders will not be able to tolerate that our industrial base is undermined by unfair competition," she told Xi. She repeated that the EU was not interested in de-coupling from China – but "de-risking" and "diversifying" supply chains was necessary to make the EU economies more resilient. Outgoing European Council President Michel referred to Beijing's export curbs on critical minerals, such as graphite which is essential for the EU defense industries. Upholding European "sovereignty and strategic autonomy" thus made a "de-risking" policy utterly necessary. And incidentally Beijing had started this trend, the two EU leaders pointed out, when China announced its "dual circulation strategy" some three years ago. With this policy, China had tried to rely more on domestic consumption and home-made technology rather than on exports and high-tech goods from abroad.Michel and von der Leyen also presented details of 13 Chinese companies to Xi which sell EU-made dual-use products to Russia and thus avoid the European sanctions put on Moscow. They expect Beijing to take "appropriate action" otherwise these Chinese companies will also be sanctioned as part of the 13th sanctions package on Russia, which is currently being debated in the European Parliament. The meeting was indeed quite "candid" as Beijing later expressed. Von der Leyen and Michel also raised serious human rights issues in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong though they were delighted that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue had commenced again. The two EU leaders expressed their concern about the rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait but also reiterated the EU's consistent One China policy. The Israel-Hamas War was also discussed.And both sides were also able to agree on a number of issues, such as their mutual interest in the continued cooperation on climate change and the environment, and Beijing's commitment to deal with the rising emission of methane. They also agreed to cooperate on global health issues and working out global rules and standards for AI. Both sides welcomed the establishment of working groups on exports controls, wines and spirits, cosmetics, food safety, intellectual property rights, and financial regulation. China had pressed for the relaunching of High-Level People-to-People Dialogue (HPPD) next year and this was agreed. First initiated in 2012, the HPPD consists of meetings of decision-makers and practitioners in various civil society and cultural fields. Agreement was also reached regarding the controversial issue of the ambiguous Chinese rules for data transfers. Beijing agreed to publish guidelines to provide greater transparency regarding how western companies can transfer their data out of China without running the danger of breaking any laws and rules. Nevertheless, this was a difficult and contentious summit. Regarding the essential topics such as how to deal with the continuing lack of market access for EU companies, the EU's huge trade imbalance with China, and Beijing's dubious support for Russia's war on Ukraine (China has still not condemned Moscow's aggression), no agreement was reached. There was no joint communiqué at the end. Both sides merely held separate press conferences. Yet, among all the tension and distrust of the last few years the summit did take place and both sides engaged and spoke to each other quite openly, and without falling out with each other. It is questionable, however, whether this will be enough to bring about "the foundation of a constructive relationship," which von der Leyen stated to Xi Jinping as the goal with a degree of polite optimism at the outset of the 2023 EU-China summit.
Character education in early childhood is not new, and character education is also not just a transfer of knowledge, but something that needs to be built early on through various stimula- tions. This study aims to develop the character of early childhood through audio-visual media with traditional Javanese songs. Using educational design-based research to develop audio-visual media from traditional songs, this media was tested in the field with an experimental design with a control group. Respondents involved 71 kindergarten students from one experimental class in one control class. The data revealed that character education in children shows the average value of the experi- mental class is higher than the control group, this means character education in children can be built through traditional songs. Further research can be done to improve the character of early childhood through a variety of media that interests children. Keywords: Early Childhood, Character Education, Javanese Traditional Songs Media References: Anderson, T., & Shattuck, J. (2012). Design-based research: A decade of progress in education research? Educational Researcher, 41(1), 16–25. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X11428813 Bates, A. (2016). The management of 'emotional labour' in the corporate re-imagining of primary education in England. International Studies in Sociology of Education, 26(1), 66–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/09620214.2016.1175959 Bates, A. (2019). Character education and the 'priority of recognition.' Cambridge Journal of Education, 49(6), 695–710. https://doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2019.1590529 Battistich, V., Schaps, E., Watson, M., Solomon, D., & Lewis, C. (2000). Effects of the Child Development Project on students' drug use and other problem behaviors. Journal of Primary Prevention, 21(1), 75–99. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007057414994 Berkowitz, M. W. (1933). The Science of Character. The Journal of Philosophy, 30(20), 557. https://doi.org/10.2307/2016365 Berkowitz, M. W., & Bier, M. C. (2004). Research Based Character Education. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 591(January), 72–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716203260082 Botvin, G. J., Epstein, J. A., Baker, E., Diaz, T., & Ifill-Williams, M. (2013). School-based drug abuse prevention with inner-city minority youth. The Etiology and Prevention of Drug Abuse Among Minority Youth, 6(I), 5–19. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315827735-6 Carr, D. (2012). Educating the Virtues: Essay on the philosophical psychology of moral development and education. London: Routledge. Cobb, J. (2007). What'll I do with the baby-o? Nursery rhymes, songs, and stories for babies. Vancouver: BC: Blacksheep Press. Damon, W. (1988). The moral child: Nurturing children's natural moral growth. New York: Free press. Derlicki, J. (2005). Ethno-pedagogy - the curse or the cure? The role of the school among youth in Nelemnoe (Yakutia). Sibirica, 4(1), 63–73. https://doi.org/10.1080/13617360500070731 Dick, W., & Carey, L. (2009). The Systematic Design of Instruction. New Jersey: Pearson Education. Ecclestone, K. (2012). From emotional and psychological well-being to character education: Challenging policy discourses of behavioural science and "vulnerability." Research Papers in Education, 27(4), 463–480. https://doi.org/10.1080/02671522.2012.690241 Fleer, M., & Hedegaard, M. (2010). Children's development as participation in everyday practices across different institutions. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 17(2), 149–168. https://doi.org/10.1080/10749030903222760 Goodman, J. F. (2019). Searching for character and the role of schools. Ethics and Education, 14(1), 15–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449642.2018.1537989 Greenberg, M. T., Kusche, C. A., Cook, E. T., & Quamma, J. P. (1995). Promoting emotional competence in school-aged children: The effects of the PATHS curriculum. Development and Psychopathology, 7(1), 117–136. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579400006374 Hanna, W. (2014). A Reggio-Inspired Music Atelier: Opening the Door Between Visual Arts and Music. Early Childhood Education Journal, 42(4), 287–294. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10643-013-0610-9 Harahap, N., Kahar, I. A., & Nasution, L. H. (2018). Preservation of lullabies songs in forming character based on local wisdom. International Journal of Linguistics, Literature and Culture, 5(1), 32–42. https://doi.org/10.21744/ijllc.v5n1.479 Hariswari, K. P., & Iswidayanti, S. (2019). Catharsis : Journal of Arts Education Gending Rare : Its Potential As A Character Education Media Based on Local Authority in Denpasar City. 8(3), 352–362. Hariyadi, S., Tamalene, M. N., & Hariyono, A. (2019). Ethnopedagogy of the osing tribe folk song: exploration and formation of biology learning character. Biosfer, 12(2), 258–276. https://doi.org/10.21009/biosferjpb.v12n2.258-276 Hendrix, R. E., Palmer, K. Z., Tashis, N., & Winner, M. G. (2013). The incredible flexible you: A social thinking curriculum for the preschool and the early elementary years. San Jose: CA: Think Social. Herliyana, & Rosmiati. (2018). Developing the Nationalism Character of Young Learners by Using Songs and Traditional Dances of Indonesia. Proceedings of the International Conference on the Roles of Parents in Shaping Children's Characters (ICECED), 287–292. Hidayati, I., Handini, M. C., & Karnadi. (2018). Character education on Dendang saluang ( Traditional song Minangkabau ) in Nagari Saribu Rumah. International Journal of Advanced Education and Research, 3(3), 01–05. Ilari, B. (2018). Scaramouche Goes to Preschool: The Complex Matrix of Young Children's Everyday Music. Early Childhood Education Journal, 46(1), 0. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10643-017-0842-1 Jeynes, W. H. (2019). A Meta-Analysis on the Relationship Between Character Education and Student Achievement and Behavioral Outcomes. Education and Urban Society, 51(1), 33–71. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013124517747681 Kotsonis, A. (2020). What can we learn from Plato about intellectual character education? Educational Philosophy and Theory, 52(3), 251–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2019.1631157 Kurniawati, Y., Pranoto, S., & Hong, J. J. (2014). Developing Early Childhood's Character Through Javanesenese Traditional Game. Indonesian Journal of Early Childhood Education Studies, 3(1), 68–72. https://doi.org/10.15294/ijeces.v3i1.9477 Lee, A. (2016). Implementing character education program through music and integrated activities in early childhood settings in Taiwan. International Journal of Music Education, 34(3), 340–351. https://doi.org/10.1177/0255761414563195 Lee, G. L. (2013). Re-emphasizing Character Education in Early Childhood Programs: Korean Children's Experiences. Childhood Education, 89(5), 315–322. https://doi.org/10.1080/00094056.2013.830907 Lickona, T., Schaps, E., & Lewis, C. (2007). CEP ' s of Effective Character Education Effective Character Education : Character Education Partnership. Mang, E. (2005). The referent of children's early songs. Music Education Research, 7(1), 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/14613800500041796 Mans, M. (2002). Playing The Music- Comparing Perfomance of Children's Song and dance in Traditional and Contemporary Namibian Education. In The Arts in Children's Live (pp. 71–86). Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Marshall, P. J., Bouquet, C. A., Thomas, A. L., & Shipley, T. F. (2010). Motor contagion in young children: Exploring social influences on perception-action coupling. Neural Networks, 23(8–9), 1017–1025. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2010.07.007 MENTERI PENDIDIKAN NASIONAL. STANDAR PENDIDIKAN ANAK USIA DINI. , PERATURAN MENTERI PENDIDIKAN NASIONAL REPUBLIK INDONESIA NOMOR § (2009). Mullen, G. (2017). More Than Words: Using Nursery Rhymes and Songs to Support Domains of Child Development. Journal of Childhood Studies, 42(2), 42. https://doi.org/10.18357/jcs.v42i2.17841 Mutema, F. (2008). Shona Traditional Children ' s Games and Play : Songs as Indigenous Ways of Knowing. English, 2(4), 189–203. Nakashima, D., Prott, L., & Bridgewater, P. (2000). Tapping Into the World's Wisdom. UNESCO Sources, 1–24. Nyota, S., & Mapara, J. (2008). Shona Traditional Children ' s Games and Play : Songs as Indigenous Ways of Knowing. English, 2(4), 189–203. Rogoff, B., Moore, L., Najafi, B., Dexter, A., Correa-Chávez, M., & Solís, J. (2007). Children's development of cultural repertoires through participation in everyday routines and practices. Handbook of socialization (In J. E. G). New York: Guilford Press. Selasih, N. N., & Sudarsana, I. K. (2018). Education Based On Ethnopedagogy In Maintaining And Conserving The Local Wisdom: A Literature Study. Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun, 6(2), 293–306. Sizer, T. R., & Sizer, N. F. (1999). The students are watching: Schools and the moral contract. Boston: Beacon. Smeyers, P., Smith, R., & Standish, P. (2010). The therapy of education: Philosophy, happiness and personal growth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sukoyo, J. (2016). The Development of Javanesenese Songs Containing Character Values as a Learning Medium of Early Childhood Education. Widyaparwa, 44(1), 1–9. Yang, L. H., Kleinman, A., Link, B. G., Phelan, J. C., Lee, S., & Good, B. (2007). Culture and stigma: Adding moral experience to stigma theory. Social Science and Medicine, 64(7), 1524–1535. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.11.013 Zeidler, Dana L; Keefer, M. (2003). the Role of Moral Reasoning on Socioscientific Issues and.
In Kiribati, as in all PICs, a robust and high-quality nursing workforce constitutes the backbone to the country's health service. Nurses require broad skills and abilities, as autonomous practitioners serving on the front lines of health provision, and as members of a multi-disciplinary team. Nurse education is provided by the School of Nursing and Health (SONH) at the Kiribati Institute of Technology (KIT), mainly under its core Kiribati Diploma of Nursing program. Midwifery education is also provided by SONH and undertaken by Registered Nurses as an 18 month, postgraduate qualification. The curriculum for the Diploma program currently being taught in Kiribati was imported many years ago from New Zealand, and there is recognition that it needs to be updated and contexualised for unique Kiribati needs. The Government of Kiribati receives assistance from New Zealand to examine the relevance and quality of the Diploma of Nursing curriculum in relation to the specific health challenges, needs, plans, identified gaps and workforce requirements in Kiribati. The vision, health goals and targets for Kiribati's health service delivery are outlined in the Kiribati Ministry of Health Strategic Plan 2016-2019, the Kiribati Development Plan 2016-2019 (KDP) and the Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2020-36 (KV20). This review fits with the Kiribati strategic objective to address gaps in health service delivery and strengthen the pillars of the health system. It also considers opportunities and pathways for Kiribati nurses under the strategic aim of promoting the employability of Kiribati nursing graduates nationally and providing a standard of training that prepares students to enter the international workforce. Wintec was contracted by New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) to carry out the review in 2017. Appropriate supporting documents were made available to provide important contextual information on the special character of Kiribati's situation as a nation, its current health challenges and goals, the healthcare system, the nursing workforce and the current nursing program. During September 2017, a team of three experts from New Zealand and Australia undertook a series of consultative and participatory meetings with relevant people in Kiribati, including from SONH, KIT, Government Ministries, Nursing Council and health sector service providers. A draft report describing their analysis and findings from those meetings was presented to involved stakeholders in Kiribati in November (see Appendix 2 for schedule of meetings), and feedback from those stakeholder meetings has been incorporated into this final version of the report. The reviewers took a holistic approach to the Terms of Reference that went beyond a narrow focus on only the existing Diploma program curriculum to adequately address wider priorities of concern. They identified 28 specific recommendations that are fully detailed in this report; only the most significant findings are outlined in this summary. There is good evidence that the current curriculum prepares graduates with an adequate level of basic nursing skills. However, there are content and teaching and learning process gaps evident, for example in the areas of aged and disability care, critical reflection, legal and ethical reasoning, and evidence informed clinical decision-making. There is evidence of some alignment to the Kiribati Nursing Council (KNC) Competencies for Registered Nursing (RN) Practice within the eleven Clinical Units within the programme. Students currently undertake substantial amounts of clinical placement across a range of clinical settings over the 3 years of the program. These settings include primary health care and community settings, medical, surgical, pediatric and obstetric wards within hospitals, and outer island health centres. Clinical facilitators are used to supervised students and there appear to be links made between student capability across the 3 years and the Standards for nursing practice. Review - KIT Diploma in Nursing Final Report 1 December 2017 4 The KNC has legislative power to set and govern standards of competency for Registered and Enrolled Nurses and to set standards of education for nursing programs and approve education institutions and the nursing curricula they deliver. A necessary and important first step therefore is a review and agreed update of the KNC Competencies for RN Practice. Following on from this a set of education program accreditation standards must be developed, which draw upon relevant available standards for nurse education. These steps need to be undertaken before developing a new curriculum that reflects a contextualized and contemporary graduate profile. Course and subject learning outcomes will be developed throughout the curriculum development process, which would be tightly aligned with a variety of assessment processes to ensure learning outcomes are achieved. A process of external benchmarking of new subjects would enable important feedback to be obtained, and strengthen links with the international and Pacific nurse education communities. The overall aim of the new Diploma curriculum should be to provide a course of study that leads to registration with the KNC and to enable novice nurses to capably function in a broad range of clinical contexts specific to Kiribati needs and priorities. It is important the curriculum incorporates the specific local geographic and demographic elements and reflects the unique i-Kiribati cultural values pertinent to effective local health service delivery. Career extension pathways for specific local health needs, such as midwifery, Public Health and specialized care can be provided as additional local courses, where feasible, or internationally where more appropriate due to budgetary and capability constraints. A stronger focus on Primary Health Care and health promotion is required, which will help address serious concerns over the increasing prevalence of Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) such as diabetes, cardiovascular and respiratory deseases. To produce a contemporary, locally appropriate curriculum the development must be owned 'in country' and involve all key stakeholders, a process that can be informed and guided by external technical experts and internationally available standards, curricula and resources (such as the WHO global standards for the initial education of professional nurses and midwives). A curriculum review working group with representatives from key stakeholders would lead this process. The international support integrated into this locally owned process would assist program articulation to quality frameworks, such as the Pacific Qualifications Framework (PQF), and ensure any Kiribati Quality or Competency Framework is underpinned by a robust quality assurance system that informs institutional internal quality management systems, accreditation and audits. Doing this will also enhance transfer of credit opportunities to facilitate international opportunities in nursing-related roles elsewhere. This report contains some analysis of nursing workforce trends and potential migrant work opportunities in Fiji, New Zealand and Australia. A refreshed, contemporary curriculum would include maximizing the use of available IT infrastructure to promote blended learning approaches, increase student engagement and improve the student experience. Utilizing practicing RNs as sessional or guest tutors and lecturers would further enhance the relationship between SONH and its clinical partners, provide opportunities for clinicians to share their knowledge and expertise with students, and augment the teaching role of Registered Nurses. The provision by KIT of English language training courses, and re-location of the SONH from its current site to the KIT facility at Betio will realise cost savings through increased usage and consolidation of teaching spaces, administration, IT infrastructure and teaching personnel. Sharing facilities with other KIT programs, developing affordable and sustainable clinical simulation and library facilities and ensuring adequate workforce planning and underpinning support systems are all important processes to consider in association with the Review - KIT Diploma in Nursing Final Report 1 December 2017 5 curriculum review. It is important to note that in 2017, KIT received provisional accreditation from the Educational Quality and Assessment Programme (EQAP) of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and KIT-SONH facility improvement and consolidation will be vital in securing full accreditation with this body. A coordinated approach to achieving these aims is essential, driven by local Kiribati leaders and supported by ongoing technical assistance from donor partners. Improving the quality of health services and the care provided to Kiribati people is at the heart of this review process. The team have listened carefully and sought to accurately capture the voices of the many individuals and groups with whom we have engaged and we trust that this is reflected within this report. We commend this report to you and thank you for the support provided in its development.
Questa tesi contribuisce al dibattito sulla Europeizzazione delle preferenze di policy dei cittadini. Questa forma di Europeizzazione si sostanzia nel sostegno dei cittadini per una governance Europea in strategici settori di policy. Utilizzando dati di sondaggio provenienti dalla ricerca Intune 2009 e da Eurobarometro, questo lavoro studia la struttura del sostegno per una governance Europea, distinguendo tra una generica preferenza per una maggiore governance e una specifica preferenza che varia tra i diversi settori di policy. Inoltre, questa tesi analizza quali sono i fattori che influenzano lo sviluppo di questi due tipi di sostegno. Nel Capitolo 1 attraverso uno studio della letteratura sulle macro teorie dell'integrazione Europea vengono presentati tre modelli alternativi che definiscono la struttura del sostegno per una governance politica Europea. Questi tre modelli sono in seguito testati e dibattuti nel prosieguo della tesi. Il Capitolo 2 fornisce una definizione del concetto di 'EU support' basata su precedenti studi teorici e empirici. Questa definizione identifica quattro dimensioni che sottostanno al concetto di 'EU support': • 'Output legitimacy': sostegno per gli output prodotti dall'Unione Europea; • 'EU governance legitimacy': sostegno come generica propensione ad affidare le decisioni di policy all'Unione Europea; • 'European identification': sostegno inteso come identificazione nella comunità politica europea; • 'EU democracy': sostegno inteso come percezione di rappresentanza politica a livello europeo. Il Capitolo 3 misura queste quattro dimensioni attraverso un modello a dimensioni latenti sui dati della ricerca Intune 2009, confermando che queste dimensioni sono sufficientemente stabili e invarianti attraverso i diversi paesi dell'Unione Europea. Il Capitolo 4 affronta l'analisi delle determinanti di queste quattro dimensioni del sostegno. I risultati dimostrano che quattro fattori influenzano in modo significativo il sostegno all'UE: 1) 'identificazione nazionale esclusiva' 2) 'attaccamento alla nazione' 3) 'fiducia nelle istituzioni nazionali' 4) 'valori politici'. Questi fattori influenzano il sostegno all'UE in tutti i paesi (quindici) oggetto dell'indagine, ma il loro effetto varia in base a quale dimensione del sostegno si considera: la propensione ad affidare le decisioni di policy all'UE ('EU governance legitimacy') viene influenzata solamente dal fattore 'identificazione nazionale esclusiva'. Inoltre, questo capitolo indaga anche la presenza di una gerarchia tra le quattro dimensioni del sostegno, derivando questa ipotesi dalle teorie neo e post-funzionaliste e da alcuni studi empirici. Tuttavia, i risultati provano che le dimensioni di 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification' e 'EU democracy' non influenzano in modo considerevole e diffuso quella di 'EU governance legitimacy'. Partendo da questo risultato, il Capitolo 5 esplora un percorso diverso, facendo un'analisi policy per policy. Infatti si concentra sull'influenza di questi ed altri fattori sulla propensione ad affidare le decisioni di policy all'Unione Europea in specifici settori politici. Da questa analisi emerge che fattori legati all'utilità soggettiva, all'identità europea e alla rappresentanza politica giocano un ruolo differente nei diversi settori: 'Output legitimacy' e 'European identification' sono le più importanti determinanti della propensione a sostenere una governance europea, ma i loro effetti sono rafforzati (o depotenziati) dalle specifiche caratteristiche delle diverse aree di policy. 'Output legitimacy' ha l'influenza maggiore nelle aree dove la governance europea è più efficiente rispetto ad una nazionale o locale (spiegazione funzionale), mentre 'European identification' ha l'effetto più consistente nelle aree politiche dove l'azione europea può correggere gli effetti della globalizzazione (spiegazione modello sociale). Ulteriori analisi evidenziano come gli intervistati tendano a preferire il livello nazionale a quello europeo per le aree di policy che richiedono ingenti investimenti economici e per quelle in cui l'Unione Europea già possiede estese competenze. Questo ultimo meccanismo evidenzia come un maggiore livello di integrazione europea non porti di per sé ad una ulteriore richiesta di governance europea (come sostenuto dai neo-funzionalisti), ma, anzi, conduca alla richiesta di ridiscutere l'attuale allocazione delle competenze. Utilizzando dati raccolti nel 2009, queste analisi non confermano l'influenza della dimensione di rappresentanza politica ('EU democracy'). Tuttavia, aggregando dati derivanti da Eurobarometro 86.2 e raccolti nel novembre del 2016 emerge come la percezione di rappresentanza politica diventi una importante e significativa determinante del sostegno per una governance europea delle politiche di immigrazione e della politica estera. Inoltre, il sostegno per una governance europea di queste due aree di policy viene anche influenzato direttamente dal numero di richiedenti asilo ospitati da ciascun paese. Infatti, maggiore è il numero di richiedenti asilo, maggiore è la richiesta di un'iniziativa politica europea che affronti questo tema. Considerando insieme questi due risultati (aumento dell'influenza della rappresentanza politica e del numero dei richiedenti asilo) viene confermata l'idea che le recenti crisi Europee (economica e dei migranti) abbiano profondamente modificato il modo attraverso cui i cittadini guardano all'Unione europea, e i motivi per cui sostengano o rifiutino una (maggiore) governance europea. In conclusione, il Capitolo 6 indaga i significati di identità nazionale ed europea per scoprire come questi influenzino il supporto per una governance europea di specifiche aree di policy. Utilizzando dati della ricerca Intune 2009, l'identità nazionale ed europea viene scomposta in quattro componenti costitutive: 'European Civility', 'National Civility', 'Ancestry', e 'Citizenship'. I risultati dimostrano come gli intervistati che ricostruiscono la propria identità nazionale sulla base delle specifiche tradizioni culturali nazionali (componente di 'National Civility') siano portati a rifiutare una governance europea. All'opposto, il sostegno per una governance europea è più probabile per quelli che qualificano l'identità europea come una forma di europeismo 'banale', dove il significato di europeismo discende dalla condivisione delle esperienze quotidiane ed ordinarie come cittadini dell'Europa (componente di 'European Civility'). Le analisi mostrano l'assenza di influenza sul sostegno da parte sia della componente pre-politica ('Ancestry') dell'identità nazionale ed europea, sia di quella politica ('Citizenship' intesa come esercitare i diritti di cittadinanza). Complessivamente, questi risultati corroborano l'idea che più l'Unione Europea è percepita come presente all'interno dell'ordinaria esperienza di vita dei cittadini, più probabile è il supporto per una maggiore integrazione politica. Tuttavia, a parità di condizioni, i significati di identità nazionale esercitano una decisa influenza sul sostegno. Infatti, maggiore è l'enfasi sulle tradizioni culturali nazionali e sul loro ruolo nella definizione di identità nazionale, minore è il sostegno per una governance europea. Questo è determinato dal fatto che le tradizioni culturali sono incorporate anche nelle leggi e nelle istituzioni politiche nazionali, ed un trasferimento di competenze all'Unione Europea ridurrebbe il ruolo e l'importanza di tali istituzioni, influenzando indirettamente l'identità nazionale. ; This dissertation contributes to the debate on Europeanization of citizen policy preferences. This form of Europeanization is defined as the support for a EU level governance instead of a national or sub-national governance of strategic policy domains. Using survey data from the Intune 2009 project and Eurobarometer surveys, this work studies how citizen support for EU policy governance is structured. It distinguishes a generic preference for more EU policy governance from a specific support for EU governance of distinct policy sectors. Moreover, this thesis analyses what influences the development of these two types of support for EU policy governance. Chapter 1 surveys the literature on macro theories of European integration and provides three alternative models of support for EU policy governance. These models are tested and debated in the proceeding of the dissertation to study the structure of support for EU policy governance. Chapters 2 provides a conceptual definition of EU support grounded in earlier theoretical and empirical works. Four dimensions of EU support are identified: • 'Output legitimacy': support as subjective utility of European integration; • 'EU governance legitimacy': support as a generic preference for EU policy governance; • 'European identification': support as identification (we-feeling) with the European political community; • 'EU democracy': support as political representation at the EU level. Chapter 3 measures these four dimensions of EU support, modelling them as latent dimensions using individual-level survey data. This chapter confirms that these dimensions are rather stable and invariant across EU member countries. Chapter 4 analyses the determinants of these four dimensions. Results demonstrate that 'exclusive national identification', 'national attachment', 'confidence in national institutions', and 'political values' exert a significant influence on the levels of EU support across Europe, but their effects vary across the four dimensions of EU support. Notably, only 'exclusive national identification' influences the generic support for EU policy governance ('EU governance legitimacy'). This chapter also investigates the presence of a hierarchy among the four dimensions of EU support testing whether generic support for EU policy governance depends upon holding one of the other three forms of EU support, following some suggestions included in theories of European integration (mainly neo and post-functionalism) and in empirical studies on EU support. However, results demonstrate that 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy' do not have consistent effects on 'EU governance legitimacy' across European countries. Chapter 5 explores this result performing a policy by policy analysis. It emerges that 'Output legitimacy', 'European identification', and 'EU democracy' play a role in driving support for EU governance of distinct policy domains. 'Output legitimacy' and 'European identification' are the most important determinants, but their effects are strengthened (or weakened) by specific policy domain characteristics. 'Output legitimacy' has the greatest influence on support for EU governance of policies where the EU governance is more effective (functional interdependence explanation); whereas 'European identification' has the highest effect on policies that work as market-correcting policies (social-model explanation) that guarantee a EU level protection from market and globalisation failures. Further analyses show that respondents tend to prefer high-expenditure policy to be governed at the national level, and, ceteris paribus, they are likely to oppose further EU integration in policy domains where EU governance is already high. This last mechanism is telling because it shows that EU governance does not lead to further integration (as argued by neo-functionalists), but on the contrary respondents favour a retrenchment from prior agreements on EU policy competencies. The analyses with 2009 data do not confirm the influence of political representation ('EU democracy'), but pooling data from November 2016 (Eurobarometer 86.2), respondents' perception of political representation within the EU becomes a highly significant determinant of support for EU governance of Immigration and Foreign policies. Moreover, the number of asylum seekers within each country contributes to explain individual-level support. These two findings confirm the idea that the recent European refugees and economic crises have profoundly modified how European citizens look to the EU, and why they support or reject EU policy governance. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates the meanings of national and European identities and their influence on support for EU governance of specific policy domains. Using Intune 2009 data, national and European identities are unpacked in four constitutive components: 'European Civility', 'National Civility', 'Ancestry', and 'Citizenship'. The results show that respondents who conceive their national identity as something rooted in national cultural traditions ('National Civility' component) are likely to reject EU policy governance. On the contrary, those who qualify European identity as a form of banal Europeanism where Europeanness is a matter of common and ordinary experiences as Europeans that forms a European way of life ('European Civility' component) are, ceteris paribus, more likely to support EU governance. Both pre-political ('Ancestry') and political (exercising 'Citizenship' rights) components do not have a consistent impact on this form of EU support. Overall, this corroborates the idea that the more the EU is present in ordinary experiences, the greater is support for EU policy governance. Conversely, a respondents' strong emphasis on national cultural traditions - also embedded in national laws and political institutions - hampers support for EU governance, since a transfer of competencies to the EU affects national laws and institutions, and, indirectly, national identities.
Der Focus dieser Arbeit liegt auf den strategischen Reaktionen deutscher Städte (insbesondere Stadtpolitik und Stadtverwaltung) auf den demographischen Wandel als ein gesamtdeutsches gesellschaftliches Phänomen, welches sich räumlich differenziert darstellt. Was sind vor diesem Hintergrund die wahrgenommenen Probleme und wie gehen die Städte damit um? Was sind handlungsleitende Strategien? Im Rahmen des Dissertationsvorhabens wurden 122 Städte bezüglich der Fragestellungen untersucht (Auswertung der demographischen Daten, Recherche auf den Homepages der Städte, Analyse der Neujahrsansprachen der Oberbürgermeister, Untersuchung der explizit artikulierten Strategien der Städte in Form von Stadtentwicklungs- und Integrationskonzepten). Die breite Auswahl empirischer Ergebnisse in der Art eines Surveys ergänzt die auf Fallstudien basierenden Forschungen zum demographischen Wandel in Deutschland. Die demographischen Veränderungen werden im Allgemeinen von den Städten als Herausforderung erkannt und auch thematisiert (in 50 von 104 Neujahrsansprachen explizit erwähnt). Die Städte stellen sich der Herausforderung, wollen aktiv in das Geschehen eingreifen: einerseits am Verteilungskampf um Bevölkerung teilhaben/den Trend umkehren und sich aktiv um Bevölkerungszuwanderung bemühen; andererseits die mit dem Wandel einhergehenden Probleme bewältigen und gegebenenfalls die Strukturen an die neue Situation anpassen. 60 von 122 Städten verzeichnen schon jetzt einen Rückgang ihrer Bevölkerung, 62 haben noch Bevölkerungswachstum. Wahrgenommene Probleme bezüglich des Bevölkerungsrückganges sind in erster Linie Leerstände im Wohnbereich, der geringere Anteil an jüngeren Menschen, unterausgelastete soziale und technische Infrastruktur sowie eine steigende Pro-Kopf-Verschuldung der Einwohner. Strategien der Städte im Umgang mit dem Bevölkerungsrückgang sind in erster Linie eine aktivierende Familienpolitik (z.B. Familienfreundliche Stadt, Bauland für Familien, Bündnis für Familie, Familienpass, bessere Vereinbarkeit von Beruf und Familie), der Ausbau der Bildungs- und Betreuungseinrichtungen (z.B. Ganztagsschulen, Betriebskindergärten, Krippen, etc.) sowie der Stadtumbau zur Anpassung der Strukturen an die sich ändernden Rahmenbedingungen. Bei 58 von 122 Städten findet sich das Thema Alterung auf den Internetseiten der Städte wieder. In diesem Zusammenhang werden besonders die Herausforderungen im Umgang mit der Bereitstellung einer altersgerechten Infrastruktur und einer optimalen Gesundheitsversorgung herausgestellt. Bezüglich der Strategien überwiegen Ansätze zur Verbesserung der Pflegesituation und des seniorengerechten Wohnens (z.B. betreutes Wohnen, Mehrgenerationenhaus), aber auch der Wissenstransfer von Alt zu Jung soll gefördert werden. Desweiteren werden in 111 von 122 Städten die Belange der älteren Mitbürger von sogenannten Seniorenbeiräten vertreten. Dass der Teilaspekt der Heterogenisierung einen zentralen Aspekt darstellt, zeigen die Ergebnisse der Interneterhebung – bei 108 von 122 Städten fanden sich Treffer zum Thema Integration. Der Ausländeranteil in den untersuchten Städten liegt zwischen 1,4 Prozent in Gera und 25,1 Prozent in Offenbach. Trotz der Integrationsbemühungen vieler Städte zeigen sich doch vielschichtige Probleme – Sprachprobleme, geringe berufliche Qualifizierung, Rückzug der Migranten in Nischenwelten (Segregation, Herausbildung von Parallelgesellschaften), hohe Arbeitslosigkeit, kein Wahrnehmen der Integrationsangebote (z.B. Integrationskurse) und auch Ausländerfeindlichkeit und Rechtsextremismus. Dem allen versuchen die Städte zu begegnen – in erster Linie in ihrer Sprache, indem sie sich als weltoffen und tolerant bezeichnen. Desweiteren setzen sich für die Belange der ausländischen Mitbürger in 90 Städten sogenannte Aus-länderbeiräte oder auch Integrationsbeiräte ein. In 25 Städten gibt es anstelle eines Beirates - oder zusätzlich - einen Integrationsbeauftragten. 14 von 122 Städten besitzen weder einen Beirat noch einen Integrationsbeauftragten. 50 Städte weisen schon explizit artikulierte Strategien in Form von Integrationskonzepten auf. Bei 28 weiteren Städten ist ein solches Konzept in Arbeit. Die Sprachförderung wird in den meisten Konzepten als Schlüssel zu Bildung und Integration angesehen. Weitere Strategien sind die Förderung der Arbeitsmarktintegration, die interkulturelle Öffnung und die Partizipation am öffentlichen Leben. Bei der Zusammenführung der sektoralen Strategien der Fachämter in eine übergeordnete für die Gesamtstadt geltende Strategie, leisten 'Integrierte Stadtentwicklungskonzepte' bereits in 70 Städten einen wichtigen Beitrag. Durch ein abgestimmtes Vorgehen können aufgrund der geringeren Finanzausstattung der Kommunen Prioritäten gesetzt und Handlungsschwerpunkte festgelegt werden. Nur ein solch integrierter Ansatz wird es den Städten in Zukunft ermöglichen, ihre Handlungsfähigkeit zu bewahren.:1 Einleitung 3 1.1 Demographischer Wandel und Strategien der Stadtentwicklung – Stand der Diskussion 3 1.2 Problemstellung und Forschungsfragen 8 1.3 Allgemeiner Bezugsrahmen der Arbeit 9 1.4 Empirischer Bezugsrahmen 10 1.4.1 Untersuchungsgegenstand 10 1.4.2 Erhebungsmethoden 12 1.5 Aufbau der Arbeit 16 2 Die Stadt im Kontext des demographischen Wandels 17 2.1 Die Stadt 17 2.1.1 Akteure, Akteurskonstellationen und institutioneller Rahmen 17 2.1.2 Organisation 22 2.1.3 Aufgaben 23 2.2 Der demographische Wandel und die Theorie der zweiten demographischen Transformation 25 2.3 Stadt und Bevölkerungsrückgang – "die schrumpfende Stadt baut um" 28 2.3.1 Wir werden "Weniger" 28 2.3.2 Probleme, Folgen und räumliche Auswirkungen 31 2.3.3 Strategien und Handlungsansätze 38 2.4 Stadt und Alterung – "die alternde Stadt zieht um" 48 2.4.1 Wir werden "Älter" 48 2.4.2 Probleme, Folgen und räumliche Auswirkungen 54 2.4.3 Strategien und Handlungsansätze 55 2.5 Stadt und Internationalisierung – "die bunte Stadt denkt um" 59 2.5.1 Wir werden "Bunter" 59 2.5.2 Probleme, Folgen und räumliche Auswirkungen 61 2.5.3 Strategien und Handlungsansätze 63 2.6 Reurbanisierung – die Lösung für die schrumpfende, alternde und weltoffene Stadt 65 3 Pläne, Strategien und der Beitrag integrierter Stadtentwicklungskonzepte 67 3.1 Strategische Planung oder Planung mit Strategien? 68 3.2 Strategische Planung im Umgang mit dem demographischen Wandel 73 4 Reaktionen deutscher Städte 75 4.1 Wir werden weniger, älter und bunter 76 4.2 Problemwahrnehmung der Städte – aktuelle Herausforderungen 79 4.2.1 Die Herausforderung des demographischen Wandels 81 4.2.2 Bevölkerungsrückgang ist keine Chance 81 4.2.3 Wir werden älter – ein Traum wird wahr? 84 4.2.4 Kulturelle Vielfalt ist nicht nur eine Bereicherung 86 4.3 Handlungsleitende Strategien – Pläne und Konzepte im Umgang mit dem demographischen Wandel 88 4.3.1 Die Kinder- und familienfreundliche Stadt 94 4.3.1.1 Bessere Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf 97 4.3.1.2 Attraktives Wohnen in der Stadt 100 4.3.1.3 Sprachrohre für Kinder und Familien 103 4.3.1.4 Städtische Hilfen 106 4.3.2 Die seniorenfreundliche Stadt 108 4.3.2.1 Lebenslanges Lernen, die Potentiale der Alten und das Ehrenamt 109 4.3.2.2 Wohnen im Alter 111 4.3.2.3 Sprachrohre für Senioren 113 4.3.2.4 Angebote und Hilfen für Senioren 114 4.3.3 Die ausländerfreundliche und weltoffene Stadt 117 4.3.3.1 Sprache als Schlüssel zu Bildung und Arbeit 122 4.3.3.2 Wohnen und Migranten – Integration auf Stadtteilebene 125 4.3.3.3 Sprachrohre und Hilfen für Migranten 129 4.3.4 Die Stadtumbaustadt – nicht mehr nur ein ostdeutsches Phänomen 133 4.3.4.1 Chancen für die Städte 134 4.3.4.2 Rückbau- und Anpassungstrategien – Entwicklung findet 'Innenstadt' 135 4.3.5 Strategische Stadtplanung – ein Hilfsmittel im Wandel? 140 4.3.5.1 Wir brauchen Strategien 140 4.3.5.2 Die Entwicklung von Strategien – Vorgehen nach Plan 141 4.3.5.3 Der Beitrag integrierter Stadtentwicklungskonzepte 146 5 Zusammenfassende Schlussfolgerungen und Perspektiven 155 6 Quellenverzeichnis 167 6.1 Literatur 167 6.2 Dokumente 186 6.2.1 Reden der Oberbürgermeister/innen 186 6.2.2 Stadtentwicklungskonzepte 198 6.2.3 Integrationskonzepte 201 6.3 Internetseiten der Städte 204 6.4 Telefoninterviews 206 7 Abbildungsverzeichnis 212 ; The focus of this work lies on strategic reactions of German cities (in particular city politics and city council) to the phenomenon of demographic change, which appears spatially differentiated. What are the problems perceived in the recent past? How do cities deal with these problems? What are the strategies pursued? Answers to these questions will be given based on an empirical research of 122 mostly large and medium-sized county-free cities in Germany (analysis and interpretation of demographic data, internet research on city homepages, content analysis of New year's speeches of city mayors, content analysis of established strategies in the form of city development concepts and concepts dealing with the integration of immigrants). The broad range of empirical findings in the manner of a survey complements demographic research in Germany that is mainly based on case studies. Most of the German cities recognize demographic change as the main challenge in the near and further future and pick it out as a central theme in city development (in 50 out of 104 New Year's speeches it was explicitly mentioned). The cities rise to that challenge and are willing to do everything within their power: On the one hand they try to gain population by striving immigration (especially young families), on the other hand they want to deal with the problems that come along with populations loss, ageing and a high percentage of foreigners and adjust city structures to the new developments. 60 out of 122 cities are already affected by population loss, 62 still have a growing population. Perceived problems regarding this matter are primarily the high vacancy rates on the housing market, the small share of young people, less utilization of social and technical infrastructure and the increasing per-capita debt (fewer inhabitants lead to less income and less allocation of funds from the German federation and Länder).To become or to be child and family-friendly is one of the main pursued strategies of cities to confront population decline and ageing. In detail cities follow an activating family policy: they provide beneficial land for building for families, participate in the national program 'Alliance for Families', and give benefits concerning leisure activities. Further strategies concern the development of the urban social infrastructure as fulltime schools, day care and nursery schools to provide a better support in reconciliation of work and family life. For the adjustment of a city's social and technical infrastructure as well as the housing market, funds for urban redevelopment are widely used. On 58 out of 122 city homepages the issue of ageing has been picked out as an important theme. In this regard especially the challenges concerning an age-appropriate infrastructure and health care have been emphasized. So cities strive for a better health care provision for older people (outpatient care, home care, new forms of foster homes) as well as senior-friendly housing (e.g. assisted living, 'Multi-Generational Homes') and the knowledge transfer between different generations (e.g. the elderly and the young). Besides those strategies 111 cities have an elected advisory council for senior citizens that stand up for the concerns of older people. Looking at the aspect of integration of immigrants it can be seen that this issue really concerns city officials. Not only that issue-related hits could be found on 108 city homepages, but also the number of perceived problems and developed concepts makes integration an important aspect in dealing with the consequences of demographic change. The share of immigrants in German cities shows significant differences between East and West Germany – it varies between 1.4 percent in the City of Gera and 25.1 percent in the City of Offenbach. Despite numerous integration efforts cities are confronted with severe and complex problems – like language problems, low professional qualification levels and little career opportunities, high unemployment rates of immigrants, development of parallel societies/immigrant communities (segregation), missing acceptation of integration offers (language courses etc.) and xenophobia. Dealing with these problems cities firstly want to be seen as cosmopolitan, multi cultural and tolerant. Secondly numerous cities (90) established an advisory board for foreigners or so called integration agents (25) that regard the interests and suggestions of immigrants. Thirdly the cities developed (50) or are still working on concepts (28) dealing with the integration of immigrants. The promotion of language skills is in most concepts seen as 'the key' to education and integration. Further strategies are employment promotion and integration in the local labor market, cross-cultural communication and competence and the participation in public life. For the integration of all kinds of sectoral strategies in an overall strategy for the entire city, city development processes and concepts have been a big help in dealing with demographic change in 70 cities. Due to the financial crisis, the coordination of interests enables city officials to assign priorities and key aspects of activity. This approach will be necessary, if German cities want to keep their capacity to act in the future.:1 Einleitung 3 1.1 Demographischer Wandel und Strategien der Stadtentwicklung – Stand der Diskussion 3 1.2 Problemstellung und Forschungsfragen 8 1.3 Allgemeiner Bezugsrahmen der Arbeit 9 1.4 Empirischer Bezugsrahmen 10 1.4.1 Untersuchungsgegenstand 10 1.4.2 Erhebungsmethoden 12 1.5 Aufbau der Arbeit 16 2 Die Stadt im Kontext des demographischen Wandels 17 2.1 Die Stadt 17 2.1.1 Akteure, Akteurskonstellationen und institutioneller Rahmen 17 2.1.2 Organisation 22 2.1.3 Aufgaben 23 2.2 Der demographische Wandel und die Theorie der zweiten demographischen Transformation 25 2.3 Stadt und Bevölkerungsrückgang – "die schrumpfende Stadt baut um" 28 2.3.1 Wir werden "Weniger" 28 2.3.2 Probleme, Folgen und räumliche Auswirkungen 31 2.3.3 Strategien und Handlungsansätze 38 2.4 Stadt und Alterung – "die alternde Stadt zieht um" 48 2.4.1 Wir werden "Älter" 48 2.4.2 Probleme, Folgen und räumliche Auswirkungen 54 2.4.3 Strategien und Handlungsansätze 55 2.5 Stadt und Internationalisierung – "die bunte Stadt denkt um" 59 2.5.1 Wir werden "Bunter" 59 2.5.2 Probleme, Folgen und räumliche Auswirkungen 61 2.5.3 Strategien und Handlungsansätze 63 2.6 Reurbanisierung – die Lösung für die schrumpfende, alternde und weltoffene Stadt 65 3 Pläne, Strategien und der Beitrag integrierter Stadtentwicklungskonzepte 67 3.1 Strategische Planung oder Planung mit Strategien? 68 3.2 Strategische Planung im Umgang mit dem demographischen Wandel 73 4 Reaktionen deutscher Städte 75 4.1 Wir werden weniger, älter und bunter 76 4.2 Problemwahrnehmung der Städte – aktuelle Herausforderungen 79 4.2.1 Die Herausforderung des demographischen Wandels 81 4.2.2 Bevölkerungsrückgang ist keine Chance 81 4.2.3 Wir werden älter – ein Traum wird wahr? 84 4.2.4 Kulturelle Vielfalt ist nicht nur eine Bereicherung 86 4.3 Handlungsleitende Strategien – Pläne und Konzepte im Umgang mit dem demographischen Wandel 88 4.3.1 Die Kinder- und familienfreundliche Stadt 94 4.3.1.1 Bessere Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf 97 4.3.1.2 Attraktives Wohnen in der Stadt 100 4.3.1.3 Sprachrohre für Kinder und Familien 103 4.3.1.4 Städtische Hilfen 106 4.3.2 Die seniorenfreundliche Stadt 108 4.3.2.1 Lebenslanges Lernen, die Potentiale der Alten und das Ehrenamt 109 4.3.2.2 Wohnen im Alter 111 4.3.2.3 Sprachrohre für Senioren 113 4.3.2.4 Angebote und Hilfen für Senioren 114 4.3.3 Die ausländerfreundliche und weltoffene Stadt 117 4.3.3.1 Sprache als Schlüssel zu Bildung und Arbeit 122 4.3.3.2 Wohnen und Migranten – Integration auf Stadtteilebene 125 4.3.3.3 Sprachrohre und Hilfen für Migranten 129 4.3.4 Die Stadtumbaustadt – nicht mehr nur ein ostdeutsches Phänomen 133 4.3.4.1 Chancen für die Städte 134 4.3.4.2 Rückbau- und Anpassungstrategien – Entwicklung findet 'Innenstadt' 135 4.3.5 Strategische Stadtplanung – ein Hilfsmittel im Wandel? 140 4.3.5.1 Wir brauchen Strategien 140 4.3.5.2 Die Entwicklung von Strategien – Vorgehen nach Plan 141 4.3.5.3 Der Beitrag integrierter Stadtentwicklungskonzepte 146 5 Zusammenfassende Schlussfolgerungen und Perspektiven 155 6 Quellenverzeichnis 167 6.1 Literatur 167 6.2 Dokumente 186 6.2.1 Reden der Oberbürgermeister/innen 186 6.2.2 Stadtentwicklungskonzepte 198 6.2.3 Integrationskonzepte 201 6.3 Internetseiten der Städte 204 6.4 Telefoninterviews 206 7 Abbildungsverzeichnis 212
Dottorato di ricerca in Economia e territorio ; La tesi ha rivolto la sua attenzione a uno strumento innovativo nella gestione degli investimenti pubblici sotto il profilo economico amministrativo, la concessione di valorizzazione demaniale cinquantennale che ha lo scopo di valorizzare il capitale demaniale dello Stato senza intaccare le risorse finanziarie dello stesso, vincolate dai criteri europei e prevalentemente destinate a coprire le spese correnti. La tesi descrive la prima concessione di valorizzazione demaniale cinquantennale rilasciata dallo Stato: Villa Tolomei a Firenze. Villa Tolomei è un complesso immobiliare plurisecolare immerso nelle colline di Firenze, che a seguito della riqualificazione e della valorizzazione è stato trasformato in un hotel e resort a cinque stelle, a soli 5 minuti dal centro storico e a 2,7 km dal Ponte Vecchio, dotato di tutti i comfort. Villa Tolomei è una dimora risalente al XIV secolo appartenuta alla famiglia Tolomei. Il complesso immobiliare è costituito, sin dalla sua origine, da diversi edifici per circa 3.500 mq di superficie, collocati all'interno di 17 ettari di un parco che presenta ancora le tracce della vecchia organizzazione a poderi. La tesi descrive i criteri contabili per la redazione del Bilancio dello Stato italiano e passa in rassegna i vincoli imposti dal Trattato di Maastricht, dal Fiscal Compact e dal Two Pack, da cui emerge le difficoltà dell'Italia nel fare fronte ai propri impegni europei, nel valorizzare il proprio patrimonio artistico e culturale e nel procedere con gli investimenti necessari per lo sviluppo del Paese senza il quale la politica di austerità del bilancio non ha efficacia. Il Bilancio dello Stato italiano infatti sta destinando le proprie risorse prevalentemente, se non totalmente, per finanziare le spese di funzionamento e per il ripianamento del debito, trascurando le spese in conto capitale e in particolare la valorizzazione del proprio patrimonio immobiliare. Diventa quindi fondamentale una stretta cooperazione con il settore privato, tramite i cosiddetti partenariati pubblico-privati (PPP), in cui sono realizzati progetti comuni con vantaggi reciproci e che perseguono obiettivi anche sociali. Tra questi, un ruolo particolare è quello della concessione di valorizzazione demaniale cinquantennale che permette allo stato di valorizzare il patrimonio e di creare occupazione e crescita, senza esborsi finanziari diretti. Una prima forma di Concessione Demaniale era già presente nella Roma Imperiale dove il complesso dei territori di proprietà della comunità, denominato "Ager Publicus", veniva assegnato ai cittadini meritevoli. Quasi un secolo più tardi con l'unificazione del Regno d'Italia e la stesura del Codice Civile del 1865, si ha la definitiva evoluzione del concetto di beni pubblici (sia mobili che immobili) distinti in demaniali (inalienabili e imprescrittibili) e patrimoniali (utili allo svolgimento delle attività interne ed estere proprie di uno Stato). In letteratura economica, l'analisi della possibile esistenza di vincoli finanziari per la decisione di produzione e d'investimento (Sau, 1999), è stata considerata fin dagli anni Cinquanta (Meyer – Kuh,1957; Gurley – Shaw, 1955). Tutti i contributi mostravano però il fianco a due possibili critiche: erano carenti nelle motivazioni teoriche di tali vincoli e si prestavano ad ambiguità interpretative nei riscontri empirici. Ciò contribuì al successo del teorema di Modigliani Miller (1958). Difatti, per oltre trent'anni i modelli teorici ed empirici delle decisioni d'investimento di una impresa privata si sono basati essenzialmente sul teorema di Modigliani-Miller. I due economisti si chiesero quale fosse il costo del capitale per un'impresa le cui fonti di finanziamento sono utilizzate per acquistare delle attività il cui rendimento è incerto. Formularono a tale riguardo tre proposizioni, nelle quali si afferma che, in base a determinate assunzioni, il valore di mercato di un'impresa è indipendente dalla sua struttura finanziaria, che il rendimento delle azioni è una relazione lineare crescente del rapporto d'indebitamento e che il tipo di strumento finanziario usato è irrilevante ai fini della valutazione della convenienza o meno dell'investimento. Si è applicato un identico ragionamento allo Stato, considerato come attore economico che investe alla stregua di un'impresa, per verificare se la sua struttura finanziaria sia effettivamente irrilevante rispetto alla politica d'investimento. Partendo dalla considerazione che, attualmente, il gettito fiscale è prevalentemente destinato a coprire le spese correnti e marginalmente le spese in conto capitale, ci si è chiesti quali soluzioni potesse trovare lo Stato per investire, nel rispetto dei vincoli europei. Si è escluso l'aumento del gettito fiscale poiché il livello della pressione tributaria è già elevato e l'aumento dell'indebitamento visti i vincoli europei. Inoltre, Il taglio della spesa pubblica, peraltro auspicabile, produce effetti solo nel lungo termine. Una metodologia alternativa, che renda irrilevante la struttura finanziaria rispetto alla politica di investimento, è la concessione di valorizzazione demaniale cinquantennale. Prendendo in esame le modalità di copertura del fabbisogno e inserendo, come variabile, la concessione demaniale cinquantennale, si ottiene un vincolo di bilancio in cui è dimostrabile l'assunto del teorema di Modigliani-Miller. Questo strumento non solo non sottrae risorse finanziarie per il mantenimento e/o la valorizzazione delle proprietà immobiliari dello Stato, ma genera un rendimento atteso attraverso la riscossione del canone di concessione. I vantaggi per lo Stato della concessione demaniale si rinvengono nella possibilità di attuare una politica di adeguamento infrastrutturale del Paese, limitando fortemente l'utilizzo di risorse finanziarie pubbliche. Utilizza competenze private in tutte le fasi di costruzione, gestione ed erogazione del servizio con un maggiore coinvolgimento dei soggetti finanziatori e con un trasferimento ottimale dei rischi al settore privato. Inoltre, lo Stato trae reddito con il canone di concessione cinquantennale demaniale che, nel caso di Villa Tolomei, ammonta a €150.000 all'anno per una durata di 50 anni, per un totale di €16.869.546,0011. Non da ultimo occorre ricordare che lo Stato incassa le imposte sul reddito generate dall'attività turistico-recettiva di Villa Tolomei. Per l'imprenditore privato, i vantaggi della concessione demaniale consistono in primis nei ridotti i costi d'investimento (non si acquista l'immobile); l'imprenditore nel caso di studio ha sostenuto solo i costi di riqualificazione del bene, che sono stati di circa €6,0 milioni, finanziati da istituti bancari e finanziari senza garanzia ipotecaria. L'attività turistico-recettiva è stata inaugurata il 24 maggio 2013 e i primi significativi risultati economici sono stati valutati in occasione della chiusura del primo anno di esercizio al 31/12/2014, il Bilancio 2014 che riporta Ricavi per €2.105.711,20, Costi €1.981.648,99 ed un Cash flow di €124.062,21. Questo livello di redditività garantisce la sostenibilità economica dell'attività, la remunerazione del capitale, ed è in linea con il business plan presentato nel bando di concessione demaniale cinquantennale attesta che l'imprenditore è stato in grado di pagare il canone di concessione e anche di generare un EBITDA positivo, fin dal primo anno di attività. Per la Regione Toscana, il vantaggio consiste nella valorizzazione dell'area che prima versava in stato di degrado e dal punto di vista economico nell'incasso dell'ammontare dell'IRAP e dell'addizionale regionale. Per il Comune di Firenze, oltre all'evidente incremento occupazionale2, lo strumento della concessione cinquantennale genera anche un introito per le casse del Comune consistente nella riscossione dei tributi e delle tasse locali (tassa di soggiorno, addizionale comunale, etc.). Infine, si genera un indotto locale in termini di un aumento dell'affluenza turistica (numero presenze camere) ed un incremento del volume degli scambi commerciali con le imprese locali (fornitori di beni e servizi) quantificabile in €1.285.024,89. Dalla analisi emerge come lo strumento giuridico amministrativo della concessione demaniale cinquantennale sia funzionale allo sviluppo locale, alla valorizzazione del patrimonio e alla sua tutela, nonostante i vincoli finanziari imposti sul bilancio pubblico in sede europea. 1 Ottenuti calcolando una rata annuale di €75.000 indicizzata al 2% annuo per 5 anni e una rata annuale di €150.000,00, indicizzata al 2% annuo per una ulteriore durata di 45 anni. 2 Attualmente Villa Tolomei conta alle sue dipendenze circa 50 lavoratori suddivisi fra rapporti di lavoro diretti ed indiretti. ; The thesis focused on an innovative administrative tool for the public investments' management: the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant, intended to enhance the public capital without employing the financial resources, bound by the European budget criteria and mainly devoted to finance current expenditure. The thesis describes the first state-owned fiftyyears enhancement grant issued in Italy: Villa Tolomei in Florence. Villa Tolomei is a XIV century villa on the hills of Florence, which has been transformed into a Luxury hotel and fivestar resort that offers all amenities, is 5 minutes away from the city center and 2.7 km from Ponte Vecchio. Villa Tolomei is a Villa belonged to the prestigious Tolomei family. The Villa has, since its origin, several buildings for about 3,500 square meters, located within 17 acres of park that still has traces of the old farm structure. The thesis describes the accounting policies for the preparation of the Italian State Budget and reviews the constraints imposed by the Maastricht Treaty, the Fiscal Compact and the Two Pack, the difficulties to match these commitments, to enhance their artistic and cultural heritage and to proceed with the investments without which the austerity policy of the budget is ineffective. The Italian State Budget is devoting its resources mainly, if not entirely, to fund operating expenses and the debt repayment, neglecting capital expenditures and, in particular, the real estate. It is therefore essential a close cooperation with the private sector, through the so-called public-private partnerships (PPP), in which joint projects are realized with mutual benefits and pursuing social objectives at the same time. Among them, the state-owned fiftyyears enhancement grant plays a special role because it allows the state to promote the heritage and to create jobs and growth, without direct financial outlays. An early form of State grant was available in Imperial Rome where all territories belonging to the community, called "Ager Publicus", were awarded to most valuable citizens. With the unification of the Kingdom of Italy and the drafting of the Civil Code of 1865, it was defined the concept of public goods (both movable and real estate) divided into state-owned (inalienable and imprescriptible) and capital (useful in carrying out the State activities at home and abroad). In economic literature, the analysis of any financial constraint on production and investment (Sau, 1999) has been considered since 1950 (Meyer - Kuh, 1957; Gurley - Shaw, 1955). There are two possible criticisms of these contributions: the theoretical motivations of these constraints were deficient and lent themselves to ambiguity in the empirical evidence. These facts contributed to the success of the Modigliani Miller theorem (1958). In fact, for more than thirty years the theoretical and empirical models of investment's decisions of a private enterprise has been based largely on the Modigliani-Miller theorem. The two economists faced the question of which is the cost of capital for the company whose funding sources are used to purchase assets, whose return is highly uncertain. They formulated three propositions, which stated that, based on certain assumptions, the market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, the performance of the shares is a linear increasing function of financial leverage and the type of financial instrument used is irrelevant to the assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the investment. The Modigliani Miller theorem has been applied to the State, as an economic actor who invests as a firm, to see if its financial structure is actually irrelevant to the investment policy. Starting from the premise that, at present, the tax revenue is mainly intended to cover the costs and only marginally the capital expenditures, it has been looked for solutions the State could found to invest, within the European constraints. Increasing tax revenues could do the financing of new investments, but this solution is not feasible because of the high tax burden; at the same time a debt is not possible because of the European constraints. Moreover, the cut in public spending, however desirable, produces effects only in the long term. An alternative tool, which makes irrelevant the financial structure compared to the investment policy, is the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant. By considering how to cover the needs and by inputting, as a variable, the granting of stateowned fifty-enhancement, it has been obtained a budget constraint in which the Modigliani- Miller theorem can hold. This tool not only removes financial resources for the maintenance and / or development of real property of the State, but generates an expected return through the collection of the concession fee. Thanks to the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant it is possible to implement the country's infrastructure, severely limiting the use of public financial resources. It uses private expertise in all phases of construction, management and service delivery with a greater involvement of stakeholders and lenders with an optimum risk transfer to the private sector. In addition, the State raises revenues from the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant that in the case of Villa Tolomei, amounts to € 150,000 per year for a period of 50 years, for a total of € 16,869,546.001. Moreover, the State collects the new income taxes generated by the tourist reception of Villa Tolomei. For the private entrepreneur, the benefits of state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant consist primarily in low investment costs (do not buy the property). In the case study, the entrepreneur claimed only the costs of the renewal of the property, which were € 6million, funded by banks and financial institutions without mortgage collateral. The hotel inaugurated on May 24th, 2013 and the first significant economic results were evaluated on 31/12/2014. The 2014 budget shows revenues of € 2,105,711.20, costs of € 1,981,648.99 and a cash flow of € 124,062.21. This level of profitability ensures the economic sustainability of the business, a fair return on capital, and is in line with the business plan presented in the notice of the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant. It confirms that the entrepreneur has been able to pay the concession fee and also to generate a positive EBITDA after the first year of operation. For the Region of Tuscany, the benefit is the enhancement of the area, which was in a state of deterioration and the collection of IRAP and additional regional tax. For the City of Florence, the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant generates an increase in employment2, and revenue for the coffers of the City consisting of local taxes (tourist tax, municipal surcharge, etc.). Finally, it generates an increase in the tourist figures and an increase in the volume of trade with local companies (suppliers of goods and services), estimated worth € 1,285,024.89. The analysis shows that the state-owned fifty-years enhancement grant is a juridical tool functional to local development, to enhance the cultural heritage and for its protection, despite the financial constraints on public finances imposed by the European Union. 1 Obtained by calculating an annual concession fee of € 75,000.00 indexed at 2% per annum for five years and an annual concession fee of € 150,000.00, indexed at 2% per annum for a further term of 45 years. 2 Currently Villa Tolomei has about 50 employees divided between direct and indirect labor relations.
Dans le monde actuel complexe, exigeant en connaissances et caractérisé par des cycles de vie de produits raccourcis, les PME reconnaissent l'importance de l'innovation pour être productives. Paradoxalement, cette volonté est limitée par leur manque de ressources ainsi que leur plus grande sensibilité au risque. Dans ce contexte, la collaboration en innovation ou plus généralement l'innovation ouverte (IO), permet aux PME de trouver les ressources d'innovation manquantes. À l'international en particulier, l'IO s'avère être une avenue porteuse pour permettre aux PME d'adapter leurs produits et services au contexte étranger, de réduire leur risque à l'international et, de ce fait, d'accroître leur compétitivité internationale. Cette thèse a ainsi comme principal objectif de faire avancer les connaissances autour de l'IO au sein des PME internationales. Plus précisément, elle analyse la littérature générale autour de l'IO au sein des PME, dresse un portrait des caractéristiques de l'IO avec des acteurs internationaux, en les comparant à celles de l'IO avec des acteurs nationaux, et identifie les limites de l'IO à l'international. Ainsi, elle favorise un transfert de connaissances auprès des gestionnaires, des intervenants et des décideurs politiques sur les caractéristiques, les limites et les conditions du recours à l'IO au sein des PME, non seulement au niveau de leur marché domestique, mais également à l'international. Dans cette logique, cette thèse se décline en trois principaux articles. Le premier article vise à définir la thématique centrale de cette recherche, à savoir l'IO au sein de la PME. Pour ce faire, une revue systématique de la littérature a été réalisée et a permis d'identifier les caractéristiques ainsi que les déterminants de l'IO au sein de la PME. Les caractéristiques sont tous les éléments qui permettent de définir le phénomène d'IO et d'identifier sa composition. L'étude des caractéristiques de l'IO a donc fait ressortir les principales pratiques adoptées par les PME pour la mise en œuvre de l'IO, les acteurs impliqués dans la mise en œuvre de l'IO et les outils mobilisés pour l'implémentation de l'IO au sein des PME. Les déterminants quant à eux, sont les facteurs qui ont une influence positive ou négative sur l'IO. Il s'agit d'éléments facilitateurs et inhibiteurs du recours à l'IO au sein de la PME. Ces déterminants ont été regroupés en cinq principales catégories : individuelles, organisationnelles, relationnelles, industrielles et contextuelles. Également, la revue systématique de la littérature introduit un cadre conceptuel intégrateur établissant des relations entre les caractéristiques et les déterminants de l'IO au sein de la PME, tout en identifiant les lacunes actuelles dans la littérature et en présentant des perspectives pour la recherche future. Ensuite, une étude empirique a permis d'affiner la compréhension du phénomène à l'étude. Cette étude a été réalisée auprès de gestionnaires de 40 PME internationales du Québec, des secteurs de la fabrication et des services et qui collaborent avec des partenaires externes dans différents projets de recherche et développement (R-D) ou de commercialisation. Ainsi, tout en s'inspirant des caractéristiques de l'IO établies dans le premier article (les pratiques, les acteurs et les outils), le deuxième article rend compte de la réalité de la pratique de l'IO par les PME à l'international. Plus précisément, il s'interroge sur la spécificité de l'IO par les PME avec des partenaires d'innovation internationaux (au sein des marchés étrangers) et la distinction réelle avec l'IO avec des partenaires d'innovation nationaux (au sein du marché domestique). Les analyses menées ont permis de conclure que, bien qu'il existe des similitudes entre l'IO au niveau national et international, il existe également plusieurs spécificités associées à chacun de ces niveaux tant en ce qui concerne les motivations, les pratiques, les acteurs et les outils de l'IO. À noter que les motivations de l'IO sont apparues comme une caractéristique supplémentaire de l'IO, induite par le terrain. Les résultats montrent que l'IO est utilisée différemment par les PME dans leurs opérations internationales ou domestiques et que la pratique de l'IO à ces deux échelles apparait comme complémentaire et non substituable. En effet, l'IO avec des partenaires nationaux permet aux PME d'accéder à des connaissances spécifiques des universités ou des centres de recherche et de financer des projets d'innovation par le biais de programmes gouvernementaux. À l'international, l'IO est un moyen pour les PME de mieux intégrer les marchés internationaux grâce à des collaborations avec des partenaires étrangers qui les aident à adapter leurs produits/services au contexte étranger, afin d'obtenir un avantage concurrentiel et accroître la légitimité sociale à l'international. Enfin, le troisième article s'inspire des déterminants identifiés lors de la revue systématique de la littérature du premier l'article et approfondit les limites à l'adoption de l'IO au sein des PME internationales. Il apparait ainsi que plusieurs limites à l'adoption de l'IO à l'international peuvent s'expliquer en fonction des quatre dimensions de la distance internationale, notamment les distances culturelle, institutionnelle, économique et géographique. Par ailleurs, l'identification de ces limites a permis de répertorier les moyens de les outrepasser, et donc, les facteurs de succès associés à l'IO au sein des PME internationales. Dans ce cadre, l'expérience internationale des dirigeants, une culture organisationnelle ouverte et innovante, le recours aux intermédiaires étrangers, les motivations sociales, l'adoption de modes d'entrée à l'international tels que la filiale ou la coentreprise, ainsi que l'utilisation des TIC atténuent les effets négatifs des limites identifiées et constituent quelques-uns des facteurs clés de succès associés à l'IO à l'international. ; In today's complex, knowledge-intensive world characterized by shortened product lifecycles, SMEs recognize the importance of innovation to be productive. Paradoxically, this desire is limited by their lack of resources and their greater sensitivity to risk. In this context, collaboration in innovation or, more generally, open innovation (OI) allows SMEs to find the missing innovation resources. Internationally, in particular, OI is proving to be a promising avenue for enabling SMEs to adapt their products and services to the foreign context, to reduce their international risk and, as a result, to increase their international competitiveness. The main objective of this thesis is thus to advance knowledge around OI within international SMEs. More precisely, this document analyzes the general literature around OI within SMEs, draws a portrait of the OI characteristics with international partners, comparing to national partners, and identifies the limits to international OI. Thus, it promotes a transfer of knowledge to managers, and political decision-makers on characteristics, limits and conditions of OI in SMEs, not only on their domestic market but also on their international market. In this logic, this thesis is divided into three main papers. The first paper aims to define the central theme of this research, namely OI in SMEs. A systematic literature review was carried out and made it possible to identify the characteristics and determinants of OI within SMEs. Characteristics are all the elements that define OI and identify its composition. Therefore, the study of OI characteristics highlighted the main practices adopted by SMEs for the OI implementation, the actors involved, and the tools mobilized. On the other hand, the determinants are the factors that positively or negatively influence OI. These are the facilitators and inhibitors of OI within the SME. These determinants have been grouped into four main categories: individual, organizational, relational and contextual. Also, the systematic review of the literature introduces an integrative conceptual framework making relationships between the characteristics and determinants of OI within SMEs while identifying current gaps in the literature and presenting perspectives for future research. Then, an empirical study made it possible to refine the understanding of the phenomenon. This study was carried out with managers of 40 international SMEs in Quebec, in manufacturing and service sectors, and collaborating with external partners in various research and development (R&D) or marketing projects. Thus, while drawing inspiration from the characteristics of OI established in the first paper (practices, actors and tools), the second paper reports on the reality of OI practice by SMEs in the international. More precisely, he questions the specificity of OI by SMEs with international innovation partners (within foreign markets) and the real distinction with OI with national innovation partners (within the domestic market). The analyzes have made it possible to conclude that although there are similarities between OI at the national and international level, there are also several specificities associated with each level regarding the OI motivations, OI practices, OI actors, and OI tools. Note that the OI motivations appeared as an additional characteristic induced by the field. The results show that OI is used differently by SMEs in their international or domestic operations and OI practices at these two scales appears to be complementary and not substitutable. Indeed, OI with national partners allows SMEs to access specific knowledge from universities or research centers and finance innovation projects through government programs. Internationally, OI enables SMEs to better integrate international markets through collaborations with foreign partners who help them adapt their products/services to the foreign context to obtain a competitive advantage and increase international social legitimacy. Finally, the third paper draws on the determinants identified during the systematic review of the literature in the first paper and delves into the limits to the adoption of OI within international SMEs. It thus appears that several limits to the adoption of the OI internationally can be explained according to the four dimensions of international distance, in particular cultural, institutional, economic and geographical distances. In addition, identifying these limits made it possible to identify the means of exceeding them, and therefore, the success factors associated with OI within international SMEs. In this context, the international experience of managers, an open and innovative organizational culture, the use of foreign intermediaries, social motivations, the adoption of international entry methods such as subsidiaries or joint ventures, and the use of ICT mitigate the harmful effects of the limitations identified and constitute some of the critical success factors associated with international OI.
The approval of Directive 2000/60/EC, better known as the Water Framework Directive (WFD), resulted from efforts to create a coherent approach to water policy at the European scale. It requires surface waters (rivers, lakes, wetlands and transitional and coastal waters) to attain good ecological and chemical status and establishes quantitative and chemical standards for groundwater. The WFD required a significant shift in priorities, goals and operational procedures by placing the emphasis on ecosystem protection and ecological health as a means to guarantee the availability of sufficient good quality water to meet sustainable needs. By establishing the river basin as the pre-eminent geographical scale for water management, it also explicitly recognized that any policy aiming at protecting European waters necessarily had to deal with the policies that guided activities in the surrounding watershed. The discussion and approval of the WFD coincided with a growing debate about, and advocacy for, a paradigm shift in water management. The shift was the expression, in the field of water resources management, of a transformation in the way we understand the relationship between society and nature, reflecting changes in other realms of our socioeconomic environment. The new approach results from the need to acknowledge the hybrid nature of water, emphasizing the complexity of the ecological, socioeconomic, technological, cultural and institutional processes that are intertwined in discourses and understandings of water. Claims about the legitimacy of intervention no longer reside exclusively in the realms of authority and privileged knowledge. Rather, legitimacy now depends on shared definitions of both problem and potential solutions. The evolving water management paradigm thus results from the fact that we are dealing with complex and reflexive socioecological systems and there are diverse incommensurable and equally valid interpretations of our physical environments. In the context of uncertainty, complexity, differing world views and high stakes that characterize water management challenges, new governance approaches have been offered as panaceas to effectively handle them. Most significant among them is the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), which promotes the principles of integration, participatory management approaches, and the use of economic instruments to achieve water policy goals. The WFD is perhaps the most comprehensive and far reaching attempt to align water management policy and practice along these principles. An evaluation of its implementation can therefore throw some light on the potential for these management prescriptions to successfully deal with the challenges that are inherent to problems of complex socio-ecological systems This dissertation contributes to a significant body of scholarly work that has studied the European experience with the WFD by critically analyzing the experience of its implementation from three complementary theoretical perspectives that refer three of the four pillars of the WFD: the scalar choices that derive from the application of the IWRM approach to water resources management that the WFD embodies; the use of economic instruments to achieve water policy goals; and the emphasis on public information, consultation and participation to legitimize water planning and management decisions and improve the effectiveness of the Directive. Through the analysis of the geographically specific case of Spain, it questions the underlying assumptions that justify this approach to European water governance and tries to discern whether the policy goals have been met. The analysis is presented through three articles that have been published in peer reviewed academic journals and a fourth publication, of a more normative nature, that reviews the evolution of water policy in Spain with a particular focus on the post-WFD implementation period. The first article (Chapter 4) summarizes the state of the art of the current debate on scalar politics and water governance. In this context, the paper reviews the territorial and organizational evolution of river basin authorities in Spain, since their origins in 1926 as Confederaciones Sindicales Hidrográficas, to their situation in 2015, in light of the current critical approach to the river basin as the unquestionable scale for water governance. It analyzes the complex process of adjustment of the river basin management approach to the politicaladministrative division of the state into increasingly powerful Autonomous regions that emerged with the advent of democracy in the 1970s, and the ensuing reconfiguration of areas of influence, division of authority, and emergence of power conflicts that are still unresolved. The paper argues that when discussing 'spatial fit' issues dealing with natural resources management, special attention should be given to ensuing changes in social relationships and power structures that each option entails, within their specific historical and geographical context. The second article (Chapter 5) discusses the way economic instruments are being promoted as a desirable alternative to public sector action in the allocation and management of natural resources. The case of water is at the vanguard of these processes and is proving to be particularly contentious. In the European Union water policies are increasingly emphasizing the application of economic instruments to improve the allocative equity and economic efficiency in the use of scarce resources. However, there are few analyses of how these instruments are really working on the ground and whether they are meeting their objectives. The paper aims to contribute to this debate by critically analyzing the experience with water markets in Spain, the only country in the European Union where they are operative. It looks at water permit sales during the 2005-2008drought period using the Tajo-Segura transfer infrastructure. The paper describes how the institutional process of mercantilización of water works in practice in Spain. It shows that the use of markets requires an intense process of institutional development to facilitate and encourage their operation. Additionally it argues that these institutions tend to favor the interests of clearly identifiable elites, instead of the public interest they supposedly promote. The third article (Chapter 6) looks at the shift from hierarchical-administrative water management toward more transparent, multi-level and participated governance approaches that has brought about a shifting geography of players, scales of action, and means of influencing decisions and outcomes. In Spain, where the hydraulic paradigm has dominated since the early 1920s, participation in decisions over water was traditionally limited to a closed water policy community, made up of economic water users, primarily irrigator associations and hydropower generators, civil engineering corps and large public works companies. The river basin planning process under the WFD presented a promise of transformation, giving access to non-economic water users, environmental concerns and the wider public to water-related information on planning and decision-making. This process coincided with the consolidation of the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) by the water administration, with the associated potential for information and data generation and dissemination. ICTs are also increasingly used by citizen groups and other interested parties as a way to communicate, network and challenge existing paradigms and official discourses over water, in the broader context of the emergence of 'technopolitics'. The paper investigates if and in what way ICTs may be providing new avenues for participated water resources management and contributing to alter the dominating power balance. We critically analyze several examples where networking possibilities provided by ICTs have enabled the articulation of interest groups and social agents (what we call citizen water networks - CWN) that have, with different degrees of success, questioned the existing hegemonic view over water. The critical review of these cases sheds light on the opportunities and limitations of ICTs, and their relation with traditional modes of social mobilization in creating new means of societal involvement in water governance. It also shows that the low democratic profile of current water management institutions in Spain clearly hinders ICTs' potential to democratize decision-making processes. Without a real willingness to open up true spaces of deliberation where all actors can participate in conditions of equality, the role of ICTs will remain one of strengthening CWNs' organizational capabilities and ability to obtain and generate information, but will not alter the basic framework for water policy-making. The final article (Chapter 7) complements the more theoretical focus of the previous chapters and from a normative perspective analyzes the evolution of Spanish water policy since the approval of the 1985 Water act. It focuses on the post-WFD implementation period (from 2003 onwards) and on the role economic water users, environmental interests and engaged citizens have played in the achievement of some key WFD-related water policy goals: environmental objectives; public and user participation in water planning and management; and use of economic instruments to achieve water policy goals. Relying on a review of different examples and experiences, the paper concludes that the necessary transformation in water policy goals, operations and procedures required by the implementation of the WFD has not taken place. The traditional water policy community has resisted this transformation and largely continues to dominate water policy decision-making. At the same time, in the context of the WFD a variety of citizen water networks that defend the patrimonial values of water have developed and consolidated and can play a significant role in the consecution of this transformation. In any case, the reforms along the three key WFD-axis analyzed have been more formal than substantial, and the key decisions over water continue to respond to the interests and priorities of the traditional water policy community.
