South-American Integration Processes under the EU Framework

Abstract

Introduction: After the Second World War, the political and economical block that today we call European Union started when six countries sought to ensure the peace among them. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands put their heavy industries under a common management, with the Coal and Steel Treaty, so no one could build weapons or develop its war industry without the others knowing it. This experience led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and 50 years later the ideas of people, goods and service freedoms continue spreading around, and the European Union has become one of the best examples of economical, political and cultural integration, and a reference around the world to encourage other regions to group. Therefore, among others, the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA) appeared in 1960, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 1967; the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), in 1991; and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993. In the case of South America , in spite of their good intentions, the huge asymmetries between LAFTA members caused the apparition of sub-regional blocs: the Andeans Community (CAN) founded in 1969, and now grouping Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru; and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) founded in 1991, between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Nowadays, after more than 40 years of integration processes, there are still strong problems inside both sub-regional blocs. CAN Member States have several diplomatic discussions regarding their political models; and Peru, Ecuador and Colombia have or are negotiating independent Free Trade Agreements with external blocs, including USA and the EU. In the other side, MERCOSUR's main players -Argentina and Brazil- have commercial disputes at the World Trade Organization, surrounding their own sub-regional bodies . Nevertheless, these two sub-regional associations were the basis for the South American Community of Nations (CSN on Spanish) in 2004, and from that point, the present attempt to unify South-America: the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR, 2008), with the participation of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay and Venezuela. The integration levels in political and economical affairs in this latter group are expected to change the way international relations will be conduit in the future of South-America. This new regional bloc has an extension of 17 658 Km² and 383 million inhabitants (2007) . With a general GDP of $2348 953 (2007) and a GDP per capita of $6126 (2007), it is one of the regions with more perspectives of development, but it is also one of the regions with the highest degrees of economic asymmetry. While in 2007 Chile, Venezuela and Brazil had a GDP per capita (2007) of $9865, $8601 and $6819, there were other countries like Paraguay and Bolivia, with a GDP per capita (2007) of $1669 and $1342. These asymmetries have leaded to strong disagreements between South American countries during previous integration process. An example that just pooling economies is not the whole solution for development is the case of Paraguay, in the middle of MERCOSUR and with barely a quarter of the MERCOSUR's GDP $6642 (2007). 'Integration' will not always mean international governmental organizations where Member States have decided to transfer competitions and empowerment of supranational institutions; in this Master Thesis, the South American integration processes will be defined as '(...)the creation and maintenance of intense and diverse patrons of interaction between previously autonomous units.' Furthermore, 'Integration' in the context of the South American reality included two concepts: 'Regionalism' and 'Regionalization'. The first is related to the wave of thinking, the interaction projects and the political initiatives (the processes) and the second, to the institutions or the agreements that represent the integration (the result). This Master Thesis tries to be oriented to describe the processes more than the institutions or the agreements; nevertheless, it is not possible to present the first without the second and vice versa. What kind of integration can be expected in South America? What kind of goals, challenges and success can South-American Nations find in their way to a social, political and economical integration? Whereas the EU is -since its very beginning- a supranational initiative, South American regional and sub-regional blocs are characterised for being mostly, the result of intergovernmental agreements. Will this difference be determinant in the integration processes? In this thesis of Master in European Studies, the South American integration -processes and institutions- will be review under the framework of six dimensions that give the EU its character of integrated regional bloc and are advocated to deep the South America Integration. Three of them related to structural bodies: executive, judicial and legislative; and the other three related to the policies that defines a Union: Monetary Policy, Foreign and Security Policy; and, Social and Development Policy. In order to do not miss the main emphasis, the description and analysis of the executive supranational body will be deeper than the corresponding to judicial and legislative bodies and the three common policies. In addition, two cases of the South American Integration will be modeled, to present the best possible scenarios to foster the integration. By the comparison of the structures and policies, and by the scenario modeling; this Master Thesis attempts to demonstrate that the lack of supranational authority and law enforcement power will play a determinant role in the success or failure in the South American integration process. The analysis in this thesis can be divided in two sections, the descriptive part and the analysis of Case Study. The information for the descriptive part is mostly from published books, research papers, journals and case studies, the information for the Case Study comes mostly from News and Newspaper articles. The technique used in the analysis of the Case Studies is the Theory Game: a shared-decision model with two players that have different priorities for the same decision. The methodology for that is described more widely in section 4.1 Fundamentals of Game Theory. This Master Thesis presents the South American integration as a whole, and the UNASUR as the present meeting point of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. Therefore, wherever South American Integration is mentioned, it is not limited to UNASUR, CAN or MERCOSUR analysis, because they coexist and overlap each other at the same time. Instead, time framework and integration approaches are considerations that need to be undeniably included. To write about the integration processes in South America is to review almost 40 years of history and political agreements and disagreements of twelve countries and the influence that they received from external factors, like Central-, North America and Europe. Nowadays, the remaining sub-regional blocs face the opportunity to pool agreements in a new attempt, together with the risk of breaking-off of the Treaties, by the influence of external agreements of Member States with third parties around the world. For reasons of space, and to focus in the present regional integration process, those external agreements, like the NAFTA or the negotiations between the CAN and the EU, and their influence in the South American regional integration process are not going to be covered in this Master Thesis. That does not mean that their influence is negligible, rather than that, in some cases, like the Free Trade Agreements between the USA and Colombia, or Peru, it means the risk of the end of the CAN as a sub-regional economic bloc. In addition, a commercial developments analysis of the South American integration process requires a separate review of each commercial category and each bilateral agreement and therefore, a deeper description of those topics is not included. Other issues that are not going to be covered in this Master Thesis are those integration processes or commercial agreements that are not part or do not lead to the South American Union of Nations, like the 'Bolivarian Alternative for Our Americas' (on Spanish ALBA) or the 'Commercial Agreement of the Peoples' (on Spanish TCP). Their own dynamic and priorities are quite interesting; nevertheless going deeper in these issues could mean to reduce attention in the main topics of this Master Thesis. This Master Thesis uses study cases to describe two facets of the South American Integration process under the Two-Person Model of the Game Theory. The model used in this Master Thesis is characterised for the intersection of two players with mutual influence and different priorities. Game Theory is a useful analysis tool with many applications in mathematics, economics and political fields; nevertheless, as a model, it is a simplification of the reality and therefore, some details like the simplicity of its initial assumptions, the deep of the analysis, outsider players and feedback, are limited, further details of these limitations are presented in section 4.2. The analysis of a play of a Game, under the Game Theory can also be made by a mathematical approach. That mathematical approach is not going to be considered in this Master Thesis in order to keep the focus in the integration process.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Content: Dedicatory and Acknowledgementsii Abstractiii List of Contentsiv List of Tablesv List of Figuresvi List of Acronymsvii I.INTRODUCTION1 1.1Introduction2 1.2Methodology4 1.3Remarks4 II.SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT6 2.1Political Framework Development towards the South-American Union of Nations7 III.SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION UNDER THE EU FRAMEWORK26 3.1'New Regionalism' and the functional approach of South American integration.27 3.2South American- and EU- Integration Structures and Policies34 3.2.1A Supranational Executive Body37 3.2.2Supranational judicial functions41 3.2.3Supranational legislative functions43 3.2.4Common Currency and Supranational Monetary Institution46 3.2.5A Common Foreign and Security Policy47 3.2.6A Common Social and Development Policy48 IV.GAME THEORY AND SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION CASE STUDIES50 4.1Game Theory51 4.1.1Fundamentals of Game Theory51 4.1.2Limitations of Game Theory54 4.2Case Studies55 4.2.1Case Study 1: Political Integration, the creation of the South American Energy Council (2007)55 4.2.2Case 2: Economical Integration, the Ecuadorian safeguards settlement (2009)62 V.CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL COMMENTS67 REFERENCES71 APPENDIXES Appendix A: South American figures78 Appendix B: Game Theory Glossary82 Appendix C: Combined priorities84 DISCLAIM89Textprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.2.1, A Supranational Executive Body: Regarding the legal order, Supranationalism means that sovereign states agree to abide by norms which are adopted at a higher level of organization. In the case of the European Union, Supranationalism is not referred to the transfer of sovereignty; it is only the transfer of the power to exercise that sovereignty. Together with that, the supremacy of the Community law and the principle of direct effect present that the legal system of the Community has a federal nature. Thence, a Supranational Institution has competences to exercise powers that belong to sovereign States. In addition, the exercise of this power should be in line with the principles of proportionality, i.e. No action shall go beyond that it is necessary; and subsidiarity, i.e. In competences that Supranational Institution shares with Member States, it does intervene only if the objective of the action cannot be achieved by the Member State. The interaction between national governments and EU Institutions, together with the freedom to act according to those competences, is the basis for the adoption of the EU rules. Beyond the legal order, Supranationalism may be employed in decision-making, monitoring and enforcement. Supranationalism can also be divided in decisional (pooling sovereignty) and normative (delegation of power). Decisional Supranationalism is referred to those decisions taken by voting procedures other than unanimity, and when governments decided to act either jointly or not at all. Normative Supranationalism refers to the delegation of power to autonomous institutions that are created by the Member States. Therefore, a Supranational Executive Body will be an Institution with the right to adopt normative decisions directly based on the Treaties, with the autonomy to execute those decisions, and without the need of approval by the Member States. Supranational actors contribute to the integration by different means and reasons. Moravscik presented that pooling or delegation in the EU, are means to assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation or enforcement in issue-areas, where joint gains are high and distributional conflicts are moderate, and where there is uncertainty about future decisions. Other contribution of supranational bodies to integration process is that they might reduce the transaction costs by institutionalizing the integrative dynamic and negotiating procedure; and, it may assist national governments in issues area in which there are reasonably clear added benefits working according to the rules, but with predictable temptations to chat in response to short-term pressures. In addition, supranational institutions bring mutual confidence; smaller countries, which want their interests taken in account, especially in multinational scenarios where there is not veto power, can relay in the impartiality of supranational actors, instead of intergovernmental decision-making procedures, where the most powerful Member States shape the process. Probably the best example of the contribution of a Supranational Executive Body to Regional Integration is in Competition Policy: The Commission received decision powers in the sphere of state aid, based on the EEC Treaty provisions, due to the necessity of an impartial and independent body to apply agreed rules to face national pressures. One of the earliest Community Regulations fixed the modalities by which the Commission would exercise that power directly to ensure that undertakings respected antitrust rules. A supranational executive body can also shape the process and foster the integration. An example is the development of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Monetary union was neither the uncontested solution to economic problems, nor an easily obtainable response to German reunification. Nevertheless, Commission officials successfully disseminated the notion that EMU altogether provided a coherent solution to the problems created by financial globalization and the end of the Cold War; furthermore, they were leading actors in the sudden proliferation of governmental initiatives in France, Italy and German in favour of the EMU. By doing that, they fostered solid political momentum behind an originally lukewarm and unfocused demand for monetary integration. There are several reasons and examples of the benefits of a Supranational Executive Body; nevertheless, South American Nations still working with Intergovernmental Structures. During the negotiations for the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty, its former General Secretary, Rodrigo Borja, presented a proposal for the authority and competences of UNASUR. In that document, member states, '(...) in exchange of the economical, political and geopolitical advantages that a common order can offer; agreed in the limitation of some of their sovereign faculties and will form the Union with common decision and executive multinational bodies'. The proposal was not accepted and finally, was part of the reasons of Borja's resignation. While in the case of the EU, the presence of a Supranational Executive Body is one of the strongest driving forces of the integration process, in the South American context, there is not yet a political will to pool sovereignty. Solón, pro-tempore General Secretary of UNASUR from 2006 to 2008, affirms 'Nobody doubts that in the future it will be necessary to move to supranational authorities (...) but today they want an agreement where everybody shall count with the other to have a meeting point'. Behind that attitude, the reasons that can be drawn are the political will of member states, driven by governments or national monopolies, which do not want to lose control over the process and the stagnation of the over-institutionalism in the past (Central America Common Market and the CAN). The stagnation of over-institutionalism drives member states to appeal to external bodies in the dispute settlement, continuing the weakening of the idea of a supranational body; the political will of member states, or its absence, could be explained for the existence of strong national political elites, allowed for the late trade liberalizations of national monopolies. Rajagopal refers to studies of how MERCOSUR member states have been primarily driven by domestic political considerations when they have furthered the integration process. This it could lead to conclude that they are not likely to develop the kind of supranational governance institutions present in the European Union; as policy elites in MERCOSUR, member states desire to maintain a great deal of domestic policy autonomy. In addition of its intergovernmental character, the faculties of the UNASUR Secretariat as Executive body are restricted by its small budget of 3 million US$/year, much more limited than the 5,4 million US$/year of the CAN General Secretariat ; and by the denial of the proposal of pooling the executive bodies of CAN and MERCOSUR. Another issue to consider is that the feasibility for South American countries to pool sovereignty or to delegate power varies from one Member State to another, according to their own constitutive and legal framework. In some cases, Constitutional texts are quite clear in stimulating regional integration and stressing the prevalence of regional law, like the Venezuelan Constitution that allows to 'confer on supranational organisations (...) the exercise of the powers necessary to carry out these integration processes (...)'(Art. 153, Venezuelan Constitution 1999). The Colombian external relations 'are based on national sovereignty (...) and on recognition of the principles of international law accepted by Colombia' and 'The State shall promote economic, social and political integration with other nations(…)', (Art. 19 and Art. 227, Colombian Constitution 1991). There are, however, other Member States whit Constitutions that needs amendment to pool sovereignty; like the Bolivian Constitutions which states 'The public authorities may not delegate the powers conferred on them by this Constitution, or confer on the executive branch powers other than those expressly conferred on them by it' (Art. 30, Bolivian Constitution). Therefore, the creation of a supranational executive body could not be totally accepted until the totality of the national Constitutions were in line with it. In addition to the considerations presented above, Chapter IV presents two Case Study based on the Game Theory to demonstrate the strong influence of an executive body with supranational competences in the integration process. Nevertheless, it is likely to expect that present integration structures will remain tied to intergovernmental political intentions, and the integration process will loose the benefits of a Supranational Executive Body.