A Formidable consensus of academic opinion exists on the question of the formation of Malaysia. In its most commonly stated form, this consensus is manifested in an explanation which specifies a date—27 May 1961—and sees Malaysia as the outcome of the attempt to solve the 'Singapore Problem'. The movement towards Malaysia is, with dull regularity, dated from the Tunku's almost casual, certainly very vague, reference to the need for a 'closer understanding' between Singapore, British North Borneo (Sabah), Brunei, and Sarawak, and for 'a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic association' which he made in the course of a speech to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of South-east Asia on 27 May 1961. The Tunku's initiative arose, it is almost invariably argued, from the fear of future events in Singapore. Since the Republicwould in all probability be granted a separate independence by 1963,the British would no longer be in a position to control the island's internal security, defence and foreign relations. The Federation would be deprived of the Internal Security Council through which it had had (in conjunction with the British) direct control over Singapore's internal Malaya viewpoint if an amenable Singapore government could be guaranteed. By May 1961, however, the opposite appeared imminent. There were indications that the PAP was rapidly losing ground. In the Hong Lim by-election held in late April, its candidate was severely trounced. This, combined with the knowledge that no government had in the past managed to win more than one term of office, and full aware-ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, created the impression in Kuala Lumpur that unless something was done, the Republic would become a second Cuba threatening the security of the Federation. The Tunku was convinced, so the argument goes, that the Federation had to ensure control over Singapore's internal security. A reversal of his previous stand on merger was, therefore, necessary. This explanation may be referred to as the security theory on the formation of Malaysia. It has a corollary: having decided that the incorporation of Singapore was necessary, the Tunku had to find a racial counter-balance to the island's Chinese population; the Borneo territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be brought into the Federation of Malaya. Malaysia was thus the logicalsolution to the Singapore Problem. Among those who have propounded the security theory are Willard Hanna, Arnold Brackman, Gordon Means, George Me. T. Kahin, James Gould, Milton Osborne, Tan Koh Chiang, J. M. Gullick, Emily Sadka, Sir Richard Allen and Justus Van der Kroef.
Telegrams exchanged between Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles and the following people: Congressmen, private citizens, the Workers Union of El Aguila Oil Company, governors, the presidents of the State Committees of the Revolutionary National Party, the Socialist Party of the Southeast, the president of the International Association of Livestock and Agriculture, the Revolutionary Union of Oaxacan Proletariats, the Revolutionary Committee for the Defense of the state of Puebla, the Cuicatecan Revolutionary Party from Oaxaca, the Agrarian Committees of Guanajuato, the Association of owners of car rentals from Cuernavaca, the Socialist Liberal Party, the League of Agrarian Communities José García from Jalapa, Veracruz, Divisional Generals, the Institutional Durangueño Party, the Union of Henequen Growers, the League of small and median farmers from Mérida, Yucatán, the President of the Agrarista Zimateco Party from Oaxaca, the Bloc of Confederated Revolutionary Students, the Regional Socialist Party, the president of the Mining and Annexes Company from Baja California, the Revolutionary Party of the Isthmus from Oaxaca, and the Tuxtepeco Democratic Party. The aforementioned telegrams concern the shutdown of churches, requests for employment, Union issues, demonstrations by workers, party assemblies, political campaigns, complaints about land seizures, requests for appointments, nomination of a candidate for Governor, election campaign, purchase of weapons, a request for repealing taxes on car rentals, and increase of fees to the import of jute sacs. / Telegramas entre el Gral. PEC y Diputados, particulares, Sindicato de Obreros de la Compañía de Petróleo El Aguila, Gobernadores, Presidentes de Comités Estatales del Partido Nacional Revolucionario, Partido Socialista del Sureste, Presidente de la Asociación Internacional Agrícola Ganadera, Unión Revolucionaria de Proletarios Oaxaqueños, Comité Revolucionario de Defensa del Estado de Puebla, Partido Revolucionario Cuicateco de Oaxaca, Comités Agraristas de Guanajuato, Unión de Propietarios de Automóviles de Alquiler de Cuernavaca, Partido Liberal Socialista, Liga de Comunidades Agrarias José García de Jalapa, Ver.; Generales de División, Partido Durangueño Institucional, Unión de Productores Henequeneros, Liga de Medianos y Pequeños Productores de Mérida, Yuc., Presidente del Partido Agrarista Zimateco de Oaxaca, Bloque Revolucionario de Estudiantes Confederados, Partido Regional Socialista, Presidente de la Compañía Minera de Anexas de Baja California, Partido Revolucionario Istmeño de Oaxaca y Partido Democrático Tuxtepecano, acerca de: cierre de iglesias, solicitud de empleo, problemas sindicales, manifestaciones de trabajadores obreros, asambleas de partidos, campañas políticas, quejas por despojos de tierras, solicitudes de entrevista, propuesta de candidato a Gobernador, campañas electorales, compra de armas, solicitud de derogación de impuesto a los autos de alquiler y alza a la importación de sacos de yute.
"Manifesto of Mr. Gen. Francisco R. Serrano, Presidential candidate." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. "Mr. General Obregón arrives in Mexico today." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexico, D. F. July 24, 1927. "General Gómez going to Nuevo León." Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. Statements by Mr. Juan Sánchez Azcona, President of the National Anti-reelectionist Party. "Tight regulations for the disarmament in Veracruz." Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. Agreement of the Secretariat of War and Navy about the right to carry arms. The anti-reelectionist student demonstration. Graphic sequence of the demonstration: "Yesterday's student demonstration." Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. Fiery speeches by young speakers against re-election. "Troops quartered since yesterday." Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. "Dr. José Parrés makes a clarification." Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. Statements from the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Development, Dr. José G. Parrés. "There was always violence during Obregón demonstrations." "General Conventions and rallies held in various cities throughout the country to show support of C. Alvaro Obregón's presidential candidacy for the four year term, 1928-1932." EL UNIVERSAL. Mexcio, D.F. July 24, 1927. (Go to planero 1, box 1, folder 4, folder 4). / "Manifiesto del Sr. Gral. Francisco R. Serrano, candidato a la Presidencia". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. "El Sr. General Obregón llega hoy a México". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. "Va a N. León el General Gómez". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. Declaraciones del Sr. Juan Sánchez Azcona, Presidente encargado del Partido Nacional Antirreeleccionista. "Estricta orden para el desarme en Ver." EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. Acuerdo de la Secretaría de Guerra y Marina sobre permisos para portar armas. La manifestación estudiantil antirreeleccionista. Secuencia gráfica de la manifestación: "La Manifestación de ayer del elemento estudiantil". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. Fogosos discursos de jóvenes oradores en contra del reeleccionismo. "Desde ayer quedaron acuarteladas todas las tropas". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. "El Dr. José Parrés hace una aclaración". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. Declaraciones del Subsecretario de Agricultura y Fomento, Dr. José G. Parrés. "Siempre hubo sangre con motivo de la Manifestación Obregonista". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. "Convenciones Generales y Manifestaciones que se han efectuado en diferentes ciudades de la República para patentizar su simpatía a la candidatura del C. Alvaro Obregón a la Presidencia de la República en el cuatrienio 1928-1932". EL UNIVERSAL. México, D.F. Julio 24, 1927. (Pasó al planero 1, cajón 1, carpeta 4, folder 4).
The surprising and flawed U.S. Supreme Court decision in Allen v. Milligan not only might have an impact on Louisiana's congressional districts, but also could affect its state legislative maps – in both cases not immediately but eventually, if at all.
Recently issued regarding Alabama's division of seven congressional districts that left just one majority-minority district where about two-sevenths of the population is black – defined as when somebody claims any black ancestry on the census – the ruling said because a number of jurisdictions nationwide had reapportioned on the basis of interpreting the Voting Rights Act as amended and reauthorized to draw the proportion of M/M districts roughly similar to that of the population, that they should despite the actual wording of the VRA that forbids such a practice. In other words, apply bad law long enough and it magically becomes acceptable due to an unsupportable undue reliance on precedent.
Louisiana has a similar situation where its population is almost a third black (31.2 percent) but of its six districts only one was made M/M. It has a pair of cases addressing this presently in the hands of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and an offshoot where a lower court had arrogated its appealed decision against the state to the Fifth Circuit into an attempt to draw its own map. The Supreme Court placed a stay on all of this activity pending the Alabama decision.
From here, several things could happen once the Court releases its stay. The Fifth Circuit could hear the cases and issue a ruling, which whether directly or more circuitously will end up back in Louisiana's Middle District. Any order to redraw will be appealed, first on the basis of the Alabama decision – which may well succeed given the important differences between that case and Louisiana's – but if that doesn't succeed then on other legal or constitutional bases.
These potential appeals have a good chance of success, when all is considered. Constitutional challenges, as brought up by Assoc. Justice Clarence Thomas in his dissent, present a substantial impediment that would invalidate the Alabama case's interpretation. Even without that, the interpretation could be conditioned by other voting rights statutory jurisprudence, such as extension of Shelby County v. Holder that established the concept of staleness in using race as a criterion for reapportionment, in that instance addressing federal government preclearance – a concept the Court seems poised to invoke outside the sphere of voting rights over affirmative action's use in college admissions.
It's important to understand the place that race, jockeying with several other criteria for reapportionment among which often is conflict, now has as a result of this decision. The special interest plaintiffs argued that race should matter above all else, or that where M/M districts could be drawn, they should be. The state defending argued that race could have no more prominence among the criteria than any other.
The Court majority decided instead to give race a preferred position, but could not go so far as to make it dominant because that would violate the Constitution. Thus, race could play a prime role in a plan, but if it ran roughshod over other criteria – a sentiment first defined in Shaw v Reno and applied in Louisiana through Hays v. Louisiana and its successors – that was an impermissible use.
So, going forward, courts will have to define instrumentally what is the preferred position that passes constitutional muster (if and until that concept isn't voided by a constitutional challenge) and then determine its application to Louisiana's current congressional map. Add to that the Court's Purcell principle, where it doesn't want undue disruption to elections, practically meaning that unless a decision to change boundaries doesn't come at least a couple of months prior to the start of the process for candidates to qualify for the offices in question, the Court will not allow such changes until after the election in question.
When taking this into consideration, and then the separate constitutional challenges that inevitably will appear if the Middle District insists on a plan that includes two M/M districts, it is unlikely that resolution of the controversy will come in time for the 2024 national elections. This makes hasty a call for a special session of the Legislature to deal with reapportionment in case the district court gets insistent, because there's a long way to go before a final judicial resolution that might well have the effect of affirming the maps in the place will take place.
For the same reason, Nairne v. Ardoin, a case brought shortly after legislative reapportionments became law last year, also has no chance affecting this fall's election and any impact it would have would not resonate until the 2027 cycle. As with similar cases, it argues that wherever M/M districts can be drawn, they should be, in its estimation adding at least six to nine such House districts to the 29 in the plan to be used first this fall and three such Senate districts to the 11 in the Senate.
Note this means that for the House the plaintiffs argue for 33.3 to 36.2 percent of districts and 35.9 percent of districts in the Senate to be M/M, where the state has just the 31.2 percent identifying with any black ancestry. That would equate to 33 House and 12 Senate seats if, as the ruling may suggest all else held equal these would be the appropriate numbers – +4 M/M districts for the House and +1 for the Senate.
Of course, all things may not be equal. If the state can show resulting districts producing these changes have really convoluted shapes or really butcher longstanding communities of interest while connecting historically disparate ones, the M/M numbers go down. Also note that this doesn't necessarily mean that fewer Republican-leaning districts would result. For example, House Districts 91 and 98 currently held by white Democrats easily could have one, or even both, flipped into black majority districts without the rearranging of district boundaries to lose any Republican districts. As the GOP will control any reapportionment process in the near future, that's what would happen.
Thus, when reviewing the outcome from this Court ruling any changes to either Louisiana congressional or legislative reapportionment are at least two election cycles away. Further, creation of an additional M/M congressional district is uncertain, and for the Legislature addition of a small number of M/M House districts that the ruling might produce – again, the whole scheme may be declared illegal or unconstitutional – hardly will change the partisan balance in that chamber and almost certainly would not in the Senate.
: December 16, 2009, a few weeks prior to the primaries that would agree on the official contestant of the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S., a group of people in Boston dressed in a way inspired by the American Revolution era. The flags they held symbolized a black rattlesnake on a yellow setting, by means of the slogan "Do not Tread on Me," in the same manner asthe Boston Tea Party of 1773. The public meeting, which was initially and principally an evident movement in the dwelling of the U.S. representative Ron Paul, was held together with a fundraising campaign prearranged by activists, which would make available a 6 million dollars fundraising on the Internet in only one day, owing to 50 individual donations. One year later, a group of Republican candidates swept the Democratic majority in the midterm elections of November 2010 and won 60 more seats in the House of Representatives, celebrating one of the biggest Republican triumphs during the last fifty years. Far from being a trivial movement in 2009, the Tea Party movement, is considered by many to have had a significant impact in this victory. The crystallization of the debate on the health care reform had given the movement unexpected power and influence. Today, they represent a new conservative movement, yet formerly well established in the country.This dissertation explores the rise of Conservative social movements since WWII and the motives behind this. In the last chapter, it focuses on the Tea Party movement asthe latest chapter in the history of the populist conservative movement as the "Party of No."Ianalyze (1) the historical background of the Right's economic theories and ideologies, (2) how the U.S. society has been pulled to the right since the late 1970s in the most continuous political reaction since the Reconstruction era after the Civil War, (3) how welfare programs - as a unifying factor - have been used as a source of fear and fantasy for the Right, and (4) the origins of the movement: the who, what and why of the Tea Party movement and how they changed the American political landscape. ; Le 16 décembre 2009, quelques semaines avant les primaires qui devaient désigner le candidat officiel des partis démocrate et républicain aux États-Unis, quelques habitants de Boston se sont inspirés de la Révolution américaine dans leurs habits. En effet, les drapeaux qu'ils portaient symbolisaient un serpent à sonnette noir sur fond jaune, ayant comme slogan « Don't Tread on Me » (Ne marchez pas sur moi), en s'inspirant du Boston Tea Party de 1773. Le rassemblement public, qui était initialement et principalement structuré dans la demeure du représentant Républicain Ron Paul, a été organisé conjointement avec une campagne de collecte de fonds lancée par des activistes. Cette campagne permettrait de collecter 6 millions de dollars de fonds sur Internet en une seule journée, grâce à des dons individuels de 50 dollars (Sinderband, 2007). Un an plus tard, un groupe de candidats républicains a balayé la majorité démocrate aux élections de mi-mandat de novembre 2010 et a remporté 60 sièges supplémentaires à la Chambre des représentants, célébrant ainsi l'un des plus grands triomphes républicains de ces cinquante dernières années (Zernike, 2010). Loin d'être un mouvement anodin en 2009, le mouvement Tea Party est considéré par beaucoup comme ayant eu un impact significatif sur cette victoire. La cristallisation du débat sur la réforme de santé avait conféré au mouvement un pouvoir et une influence inattendus. Aujourd'hui, ils représentent un nouveau mouvement conservateur, pourtant bien établi dans le pays.Le but de cette thèse est d'analyser la montée des idées et des politiques de la nouvelle droite depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale aux Etats-Unis. Au lieu de considérer la droite contemporaine comme fondamentalement sans rapport avec l'économie et la société conventionnelles des États-Unis, on analyse les nombreuses manières dont le nouveau conservatisme s'inspire profondément dans les débats politiques américains. On considère trois grandes questions : Ces questions sont les suivantes : (1) Existe-t-il une nouvelle droite et, dans l'affirmative, en quoi consiste-t-elle et pourquoi est-elle qualifiée de « nouvelle »? (2) Quel est le rôle des idées dans la formation de la politique gouvernementale ? Et (3) quelles sont les implications du nouveau conservatisme sur l'avenir de la démocratie américaine ?Après l'échec des néoconservateurs sous l'administration Bush et la victoire de Barack Obama en tant que premier président noir de l'histoire américaine, les commentateurs ont déclaré la fin du conservatisme aux États-Unis. Cependant, l'émergence du Tea Party en tant que mouvement populaire influent a tout simplement prouvé le contraire. Dès son apparition, le Tea Party était simplement considéré comme un groupe raciste, craignant l'autorité croissante d'un président noir. La thèse vise donc à révéler que les éléments entourant la réaction du mouvement du Tea Party étaient en réalité plus profonds, allant au-delà d'une simple réaction raciste et remontant à des décennies d'un mouvement conservateur de longue date enraciné dans la vie et la politique américaines.La thèse vise également à examiner les sources de soutien du mouvement Tea Party dans la sphère politique américaine. Entre les événements émergents de 2008 et les élections à mi-parcours de 2010, le mouvement Tea Party est devenu une force de mobilisation importante qui a suscité un intérêt considérable pour la politique américaine. On explique l'origine de la naissance du mouvement Tea Party qui est apparu à ce moment-là, tout de suite après l'élection d'un président démocrate en 2008. Ainsi, afin de comprendre les origines du mouvement, on met en évidence les facteurs qui ont contribué à l'émergence de ce phénomène politique.
Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa's election in October came as a surprise. The 35-year-old heir to a banana empire was an unknown figure in national politics until last year, when he launched a presidential candidacy and exceeded expectations in a debate. His conciliatory tone at a time of polarization and political violence–including the assassination of anti-corruption candidate Fernando Villavicencio–and his emphasis on job creation excited voters, especially young ones.Still, many observers were skeptical that Noboa, the country's youngest president in recent history, had the experience to address Ecuador's daunting economic and security challenges, especially given his abridged timeline. (Last year's special election was to complete the remaining 18 months of former President Guillermo Lasso's term.)The once-peaceful nation is grappling with a surge in violent crime linked to drug trafficking organizations, with homicides up from five per 100,000 inhabitants in 2017 to 45 in 2023. As if that was not difficult enough, Noboa arrived at the presidential palace, Carandolet, with hardly enough money to cover basic government obligations, including the salaries of public employees.Daniel Noboa arrived at the presidential palace, Carandolet, with hardly enough money to cover basic government obligations, including the salaries of public employees."Then, in early January, criminal organizations unleashed a wave of terror nationwide. The leader of the criminal gang Los Choneros escaped from prison, gangsters held prison guards hostage, set off car bombs, and stormed a TV station during a live broadcast.Noboa declared a 60-day state of emergency, which he extended earlier this month for an additional 30 days. After declaring an "internal armed conflict," the president designated 22 criminal gangs as terrorist organizations and deployed the armed forces to improve safety and wrest control of prisons from the inmates.The initial results are mixed. Homicides dropped by over 30% in January compared to the month before, according to the National Statistical and Census Institute. February saw a further 25% decrease. However, other crimes have surged in Guayaquil's metropolitan area, a hub for transnational drug-trafficking organizations. Extortion cases tripled in the first two months of the year compared to the same period in 2023. Kidnappings are also way up, according to Victor Herrera, the area's police chief.Nevertheless, more than 70% of Ecuadorians approve of the president's security strategy, according to Comunicaliza, a pollster, and the president remains popular.Noboa has also taken steps to address Ecuador's economic troubles, and to generate resources to pay for crimefighting. Lawmakers approved a tax reform and an energy sector overhaul, and the president overrode a congressional veto to raise the value-added tax to fund anti-gang efforts. The fiscal reforms are designed to ease negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for a $3 billion agreement and pave the way for support from other international financial institutions.Noboa also sought international support for his security policy, securing equipment and training from the United States and promises of cooperation from Brazil. Still, the recent extension of the state of emergency has raised questions about Ecuador's long-term strategy. What will happen once soldiers return to their barracks?The recent extension of the state of emergency has raised questions about Ecuador's long-term strategy. What will happen once soldiers return to their barracks?"For longer-term solutions, Noboa proposed an 11-question plebiscite that would clarify the role of the armed forces in internal security, increase criminal sentences, and permit extradition. He is building the country's capability to carry out sophisticated criminal investigations, and he recently announced specialized units to combat extortion, kidnapping, and money laundering.Still, broader structural reforms are essential, including to fight public corruption in rule of law institutions. That includes the courts and police, where criminal organizations have developed ties, as was made clear by the recent "Metastasis" and "Purge" investigations. Noboa should also do more to create alternatives for Ecuadorian youth who are likely targets for gang recruitment.None of this is easy, but Noboa's popularity and pragmatism offer a rare opportunity to address the interconnected challenges of security and the economy in Ecuador.
While the hot war in Ukraine continues spreading death and destruction, NATO tries to launch a new cold war with Russia, which would likely be a parody of the Cold War against Stalin and Brezhnev's Soviet Union.A few years ago, after Crimea's annexation by Russia, the proclamation of two separate republics in eastern Ukraine, and the failure of the first Minsk Agreements between Europe and Russia, I closely witnessed how the American military-industrial complex and the foreign affairs bubble in Washington immediately took the occasion to fill the void. On their behalf, the Atlantic Council, a think tank with strong connections with NATO, the Pentagon, and diplomacy, solemnly proclaimed the urgency that "the United States must provide lethal (sic) defensive military assistance to Ukraine." A few days later, the second Minsk Agreements to decentralize Ukraine and set a special status for the two republics in the Donbas were signed —without the participation of the United States, and never implemented. In the further process, Ukraine reformed its constitution to enshrine the "strategic course" of becoming a NATO member. Still in September 2021, NATO was performing military exercises in Ukraine.Putin's criminal mistake of attacking Ukraine has suited those belligerent impulses. Yet, the differences with the Red Scare about the Soviet Union are huge. Now there are no nuclear missiles directed over each other. There is no arms race but arms reduction. Russia does not occupy and controls half of Europe. Communist regimes do not rule one-fourth of the world population. There is no political ideology or intellectual penchant for confronting two antagonistic political and economic systems. There are no pro-Russian political parties with popular support in Western democracies. Local wars in Africa, Asia, or Latin America are not exacerbated by the rivalry between two great powers. The economies are interdependent in a globalized world.On one side, Russia's "most significant and direct threat," as stated by the recent NATO summit, is almost pathetic. Putin's aggressiveness is not driven by the feeling of being strong but by the fear of being weak and inferior, the dread of being surrounded by imminent danger. The Russian Empire lost nearly 20% of its population in the Bolshevik Revolution and the dissolution of the Soviet Union estranged 50% of its inhabitants. As compensation, Crimea and Donbas would add barely 4% to Russia's current population. Russia's army is more powerful than it would correspond to its economy and population sizes. But the old empire keeps declining, and the Ukraine war is an alibi for domestic sufferance and rhetoric of "national unity." On the other side, the rearmament of the US and its allies will be extremely limited. The United States military spending, up to 8% of GDP in the 1980s, is now below 4%. US troops in Europe are less than one-third of those during the Cold War. There will not be a display of new troops but a rotation of a few currently existing ones. The increase of military spending up to 2% of GDP in the other NATO members is just a hypothesis for successive governments and electoral cycles. All in all, NATO's new Strategic Concept looks like the opposite of warrior President Ted Roosevelt's lemma: it is speaking loudly and carrying a small stick. Meanwhile, Ukraine will continue suffering death and destruction. It will not become a member of NATO, which the summit in Madrid did not mention as a possibility, in contrast to its warm support in the 2021 summit. The Ukrainians will also keep dreaming of European Union membership, which took between eight and twelve years for other fourteen former communist countries. The candidate Ukraine is larger than all these countries and the most corrupt and poorest in Europe.We should never forget that politicians' horizon is short-term. NATO's previous Strategic Concept in 2010, which cuddled Russia as a "strategic partner," was canceled less than two years later. In 2024, there will be elections in the United States, the United Kingdom, and to the European Parliament. It is highly dubious that the war will be a relevant campaign issue by then. That year there should also be elections in Russia and Ukraine, but these are to be seen.==In Spanish in El Pais click
Why do people tend to vote for the same political party many years, despite the fact that parties change their electoral programs, their leaders and their candidates in elections? Why do they tend to justify the actions of the party much more easily than others? The answer to those questions is provided by the party identification theory originating in the prominent Michigan school of electoral behaviour research.While there is some evidence that party identification is decreasing in Western countries, the concept is still widely discussed and used in electoral research. There is a huge amount of literature on the measurement issues, changing level of partisanship in US, Europe and other countries, on the determinants and the effects of party identification. The empirical evidence on the formation of the party identification in new democracies, however, is scarce. The case of Lithuania, therefore, is interesting and informative.The aim of the article is to examine the factors of the emergence of party identification in Lithuania, trying to reveal the mechanisms of the formation of partisanship in the emergent state of party system formation. The analysis is based on the data from the representative face-to-face post-electoral survey carried out in 13 November – 10 December 2012 (N = 1500) for the Lithuanian National Election Study.In the first part of the article, the two rival theories of party identification are introduced and hypotheses about the factors of party identification formation are presented. In the second part, the methodological issues of measurement of party identification are discussed and the level of party identification in Lithuania is examined. The third part of the article focuses on the determinants of party identification. Three main hypotheses are tested. The first hypothesis presumes that party identification derives from the political socialisation in family and depends on the party identification of parents. Family socialisation in Lithuania, however, should only have an impact on those who were born after 1972 because they received their political socialisation in democratic regime. The second hypothesis is related to the theory of social cleavages. It states that the probability of having party identification is bigger for those who feel the salient social cleavage in the society and recognize its political relevance. Finally, the third hypothesis, based on the theoretical claim of Philip Converse, is that party identification depends on the length of democratic experience of electorate.Careful analysis of the level of party identification reveals that no less than a third of Lithuanian electorate could be characterised as party identifiers. Only half of them, however, have an affective relation with their party. The partisanship of the others seems to be based on rational evaluation rather than psychological attachment. The three parties that have most of partisan supporters are the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, the Labour Party and the Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats.The results of the analysis reveal that consistent party identification of parents has an impact on the party identification of their children. The effect, however, is not different for those who are born before and after 1972. It suggests that this is the effect of social network rather than family socialisation. The probability to have a party identification is higher for those who are most anti-communist as it is the dominant political cleavage in Lithuania. The impact, however, is mediated by age and moderated by interest in politics.The impact of age on party identification is considerable but not consistent with the hypothesis. The theory presumes that the probability to have a party identification should consistently grow until the age of 40 and afterwards it should remain constant. The results of the logistic regression, however, reveal that the highest probability to have a party identification is in the 50–59 age group rather than 30–39, even after controlling other variables such as interest in politics, political sophistication and salience of political cleavages. One possible explanation of this finding suggests that party identification is strongest for the generation that was most active in the formation of democratic political system in Lithuania in 1988–1991.
Typed letter to Hays' father regarding 1952 reelection campaign and challenges from candidate Amis Robert Guthridge ; #3 of doing things and my own political philosophy, and I really believe that the results in this race tend to prove their efficacy. One of the best letters I had after the election was from Jim Hurley, an 80-year old friend at Hector, who says, "I have never found you straddling. You always state you position and you didn't ride on somebody else's coattail." Mr. Hurley listens to my broadcasts and he reads my weekly letter, and he has taken the trouble to know where I stand. Moreover, there are few instances in which any Member of Congress can escape taking a position. Even the so-called civil rights compromise is not an evasion, no is it fair to emphasize the element of compromise in my plan. It represents a definite legislative program, one based on the national situation as distinguished from sectional politics. This is one of the difficulties that I will always have to face. Where grave issues are involved I cannot let expediency dictate my position. In some of the prominent debates I have been on the temporarily unpopular side, as in price control, and I have had to be "soft spoken." Anyway, I was ready with an answer if I had had to provide one on this matter of compromise which Amis complained of, and I know you won't interpret this as meaning that I think my record is perfect by any means. I have tried honestly, however, to represent the people of the District and I have tried to find the proper balance between the local and regional interests on one hand and the national and international interests on the other. The welfare of the people of Arkansas has motivated me at all times in the foreign policy decisions, which I think continue to be most crucial ones which the Congress confronts. I wish it were possible for me to fully express my gratitude for all you have done for me; first to get me elected and then to help me hold this position and to build some leadership at home. I could not have held on without the strength you have helped me build and I thank you with all my heart for your interest in what I am trying to do. I hope you can think with me about the national issues as distinguished from the local and State matters. I know they are vital and I do not disparage the problems there at home, but someone must think about the problems of national unity, of a stabilized economy, of a peaceful world, of the nation's security, and of the inter-relationships of modern life that force us to think about what is happening in New York and California, in Japan and Germany. We are living in that kind of world. From the practical standpoint, of course, it is vital that I have your counsel and advice on the impact of these things on the thinking of people at home. I will continue to count upon it and I hope this Fall we can have some meetings that will help us all – not only from my selfish, political standpoint but with the view to acquainting the people at home with my purpose and methods. My three major interests will continue to be (1) the Arkansas River program, (2) the development of policy with reference to dispersal of industry so as to give the agricultural states a better break, and (3) the development of a sound foreign policy. If it would help politically to speak of it, or if it were possible to dramatize it, I would speak of another major interest of my political life, namely, the democratic process itself. I have been deeply concerned all along with our election system and the processes of making and interpreting laws. This involves a large moral element and I think it will become apparent that more thought must be given to improving our political system.
Moldova, a small Eastern European country tucked between southern Ukraine and Romania, is set to host its parliamentary elections in October 2024. These elections will coincide with a referendum on whether Chisinau should join the European Union. Russia, which maintains a modest military presence in Moldova via Transnistria, a Kremlin-backed breakaway region that is internationally recognized as an integral part of Moldova, is alleged to be meddling in preparations for October's elections. The potential for Russian interference has sparked a response from Washington hawks who have been drafting plans to "beat the Kremlin in Moldova" by encouraging NATO's centers of excellence to assist Moldova against any Russian hybrid aggression, deepening U.S.-Moldova defense ties and "solving" the Transnistria issue without Russian participation in diplomatic talks. While allegations of interference by the Kremlin are likely true, an important question should be asked: Is it Washington's responsibility to become even more entrenched in Eastern Europe and risk further escalation with Moscow over a country with little security relevance to the United States?Since Moldova emerged as an independent country after the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States affirmed its commitment to supporting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This commitment was tested not long after Moldova declared independence in August of 1991 when clashes between separatist Transnistrian forces — including Russian remnants of the former Soviet 14th Army — and Moldovan police led to an all-out military confrontation. The conflict ended in a ceasefire that included provisions for a trilateral peacekeeping force compromising Moldovan, Transnistrian, and Russian units, thus securing Transnistria's de facto independence. In the aftermath, Washington has officially supported a peaceful resolution to the territorial dispute, a stance that has historically shaped its approach to the region. But efforts to reach a settlement have gone nowhere since 2003, when one of Vladimir Putin's Kremlin aides, Dmitry Kozak, succeeded briefly in persuading the Moldovan president to sign an accord that would have unified Moldova as a federation and allowed for the continuing presence of Russian troops in Transnistria. Washington opposed the deal in part because it effectively would have closed the door on future Moldovan NATO membership — precisely the reason Russia supported it. A recent CSIS report links Chisinau's future to five factors: Washington's willingness to provide material assistance to Ukraine and Moldova, whether Ukraine manages to stave off Russian forces on the battlefield, whether Moldova's pro-Western President Maia Sandu is reelected this fall, whether Moldova's reform agenda and economic opening with the European Union continues to progress, and whether Moldova can handle an anticipated energy crisis in December 2024. However, as tensions between the United States and Russia have rapidly worsened throughout the Russo-Ukrainian War, now is not the time to "go big" on Moldova, as the report urges. Rhetoric calling for greater involvement in Moldova is nothing new. Hawkish senators, such as the late John McCain and Lindsey Graham, have advocated for increasing "cooperation with, and support for, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and other non-NATO partners," including incorporating Moldova and Georgia into NATO. More recently, former national security adviser John Bolton argued last year that "today's circumstances nonetheless provide a compelling reason for NATO itself to launch efforts to expel remaining Russian forces from Moldova and reduce Moscow's political machinations, voluntarily or otherwise." Regardless of the rhetoric, becoming more directly involved in Moldova's political affairs would yield juice that is not worth the squeeze. Despite the insistence that Moldova's geography and desire to become a functioning democracy make Chisinau a strategic interest for the United States, upgrading involvement in Moldovan political affairs may turn the country into another source of escalation between the West and Russia. In its current state, Moldova is capable of carrying out free and fair elections. Though Freedom House categorized Moldova as "partly free" in its latest annual report, Chisinau scored well in areas such as electing a head of government and other chief national authorities, including parliament. Moldova has achieved this while maintaining constitutional neutrality, which includes avoiding involvement in military alliances. Additional Western interference could be perceived as pushing Chisinau away from its self-imposed neutrality and may not be necessary for Moldova to continue its trajectory of ensuring that its citizens have a voice in how they are governed. From a security standpoint, Moldova faces little threat of being invaded by Moscow as long as Russia remains entangled in its conflict with Ukraine, according to former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Matthew Bryza. "Russia has no ability now to invade Moldova," he told Responsible Statecraft. "Yes, it has a military base there. But I think Russia has enough on its plate right now in Ukraine and…unless it prevails in Ukraine, it won't do something similar in Moldova. Rather than Washington involving itself more fully in Moldovan political affairs, Europeans should take the lead in working toward a peaceful resolution to Transnistria's frozen conflict. By formally resolving the dispute, Moldova's path to eventually joining the EU will be more straightforward. If the EU is unwilling to support Moldova, it should not have accorded candidate status to a country in a territorial dispute with a rogue statelet sympathetic to Russia.However, Washington can encourage the revitalization of talks of the 5+2 dialogue, which includes Russia, Ukraine, the EU, the U.S., the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Moldova, and the authorities in Transnistria itself. While resuming those talks may likely prove difficult so long as the Russo-Ukrainian War continues, all parties have a stake in demonstrating their good faith in working to forge a settlement that puts the Transnistria issue to rest. Political affairs in Moldova, including the Transnistria territorial dispute, have not seriously piqued Washington's interest for a good reason: they are not critical to U.S. national security. Washington must not make Moldova the next proxy war with Russia. Ultimately, Moldova's journey to becoming an EU member is not worth edging the West and Russia toward a new and more dangerous level of escalation.
Inhaltsverzeichnis: The Trump Campaign (2015-2016) -- Chemistry and spin: Putin, Trump and other US candidates -- U.S. Presidential hopeful Trump says he and Putin would be pals -- What President Trump would mean for Russia -- Trump slams Obama, gives Putin an "A" for leadership -- Odd checks, asymmetrical balances -- Losing the Trump card -- From Hillary to Trump: What the Kremlin can expect from the candidates -- Who's afraid of Donald Trump? -- (Editorial): Antidemocracy -- White House and television: Who invented Donald Trump? -- Exceptional case -- Through the looking glass -- Trump as a mirror -- Hillary or Donald, it's all nuts -- Is Mr. Trump the next U.S. President? -- Breaking democracy's morals: The Trump phenomenon makes U.S. politics look more like those of Europe -- The America watchers -- Russia-U.S. relations after the election: "We will be ready for a new start" -- U.S. gives another reason to believe its democracy is deeply flawed -- Good-bye familiar America? U.S. foreign policy: A forecast until 2024 -- Trump card: A Donald Trump Fan Club watched the unthinkable unfold in Moscow -- Hey Trump, come on over! -- Actor's triumph: What to expect from the U.S. President-Elect -- Four years for white men -- Transatlantic backlash -- The U.S. has sneezed and now Russia will catch a cold -- In search of a Russian Trump -- Sergei Glazyev: "Ttrump needs help!" -- What next? forecasts of a new world order -- The shape of things to come -- Will Donald Trump abolish NATO? -- Two faces of American capitalism -- Will Trump tear up the nuclear deal with Iran? -- How will Russia respond to Trump? -- What will the Middle East look like under Putin and Trump? -- Europe turns toward Russia in major foreign policy change -- What are the implications of Israeli-U.S. conflict over U.N. resolution? -- Battle of ideas in Washington -- "There's no reset button. We're either going to get along or we're not" -- Trump changes horses -- Republican Party of regions -- Why Donald Trump is not a Putin agent -- The Crimea for lease: A Russian trail in settlement plans for Ukraine -- Russian lawyer tells State TV she met Trump Jr. to ask for "help" -- Kremlin not surprised by media reports on eavesdropping on Russian Ambassador to U.S. -- Senator blasts resignation of Trump's national security adviser over Russia contacts -- Rendezvous without hope for a reset -- Dancing with Washington -- Russian Ambassador Kislyak on meeting with Trump adviser Flynn: "There were no secrets" -- Spying on Uncle Sam -- One hack too far -- Attacks from Moscow: Did the U.S. believe in Russian hackers? -- America comes out on different sides of Russia -- Five-fake report -- Watergate for Trump -- A world without illusions, myths. "Dangerous but predictable": How Russia spooked the world with hackers and prostitutes -- Munich: Cold talk -- Seducing Europe -- Munich shows Western elite's total discombobulation -- NATO: Trump's burden -- The foundation of the West is shaken, its future uncertain -- The whole earth minus the U.S.: The consequences of America exiting the climate agreement -- How Trump is stealing Eastern Europe right from under Russia's nose -- The world comes to those who wait -- Macron displaces Merkel -- Moscow proposes Trump take a different view of Iran -- Will tomorrow come? -- Trump to halt plan to fight Islamic State with Russia -- U.S. strikes Syria: Trump is a president who no longer calls the shots -- Uncle Donald's show -- We have contact -- President Trump pushes for "Arab NATO" in the Middle East -- Trump appears in the East -- Top salesman -- Trial agreement -- Second nuclear century? -- Donald Trump's nuclear policy: First outlines -- We need an Iran deal with North Korea -- False calm: Why Russia prefers not to notice the nuclear crisis at its borders -- Short victorious war: U.S. President's magic wand to wave in a pinch -- Mutually assured distraction -- Nuclear deterrence: An eternal guarantee -- North Korea nuclear crisis: Why Russia's attempt to get involved in the big game is a bad idea -- Trumponomics -- No golden opportunity -- Russian matryoshka: How many demands for Trump can hide inside Putin? -- Ssergei Lavrov: "We are willing to work with the donald trump administration on the entire agenda" Honeymoon -- Kremlin and White House intent on eliminating negative balance -- "They tricked us": White House didn't expect Tass photographer to cover Trump-Lavrov meeting -- Lavrov briefed Putin on his meeting with Tump -- Opponents shake hands: Results of the first meeting between Putin and Trump -- Worse than under Obama: Why new U.S. sanctions have caused panic in Moscow -- Statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry -- How Putin expelled diplomats and hinted at cooperation with the U.S. -- After sanctions, there's no way back -- Sanctions -- "Trump is his own person.
The song remains the same as Wilson and the Four Dwarves battled among themselves futilely to keep Republican Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry from an expected eventual gubernatorial victory.
Not a band but gubernatorial aspirants Democrat former cabinet member Shawn Wilson; independent trial lawyer Hunter Lundy; and Republicans state Sen. Sharon Hewitt, Treas. John Schroder, and former gubernatorial appointee Steven Waguespack – all met in a candidate forum for the office televised by the Louisiana Public Broadcasting consortium of stations and affiliates. Noticeably absent was Landry, who the latest polls make the clear front runner, followed distantly by Wilson, with the other four unable to crack single digits of support.
For that reason, any analysis of the efforts insofar as specific answers to issues is meaningless without Landry's responses. General impressions of each will suffice from the forum that won't change the dynamics of the contest that will put Landry and Wilson into a runoff, with Landry the clear favorite.
As such, Wilson made the most overtures towards attacking Landry, as if aching for a head start and needing quite a one if he has any chance of achieving the dramatic improvement in fortune necessary to win. That he has a long way to go echoed from the noticeable lack of quality and effectiveness of these sorties, such as the lame assertion that Landry's absence meant anything more meaningful than a front running strategy of playing it safe.
In the meantime, he also managed to convey, despite the polished nature of his rhetoric, his visible shortcomings as a candidate for statewide election in Louisiana. At one point, when Lundy called him an extremist liberal, he ridiculously suggested that his issue preferences on the whole weren't really liberal, much less sharply to the left – this coming from somebody who advocated throughout the forum for much bigger government and thereby the higher taxes to fund it, for abortion on demand, for allowing government mandates to trample constitutional rights, and for allowing medical mutilation of children, and who has a history of consistently stumping for all of the above. Good luck in keeping that information from the state's center-right voting majority.
Predictably most of the fire he got was from Lundy, the placeholder for white liberal populist Democrats who retain social conservatism. He needs to convince black voters – Wilson is black – that he has a better chance than Wilson in a runoff against Landry.
Lundy's biggest hurdle to surmount in this long shot task is himself. The other half of the time when he's not blaming insurance or fossil fuel companies for everything wrong in the state he comes off as a dunce. Halfway through the debate, in a discussion that brought in both his whipping boys, Hewitt and Waguespack had had enough of his act and in their replies in turn schooled him on the intricacies of insurance rate-setting and the current threat of salt water intrusion up the Mississippi River. The very few voters watching were reminded that his platform long on demagoguery and short on facts chock full of raising taxes, spending more money, and punishing his enemies – the same agenda that has put the state so far behind others in economic development.
Hewitt's answers showed a good, and unapologetic, grasp of policy as more than the others she challenged liberal orthodoxy. Waguespack wasn't far behind if more restrained. For his part, Schroder concentrated more on what in retrospect has become a failed strategy of trying to invoke a crusade against corruption as a central theme to his campaign that has failed to generate any excitement for his candidacy.
Just as Lundy needs to detach votes from Wilson, each of the Republicans needs to abscond with a good portion of Landry's intended haul to vault over everybody but Landry into a runoff, and they took a minor potshot at him here and there. Their problem is they don't differ much with him on the issues, leaving little ground on which to criticize and to the extent they need to make the runoff, and the ordnance they tried to deliver wasn't nearly enough nor powerful enough.
Something major needs to explode on the hustings to change this election's trajectory from a Landry win upon dispatching Wilson in the runoff. This forum wasn't it, nor sowed any seeds to cause that.
La preocupación por éste tema de investigación, radica en la anticuada forma de realizar los procesos electorales en los Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados (GAD) del Ecuador, para ser específicos, en los gobiernos seccionales de menores ingresoseconómicos, ya que se ha creado una cultura electoral, en la cual es desarrollada la campaña política de forma improvisada por coidearios, militantes o familiares de los candidatos, a consideración que han formado parte de una campaña anterior, en la que ganaron elecciones. Por lo ende, personas con conocimiento y capacidad no pueden aportar a su país desde sus localidades, pero en la actualidad con la irrupción de la tecnología ha creado un cambio, una revolución digital, pasando de la sociedad de la información, a la sociedad del conocimiento, en la cual las interacciones ya no son vertical o de jerarquías, sino horizontales, por el incremento de la información, es así que las plataformas digitales, las redes sociales juegan un papel importante en la sociedad, creando comunidades unidas por ideas, llegando a más personas que compartan el mismo propósito. Las NTIC, Redes Sociales, Big Data e Inteligencia Artificial, como herramientas tecnológicas para su aplicación en campañas electorales es de vital importancia por cuanto son elementos que están a disposición en el presente siglo, utilizando la mayoría de las personas o teniendo conocimiento de ellos, hasta en lugares recónditos del país, por lo menos uno de ellos, que es la radio; tecnología de mucha data pero que aún se encuentra en vigencia, ya sea de forma análoga o digital. ; The concern for this research topic lies in the antiquated way of carrying out the electoral processes in the Decentralized Autonomous Governments (GAD) of Ecuador, to be specific, in the sectional governments with lower economic incomes, since an electoral culture has been created, in which the political campaign is improvisedly developed by co-leaders, militants or relatives of the candidates who have been part of a previous campaign, in which they won elections. Ecuador since the Republican age has had leaders, both local and national, who have left much to be desired, the economic factor that leads a campaign, with its inseparable companion, the populism, is always a constant. Therefore, people with knowledge and ability cannot contribute to their country from their localities, but nowadays, with the irruption of technology, a change has been created, a digital revolution, moving from the society of the information, to the society of the knowledge, in which interactions are no longer vertical or hierarchical, but horizontal, due to the increase in information. Thus, digital platforms and social networks play an important role in society, creating communities united by ideas, reaching more people who share the same purpose. The ICTs, Social Networks, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, as technological tools for their application in electoral campaigns are of vital importance because they are elements that are available in this century, that are used by most people or at least they have knowledge of them, even in remote parts of the country, at least one of them, which is the radio; Long-standing but still-in-use technology, whether analog or digital. Thus, a candidate currently has these technological tools, with which, being used well, they can transmit their message and can reach the ideal population to be well received. This is why in electoral processes the ideal management of NICTs and social networks is not an option, but an obligation, since we also have endless data that are created daily, forming Big Data, for which, Artificial Intelligence is indisputably needed to process them and give better results, with which we can better address the citizen to meet their needs and also to recognize that our proposal is the best. Thus, this small study does not intend to create experts in Political Marketing or Cyberpolitics, but it does act as a manual, as a guide, explaining what each technology and social network is for, as well as how to use them efficiently, based on to the segmentation of the country's inhabitants, according to their location in geographical areas, population location; It is understood as urban and rural areas, as well as generational ages, but with technology, we cannot reduce ourselves to those limits.
During the Antebellum Era, many of Thomas Jefferson's concepts became part of the great debate that led to the Civil War. The debate over Jeffersonianism incorporated all aspects of Thomas Jefferson's life. From slavery and agriculture to manufacturing, industrialization, and tariffs, all played a part in the splintering of the American nation. While some would say that slavery caused the Civil War, the real cause was the incompatibility of the various visions Americans held for the future of their nation. Like the great conflict of the 1790s between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, the men of the antebellum era divided over an industrialized nation and an agricultural one. The only difference between the antebellum debate and that of the 1790s was that in the 1830s, 40s, and 50s, all parties claimed to be rooted in the political ideals of Thomas Jefferson. This crisis of Jeffersonianism began in the early 1830s, when South Carolina nullified the Tariff of 1832. The reactions of President Andrew Jackson during the Nullification Crisis led to the creation of political ideologies that opposed the Jacksonian Democrats. The two most important political groups were the nationalists and the extreme states' rights men. While the crisis was resolved without bloodshed, it left the political foundations of America in shambles. Neither of the parties formed during the Nullification Crisis were a major party; rather, members of both political parties filled the ranks of these minority groups. Men influential enough to sway the nation their way formed these new political organizations. John C. Calhoun organized the extreme states' rights men. Using Jefferson's theory of nullification laid down in the Kentucky Resolution, he convinced South Carolina to nullify the Tariff of 1832. Like Jefferson, the extreme states' rights men saw agriculture as the future of America. They believed in a central government with little power that could be controlled by the states. Most of the men included in this group lived in the South and then later called for the South to secede. The literary voice of the extreme states' rights men was William Gilmore Simms. Editor, author, and sometimes politician, Simms converted from nationalism to secessionism. Like Calhoun, Simms began changing his political views after the Nullification Crisis. Through his literature, he justified Southern institutions and actions by defining them as Jeffersonian in nature. His defense was that Jefferson was a Southerner, who owned a plantation, as well as slaves, and who made his living from the earth. If it was good enough for Jefferson, it was good enough for America. The nationalists, on the other hand, were the exact opposite. They favored federal power over the states, internal improvements, and an industrialized nation, as opposed to an agricultural nation. They were not against agriculture; however, they believed that agriculture should support the industrialized growth of America. Led by men like Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, the nationalists pushed for internal improvements and the industrialization of America. Like extreme states' rights men, the nationalists claimed to be the heirs of Jefferson. In this case, they drew their Jeffersonian roots from the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. During his presidency, Jefferson actually strengthened the federal government's power, with the Louisiana Purchase and the enforcement of the Embargo of 1807. John Pendleton Kennedy became the voice of the nationalists. Through his writing, he defended nationalist ideologies by poking fun at the South for relying solely on commercial agriculture for its survival. Kennedy believed that the true Jeffersonian vision for America was one in which agriculture supported industry. The farmers of America would feed the workers who produced their items for trade with the rest of the world, creating a flourishing trade system that would strengthen American power. The crisis in Jeffersonianism affected all areas of American society, from North to South, and East to West. However, the different political ideologies could not be contained within individual sections of the country. The politics of the time were confusing, because men bounced from party to party on a whim. Every election year saw the major-party candidates fighting for nominations in their own parties, as well as against third-party candidates. In the end, the political crisis ended after the Civil War. The men of the antebellum era strove to build Jefferson's America, but in the process, they adjusted their ways and built Hamilton's instead.
The latest elections showed that the radical right within the EU Parliament has increased its seats and hence political influence. The conservative group of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) gained 7 seats while the Identity and Democracy (ID) group has enlarged its membership by 9.[1] In addition, the radical right can count on the support of 15 MEPs from Alternative für Deutschland and the 11 belonging to the Hungarian Fidesz party. If united, the bloc would gather support from 160 MEPs, being the second political force in the Parliament. However, the so-called radical right is not a cohesive force and therefore its relevance will be highly dependent on political factors. Even because of that, the majority supporting the future Commission is unlikely to change.[2] In a scenario where another centrist majority faces such a right-wing surge, the most critical phase may be the presentation of the EU Agenda 2024-2029, which – aiming at a broad consensus – needs to reconcile not only different national interests but also opposing political views in a coherent framework. The new landscape may drive the future Commission to seek votes from the aforementioned right-wing groups, trading some strategic priorities to avoid the creation of a large anti-Commission bloc in the Parliament. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose importance has grown during the current legislative term due to recent crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, is one of the policy areas that could be impacted by the outlined scenario.Conservatives, radical right and EU foreign policy In the EU Parliament, the radical right is composed of two distinct political families, namely the ECR and the ID group. Despite an approach tendentially Eurosceptic and mistrustful of the current EU integration processes, the ECR group has over the years taken positions more aligned with those of the European People's Party (EPP), especially in foreign policy, where there is a growing pro-Atlantic proclivity, coupled with hawkish attitudes towards Russia.[3] In contrast, the ID group has so far been characterised by a nationalist nature and takes openly hostile positions to the EU, uncooperative in the European Parliament and opposed to any further transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU dimension. The group's markedly nationalistic nature makes it challenging to find a synthesis between the different national claims, which in turn renders a structural and effective collaboration within the group, with the ECR or the EPP more complex. This cooperation is even more difficult in topical areas such as foreign policy whose relevance is steadily growing.Support for Ukraine As of today, it seems likely that the next European Parliament will continue providing financial, logistical and military support to Kyiv, regardless of the electoral results. Therefore, the elections should not translate into a reversal of the EU's support for Ukraine, even in consideration of the positions to date assumed by the ECR, which are often aligned with the current majority.[4] On the Ukrainian issue, the ID group is more fragmented; there are parties like the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) that are traditionally close to Russia and others, such as the Polish and Baltic, which look particularly hawkish on Moscow. Many parties within the group are today openly campaigning to cut the EU aid for Ukraine, sometimes supporting pro-Russian narratives. In October 2023, the European Parliament voted by a vast majority for an aid package supporting Ukraine within the multi-annual financial framework 2024-2027.[5] This same majority might be slightly thinner after the elections. The most sceptical and hostile parties towards the Ukrainian cause may attempt to exploit the budgetary instruments and negotiations in the aftermath of the EU elections to condition the Union's choices in this area, especially concerning reconstruction or new financial loans. Another complex issue to unravel in the next years will be Ukraine's access to the common EU market and its repercussions on the Common Agricultural Policy; the topic is expected to be highly polarising especially within the right-wing camp, as the boycott of Ukrainian grain showcased in 2022.Enlargement After years of stagnation, the enlargement process has been reinvigorated by the war in Ukraine. In the last years, the Commission imprinted to enlargement a new speed, conferring the candidate status upon Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in 2023 and opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, while the situation in Georgia has been made muddled by the recent approval of the so-called "Foreign Agents Law" by the national Parliament. ECR and ID's political stances about enlargement are taking quite divergent trajectories. The parties that constitute the ID group are openly opposed to the enlargement process, mainly because of the consequences in terms of expected migration flows as well as the potential impact on cohesion funds and the overall financial budget of the Union. Differently, the parties within or close to ECR pursue purely national interests in favouring the inclusion of specific candidates while opposing others. This is what happened with the Polish Law and Justice party (PiS) supporting the enlargement towards Ukraine for national security reasons, or Fidesz's favouring the Western Balkans while opposing Ukraine.[6] ECR's positions on enlargement are therefore more blurred and have been profoundly affected by the invasion of Ukraine. The partial narrowing of the gap between ECR and the incumbent majority on this issue is testified by the document that outlines ECR's priorities for the next legislature, where enlargement is defined as "a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity",[7] and will be supported in the next future by the parliamentarian group.[8] Yet, as the enlargement debate is increasingly linked to the reform of the EU Treaties, the ECR group tried to disconnect this relationship, stating that "the enlargement process must not be used as a backdoor to introduce […] treaty changes and new powers such as qualified majority voting in the Council on foreign policy issues".[9] The wording indicates a positive attitude towards the enlargement process as long as it will not trigger real institutional changes. Therefore, an increased centrality of the conservatives and the far right may hurdle any reform aimed at relinquishing the member states' veto power in foreign policy or approving any voting mechanisms in the EU Council that may diminish the perceived national influence. Although this attitude may not necessarily halt the enlargement process, the opposition to any reforms at the institutional level could indirectly put the brakes on it in light of the nexus between enlargement, governability and reforms.[10]Defence funding One of the primary fears of a potential right-wing Parliament is the stalling of the shy advancements recently made in the defence field. The latest progress in the CSDP domain has been initiated by the Juncker Commission with the establishment of the European Defence Fund, an instrument intended to improve joint military research and development. The von der Leyen Commission updated this framework with the Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), which, according to proponents, should encourage member states to purchase European defence systems rather than relying on external procurement (mostly the US and South Korea). The significance of these steps should not be underestimated in consideration of the forthcoming rearmament carried out by EU member states, which necessitate topping off the inventories that were supplied to Ukraine. Besides the armament industry, the EU is also focusing on the establishment of a Rapid Deployment Capacity, a small operative standing unit composed of rotating European brigades. The settlement of this force was endorsed by the 2022 Strategic Compass,[11] the EU's major strategic document published (after months of fruitless elaboration) in response to the Ukrainian invasion. When it comes to the radical right groups, the two aspects of defence (industry and operational) must be distinguished. For instance, in terms of development and joint acquisition, the ECR has been a staunch backer of a stronger European defence (and its lawmakers even contributed to the EDIRPA's regulation),[12] while the ID's attitude has been more ambiguous, and the group looks poorly integrated. However, in terms of operational steps, both political groups are extremely suspicious about the formation of a European army or any joint deployment force. The leaders of all of these parties have expressed concern that such an instrument would either threaten the states' sovereignty in a sensitive subject like defence (especially ID)[13] or weaken NATO (especially ECR).Maintenance with no leap forwards Although the two groupings have similarities, it is important to note that the alignments in the future EU Parliament may be more fluid and unpredictable due to current political circumstances. In this regard, two factors could be significant: the formation of the next EU Commission (with the associated political dynamics) and the possible election of Donald Trump in November. From a European standpoint, especially this latter point is sensitive, owing to the growing concern that Europe alone would not be able to sustain Ukraine militarily and economically for long in case of a US disengagement. With these caveats in mind, in the three outlined sectors – Ukraine, enlargement and defence – the first challenge for the ID and ECR groups is to align their respective agendas. The specific political weight of the two formations is linked to their unity and the ability to put forward a set of coherent proposals (or vetoes). While the greater presence of MEPs from the two groups will be noticed across sectors, their ability to influence the next Parliament's policy agenda and especially CFSP will be closely linked to their ability to overcome their internal fragmentation. It is precisely this latter aspect, in light of the heterogeneous nature of the two groups, that seems to limit their effective ability to intervene effectively in the policy areas under consideration. The different stances held by the radical right on the dossiers considered – also subject to the political contingencies of the moment – will hardly undermine EU policy in support of Ukraine. Likewise, defence investments should not suffer profound deviations. The only field at risk of circumvention is enlargement, where the game and the players however transcend the simple divide left-right wing. Against this background, the majority of the radical right in the next EU Parliament will likely endorse the CFSP initiatives at play, but hardly come up with new ideas or proposals, nor accept deep revisions of the current foreign policy framework. Arguably, the different formations on the right side of the Parliament will try to limit any possible reform of the institutional set-up of the CFSP, following the traditional skepticism over an enlargement of the EU competencies in this area. The obstructionism of the radical right on a possible CFSP reform will not necessarily translate into interference with the current initiatives, which mostly maintain an intergovernmental and voluntary approach.Federico Castiglioni and Luca Cinciripini are Researchers in the EU, Politics and Institutions programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI).[1] European Parliament, 2024 European Election Results, https://results.elections.europa.eu.[2] Andrew Gray, Michel Rose and Julia Payne, "EU's von der Leyen Seeks Centrist Allies after Far-Right Election Gains", in Reuters, 10 June 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eus-von-der-leyen-seeks-centrist-allies-after-far-right-election-gains-2024-06-10.[3] ECR Group, The ECR Will Stand by Ukraine until Russia Is Defeated and Beyond, 9 February 2023, https://ecrgroup.eu/article/legutko_the_ecr_will_stand_by_ukraine_until_russia_is_defeated_and_beyond.[4] EPP Group, EPP, S&D, Renew Europe, Greens/EFA and ECR Leaders Call on EUCO to Deliver on Ukraine, 31 January 2024, https://www.eppgroup.eu/newsroom/leaders-call-on-euco-to-deliver-on-ukraine.[5] European Parliament, A Long-Term Solution for Ukraine's Funding Needs, 17 October 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20231013IPR07125.[6] Rosa Balfour and Stephan Lehne (eds), Charting the Radical Right's Influence on EU Foreign Policy, Brussels, Carnegie Europe, April 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/charting-the-radical-rights-influence-on-eu-foreign-policy.[7] The wording adopted by the ECR's document resounds the conclusions of the European Council of December 2023. See: European Council Conclusions, 14 and 15 December 2023, point 13, https://europa.eu/!VTprkk.[8] ECR Group, Priorities 2024-2029, April 2024, point 11, https://ecrgroup.eu/priorities#11.[9] Ibid. However, it is worth noting that Meloni's Italy joined the group of countries in favour of qualified majority voting on foreign policy, thereby contradicting the ECR stance. See Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministries on the Launch of the Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, 4 May 2023, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2595304.[10] Luigi Scazzieri, "The European Parliament Elections: A Sharp Right Turn?", in CER Insights, 30 April 2024, https://www.cer.eu/node/10889.[11] Council of the EU, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, 14 March 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/node/410976_en.[12] Sebastian Clapp, "European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA)", in EPRS Briefings, November 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)739294.[13] Jordan Bardella, "Défense nationale: il faut à la France les moyens de la puissance et de l'indépendance", in L'Opinion, 9 November 2022, https://www.lopinion.fr/politique/defense-nationale-il-faut-a-la-france-les-moyens-de-la-puissance-et-de-lindependance-la-tribune-de-jordan-bardella.
