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A worldwide financial crisis of enormous magnitude continues to unfold rapidly. Unlike other crises in recent decades, the current episode is rooted in industrial countries' financial systems and is affecting low-income and middle-income countries (MICs) alike. Defaults on securitized sub-prime mortgages as a real estate market bubble burst led to failures or near-failures of several large financial institutions and a collapse of inter-bank and commercial paper markets. A tightening of credit, combined with declining consumer confidence, has brought on worldwide recession with growing unemployment, and many fear that the downturn will be severe and protracted. At the same time, the rapidly multiplying signs of contraction are prompting strong responses, including fiscal stimulus packages and reductions in benchmark lending rates, on the part of several of the affected developed countries. The Bank Group is well placed to help mitigate the impact of the current crisis with financing and advisory services, and its clients are already requesting increased support. A rapid, high-quality response that combines financial and advisory support can do much to ease the inevitable ramifications of the crisis. Lessons from evaluations of previous Bank Group responses to past crises can help inform the response to the current crisis in order to increase its effectiveness.

U.S. officials view the war in Ukraine as a way of achieving geopolitical objectives in the Black Sea, an energy-rich region that connects Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.At two recent Senate hearings, State Department officials portrayed the war as a means of transforming the geopolitics of energy in the Black Sea. As long as Ukrainians keep fighting, they said, there remains a potential to transform the Black Sea into a new market for the European Union. The officials envisioned a new energy corridor that provides Europe with oil and natural gas from Central Asia."The United States has long recognized the geostrategic importance of the Black Sea region," State Department official James O'Brien told the Senate in a written statement. "Not only does the Black Sea border three NATO Allies and several NATO partners, but it is also a vital corridor for the movement of goods—including Ukrainian grain and other products bound for world markets—and hosts significant untapped energy resources."Weakening RussiaSince the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, officials in Washington have seen the war as an opportunity to weaken Russia. While they have mobilized military and economic support for Ukraine's defense, they have worked to impose major costs on Russia's military and economy. As U.S.-backed Ukrainian forces have imposed major losses on Russian forces, the United States and its allies have worked to isolate Russia economically and limit its revenues from the sale of oil and natural gas.So far, the United States has provided Ukraine with $43.9 billion in military assistance, and a U.S.-led coalition of some 50 nations has committed an additional $33 billion in military support.The support of the United States and its allies has proven critical to Ukraine's resistance to Russia, which "starts with the incredible courage of the Ukrainian people, the Ukrainian fighters," Secretary of State Antony Blinken acknowledged last year. "But what we've been able to provide them—the United States, Germany, and many other partners and allies—is what is making the difference."While U.S. officials have been open about their intentions of using Ukraine to weaken Russia, they have been careful about claiming that they are making hardheaded geopolitical calculations. Typically, U.S. officials have remained sensitive to the Ukrainian position that the war is a matter of resisting Russia's military occupation, especially given that so many Ukrainians have died fighting in the war."We brought together a coalition of more than 50 countries to help Ukraine defend itself, and it's critical," President Biden said in September, as he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.When O'Brien spoke to a Senate committee on October 25, he provided a blunter explanation of U.S. goals. Not only did he portray the war as "a very good bargain" for the United States, citing the fact that "Ukrainians are paying the bulk of the cost" by doing nearly all the fighting, but he also described it as an opportunity for the United States to achieve major geopolitical objectives, ones he indicated were "incredibly exciting."One key objective, O'Brien explained, is to strengthen NATO's presence in the Black Sea. Given that NATO is present in the Black Sea through member states and partner countries, O'Brien saw an opportunity to use the war to increase NATO's military presence across the region's lands, airspace, and waters. In terms of the weapons involved, he said, "that will be something that NATO will dig in on."Pulling the Black Sea WestwardAnother key objective, O'Brien noted, is to pull Ukraine and other Black Sea countries away from Russia while integrating them into the European Union, where they will be required to follow its rules of trade and production. The entire region, he envisioned, "becomes a place where we're in very good position to control what happens as the rules get made," he said.In another major admission, O'Brien acknowledged that Washington aspires to create oil and gas pipelines that lead from Central Asia to Europe. Claiming that Central Asia relies too much on China and Russia to export its energy resources, O'Brien reviewed multiple possibilities for alternative pipelines to run through Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey."Whatever path we take leads us to the Black Sea," he said.The senators who convened the hearing supported O'Brien's vision, agreeing that the Black Sea remains an area of great geopolitical importance. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), who has been pressuring the Biden administration to devise a formal strategy for the Black Sea, praised its efforts to create a "new east-west energy corridor that would go under the Black Sea and provide an alternative for energy coming out of Central Asia into Europe."For decades, in fact, the United States has been pursuing geopolitical opportunities in the Black Sea. Years of analysis by U.S. diplomats, as captured in leaked diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks, show that U.S. officials have attributed a great deal of importance to the region, especially as it concerns energy. One of Washington's major goals has been to strengthen NATO's presence in the Black Sea region, regardless of warnings that such moves could provoke Russia.U.S. energy companies also depend on the region's pipelines. Chevron and ExxonMobil, both of which maintain operations in Kazakhstan, rely on a pipeline that leads to the Black Sea.Earlier this year, Defense Department official Mara Karlin spoke about the "critical geostrategic importance" of the Black Sea region, characterizing it as a major frontline for the transatlantic alliance, a major link between Europe and the Middle East, and "a key node for transit infrastructure and energy resources."The Senate has been active in considering the geopolitical factors at stake. Not long after holding the hearing on October 25, the Senate convened an additional hearing on November 8 to revisit the reasons for the war in Ukraine. O'Brien testified once again, this time joined by additional colleagues who helped him reinforce his message about the geopolitics of energy in Ukraine, the Black Sea, and the broader region.Redrawing the Energy MapState Department official Geoffrey Pyatt, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine who now leads U.S. energy diplomacy, explained that the United States is facing extraordinary opportunities in the Black Sea region, which he described as "one of the fulcrums of the energy map of Europe today."One of the most significant regional transformations, Pyatt explained, is "the redrawing of the energy map around the Black Sea that's taking place." It includes "new pipeline infrastructure," such as "the Southern Gas Corridor to bring gas from Central Asia to European consumers."While the war has created new opportunities to transport natural gas from Central Asia to Europe, it has also made it much more difficult for Russia to export natural gas to Europe. Whereas Russian natural gas made up 45 percent of the EU's natural gas imports in 2021, it is now down to 15 percent."As we look to the future, you're going to have a Europe which has decoupled from Russian energy supplies," Pyatt said.So far, the major winner in the geopolitical contest has been U.S. energy companies. As Russian exports to Europe have decreased, U.S. exports have increased, positioning the United States to become one of Europe's major suppliers. If Europe can acquire more natural gas from Central Asia, then Russia could potentially be excluded from the European market altogether.As O'Brien noted, the situation is putting Russian President Vladimir Putin in a tough position. "It's a long-term strategic loss for him, and it creates a great opportunity for us in a number of important sectors," he said.But a major question remains: how long will U.S. officials continue viewing the war as "a good deal for America," as O'Brien described it? Although Ukraine is paying the bulk of the cost in terms of fighting, the number of deaths keeps rising, and there is no end in sight."It's difficult to get a decisive battle, so what we need is what's in the supplemental," O'Brien said, referring to the Biden administration's request for more money to help Ukraine fight the war. It will provide "the ability to fight this fight over some time," he said.This piece has been republished with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.

When Napoleon Bonaparte staged a coup d'état to oust the civilian government of the Directorate in France, he justified his actions as necessary to save the spirit of the Revolution. The army, in Napoleon's view, had a solemn obligation to defend the nation against threats both at home and abroad.The notion that a military, as guardians of a national spirit, has the right to seize the authority of the state became known as Bonapartism. This seemingly persistent belief in certain militaries in Africa emphasizes the need for comprehensive reform.Military regimes can perceive themselves to be better at governance than civilians. The simplicity of efficiently carrying out orders stands in stark contrast to the seemingly endless bureaucracy impeded by incompetence and corruption. In crises where politics leads to impasses in service delivery, the military's projection as being "above politics" can help it seize and keep power in fragile states.Despite the anti-French rhetoric of coup leaders in Africa, many of them nonetheless invoke this spirit of Bonapartism in acting to "save" the state. As the French Revolution began to eat itself under the Reign of Terror, for Napoleon the only means to preserve the Revolution was for its defenders to remove the civilian leadership by force.This was no singular event. Several times in the 19th and 20th centuries, the French army forced dramatic changes in the state whenever the national spirit had been challenged. Bonapartism furthermore formed a significant part of military formation in France's colonies, particularly in Africa.The problem with Bonapartism is that it has greatly undermined attempts to professionalize security forces. When we speak of professional soldiers outside of a (former) colonial setting, we mean a trained soldier who readily accepts and defends civilian authority. Such a situation is so taken for granted today that we do not always appreciate how necessary this is for a thriving democracy.If a military perceives itself to be better, more competent, or in some way less fallible than the civilian government, then a risk of Bonapartism can persist regardless of how well trained they might be. U.S. training of officers, such as those in Niger, may unintentionally lead to a growing confidence in the military about their competence and increase the risk of a takeover.The officers leading the coups in Niger and Gabon cite persistent civilian misrule, aided in no small part by continued French dominance in domestic political and economic policies in both countries, as the primary justification for their intervention. They present themselves as acting in the best interests of the nations they are nominally intended to protect. Seizing power away from incompetent civilians is merely a continuation of their duty.Scenes of crowds celebrating the removal of decades-long dictatorships do indicate at least a modicum of legitimacy for the military's actions in Gabon. Many coup leaders across Africa have justified their actions on the demonstrable misrule by civilian governments. In almost every scenario, however, the coup leaders merely became the new dictators. These actions further emulate Napoleon's hold on power, although few did so as blatantly as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, who declared himself Emperor 4 December 1977.Bonapartism is not solely a francophone problem and can exist in any state with weak democratic institutions. In the cases of Zimbabwe and Egypt, despite the civilian façade, the spirit of Bonapartism still lingers. For both states, the military has long been the true source of the state's authority.Zimbabwe's elections are a mere formality, a political tradition rather than any substantive effort to change the civilian authority. Aside from the Egyptian military's brief foray into relinquishing power to the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012, the civilian leadership serves at the pleasure of the military, not the electorate. When the military felt that Egypt was at risk under the leadership of the Brotherhood, they acted to save the state by retaking authority, a quintessential Bonapartist action.The coup in Sudan that ousted Omar al-Bashir was a remarkably similar instance of a military acting to change the civilian leadership during a crisis. However, the current infighting among senior officers points to an entirely different matter. It's actually a misnomer to refer to states like Sudan as "weak." Rather, the problem lies in the fact that the state is too powerful in relation to other aspects of the society, particularly the economy.Such states are the 'only game in town' in terms of attaining mobility, income, and basic security. Fights over who controls the state become so violent because of a lack of options. As long as other sectors remain underdeveloped, the risks of coups will persist. In such cases, it may well be counter-productive to invest too much in the militaries, and making control of the military all the more tempting.There are steps the African Union and other international bodies can take to militate against Bonapartism. The first concerns the AU's Lomé Declaration of 2000, which established a norm against unconstitutional regime changes by stating that any extra constitutional changes in a government is grounds for immediate suspension. In practice, this commitment has been far from rock solid, with the AU making numerous exceptions over the years.Moreover, tougher penalties could be applied, especially in the form of mandating Security Sector Reform (SSR) as necessary processes to return to the AU.SSR entails a comprehensive overhaul of a state's security sector. The security sector includes not only the military but also the police, judiciary, and any intelligence services. Importantly, SSR requires more than mere training, as the Niger and Burkina Faso cases demonstrate. Therein lies the rub of military governance and strengthening democracies: the only body with the authority to restructure the military is the military itself.Save for the odd counter-example, democratic promises by army officers have rarely been realized. Even in instances where elections have been held, the military nonetheless retains inordinate influence over the civilian leadership, and the threat of future coups persists.SSR is neither cheap nor easy to adequately implement. One of the most important factors is rewriting a constitution with sufficient judicial strength to ensure that an elected legislative body has the ultimate authority over all security forces. Doing so must result in the end of Bonapartism for the military and the conclusion that they are not the sole nor ultimate defenders of the nation.The rush to hold elections after a coup is often seen as an act of good faith by coup-leaders to return a country to democracy. However, to be a democracy does not only mean having elections, as democracy contains a set of values, including civilian oversight and regulation of all coercive forces in a state.Every soldier needs to be educated on the importance of civilian leadership as they are far more likely to know what is in the best interests of the civilian population than a general. Military training by foreign experts without complementary democracy training is, as Niger bears out, counter-productive to the overall mission objectives of combating Islamist insurgencies. US foreign military training reportedly includes instruction on safeguarding democracy and human rights.While US policy is to immediately halt all military aid following a coup, the policy has not always been strictly enforced, more rigorous enforcement may be more effective in the long term. These recent coups raise the difficult question on the efficacy of democracy and human rights training for militaries who are evidently not receptive to the message.Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte attempted a similar overthrow of a civilian government as his more illustrious uncle in 1851. This more foolhardy power grab led Karl Marx to quip that "history repeats itself, the first as tragedy, the second as farce." Unless the right lessons are learned, the Bonapartism lurking in African militaries will continue the tragedy of military rule.

Eye health and vision have widespread and profound implications for many aspects of life, health, sustainable development, and the economy. Yet nowadays, many people, families, and populations continue to suffer the consequences of poor access to high-quality, affordable eye care, leading to vision impairment and blindness. In 2020, an estimated 596 million people had distance vision impairment worldwide, of whom 43 million were blind. Another 510 million people had uncorrected near vision impairment, simply because of not having reading spectacles. A large proportion of those affected (90%), live in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). However, encouragingly, more than 90% of people with vision impairment have a preventable or treatable cause with existing highly cost-effective interventions. Eye conditions affect all stages of life, with young children and older people being particularly affected. Crucially, women, rural populations, and ethnic minority groups are more likely to have vision impairment, and this pervasive inequality needs to be addressed. By 2050, population ageing, growth, and urbanisation might lead to an estimated 895 million people with distance vision impairment, of whom 61 million will be blind. Action to prioritise eye health is needed now. This Commission defines eye health as maximised vision, ocular health, and functional ability, thereby contributing to overall health and wellbeing, social inclusion, and quality of life. Eye health is essential to achieve many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Poor eye health and impaired vision have a negative effect on quality of life and restrict equitable access to and achievement in education and the workplace. Vision loss has substantial financial implications for affected individuals, families, and communities. Although high-quality data for global economic estimates are scarce, particularly for LMICs, conservative assessments based on the latest prevalence figures for 2020 suggest that annual global productivity loss from vision impairment is approximately US$410·7 billion purchasing power parity. Vision impairment reduces mobility, affects mental wellbeing, exacerbates risk of dementia, increases likelihood of falls and road traffic crashes, increases the need for social care, and ultimately leads to higher mortality rates. By contrast, vision facilitates many daily life activities, enables better educational outcomes, and increases work productivity, reducing inequality. An increasing amount of evidence shows the potential for vision to advance the SDGs, by contributing towards poverty reduction, zero hunger, good health and wellbeing, quality education, gender equality, and decent work. Eye health is a global public priority, transforming lives in both poor and wealthy communities. Therefore, eye health needs to be reframed as a development as well as a health issue and given greater prominence within the global development and health agendas. Vision loss has many causes that require promotional, preventive, treatment, and rehabilitative interventions. Cataract, uncorrected refractive error, glaucoma, age-related macular degeneration, and diabetic retinopathy are responsible for most global vision impairment. Research has identified treatments to reduce or eliminate blindness from all these conditions; the priority is to deliver treatments where they are most needed. Proven eye care interventions, such as cataract surgery and spectacle provision, are among the most cost-effective in all of health care. Greater financial investment is needed so that millions of people living with unnecessary vision impairment and blindness can benefit from these interventions. Lessons from the past three decades give hope that this challenge can be met. Between 1990 and 2020, the age-standardised global prevalence of blindness fell by 28·5%. Since the 1990s, prevalence of major infectious causes of blindness—onchocerciasis and trachoma—have declined substantially. Hope remains that by 2030, the transmission of onchocerciasis will be interrupted, and trachoma will be eliminated as a public health problem in every country worldwide. However, the ageing population has led to a higher crude prevalence of age-related causes of blindness, and thus an increased total number of people with blindness in some regions. Despite this progress, business as usual will not keep pace with the demographic trends of an ageing global population or address the inequities that persist in each country. New threats to eye health are emerging, including the worldwide increase in diabetic retinopathy, high myopia, retinopathy of prematurity, and chronic eye diseases of ageing such as glaucoma and age-related macular degeneration. With the projected increase in such conditions and their associated vision loss over the coming decades, urgent action is needed to develop innovative treatments and deliver services at a greater scale than previously achieved. Good eye health at the community and national level has been marginalised as a luxury available to only wealthy or urban areas. Eye health needs to be urgently brought into the mainstream of national health and development policy, planning, financing, and action. The challenge is to develop and deliver comprehensive eye health services (promotion, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation) that address the full range of eye conditions within the context of universal health coverage. Accessing services should not bring the risk of falling into poverty and services should be of high quality, as envisaged by the WHO framework for health-care quality: effective, safe, people-centred, timely, equitable, integrated, and efficient. To this framework we add the need for services to be environmentally sustainable. Universal health coverage is not universal without eye care. Multiple obstacles need to be overcome to achieve universal coverage for eye health. Important issues include complex barriers to availability and access to quality services, cost, major shortages and maldistribution of well-trained personnel, and lack of suitable, well maintained equipment and consumables. These issues are particularly widespread in LMICs, but also occur in underserved communities in high-income countries. Strong partnerships need to be formed with natural allies working in areas affected by eye health, such as non-communicable diseases, neglected tropical diseases, healthy ageing, children's services, education, disability, and rehabilitation. The eye health sector has traditionally focused on treatment and rehabilitation, and underused health promotion and prevention strategies to lessen the impact of eye disease and reduce inequality. Solving these problems will depend on solutions established from high quality evidence that can guide more effective implementation at scale. Evidence-based approaches will need to address existing deficiencies in the supply and demand. Strategic investments in discovery research, harnessing new findings from diverse fields, and implementation research to guide effective scale up are needed globally. Encouragingly, developments in telemedicine, mobile health, artificial intelligence, and distance learning could potentially enable eye care professionals to deliver higher quality care that is more plentiful, equitable, and cost-effective. This Commission did a Grand Challenges in Global Eye Health prioritisation exercise to highlight key areas for concerted research and action. This exercise has identified a broad set of challenges spanning the fields of epidemiology, health systems, diagnostics, therapeutics, and implementation. The most compelling of these issues, picked from among 3400 suggestions proposed by 336 people from 118 countries, can help to frame the future research agenda for global eye health. In this Commission, we harness lessons learned from over two decades, present the growing evidence for the life-transforming impact of eye care, and provide a thorough understanding of rapid developments in the field. This report was created through a broad consultation involving experts within and outside the eye care sector to help inform governments and other stakeholders about the path forward for eye health beyond 2020, to further the SDGs (including universal health coverage), and work towards a world without avoidable vision loss. The next few years are a crucial time for the global eye health community and its partners in health care, government, and other sectors to consider the successes and challenges encountered in the past two decades, and at the same time to chart a way forward for the upcoming decades. Moving forward requires building on the strong foundation laid by WHO and partners in VISION 2020 with renewed impetus to ultimately deliver high quality universal eye health care for all.

In 2017, the Central American Agricultural Council (CAC), with the support of CCAFS, CIAT, IICA, FAO, ECLAC and CATIE, formulated and adopted the Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy (EASAC) for the Central American Integration System (SICA) region. This regional strategy aims at promoting climate-smart agriculture (CSA) at scale and is an original example of regional policy. This communication presents the first results of an assessment process of the EASAC outcomes three years after its launch. We carried out a methodology mobilizing the theory-based assessment (Delahais and Toulemonde 2012; Lemire, et al. 2012, Maine, 2008) applied to a policy innovation, in this case, the EASAC. Theory-based approaches have been designed to provide systematic, robust approaches to understand whether the intended outcomes of an intervention have been achieved (or not), and the importance of the intervention's contribution under consideration, relative to that of other alternative causes. This assessment process encompasses three steps: (i) the formulation of the EASAC Theory of Change (ToC), (ii) the identification of changes aligned with the ToC and (iii) the analysis of EASAC's contribution to some of these identified changes. In this communication, we present the results of the two first above mentioned steps. To establish the EASAC ToC, we first reformulated the EASAC into a ToC vocabulary/thinking starting from the policy document (CAC, 2017) and adjusting it through an iterative process of consultation and validation with 8 key actors (EASAC formulators). Once the ToC validated, we conducted 44 semi-directed interviews with actors involved in CSA related actions or interventions at regional and national level of the 8 countries of SICA. The objective of these interviews was to understand what expected changes identified in the EASAC ToC have occurred so far. Finally, the changes were analyzed and compared across and among countries. The EASAC ToC is structured along four routes: (1) policy route, (2) institutional, (3) financing and (4) communication. The four routes aim through the formulation and implementation of CSA policies (policy route); the creation and promotion of spaces for CSA dialogue and partnerships and the strengthening of CSA capacities of actors (institutional route); the development of a portfolio of CSA projects to apply to competitive international funds (financial route); the implementation of communication campaigns to foster the implementation of the EASAC (communication route) to a final outcome: the adoption of CSA practices, services and technologies by local farmers and thus achieve a great impact focused on a more productive, adapted and resilient agriculture in the face of climate change (CC). Results related to the identification of changes aligned with the ToC show that, although the EASAC was launched only 3 year ago, 252 changes related to the four EASAC ToC routes were identified in all countries of SICA and at the regional level to date, attesting of a great dynamic toward CSA scaling in the region. A total of 225 changes occurred in the eight countries in the SICA region. Costa Rica and Guatemala stand out with the highest number of changes identified. Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua show with an average progress, and finally Panamá, the Dominican Republic and Belize exhibit the lowest number of changes observed. The remaining 27 identified changes were exclusively at the regional level. The policy route is the strongest and most profuse as it concentrates the largest number of changes identified (182 changes) that mostly (98) correspond to the formulation and implementations of CSA conducive policies at regional, national and/or subnational levels concentrated in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. The remaining changes (84) are local implemented CSA conducive projects that respond to regional programs (sometimes 'jumping' the national level) such as EUROCLIMA+, FAO-EU FLEGT - Latin America, REDD+, RECLIMA, RELIVE, BIOCLIMA, ARAUCLIMA, AGROINNOVA, PROCAGICA, among others. However, the CSA approach has yet to be incorporated further into the planning, research, monitoring and evaluation processes of the agricultural sector at both the regional and national levels. The institutional route, although less developed than the policy route, presents a total of 45 changes distributed in three dimensions: i) the creation and promotion of coordination initiatives, alliances and CSA dialogue spaces at regional and national levels, ii) the strengthening of CSA capacities of governments, research actors and extension systems at national level and iii) financial services designed and implemented through specific programs, mainly supported by regional cooperation (ECLAC). Most of the changes in this route corresponds to CSA dialogue spaces and alliances mainly in Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador. However, there is a gap between countries in the creation and diversification of coordination initiatives, alliances and spaces for dialogue for the promotion and follow-up of the CSA approach. Moreover, there is a lack of institutionalization of the programs for research actors, public officials and extensionists to strengthen their capacities to formulate and implement CSA practices, services and technologies. The financing route has been strengthened mainly through technical and financial support from international cooperation agencies with 25 changes identified at the regional and national levels mostly impulse by a regional initiative from FAO in partnership with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) that seeks to facilitate access to climate finance and strengthen the national capacities of the countries to create a portfolio of CSA projects in the region. Even though there are advances in this route, some aspects pointed out in the EASAC are still missing or are partly implemented. A consolidated portfolio of CSA projects and an updated database on sources of climate financing need to be consolidated. Besides, more work must be done on the creation of alliances to promote financial services and, to consolidate a common agenda of CSA climate action in Central America. Finally, regarding the communication route, no changes were observed so far. Considering the orientation of changes both at regional and country levels, the emphasis of the changes has been oriented more towards adaptation to CC (137) than mitigation (36), although the CSA approach integrate both adaptation and mitigation. The agricultural sectors most prioritized have been cattle raising (73), coffee (44), and some basic grains: corn (15), rice (14) and beans (13). In addition, the predominant issues on the sector's policy agenda in the countries have been water resource sustainability (45), food and nutritional security (FNS) and family agriculture (95). Finally, it is worth noting that the changes identified tends to be geographically concentrated in the Central American Dry Corridor, although the aim of the intervention is to expand the scope of these measures to other areas of the region. The first results of the evaluation of the effect to date of the EASAC provides original insights to the discussion on the effectiveness of scaling up CSA through a regional policy framework, on the effectiveness of EASAC ToC and its implementation features. To go deeper into this, a rigorous and systematic analysis must be conducted in a second phase of this study to assess the degree of contribution of the EASAC to these identified changes. However, these first results of the assessment process is of interest to regional and national stakeholders in particular CAC executive secretariats well as scholars and practitioners as they enable to draw preliminary recommendations to support the implementation of EASAC in the region and lessons learned for strengthening enabling policy environments to achieve CSA goals in the region and other parts of the world.

About taxes and other demons Colombia is one of the Latin American countries where the tax system is dynamic, 20 tax reforms in 17 years are proof of this (on average one every 18 months). Many of these reforms are preceded by "spectacular" announcements: almost every tax reform presented and approved is often said to be "structural" and that it will change "radically" the dynamics of taxes in Colombia.Almost every attempt at reform begins by indicating that government expenditures have grown and that greater urgent efforts are urgently needed to cover the "fiscal gap", while at the same time each reform has a debate on the inequality and injustice of taxes in Colombia, as well as emphasizing the priority of "maintaining efficiency and economic competitiveness" and offering alternatives to generate a tax system that apparently solves this "triple problem".However, it is clear that the reforms hardly solve any of them: they are not able to raise the collection radically, because along with every decision to increase it, there is one that erodes taxable bases, creates exemptions or simply generates benefits for taxpayers who have failed to pay (the so-called tax amnesties). On the other hand, they also do not solve the efficiency problems of the tax system because it uses high tariffs, major distortions –particularly in income tax– and tedious control processes, issues that now under the convergence of accounting systems to IFRS tends to worsen. Finally it does not solve the problem of equality, since in the end the decision to charge more is broken by the weakest link in the chain: the average taxpayer, who does not have the capacity for political lobbying before the congress and the executive, who is not listen to, but on the other hand is the one who does not protest.And this scenario repeats after every tax reform, increasing the disorder and generating greater obstacles not only to taxpayers but to accountants, who play at all times with new rules of the game, creating new needs for updating, new discussions about interpretations that must be made about tax processes, new resistance to the payment of taxes and also increases taxpayers' disagreement.This is in part the overview the articles that make up this edition of the journal Revista Activos seek to present, through different approaches: from the structural problems of the tax system, to the specific and precise ones that organizations or sectors of organizations face.We hope as always that this edition meets the expectations of our readers.SincerelyEditorial team journal Revista ActivosGloria Valero, Michael Díaz, Jairo Bautista ; Sobre impuestos y otros demoniosColombia es uno de los países de América Latina donde el sistemas tributario es dinámico, 20 reformas tributarias en 17 años son evidencia de ello (en promedio una cada 18 meses). Buena parte de dichas reformas están precedidas por anuncios "espectaculares": casi que de cada reforma tributaria presentada y aprobada se suele decir que esta sí es "estructural" y que va a cambiar "radicalmente" la dinámica de los tributos en Colombia.Casi todo intento de reforma comienza por indicar que los gastos del gobierno han crecido y que se necesita de manera urgente mayores recaudos para cubrir el "hueco fiscal", al mismo tiempo cada reforma ambienta un debate sobre la desigualdad y la injusticia de los tributos en Colombia, así como resaltan la prioridad de "mantener la eficiencia y la competitividad económica" y suelen ofrecerse diversas alternativas para generar un sistema tributario que en apariencia solucione este "triple problema".Sin embargo, lo que es claro es que las reformas difícilmente logran solucionar alguno: no son capaces de aumentar radicalmente el recaudo, porque a la par de cada decisión para aumentarlo, existe una que desgasta las bases gravables, crea exenciones o simplemente genera beneficios para contribuyentes incumplidos (las llamadas amnistías tributarias). Por otro lado, tampoco solucionan los problemas de eficiencia del sistema tributario pues usa tarifas elevadas, distorsiones mayúsculas –particularmente en el impuesto de renta– y procesos de control tediosos, cuestiones que ahora en el marco de la convergencia de los sistemas de contabilidad a IFRS tiende a agravarse. Finalmente tampoco soluciona el problema de la equidad, puesto que al final la decisión de cobrar más se rompe por la parte más débil de la cadena: el contribuyente de a pie, el que no tiene la capacidad de lobby político ante el congreso y el ejecutivo, al que no escuchan, pero por otra parte es el que no protesta.Y este escenario se repite tras cada reforma tributaria, aumentando el desorden y generando mayores tropiezos no solo a los contribuyentes sino a los contadores, que juegan todo el tiempo con reglas de juego nuevas, lo cual crea nuevas necesidades de actualización, nuevas controversias sobre las interpretaciones que deben hacerse sobre los procesos tributarios, nuevas resistencias al pago de los impuestos y también aumenta la inconformidad de los contribuyentes.Este es en parte el panorama que los artículos que componen la presente edición de la Revista Activos buscan presentar, a través de diferentes enfoques: desde los problemas estructurales del sistema tributario, hasta los puntuales y particulares que enfrentan organizaciones o sectores de organizaciones.Esperamos como siempre, que esta edición cumpla las expectativas de nuestros lectores.Atentamente,Equipo editorial Revista ActivosGloria Valero, Michael Díaz, Jairo Bautista. ; La Colombie est l'un des pays d'Amérique Latine où le régime fiscal est dynamique, 20 réformes fiscales en 17 ans en sont la preuve (en moyenne une tous les 18 mois). Une grande partie de ces réformes sont précédées par des annonces «spectaculaires»: presque chaque réforme fiscale approuvée est présentée comme «structurelle» et comme celle qui va changer « radicalement » la dynamique des impôts en Colombie. Presque toutes les tentatives de réforme commencent par indiquer que les dépenses publiques ont augmenté et qu'il est urgent d'augmenter les revenus afin de couvrir le «déficit budgétaire», en même temps chaque réforme accompagne un débat sur l'inégalité et l'injustice des impôts en Colombie, ainsi qu´ils soulignent la priorité de «maintenir l'efficacité et la compétitivité économique» et généralement on propose diverses alternatives pour générer un système fiscal qui en apparence puisse résoudre ce «triple problème».Cependant, ce qui est clair c'est que les réformes arrivent difficilement à en résoudre un seul: elles ne sont pas capable d'augmenter radicalement la perception, parce qu'en parallèle à chaque décision pour l'augmenter, il y en a une autre qui diminue les bases imposables, crée des exemptions ou génère simplement des avantages pour les contribuables qui ne payent pas à temps (ce qu'on appelle les amnisties fiscales). D'autre part, elles ne résolvent pas non plus les problèmes d'efficacité du système fiscal car il utilise des tarifs élevés, distorsions majeures, -particulièrement sur l'impôt sur le revenu- et des processus de contrôle fastidieux, questions qui actuellement dans le cadre de la convergence des systèmes comptables à IFRS tendent à s'aggraver. Finalement, elles ne résolvent pas non plus le problème de l'équité, puisqu'à la finale la décision de percevoir plus se brise par la partie la plus faible de la chaîne: c'est-à-dire le contribuable de base, celui qui n'a pas la capacité de lobbying politique auprès du Congrès et de l'exécutif, mais d'un autre côté c'est celui qui ne proteste pas.Ce scénario se répète à chaque réforme fiscale, augmentant ainsi le désordre et créant plus des revers non seulement pour les contribuables mais aussi pour les experts comptables qui doivent «jongler» tout le temps avec de nouvelles règles du jeu, ce qui crée de nouveaux besoins de mise à jour, de nouvelles controverses sur les interprétations qui doivent se faire sur les processus fiscaux, de nouvelles résistances à payer les impôts et cela augmente également le mécontentement des contribuables.Ceci est une partie du panorama que les articles inclus dans cette édition de la Revista Activos (Magazine Activos) cherchent à présenter, à travers différentes approches: depuis les problèmes structurels du système fiscal, jusqu´aux problèmes ponctuels et particuliers qu'affrontent les entreprises ou certains secteurs.Nous espérons comme toujours, que cette édition réponde aux attentes de nos lecteurs.Cordialement, L'équipe de rédaction de la Revista Activos (Magazine Activos) Gloria Valero, Michael Díaz, Jairo Bautista.

Sobre impuestos y otros demoniosColombia es uno de los países de América Latina donde el sistemas tributario es dinámico, 20 reformas tributarias en 17 años son evidencia de ello (en promedio una cada 18 meses). Buena parte de dichas reformas están precedidas por anuncios "espectaculares": casi que de cada reforma tributaria presentada y aprobada se suele decir que esta sí es "estructural" y que va a cambiar "radicalmente" la dinámica de los tributos en Colombia.Casi todo intento de reforma comienza por indicar que los gastos del gobierno han crecido y que se necesita de manera urgente mayores recaudos para cubrir el "hueco fiscal", al mismo tiempo cada reforma ambienta un debate sobre la desigualdad y la injusticia de los tributos en Colombia, así como resaltan la prioridad de "mantener la eficiencia y la competitividad económica" y suelen ofrecerse diversas alternativas para generar un sistema tributario que en apariencia solucione este "triple problema".Sin embargo, lo que es claro es que las reformas difícilmente logran solucionar alguno: no son capaces de aumentar radicalmente el recaudo, porque a la par de cada decisión para aumentarlo, existe una que desgasta las bases gravables, crea exenciones o simplemente genera beneficios para contribuyentes incumplidos (las llamadas amnistías tributarias). Por otro lado, tampoco solucionan los problemas de eficiencia del sistema tributario pues usa tarifas elevadas, distorsiones mayúsculas –particularmente en el impuesto de renta– y procesos de control tediosos, cuestiones que ahora en el marco de la convergencia de los sistemas de contabilidad a IFRS tiende a agravarse. Finalmente tampoco soluciona el problema de la equidad, puesto que al final la decisión de cobrar más se rompe por la parte más débil de la cadena: el contribuyente de a pie, el que no tiene la capacidad de lobby político ante el congreso y el ejecutivo, al que no escuchan, pero por otra parte es el que no protesta.Y este escenario se repite tras cada reforma tributaria, aumentando el desorden y generando mayores tropiezos no solo a los contribuyentes sino a los contadores, que juegan todo el tiempo con reglas de juego nuevas, lo cual crea nuevas necesidades de actualización, nuevas controversias sobre las interpretaciones que deben hacerse sobre los procesos tributarios, nuevas resistencias al pago de los impuestos y también aumenta la inconformidad de los contribuyentes.Este es en parte el panorama que los artículos que componen la presente edición de la Revista Activos buscan presentar, a través de diferentes enfoques: desde los problemas estructurales del sistema tributario, hasta los puntuales y particulares que enfrentan organizaciones o sectores de organizaciones.Esperamos como siempre, que esta edición cumpla las expectativas de nuestros lectores.Atentamente,Equipo editorial Revista ActivosGloria Valero, Michael Díaz, Jairo Bautista. ; About taxes and other demons Colombia is one of the Latin American countries where the tax system is dynamic, 20 tax reforms in 17 years are proof of this (on average one every 18 months). Many of these reforms are preceded by "spectacular" announcements: almost every tax reform presented and approved is often said to be "structural" and that it will change "radically" the dynamics of taxes in Colombia.Almost every attempt at reform begins by indicating that government expenditures have grown and that greater urgent efforts are urgently needed to cover the "fiscal gap", while at the same time each reform has a debate on the inequality and injustice of taxes in Colombia, as well as emphasizing the priority of "maintaining efficiency and economic competitiveness" and offering alternatives to generate a tax system that apparently solves this "triple problem".However, it is clear that the reforms hardly solve any of them: they are not able to raise the collection radically, because along with every decision to increase it, there is one that erodes taxable bases, creates exemptions or simply generates benefits for taxpayers who have failed to pay (the so-called tax amnesties). On the other hand, they also do not solve the efficiency problems of the tax system because it uses high tariffs, major distortions –particularly in income tax– and tedious control processes, issues that now under the convergence of accounting systems to IFRS tends to worsen. Finally it does not solve the problem of equality, since in the end the decision to charge more is broken by the weakest link in the chain: the average taxpayer, who does not have the capacity for political lobbying before the congress and the executive, who is not listen to, but on the other hand is the one who does not protest.And this scenario repeats after every tax reform, increasing the disorder and generating greater obstacles not only to taxpayers but to accountants, who play at all times with new rules of the game, creating new needs for updating, new discussions about interpretations that must be made about tax processes, new resistance to the payment of taxes and also increases taxpayers' disagreement.This is in part the overview the articles that make up this edition of the journal Revista Activos seek to present, through different approaches: from the structural problems of the tax system, to the specific and precise ones that organizations or sectors of organizations face.We hope as always that this edition meets the expectations of our readers.SincerelyEditorial team journal Revista ActivosGloria Valero, Michael Díaz, Jairo Bautista ; La Colombie est l'un des pays d'Amérique Latine où le régime fiscal est dynamique, 20 réformes fiscales en 17 ans en sont la preuve (en moyenne une tous les 18 mois). Une grande partie de ces réformes sont précédées par des annonces «spectaculaires»: presque chaque réforme fiscale approuvée est présentée comme «structurelle» et comme celle qui va changer « radicalement » la dynamique des impôts en Colombie. Presque toutes les tentatives de réforme commencent par indiquer que les dépenses publiques ont augmenté et qu'il est urgent d'augmenter les revenus afin de couvrir le «déficit budgétaire», en même temps chaque réforme accompagne un débat sur l'inégalité et l'injustice des impôts en Colombie, ainsi qu´ils soulignent la priorité de «maintenir l'efficacité et la compétitivité économique» et généralement on propose diverses alternatives pour générer un système fiscal qui en apparence puisse résoudre ce «triple problème».Cependant, ce qui est clair c'est que les réformes arrivent difficilement à en résoudre un seul: elles ne sont pas capable d'augmenter radicalement la perception, parce qu'en parallèle à chaque décision pour l'augmenter, il y en a une autre qui diminue les bases imposables, crée des exemptions ou génère simplement des avantages pour les contribuables qui ne payent pas à temps (ce qu'on appelle les amnisties fiscales). D'autre part, elles ne résolvent pas non plus les problèmes d'efficacité du système fiscal car il utilise des tarifs élevés, distorsions majeures, -particulièrement sur l'impôt sur le revenu- et des processus de contrôle fastidieux, questions qui actuellement dans le cadre de la convergence des systèmes comptables à IFRS tendent à s'aggraver. Finalement, elles ne résolvent pas non plus le problème de l'équité, puisqu'à la finale la décision de percevoir plus se brise par la partie la plus faible de la chaîne: c'est-à-dire le contribuable de base, celui qui n'a pas la capacité de lobbying politique auprès du Congrès et de l'exécutif, mais d'un autre côté c'est celui qui ne proteste pas.Ce scénario se répète à chaque réforme fiscale, augmentant ainsi le désordre et créant plus des revers non seulement pour les contribuables mais aussi pour les experts comptables qui doivent «jongler» tout le temps avec de nouvelles règles du jeu, ce qui crée de nouveaux besoins de mise à jour, de nouvelles controverses sur les interprétations qui doivent se faire sur les processus fiscaux, de nouvelles résistances à payer les impôts et cela augmente également le mécontentement des contribuables.Ceci est une partie du panorama que les articles inclus dans cette édition de la Revista Activos (Magazine Activos) cherchent à présenter, à travers différentes approches: depuis les problèmes structurels du système fiscal, jusqu´aux problèmes ponctuels et particuliers qu'affrontent les entreprises ou certains secteurs.Nous espérons comme toujours, que cette édition réponde aux attentes de nos lecteurs.Cordialement, L'équipe de rédaction de la Revista Activos (Magazine Activos) Gloria Valero, Michael Díaz, Jairo Bautista.

Over the last decades, the world's population has been growing at a faster rate, resulting in increased urbanisation, especially in developing countries. More than half of the global population currently lives in urbanised areas with an increasing tendency. The growth of cities results in a significant loss of vegetation cover, soil compaction and sealing of the soil surface which in turn results in high surface runoff during high-intensity storms and causes the problem of accelerated soil water erosion on streets and building grounds. Accelerated soil water erosion is a serious environmental problem in cities as it gives rise to the contamination of aquatic bodies, reduction of ground water recharge and increase in land degradation, and also results in damages to urban infrastructures, including drainage systems, houses and roads. Understanding the problem of water erosion in urban settings is essential for the sustainable planning and management of cities prone to water erosion. However, in spite of the vast existence of scientific literature on water erosion in rural regions, a concrete understanding of the underlying dynamics of urban erosion still remains inadequate for the urban dryland environments. This study aimed at assessing water erosion and the associated socio-environmental determinants in a typical dryland urban area and used the city of Windhoek, Namibia, as a case study. The study used a multidisciplinary approach to assess the problem of water erosion. This included an in depth literature review on current research approaches and challenges of urban erosion, a field survey method for the quantification of the spatial extent of urban erosion in the dryland city of Windhoek, and face to face interviews by using semi-structured questionnaires to analyse the perceptions of stakeholders on urban erosion. The review revealed that around 64% of the literatures reviewed were conducted in the developed world, and very few researches were carried out in regions with extreme climate, including dryland regions. Furthermore, the applied methods for erosion quantification and monitoring are not inclusive of urban typical features and they are not specific for urban areas. The reviewed literature also lacked aspects aimed at addressing the issues of climate change and policies regarding erosion in cities. In a field study, the spatial extent and severity of an urban dryland city, Windhoek, was quantified and the results show that nearly 56% of the city is affected by water erosion showing signs of accelerated erosion in the form of rills and gullies, which occurred mainly in the underdeveloped, informal and semi-formal areas of the city. Factors influencing the extent of erosion in Windhoek included vegetation cover and type, socio-urban factors and to a lesser extent slope estimates. A comparison of an interpolated field survey erosion map with a conventional erosion assessment tool (the Universal Soil Loss Equation) depicted a large deviation in spatial patterns, which underlines the inappropriateness of traditional non-urban erosion tools to urban settings and emphasises the need to develop new erosion assessment and management methods for urban environments. It was concluded that measures for controlling water erosion in the city need to be site-specific as the extent of erosion varied largely across the city. The study also analysed the perceptions and understanding of stakeholders of urban water erosion in Windhoek, by interviewing 41 stakeholders using semi-structured questionnaires. The analysis addressed their understanding of water erosion dynamics, their perceptions with regards to the causes and the seriousness of erosion damages, and their attitudes towards the responsibilities for urban erosion. The results indicated that there is less awareness of the process as a phenomenon, instead there is more awareness of erosion damages and the factors contributing to the damages. About 69% of the stakeholders considered erosion damages to be ranging from moderate to very serious. However, there were notable disparities between the private householders and public authority groups. The study further found that the stakeholders have no clear understanding of their responsibilities towards the management of the control measures and payment for the damages. The private householders and local authority sectors pointed fingers at each other for the responsibilities for erosion damage payments and for putting up prevention measures. The reluctance to take responsibility could create a predicament for areas affected, specifically in the informal settlements where land management is not carried out by the local authority and land is not owned by the occupants. The study concluded that in order to combat urban erosion, it is crucial to understand diverse dynamics aggravating the process of urbanisation from different scales. Accordingly, the study suggests that there is an urgent need for the development of urban-specific approaches that aim at: (a) incorporating the diverse socio-economic-environmental aspects influencing erosion, (b) scientifically improving natural cycles that influence water storages and nutrients for plants in urbanised dryland areas in order to increase the amount of vegetation cover, (c) making use of high resolution satellite images to improve the adopted methods for assessing urban erosion, (d) developing water erosion policies, and (e) continuously monitoring the impact of erosion and the influencing processes from local, national and international levels. ; In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist die Erdbevölkerung mit großer Geschwindigkeit gewachsen. Das hatte eine verstärkte Urbanisierung zur Folge, insbesondere in den Entwicklungsländern. Zurzeit lebt über die Hälfte der globalen Bevölkerung in Stadtgebieten, mit steigender Tendenz. Städtewachstum geht mit einem signifikanten Verlust von Vegetationsbedeckung, sowie mit Bodenverdichtung und -versiegelung einher. Diese Faktoren führen bei Starkregenereignissen zu einem hohen Oberflächenabfluss, und zu Problemen durch beschleunigte wasserbedingte Bodenerosion in Straßen und auf Baugelände. In Städten ist eine beschleunigte wasserbedingte Bodenerosion ist ein ernstzunehmendes Umweltproblem, denn sie verursacht eine Verschmutzung der Gewässer, eine verminderte Grundwasserneubildung und erhöhte Landdegradierung. Darüber hinaus kommt es zu erosionsbedingten Schäden in der städtischen Infrastruktur, inklusive der Entwässerungssysteme, sowie an Häusern und Straßen. Für ein nachhaltiges Planen und Management von erosionsanfälligen Städten ist es von essentieller Bedeutung, die Probleme der Wassererosion in städtischen Gebieten zu verstehen. Trotz der großen Anzahl wissenschaftlicher Studien über Wassererosion in ländlichen Gegenden bleibt unser Verständnis der zu Grunde liegenden Erosionsdynamiken in urbanen Trockengebieten unzureichend. Diese Studie zielt darauf ab, Wassererosion, sowie die dazu beitragenden sozio-ökologischen Faktoren, in einem typischen urbanen Trockengebiet zu erfassen. Hierzu wurde ein fachübergreifender Ansatz am Fallbeispiel der Stadt Windhoek, Namibia, gewählt. Die Arbeit umfasst eine detaillierte Literaturanalyse der aktuellen Forschungsansätze zur urbanen Wassererosion und den damit verbundenen Herausforderungen. Außerdem wurde eine feldstudienbasierte Methode entwickelt, mit der das Ausmaß der Wassererosion in der Stadt Windhoek quantifiziert und räumlich erfasst wurde. Schließlich wurden persönliche Befragungen mit halbstrukturierten Fragebögen durchgeführt, um die Wahrnehmung der verschiedenen Interessenvertreter zum Thema Erosion in Stadtgebieten zu analysieren. Die Literaturanalyse hat gezeigt, dass 64% der untersuchten Studien in der entwickelten Welt durchgeführt wurden und nur sehr wenige Regionen mit extremen Klimabedingungen, einschließlich Trockengebieten, untersucht wurden. Hinzu kommt, dass die verwendeten Methoden zur Erosionsquantifizierung und -beobachtung die für urbane Gebiete typischen Merkmale nicht beinhalten und dafür auch nicht ausgerichtet sind. Des Weiteren mangelt es der untersuchten Literatur an Ansätzen, die den Einfluss des Klimawandels und politische Aspekte in Bezug auf Erosion in Stadtgebieten thematisieren. In einer Feldstudie wurde das Ausmaß von Wassererosion in der trocken gelegenen Stadt Windhoek quantifiziert und räumlich erfasst. Beinahe 56% der Stadt waren von Wassererosion betroffen und wiesen Anzeichen beschleunigter Erosion in Form von Rinnen und Rillen auf. Letztere traten vor allem in den unterentwickelten, informellen und semi-formellen Stadtgebieten auf. Das Ausmaß der Erosion in Windhoek wurde unter anderem von der Vegetationsbedeckung und dem Vegetationstyp, von sozial-urbanen Faktoren, und zu einem geringeren Grad von dem geschätzten Gefälle bestimmt. Der Vergleich einer interpolierten feldstudienbasierten Erosionskarte mit Ergebnissen, die auf einer konventionellen Methode zur Erosionserfassung (der Allgemeinen Bodenabtragsgleichung (ABAG)) basieren, ergab eine starke Abweichung in den räumlichen Mustern. Das verdeutlicht die Unzulänglichkeit einer direkten Übertragung von traditionellen nicht-urbanen Methoden zur Erosionserfassung auf ein urbanes Umfeld und betont die Notwendigkeit, neue Methoden sowohl zur Erfassung als auch zum Management von Erosion für urbane Gebiete zu entwickeln. Aus der großen Variabilität des Erosionsausmaßes innerhalb der Stadt lässt sich folgern, dass Methoden zur Kontrolle von Wassererosion in Städten standortspezifisch sein sollten. Anhand von halbstrukturierten Fragebögen wurde in einem weiteren Teil der Arbeit die Wahrnehmung und das Verständnis der unterschiedlichen Interessenvertreter zum Thema urbane Wassererosion in Windhoek untersucht. Insgesamt wurden 41 Interessenvertreter zu ihrem Verständnis der Wassererosionsdynamiken, zu ihrer Wahrnehmung in Bezug auf mögliche Ursachen und zum Ausmaß der Erosionsschäden, sowie zu ihrer Einstellung zur Verantwortlichkeit für die Erosion in der Stadt befragt. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass es eine geringe Wahrnehmung für das Phänomen der Erosion als Prozess gibt, dafür aber eine im Vergleich erhöhte Wahrnehmung der Erosionsschäden und der Faktoren, die zu den Schäden beitragen. Ungefähr 69% der Interessenvertreter stuften die Erosionsschäden als moderat bis sehr ernsthaft ein. Dabei gab es erkennbare Differenzen zwischen der Gruppe der privaten Haushalte und der der öffentlichen Behörden. Des Weiteren hat die Untersuchung ergeben, dass die Interessenvertreter kein klares Verständnis ihrer Verantwortung in Bezug auf das Management der Kontrollmaßnahmen, sowie ihrer finanziellen Verantwortung für die Schäden haben. Die privaten Haushalte und die örtlichen Behörden wiesen sich gegenseitig die Zahlungsverantwortung für die Erosionsschäden und für vorbeugende Maßnahmen zu. Der Unwille der einzelnen Akteure, Verantwortung zu übernehmen, könnte eine Zwickmühle für die betroffenen Gebiete werden. Dies gilt insbesondere für die informellen Siedlungen, in denen von den örtlichen Behörden kein Landmanagement durchgeführt wird, das Land aber auch nicht Eigentum der Bewohnern ist. Abschließend hat die Studie ergeben, dass es für eine effektive Erosionsbekämpfung in der Stadt von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung ist, die verschiedenen, den Prozess der Urbanisierung auf negative Weise verstärkenden Dynamiken, auf ihren unterschiedlichen Skalen zu verstehen. Auf Grundlage der hier präsentierten Ergebnisse wird eine Entwicklung speziell auf Stadtgebiete ausgerichteter Ansätze mit folgenden Zielen dringend nahegelegt: (a) Einer Integration von diversen sozio-ökonomisch-ökologischen Aspekten, die sich auf Erosion auswirken; (b) Einer wissenschaftlich begründeten Verbesserung der natürlichen Kreisläufe, die sich positiv auf die Wasserspeicherung im Boden und die Nährstoffverfügbarkeit für Pflanzen auswirken, um dadurch einen höheren Vegetationsbedeckungsgrad zu erreichen; (c) Der Nutzung hoch aufgelöster Satellitendaten, um die Methoden zur Erosionserfassung für urbane Gebiete zu verbessern; (d) Der Entwicklung politischer Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung von Wassererosion.

Resumen: La incorporación de la mujer al trabajo ha ido en progresivo aumento a lo largo de estas últimas décadas ubicándose principalmente en ciertos sectores de la economía específicamente en el área de servicios. Este incremento no fue ajeno a los cambios que se produjeron en el sistema de producción económica, donde el sector terciario se expandió con fuerza, por lo que podemos afirmar que hay una feminización de este sector. El ingreso de la mujer a niveles de educación superior, el cambio en las pautas de fecundidad y la postergación de la maternidad han sido factores que influyeron en su participación en las esferas laborales. La mujer ha generado ingresos familiares que hasta hace poco tiempo atrás alcanzaban sólo los hombres, redefiniendo de esta manera parámetros de la economía familiar. Sin embargo, su acceso no fue parejo: se concentran en ciertos sectores de las organizaciones, acceden en menor medida a puestos directivos, ante un mismo puesto de trabajo ganan menos que los hombres - estas y otras realidades- explican las desigualdades. El presente trabajo realiza un análisis del sector publicitario en la Argentina, en donde se analizan las características sociodemográficas, actitudinales y organizacionales de este mercado laboral. Además, describe la distribución de los puestos de trabajo en los que se concentran principalmente las mujeres. Fenómeno explicado por un lado desde la segregación horizontal sustentada en teorías económicas y socioculturales. Y por otro lado, por la segregación vertical que muestra que las mujeres ocupan en menor medida puestos directivos y acceden a lugares de trabajo de menor prestigio. Una segunda etapa de la investigación mide los niveles de conflicto entre sus empleados y el concepto de calidad de vida laboral. En el estudio se llevó a cabo un abordaje cuantitativo sustentado en entrevistas realizadas a los empleados de las agencias que integran la Asociación Argentina de Agencias de Publicidad y otra fase cualitativa con entrevistas en profundidad a mujeres que han alcanzado puestos jerárquicos. La cantidad de mujeres y de hombres que trabajan en el rubro publicitario es parejo, sin embargo la distribución en las áreas presenta diferencias. Las mujeres se concentran principalmente en los departamentos de Atención de Cuentas y Administración. 10 El sector se caracteriza por ser joven, con alto nivel educacional - más entre las mujeres que los hombres- sin hijos ni pareja. También se observa una postergación de la maternidad, son más las mujeres que no tienen hijos que los hombres. Los hombres y las mujeres rotan por agencias en la misma medida y tienen pocos años de antigüedad en el sector. Los hombres trabajan más que las mujeres, encontrándose una diferencia de cinco horas semanales. Se describe además la brecha salarial -siempre a favor de los hombres- y se acentúa la diferencia en el departamento de Administración; el área que Genera Contenidos, Atención al Cliente y Planificación/Investigación también se observan inequidadesaunque en menor medida. A medida que se asciende en el cargo menor es la participación de mujeres, la fuerza laboral femenina se concentra en la base de la pirámide. Los motivos que podrían sustentar la escasa presencia de mujeres en los puestos de decisión se asientan en barreras y/o prejuicios organizacionales –denominado Techo de Cristal- o actitudinales (Suelo Pegajoso). Las posibilidades que tienen las mujeres de acceder a cargos directivos es menor que los hombres. Las mujeres con hijos utilizan más las políticas de flexibilidad laboral como ser: los permisos por excedencia, la autonomía para ausentarse del trabajo, el trabajo a tiempo parcial, la elasticidad de horario laboral, entre otros. En cuanto a la valoración de su trabajo los empleados rescatan el trabajo en equipo la cooperación entre ellos, la libertad e independencia en la realización de sus tareas. Los vínculos entre sus pares son apreciados, sin embargo se muestran más críticos con la organización y con sus jefes. No se presenta en este estudio niveles de conflicto en el sector publicitario ni el departamento en el que trabajan; en cambio aparece como posibilidad de abandono el puesto de trabajo. La maternidad, el nacimiento de los hijos, la salud y la falta de vida personal surgen como las posibles causas de conflicto laboral principalmente entre las mujeres. ; Abstract: The introduction of women to work has been gradually increasing throughout the last decades and has established in certain sections of economy specifically in the service field. This growth has not remained aside of the changes that have occurred in the economy production system where the tertiary sector strongly expanded. Consequently, it can be assured that there is a feminist intrusion in this sector. Women entry to higher levels of education , the change in fertility standards and the delay in motherhood have all been issues that have influenced in her participation in the working fields. Women have generated family incomes that only some time ago were achieved by men, thus, redefining family economy parameters. Nevertheless, her access has not been equal: it has concentrated on certain sectors of organizations; they reach hierarchical positions in a lower degree. If given the same job than men, they earn less. These and other realities support these inequalities. This investigation deals with the analysis of advertising in Argentina. It analyses the sociodemographic, attitudinal and organizational features of this working market. Moreover, it describes the distribution of those jobs in which women concentrate most. This phenomenon is explained, on one hand, by the horizontal segregation supported by economic and sociocultural theories, and, on the other hand, by the vertical segregation which shows that women achieve in a lower degree managing jobs and reach jobs of less prestige. A second stage of the survey measures the conflict standards between her employees and the idea of quality during working life. This study has dealt with a quantitative approach based upon interviews made to agencies employees that form part of the Asociacion Argentina de Agencias de Publicidad together with a qualitative approach based upon interviews made to women who have reached hierarchical jobs. The amount of women and men working in the advertising field is similar. Nonetheless, its distribution show differences. Women gather mainly in the Account Attention Department and in the Administrative Department. This sector characterizes to be young, with a high educational level- more among women than men- without children or a couple. A delay in motherhood is observed, thus, there are more women without children than men. Men and women move around different agencies in a similar scale, they spend few years in the field. Men work more than women, showing a difference of five hours per week. Salary gap is also described - always in favour of men- and the difference in the Administrative Department is strengthened. Some inequalities, though they are less, can be noticed in Content Generation area, Customer Attention and Planning / Research area. The higher the growth in the post is, the less the participation of women is. Women working strength concentrate on the pyramid basis. The reasons that might account for the insufficient existance of women in decision jobs rely on organizational and/or prejudice barriers - called Crystal Roof- or attitudinal ones (Sticky Ground) The possibilities that women have to reach management jobs are less than men's. Women with children make use of flexible working politics such as leave permissions, autonomy to be absent in their jobs, part time work and working hours elasticity among others. As regards their work assessment, employees highlight team work, cooperation among them and freedom and independency in their work performance. Relationships among their pairs is appreciated though they become critical with the organization and their bosses. This study does not show conflict levels either in the advertising field or in the department where they work. Nevertheless, the job comes up as a possible giving up. Motherhood, children birth, health and the lack of personal life appear as possible causes of working conflict principally among women.

Élaborée à partir de l'étude croisée de deux cas de politiques de développement local, cette recherche doctorale porte sur les transformations du traitement spatialisé des problèmes sociaux dans les agglomérations de Lille et de Hambourg. Inscrite dans une démarche constructiviste, cette analyse socio-historique de la genèse des projets de l'Union, aux confins des communes de Roubaix, Tourcoing et Wattrelos et de l'Internationale Bauaustellung (IBA) Hamburg, sur l'île de Wilhelmsburg, traite de l'évolution des formes de catégorisation de ces « quartiers défavorisés » et du traitement politique qui en est fait. L'enquête ancrée entre sociologie de l'action publique et sociologie urbaine, recourt à des matériaux ethnographiques (observation de réunions, entretiens approfondis) et à des archives issues des fonds des différentes instances publiques engagées dans les projets étudiés de 1990 à 2014. Remettant en cause les approches de développement social traditionnelles articulées autour de systèmes de zonages – qu'il s'agisse de la « politique de la ville », ou du développement social des quartiers (soziale Stadtteilentwicklung) – l'Union et l'IBA font du traitement des « quartiers défavorisés », un enjeu d'« attractivité » et de « rayonnement métropolitain ». Alors que dans l'agglomération lilloise, le projet de l'Union repose sur un volet économique de soutien aux « filières d'excellence » de « l'image » et des « textiles innovants » et sur la construction d'un écoquartier (2007-2022), l'IBA Hamburg comporte des mesures de densification du peuplement, de construction d'infrastructures de production d'énergies renouvelables et un volet socio-éducatif ayant pour objectif d'améliorer l'offre scolaire des quartiers de Wilhelmsburg et Veddel (2007-2013). Après avoir contextualisé les rapports de pouvoir socio-économiques qui structurent chaque agglomération pour la période 1950-1990, cette étude retrace de manière détaillée la constitution des coalitions d'acteurs, des catégories et des instruments d'action publique qui caractérisent les processus de renouvellement urbain étudiés. De tels outils analytiques ont permis de dépasser les asymétries apparentes entre les deux cas, et de mettre en lumière les modalités économiques et symboliques du tournant « métropolitain » du problème des « quartiers » ainsi que les répercussions d'une telle métamorphose sur la sélection des acteurs considérés légitimes à prendre part à la décision. L'étude des réseaux de réformateurs contribuant à la construction des catégories de « quartier défavorisé » (benachteiligter Stadtteil) et d'« attractivité métropolitaine » (internationale Ausstrahlung) est menée au regard du contexte économique local des agglomérations de Lille et Hambourg. L'analyse de ce processus de catégorisation a également impliqué de prendre en compte les formes de circulations transnationales et infranationales qui ont contribué à le nourrir. Il est alors apparu que la spatialisation des problèmes sociaux puis la traduction du problème des « quartiers » en projet de réforme de l'administration et son articulation à la catégorie d'« attractivité métropolitaine », en amont du lancement de l'IBA et de l'Union, participent d'une même dynamique d'occultation progressive de la question sociale. Enfin, si une telle démonstration met en lumière les « possibles non-advenus » exclus au fil de la catégorisation du problème des « quartiers » comme enjeux d'« attractivité métropolitaine », elle illustre également les mécanismes de production du consensus mis en place une fois ces alternatives politiques écartées. En refaçonnant le concept de « mythe d'action publique », ce travail dégage quatre systèmes de justifications permettant de comprendre comment les différentes mesures portées par chaque projet ont pu être légitimées et effectivement mises en pratique. Attractivité, excellence, bonne gouvernance et justice spatiale sont les quatre mythes au carrefour desquels, les dispositifs de l'IBA et de l'Union sont conçus et mis en œuvre. Issus de l'étude en situation de l'instrumentation de chaque projet et des arènes de négociations qu'ils instaurent, ces systèmes de justifications sont un outil d'analyse privilégié pour l'étude des contradictions sous-jacentes à ces deux grands projets de renouvellement urbain. L'observation ethnographique des groupes de travail et des réunions de chargés de projets a permis d'appréhender ces instances à l'aune du concept de « rites » en mettant en lumière les jeux de rôles auxquels se prêtent les acteurs qui font l'apologie de ces mythes tout en prenant un recul critique en coulisses de ces cérémonies. L'Union et l'IBA Hamburg sont dès lors apparus comme les formes archétypales d'une nouvelle manière de traiter spatialement des problèmes sociaux, révélatrice d'évolutions socio-économiques et symboliques que l'on retrouve dans un nombre croissant de villes des économies capitalistes. ; This crossing of two case-studies (approche croisée) of urban development projects deals with the transformations of socio-spatial policies in the metropolis of Lille and Hamburg. Taking a constructivist approach, it focuses on the genesis of the Union-project between the municipalities of Roubaix, Tourcoing and Wattrelos, and of the « international building exhibition IBA Hamburg » (internationale Bauaustellung) on the Elbe island of Wilhelmsburg. The construction of « public problems » and the framing of "deprived neighborhood" (quartiers dévaforisés / benachteiligte Stadtteile) as categories of public action and the changes of the political treatment of these sociospatial problems are at the center of this socio-historical research. This sociological analysis of political processes relies on qualitative data-gathering (ethnographic observations of workinggroups, semi-structured and partly-standardized interviews) and on archives analysis of several institutions that took part in each urban development process between 1990 and 2014. Both, the IBA Hamburg and the Union-project can be considered as a new form of urban renewal projects to the extent that they challenge former programs of social urban policies that are based on smaller development areas. The projects combine goals of socio-spatial development with the ambition of fostering the attractiveness, the image and the international standing of their metropolis. While the Union-project (2007-2022) relies on economic development measures towards innovative enterprises in the sectors of technical textiles and IT-industries, as well as the construction of a sustainable neighborhood (ecoquartier), the IBA Hamburg (2007-2013) aims to promote the growth of Wilhelmsburg's population, the construction of renewable energy production infrastructures and the development of social- and educative institutions on the Elbe Island. Beyond these considerable divergences in content and the different scope of both projects – the development area in l'Union concerns 80 hectares whereas the IBA takes place on 42 square kilometers – these urban renewal processes proved to be typical forms of great projects of social urban development. Considering the most important political economical evolutions of the last decades (1950-1990), this PhD thesis analyses the emergence of constellations of actors, categories and tools of local government of both projects. By doing this, the commitment of reformer networks can be brought to light: experts, academics and senior civil servants actually contributed to the identification and framing of the problem of "deprived neighborhoods" and then to its articulation as a question of "international attractiveness". Such a categorization process, that turns a socio-spatial problem into a project of reform of public administration and then into a matter of "international competitiveness" finally nourishes the same depoliticization dynamic that leads to the concealment of the social question. Even if this study highlights the losers of both urban renewal processes, to the extent that it looks at the unsuccessful political alternatives, it also deals with the mechanisms of consensus production that are instituted after the framing of a first space of possibilities. Based on the concept of "myth of public action", this part of the thesis underlines the justification systems, which contribute to legitimate the different measures of both projects. Attractiveness, excellence, good governance and spatial justice are the four myths on which the IBA Hamburg and the Union- roject have been defined and implemented. This analytical pathway enabled to question the different contradictions of both projects, based on the observation of working groups in which these myths have been alternately glorified – on stage – or criticized – backstage. This analysis of the management of the projects' contradictions by their promoters through such role playing gives the occasion to highlight a specific way of dealing with socio-spatial problems that seems to become ever more significant for European urban policies.

The recent years have shown an increasing number of inter-linkages across countries. This surely is a result of what is called the integration phenomenon. Looking at the financial side, stock and bond markets have become more intertwined across countries leading to a simplification of trade in securities and goods. Banking sectors across borders on the other hand have come to be more unified, allowing countries to increase the number of operations further boosting trade and helping promote domestic growth and development. To this end my dissertation has studied the recent phenomenon of financial integration and its effect on economic growth and financial development. Moreover it examined the impact of the most recent measures taken at the European level that are established to promote greater integration and harmonization. The first chapter of the dissertation, "Financial Openness and Financial Development: An Analysis Using Indices" studies the link between financial openness and financial development through panel data analysis on advanced and emerging market countries. Using indices, financial openness together with institutional, educational and macroeconomic variables is shown to explain a large part of the variation in financial development across countries and over time. The analysis demonstrates that different indexing strategies could serve in finding better measures in terms of significances for financial openness and financial development in comparison to the individual indicators used in the literature. Principal component type financial openness index conveys a positive effect on financial development independent from the lag structure chosen, time dummies and trends used. The second chapter of the dissertation, "Financial Harmonization and Industrial Growth: Evidence from Europe" analyzes the growth effects of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European Commission, a set of measures and directives that aim to harmonize European financial markets. Using a panel of 25 countries and 30 industries, the standard specification predicts harmonization to lower growth, though the negative effect is mitigated for industries that depend more on external finance. This seemingly surprising result however occurs as a result of omitted variable bias. As in any policy implementation, early adopters are more likely to bear higher costs and experience less of the benefits of harmonization. Controlling for the relative timing of adoption, harmonization is then shown to have a positive effect on growth. This finding is robust to including further controls, splitting up the sample into different groups of countries, and extending the model to a dynamic setting. The third and the last chapter of the dissertation, "Financial Harmonization and Financial Development: An Application of Europe's Financial Services Action Plan" examines the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the European Commission which intends to create an open, secure, integrated financial market across EU member countries. Although recent research has shown a positive impact of the FSAP directives on cross-border lending and industrial growth the effect on financial development remains to be examined. Using principal component analysis to construct financial, banking sector, bond and stock market development indices, this paper investigates the impact of financial harmonization policies of the FSAP on financial development in a panel of twenty five EU member states for the period of 1996 – 2007. Taking into account the timing perspective in implementing the FSAP directives across countries financial harmonization is found to positively affect financial development. The results are shown to be robust to different approaches in constructing the harmonization index and the harmonization difference (relative timing of adoption) variable, adding further controls, and extending the analysis to include the data for the recent period. ; En los últimos años hemos presenciado un incremento en el número de vínculos entre los países. Esto sin duda es un resultado de lo que se denomina fenómeno de integración. Mirando el lado financiero, los mercados de acciones y bonos se han entrelazadas más entre los países, llevando a una simplificación del comercio de valores y mercancías. Los sectores bancarios a través de fronteras, por otra parte han llegado a estar más unificados, lo que permite a los países a aumentar el número de operaciones para impulsar aún más el comercio y ayudar a promover el crecimiento interno y el desarrollo. Con este propósito, mi tesis estudia el fenómeno reciente de la integración financiera y su efecto sobre el crecimiento económico y el desarrollo financiero. Además se analiza el impacto de las medidas más recientes adoptadas a nivel europeo que se establecieron para promover una mayor integración y armonización. El primer capítulo de la tesis, "Apertura Financiera y Desarrollo Económico: un Análisis utilizando Índices" estudia la relación entre la apertura financiera y el desarrollo económico mediante un análisis de datos de panel de países avanzados y países emergentes. Utilizando los índices, se muestra que la apertura financiera, junto con variables institucionales, educativas y macroeconómicas explica una gran parte de la variación en el desarrollo financiero entre los países ya lo largo del tiempo. El análisis demuestra que las diferentes estrategias de indización podrían ser útiles en la búsqueda de mejores medidas en términos de significatividad para la apertura financiera y el desarrollo financiero en comparación con los indicadores individuales utilizados en la literatura. Los índices de apertura financiera de componentes principales transmiten un efecto positivo en el desarrollo financiero independiente de la estructura de retardos elegida, dummies temporales y tendencias utilizadas. El segundo capítulo de la tesis, "Armonización financiera y Crecimiento Industrial: Evidencia de Europa" analiza los efectos de crecimiento del Plan de Acción de Servicios Financieros (SFAP) de la Comisión Europea, un conjunto de medidas y directivas dirigidas a armonizar los mercados financieros europeos. Utilizando un panel de 25 países y 30 industrias, la especificación estándar predice la armonización a menor crecimiento, aunque el efecto negativo se ve mitigado por las industrias que dependen más de la financiación externa. Este aparentemente sorprendente resultado, sin embargo, se produce como resultado del sesgo de variables omitidas. Como en cualquier aplicación de políticas, los primeros usuarios son más propensos a enfrentar mayores costes y experimentar menores beneficios de armonización. Controlando por el tiempo de adopción, la armonización muestra entonces tener un efecto positivo en el crecimiento. Este hallazgo es robusto a la inclusión de nuevos controles, dividiendo la muestra en diferentes grupos de países, y extendiendo el modelo a un entorno dinámico. El tercer y último capítulo de la tesis, "Armonización Financiera y Desarrollo Económico: Una Aplicación del Plan de Acción de Servicios Financieros Europeo", analiza el Plan de Acción de Servicios Financieros (SFAP) de la Comisión Europea, que pretende crear un mercado financiero integrado, abierto y seguro para los países miembros de la UE. Aunque la investigación reciente ha demostrado un impacto positivo de las directivas del SFAP en los préstamos transfronterizos y el crecimiento industrial, queda por examinar el efecto sobre el desarrollo financiero. Mediante el análisis de componentes principales para la construcción de los índices de desarrollo de los mercados financieros, el sector bancario, y los mercados de bonos y acciones, este trabajo investiga el impacto de las políticas de armonización financieros de la SFAP en el desarrollo financiero de un grupo de veinticinco Estados miembros de la UE para el período de 1996 a 2007. Teniendo en cuenta la perspectiva de los tiempos de implementación de las directivas del SFAP en los países, se concluye que la armonización financiera influye positivamente en el desarrollo financiero. Los resultados se muestran robustos a diferentes enfoques en la construcción del índice de armonización y la diferencia de armonización (tiempo relativo de adopción), a la adición de más controles, y a la extensión del análisis para la inclusión de los datos para el período más reciente.

The high street and the retail sector are facing a period of flux with tremendous pressures from local, national and global consumer trends, including rapid changes in the fiscal climate affecting local authorities. This situation has become particularly acute since the global economic downturn of 2008, which many see as the start of a significant long term global restructuring or the world's economy. Building on the findings of recent Government thinking, including the "Understanding high street performance" report by Genecon and the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills published in 2012, this study argues for a fresh approach to the situation faced by the retail sector, the high street and, more generally, town centres across the country. Instead of a reactive approach to consumer trends, this report argues for a re-think of the strategic positioning of town centres to reclaim them to their rightful position and role as places that serve their communities, visitors, businesses and key stakeholders with a quality of experience that encourages them to keep coming back, staying longer and becoming local residents in due course. In line with this, the achievement of prosperity for town centres is aligned here with their strategic aspirations, and ability to satisfy changing demands, which this report suggests includes a holistic approach to the integration and management of the daytime, evening and night time economies. These three segments of the 24-hr economy should be seen as part of one menu that town centres offer in an economy increasingly driven by customer experience and perceptions. To achieve this, key town centre decision makers - who should include the business community as well as local residents - need first to establish a vision for the future of their town centre that is anchored in the 'personality' or unique characteristics of their town, sometimes referred to as the 'DNA' of the place. The aims of this study are to: 1. Present a set of tools that will help places of different sizes (from small market towns to large city centres and potentially also villages and rural locations) to plot a locally tailor-made strategic road map towards prosperity informed by their stakeholders. 2. Develop and present a state-of-the-art Town Centre Classification Matrix linked to a 'personality' test for town centres. This tool, which can be used for individual retailers and businesses as well as entire towns and tourist destinations, represents the first stage of strategic positioning and includes key elements of perceptions among visitors, residents and businesses. 3. Develop and present a new and clear national performance framework for town centres is presented. This framework is linked to the Town Centre Classification Matrix and allows places to evaluate their current situation and to monitor progress towards their strategic vision or objectives. This is achieved through a ground-breaking approach that effectively demystifies the concept of town centre performance indicators. Each indicator is explained in an approachable manner with data collection methodologies that include the possibility of using commercially available data or adopting a do-it-yourself method to field research locally. 4. Empower and support communities, Town Teams, Portas Pilots, local authority representatives, businesses operating in or near town centres, trader organisations, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), town centre managers, business improvement district managers, policy makers, town planners, charities, national retail associations, shopping centre managers, urban regeneration practitioners, tourism officers, consultancies and researchers. 5. Help locations and centres of all sizes to make key investment decisions adopting a strategic approach using decision support tools (including key performance indicators) that enable decision makers to prioritise and deal with local issues effectively. Additionally, the indicators used in this study also support users who wish to do so in pursuing further market research avenues to gain a better understanding of their town centre and the complexity of interactions between different parameters. This includes the differences that may exist in some places between facts and perceptions (e.g. reported retail crime versus perceptions of crime and safety in the town centre). As in any change management context, it is vital to know the facts so that informed decisions can be taken to prioritise available resources effectively. Based on the findings of this study, there follow ten key recommendations for further action from central government, LEPs, the retail sector and key local decision makers: 1. The role of retail and other businesses (e.g. leisure) in town centres should be revised to adopt a more holistic approach bringing the daytime, evening and night time economies under a common umbrella of strategic positioning and performance. 2. The national performance framework for town centres and Town Centre Classification Matrix presented here should be adopted nationally as part of a wider package to support ailing high streets and town centres. 3. A National Observatory for Town Centre Prosperity should be created for the UK, based on the Town Centre Performance Barometer Toolkit presented here. This national observatory should act as a common database of best practice and avoid simplistic benchmarking or league table approaches. Instead, it should focus on the sharing of innovative and entrepreneurial practices adopted by different town centres to achieve prosperity through inclusive and strategic partnership approaches at all levels. 4. A long term analysis of UK town centre prosperity trends should be carried out on the basis of field data collected using the performance criteria presented in this study. Whilst the indicator-based Town Centre Performance Barometer Toolkit is adequate for a first snap shot of the issues affecting different town centres today, it will only provide limited assistance to locations unless trends can be developed for each indicator through continuous use over a longer time frame. 5. The role of effective and genuine partnership-based place management as a key mechanism in the strategic visioning and delivery of prosperous town centres of all sizes should be recognised and supported by central and local government, urban regeneration professionals, LEPs and key local decision makers. This should apply not only to the operational management of town centres but, crucially, to key decisions affecting their development, including major interventions and regeneration projects with an impact on future growth prospects. 6. The effectiveness of current place management models (including Town Teams, Portas Pilots and Business Improvement Districts, among others) should be investigated further with due attention to place management practice overseas to establish more focused support interventions from the public and private sectors in achieving better results in each case without reinventing the wheel. 7. The impact of high performing town and city centres on neighbouring smaller centres should be investigated further, particularly by LEPs, taking a regional network and impact approach to avoid a polarisation of resources towards a (limited number of) high performing town or city centres or the squandering of resources on duplication in a small geographic area. Similarly, governance issues affecting LEPs and local councils in areas (including town centres) located on different local authority boundaries should be addressed as part of a wider framework. 8. The interactions between town centre performance parameters and their cause-effect relationships should be researched further as there is currently a limited level of evidence and understanding of these beyond relatively simple one-to-one (and not one-to-many) relationships. 9. A better understanding of consumer behaviour within the town centre ecosystem needs to be achieved at both macro and micro level in order to better support long-term decision making for their effective strategic positioning. This study offers a first step towards this by highlighting the importance of visitor perceptions but does not address the deeper and more complex mechanisms that govern the development of these perceptions. 10. The national observatory recommended above should develop further the indicator-based toolkit presented here to create indices linked to a weighting system for individual indicators derived from an extensive nation-wide field research programme on town centre prosperity.

Origin countries' governments are increasingly adopting policies to attract the resources of their migrants and their communities to stimulate development. These policies, sometimes referred to as 'diaspora engagement policies', range from securing the rights and protection of migrants while they are abroad, to strengthening the migrants' sense of national identity and their linkages to the origin country and promoting remittances, financial investments and contributions to development. This study examines migrant communities and organisations from three countries - Ghana, India and Serbia - and explores how the governments of these countries have perceived 'their' respective migrants and, more specifically, the way in which these governments have attempted to engage migrants and their organisations in the interest of national development. The strategies adopted demonstrate various levels of commitment to policies for migrants. At times governments accommodate the needs of migrants into existing policies; other times they design new policies to support the specific needs of migrant communities and some other times they decide not to introduce any national policy to engage the diasporas. In fact, recognizing the value of migrants does not necessarily translate into concrete policies that welcome them to take part in national development. The present study focuses specifically on how origin country governments have formulated and implemented four specific policies: I Facilitation of remittance transfers and finance investments. Several countries have introduced policies to encourage official remittances including increasing the competition among money transfer services leading to reduced transfer fees, expanding the banking and transfer service networks to reach remote areas, and introducing remittance receivers to banking services and savings schemes. In some cases these changes have occurred thanks to financial reforms introduced by governments to open the market to competition and liberalise the foreign exchange. Many obstacles still exist to channel remittances from informal to formal services, not the least the persistent lack of trust of some migrants towards their government and, more generally, the fact that transferring money formally often provides more advantages to the government and service agencies than to the migrants. II Promotion of migrants' investment in small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs) in the origin countries. SMEs represent an exciting potential both for migrants and their origin countries. Most countries, including Ghana, India and Serbia, are willing to dedicate resources to either create institutions to support migrants' enterprises or to promote public events to encourage the diasporas to become part of a transnational network of entrepreneurs. However, the general investment climate in the origin countries continues to be the principal concern of migrants interested in SME development and overall most of the entrepreneurial activities supported by migrants in origin countries are still the result of autonomous activities of individual migrants rather than specific investment programmes. III Encouraging the transfer and circulation of skills. The government of India has created a systematic method to attract the skills and the human capital of its diaspora for the development of various sectors of the Indian economy. Ghana's main concern remains the health sector and it is acting to prevent the departure of its health professionals as well as on attracting Ghanaians abroad to provide temporary service in the national health system. Serbia's interest in this area has not yet been matched by actual policies. The future outcomes of the policies enacted by India are awaited as they will provide valuable lessons for other countries. IV Implementation of collective development projects initiated by migrant organisations. Migrants' potential for development has always been present and migrants have participated in development activities independently or as part of migrant associations for decades. By and large, collective development projects continue to be designed and implemented by migrants and their associations without the intervention of international development agencies or governmental bodies. In the Serbian case, the diaspora has requested the government to provide greater guidance to migrant 4 associations so that they can direct their resources to areas of need. India has recently established an institution to provide such guidance. The case of Ghana offers an alternative view as migrant associations are reluctant to participate in large projects where they do not know personally local actors, particularly if government agencies are involved. As a result, the Ghanaian government's strategy so far has been to showcase the achievements of migrant organisations' projects rather than to intervene. The study also identifies certain aspects that seem to affect the way in which origin country governments respond to their diasporas:  Government's perceptions of its own migrants shape the manner in which migrants are described in public discourse, whether they are seen as a positive or negative force and, as a consequence, whether they are included or excluded from national policy. A country's migration history and trends greatly influence these perceptions and will shape the strategy adopted by a government towards its migrant communities.  The historical relations between a government and its migrants and their communities abroad greatly determine the policy approach taken by a government. Migrant communities that have historically been suspicious of the government's intentions will require much more reassurance from the state that its activities are promoted in the genuine interest of migrants. Establishing positive linkages will be much less difficult for governments that have maintained contact with their migrant communities over time.  The contributions that migrants can make to development may appear to easily fit into a country's national interests. However, it can be difficult for a government to include migrants in its national development plan as migrants add an extra set of interest to existing arrangements. Origin country governments also have the delicate task to find a good balance between the rights provided to migrants and nonmigrants.  Even when a government sees value in engaging its diasporas and believes that a long-term collaboration with migrants could lead to development, it might not have the necessary resources or the institutional capacity to design, implement and evaluate diaspora engagement policies. These policies in fact require the participation of various government departments, which must reach agreement to design cohesive policies and coordinate their implementation. Such availability of time and resources might not always be available in countries where there are more pressing national priorities.  A country's level of development and, even more importantly, a government's commitment to improvement through economic, financial, and social reforms seem to have a strong effect on the outcomes of diaspora engagement policies. Persistent low transparency and accountability, extensive bureaucratic processes and high levels of corruption reduce migrants' interest in becoming involved in development. In some countries, migrants' lack of trust in the government will discourage them from becoming involved in development, particularly when migration and development initiatives involve government agencies.  Pressure from governments and international agencies might push origin countries that are not interested or ready to engage migrants to commit to diaspora engagement policies. These activities seldom turn into action or last beyond the initial period of funding. Government policies to support migrants' involvement in development, as much as migration and development initiatives promoted by international development agencies, must be designed with a clear understanding of the characteristics of the migrants they are meant to support, of the historical relations that exist between the government and its migrants, and the interests and the objectives of the diasporas. Migrants should be given the opportunity to negotiate their own role in national development and to influence development policies. In the end, to be appealing, policies to engage migrants should provide added value not only for the government and its specific projects, but also for migrants who often go beyond their personal call of duty to lend a hand in the development of their origin country.

Until very recently, in the debates on water in the Spanish and European context, the concept of the Human Right to Water and Sanitation (HRWS) evoked foreign realities, typical of Latin American countries or other regions of the global south. However, since the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008, as a result of the consequent emergence of situations of poverty and precariousness, the concern to defend the recognition and implementation of this right became present. The declaration of the HRWS by the United Nations in 2010 (United Nations 2010a,2010b), coinciding with this historical juncture, has promoted processes and debates around its effective implementation at an international, European and Spanish level. The current health crisis and the consequent economic debacle caused by the COVID-19 at the beginning of 2020 have updated the urgency of the debate on the HRWS. In 2015, the plenary session of the European Parliament supported the citizens' initiative Right2Water, which sought to guarantee the right to water for all people and the transposition of the HRWS into the legislation of member states. The current reform process of the Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC) is justified, among other reasons, by the need to adapt these regulations to the aforementioned commitment to coherence. The Right2Water initiative was transferred to Spain, mainly thanks to the encouragement of the Association of Public Water Supply and Sanitation Operators (Asociación de Operadores Públicos de Abastecimiento y Saneamiento Agua, AEOPAS), within the framework of the statewide Public Water Network (Red Agua Pública, RAP), through the Social Pact for Public Water (Pacto Social por el Agua Pública, PSAP). The effects of the crisis also coincided with privatization processes of water services that, justified by austerity policies, European institutions promoted in the countries most affected by the crisis, despite strong social opposition. In some of these countries, such as Spain, the process of privatization has been especially related to the seek of funding by municipalities in crisis, through the perverse mechanism of the 'concession fee', which allows for a rapid injection of money into the municipal treasury in exchange for a decades-long privatization of the service. This process is usually accompanied by increasing rates and greater pressure on users with payment problems. The relations between the causes and consequences of the crisis and privatization, as well as the emergence of situations of water poverty of different types, have led to the present existence of a social movement, with a solid discourse that is committed to defending the human right to water, as well as the model of public management, in our cities. At the same time, the existence of public water management companies, which formally maintain public ownership of the service but practice a mercantile management style (priority of profit and loss accounts, opacity, consideration of users as clients) has led to demands to renew public management models to guarantee compliance with the human right to water in a broad and deep sense, redefined in an antagonistic way: a recognition of access to drinking water and sanitation as a human right rigorously conceived that puts into question the neoliberal logic of managing water services. This is one of the core arguments this article addresses: the HRWS today constitutes the banner of a movement that is articulated around the concept of water as a common good and that is oriented towards the objective of building a collaborative and transparent model of public management. The ownership of water and sanitation services operators (in their different modalities, from strictly public to strictly private formulas) is related to the implementation of the HRWS, which contributes to the reactivation of debates on the need to preserve or recover ('remunicipalización') the public character of these services, and with the need to generate legal frameworks that guarantee effective local democratic policies. To this social dimension, committed to the public and democratic dimension, open to new debates on common goods management, another characteristic is added: the human rights movement in Spain has been in tune from its beginnings in discourse and organizational structure with socio-eco-integrating perspectives of natural resources, aquatic ecosystems management, which is at the foundation of the possibility of implementing the human right to water. This is a relevant and somewhat distinctive quality of the Spanish experience, which contrasts with the unfortunate, although historically explainable, disagreements and conflicts that frequently characterize the social and environmental perspectives in the movements in defense of water. In addition to the above, this article presents a new approach to the typology of water poverties. Until recently, the efforts that have been carried out in the implementation of the HRWS have been focused especially on accessibility, condemning and trying to alleviate the deficits in supply and sanitation coverage in the Global South. In contrast, its recent reception in European countries has focused especially on affordability (prohibition of cuts, guarantee of a vital minimum, social rates) and on implications for governance (transparency, accountability) and the management model (public versus private). However, throughout this research it has been found that accessibility remains a significant problem in certain European regions, especially related to the existence of marginal settlements, slums, homelessness, temporary immigrant workers in rural areas, etc. The problem of HRWS is thus situated in the broader context of access to housing and dignified living conditions, and is related to the marginalization and exclusion of groups or social sectors, due to various factors, generally combined, of economic, cultural and/or ethnic nature. Finally, another issue that this article addresses is the question of the legal regulation of the human right to water in Spain. It will seem strange to a non-expert observer of this matter that after the intense concern, organization and reflection on the subjects that have been mentioned, and which are presented in detail below, and in a country with such a long tradition of water policy and legislation as Spain, we lack a state or autonomic-wide regulatory framework for the management of urban water. And not only do we still lack this or these framework(s) but we have been discussing their need for many years (the jurisdictions and responsibilities over the urban cycle are municipal) and, if they are really needed, their nature, contents and scale of formulation. The article analyzes the keys to this process and ends by presenting the latest propositions on this subject from the HRWS social movement in which its authors are conceptually situated. From a theoretical (urban political ecology) and methodological (transdisciplinary participatory research-action) point of view, the article has been developed in the double framework in which the authors operate. On the one hand, the working group on the urban water cycle of the New Water Culture Foundation (Fundación Nueva Cultura del Agua) and, on the other, the Research Networks of Excellence of the National Research Agency on water poverty (WAPONET, CSO2017-90702-REDT), made up of researchers from seven Spanish universities (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Politécnica de Catalunya, Oberta de Catalunya, Jaume I de Castellón, Alicante, Oviedo, Granada y Sevilla). As a space for transdisciplinary action-participation on which this work has been specifically based, mention should be made of the Andalusian Social Committee on Water (Mesa Social del Agua de Andalucía), whose composition and main activities between 2017 and 2020 are reflected throughout these pages. We owe information, ideas and experiences to all the colleagues who participate in these spaces, where we carried out a real process of co-production of knowledge, throughout years of work in common. ; El derecho humano al abastecimiento y al saneamiento (DHAS) constituye hoy en España y en Europa la bandera de un movimiento que se articula en torno al concepto del agua como bien común y que se orienta al objetivo de construir un modelo de gestión pública participativa y transparente. La materialización efectiva del DHAS se relaciona discursivamente con la titularidad pública o privada de los operadores de los servicios urbanos de agua, lo que ha contribuido a la reactivación de los debates sobre la necesidad de conservar o recuperar el carácter público de estos servicios, y sobre la necesidad de generar marcos jurídicos que garanticen políticas de democracia local efectiva. A esta dimensión sociopolítica, se añade otra característica: el movimiento del DHAS en España sintoniza en discurso y articulación organizativa con las perspectivas socio-eco-integradoras de la gestión del agua como recurso natural, de los ecosistemas acuáticos. Ésta es una cualidad importante y en cierta manera distintiva de la experiencia española, que contrasta con los desencuentros y conflictos que frecuentemente caracterizan a las perspectivas social y ambiental en los movimientos de defensa del agua, y en general de los recursos naturales. Complementariamente a lo anterior, este artículo presenta un nuevo enfoque de la tipología de pobrezas hídricas. La reciente recepción del DHAS en los países europeos se ha focalizado especialmente en la asequibilidad (prohibición de cortes, garantía del mínimo vital, tarifas sociales) y en las implicaciones para la gobernanza (transparencia, rendición de cuentas) y el modelo de gestión (publico versus privado). No obstante, a lo largo de la investigación que se presenta, se ha constatado que la accesibilidad sigue siendo un problema significativo en ciertas regiones europeas, relacionado especialmente con la existencia de asentamientos marginales, chabolismo, personas sin hogar o trabajadores temporeros inmigrantes en áreas rurales. Finalmente, este artículo aborda la cuestión de la regulación legal del derecho humano al agua en España, analizando las claves de este proceso y presentando las últimas propuestas del movimiento del DHAS en el que sus autores conceptualmente se sitúan. Desde un punto de vista teórico (ecología política urbana) y metodológico (investigación-acción participativa transdisciplinar), el artículo se ha desarrollado en el doble marco en el que los autores se desenvuelven. Por una parte, el grupo de trabajo de ciclo urbano del agua de la Fundación Nueva Cultura de Agua (https://fnca.eu/oppa/ciclo-urbano-del-agua); y, por otra, la Red de Excelencia de la Agencia Estatal de Investigación sobre pobreza hídrica (WAPONET, CSO2017-90702-REDT, https://waponet.org/approach/).

Over the past decade, the use of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) by the Moroccan Government has undergone remarkable development in many activity sectors, particularly, infrastructure, agriculture, energy, ports, transportation. etc. This type of partnership in the irrigation sector was initiated in 2005 and concerned the El Guerdane project in the Souss-Massa area. This project commissioning started in 2009; the irrigation of this perimeter was essentially based on pumping water from the aquifer. In addition, the importance of water withdrawals, given the scarcity of inputs, has led to a continuous decline in the water table levels (from 1.5 to 2 m /year). At this rate, the medium and the long term future of the 10,000 ha of citrus was seriously threatened. As a result, the idea of safeguarding this sector came up and was undertaken by the Government. The project to safeguard the citrus-growing area of El Guerdane consists of an annual volume of water transfer estimated to 45 million m3 from the Aoulouz-Chakoukane dam to irrigate 10 000 ha of plantations in the the project's area. Since the commissioning of the El Guerdane project, the Moroccan Government has continued to implement similar projects all over the country. Unfortunately, the Government did not benefit from the return on experience based on completed projects' assessment in order to come out with corrective measures that could have been adopted either within the program's framework or switch for other types of partnership. In this research, we went through several aspects to evaluate the impact of this public-private partnership program. Accordingly, these aspects concern the financial and the agronomic valorization of irrigation water, the farmers' net income, the technical efficiency of farms and the technical and economic efficiency of the use of irrigation water. In order to study the project's impact on the aspects already mentioned, we have selected and defined a control perimeter that did not benefit from this program (the Issen perimeter). In addition, we defined a representative sample to avoid the exogenous factors' effect on our results (the propensity score matching method). Our sample was selected using the software R.3.1.0 and SPSS 23. Furthermore, the impact evaluation was carried out by the double difference method. In this work, we have been interested in qualitative aspect related to the regulation of the El Guerdane project that has been realized in the form of public-private partnership thanks to the interviews carried out with the different actors of this project (farmers, private partner, Government, Regional Office of Agricultural Development, etc.). The estimation of the scores related to the different types of efficiency was carried out using the FRONTIER 4.1 software by choosing a stochastic parametric model and by using a functional Translog form. The analysis of the irrigation water valorization determinants was carried out using an ordinary regression model by the GRETL software, while the analysis of the determinants of the efficiency scores was carried out by a Tobit model using the same software to take into consideration the truncated criterion of the dependent variable. The survey concerned 130 citrus growers in both perimeters studied. For the El Guerdane perimeter, the financial valorization increased from a negative level of -0.637 DH /m3 in 2009 to a positive level of 2.19 DH /m3 in 2016. The agronomic valuation level has improved in the El Guerdane perimeter from 2.59 Kg / m3 in 2009 to 3.65 Kg/m3 in 2016. In 2009, water price and farm size are positively correlated with the level of irrigation water valorization, while the participation in the public-private partnership program is negatively correlated with this aspect (irrigation water valorization). In 2016 only the farms' size impacts the irrigation water valorization in both perimeters. This partnership program was able to improve the financial valorization of irrigation water by 2.1 Dh / m3, the agronomic valorization by 1.05 Kg / m3 and the farmers net income by 10 902 Dh / ha. The farms technical efficiency is affected only by their areas in 2009 and 2016. The technical efficiency of irrigation water use is positively impacted by farm size and negatively impacted by the public-private partnership program in 2009; also, the technical efficiency of irrigation water use is negatively correlated to water price in 2016. The economic efficiency of irrigation water use is negatively correlated to the participation in the public-private partnership program in the year of 2009. However, it was negatively impacted by the water price in 2016 and positively impacted by the partnership program in the same year. The project monitoring shows that during the exploitation years ,all the indicators maintain a positive trend resulting in a record level for some of them such as the volumes taken and distributed to the users. Despite the negative impact of the public-private partnership program on several aspects, in 2009 or in 2016, the social cost of the El Guerdane project remains a significant component that could justify the use of this type of collaboration. Therefore, the use of this mode of management for the irrigation water service will be more relevant if the aspect of the technical supervision of the farmers is taken over by the private partner. ; Au cours de la dernière décennie, le recours par le Maroc aux partenariats public-privé a connu un développement remarquable dans de nombreux secteurs d'activité notamment ceux des infrastructures, de l'agriculture, de l'énergie, des ports, du transport, etc. Ce mode de collaboration dans le secteur de l'irrigation a été lancé, pour la première fois au Maroc, en 2005 et concernait le projet El Guerdane dans la région du Souss-Massa. La mise en service dudit projet date de 2009. L'irrigation de ce périmètre reposait essentiellement sur le pompage à partir de la nappe. Par conséquent, l'importance des prélèvements en eau, devant la rareté des apports, a conduit à une baisse continue du niveau de la nappe (1,5 à 2 m/an). A ce rythme, l'avenir de 10 000 ha d'agrumes se trouvait menacé à moyen et à long terme. C'est ainsi que l'idée de sauvegarde de ce secteur a été initiée par l'Etat. Ce projet de sauvegarde de la zone agrumicole d'El Guerdane consiste en un transfert d'un volume annuel d'eau de 45 millions de m3 à partir du complexe de barrages Aoulouz-Chakoukane au profit de 10 000 ha de plantations dans la zone du projet. Le coût de ce projet s'élevait à plus de 980 MDH. Depuis la mise en service du projet El Guerdane, l'Etat continue à lancer d'autres projets dans le cadre de ce programme de partenariat sans aucune évaluation des projets achevés afin de capitaliser sur les expériences et apporter des mesures correctives dans le cadre du même programme, ou, le cas échéant, opter pour d'autres modes de partenariat. Dans le présent travail, nous nous sommes intéressés à plusieurs aspects pour évaluer l'impact de ce programme de partenariat public-privé. Ces aspects concernent la valorisation financière et agronomique de l'eau d'irrigation, la marge nette des agriculteurs, l'efficacité technique des exploitations agricoles ainsi que l'efficacité technique et économique de l'utilisation de l'eau d'irrigation. Afin d'analyser fidèlement l'impact du projet sur les aspects cités, nous étions dans l'obligation de choisir et définir un périmètre témoin ne bénéficiant pas de ce programme (le périmètre Issen) et d'utiliser une méthode d'échantillonnage très précise afin de contourner l'effet des facteurs exogènes sur les résultats (la méthode d'appariement par score de propension). La méthode d'échantillonnage est effectuée à l'aide des logiciels R.3.1.0 et SPSS 23 et l'évaluation d'impact est réalisée par la méthode de double différence. Aussi, nous nous sommes intéressés dans le présent travail à un aspect qualitatif relatif à la régulation du projet El Guerdane réalisé sous forme de partenariat public-privé grâce aux entretiens effectués avec les différents acteurs de ce projet (usagers, partenaire privé, Etat, Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole, etc.). L'estimation des scores des différents types d'efficacité est effectuée par le logiciel FRONTIER 4.1 en choisissant un modèle paramétrique stochastique et en utilisant une forme fonctionnelle Translog. L'analyse des déterminants de la valorisation de l'eau d'irrigation est effectuée en utilisant un modèle de régression ordinaire par le logiciel GRETL , tandis que l'analyse des déterminants des scores des efficacités est effectuée par un modèle Tobit en utilisant le même logiciel dans le but de prendre en considération le critère tronqué de la variable dépendante. L'enquête du terrain a concerné 130 agrumiculteurs dans les deux périmètres étudiés. La valorisation financière est passée, pour le périmètre El Guerdane d'un niveau négatif en 2009 estimé à -0, 637 Dh/m3 à un niveau positif de 2,19 Dh/m3 en 2016. Pour la valorisation agronomique, on constate aussi que son niveau a connu une amélioration dans le périmètre El Guerdane en passant de 2,59 Kg/m3 en 2009 à 3,65 Kg/m3 en 2016. En 2009, le tarif de l'eau et la taille des exploitations sont corrélés positivement avec le niveau de la valorisation de l'eau d'irrigation, tandis que la participation au programme de partenariat public-privé est corrélée négativement avec cet aspect. Pour l'année 2016 seule la taille des exploitations impacte la valorisation de l'eau d'irrigation dans les deux périmètres. Ce programme de collaboration a pu améliorer la valorisation financière de l'eau d'irrigation de 2,1 Dh/m3, la valorisation agronomique de 1,05 Kg/m3 et la marge nette de 10 902 Dh/ha. L'efficacité technique des exploitations est affectée uniquement par leurs superficies aussi bien en 2009 qu'en 2016. L'efficacité technique de l'utilisation de l'eau d'irrigation est impactée positivement par la taille des exploitations et négativement par le programme de partenariat public-privé en 2009 et elle est corrélée négativement avec le tarif de l'eau en 2016. Concernant l'efficacité économique de l'utilisation de l'eau d'irrigation, en 2009 elle est corrélée négativement avec la participation au programme de partenariat public-privé et en 2016 elle est impactée négativement par le tarif de l'eau et positivement par le programme de partenariat. Le suivi du projet montre qu'au cours des années de son exploitation, tous les indicateurs continuent leur évolution croissante; certains ont même atteint un niveau record, notamment les volumes prélevés et distribués aux usagers. Malgré l'impact négatif du programme de partenariat public-privé sur plusieurs aspects soit en 2009 ou en 2016, le coût social du projet El Guerdane reste une composante non négligeable pouvant justifier le recours à ce mode de collaboration. Par conséquent, le recours à ce mode de gestion pour le service de l'eau d'irrigation sera plus pertinent si l'aspect de l'encadrement technique des bénéficiaires est pris en charge par le partenaire privé.