Изучается роль Британского комитета по внешней политике в формировании Английской школы международных отношений. Рассматриваются вопросы организации, персонального состава участников и формирование повестки работы Комитета. Выделяются этапы работы Комитета, анализируется проблема соотношения Комитета и Английской школы, поднятая в английской литературе последних лет. ; This article analyzes the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and its role in the genesis of the English school of International Relations. The aim of the article is to study the formation and development of the general idea of the School: the concept "international society". Questions of organization, personal staff, agenda formation, periods of the work of the Committee and correlation between the British Committee and the English School are the main research tasks in the article. The sources for the study were the texts of published works by leading members of the English school. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics was a unique scientific project, which worked for 25 years (1959-1985) and became the basis for the English School of International Relations. Historians H. Butterfield, M. Wight, A. Watson, M. Howard, philosophers D. McKinnon and H. Bull took an active part in the work of this seminar. Meanwhile, such persons as Charles Manning, Fred Norhtage, Edward Carr and some other people, who are usually referred to the English School members, did not take part in the British Committee for different reasons. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics consisted of a small group scientists and diplomats who were educated in elite British universities like Cambridge and Oxford. They were acquainted with each other personally. Such a composition of the British Committee demonstrated the aristocratic character of the study of international relations as an intellectual pursuit in the 1950s-1960s in United Kingdom. However, this little group of specialists, many of them were not English, became the symbol of the entire British science of international relations. Is it correct? This is one of the key questions in the article. The main conclusion on this issue is that the Committee was a forum where the general practice of the English School had formed. But the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics and the English School are not synonyms. The English School consists of several generations of scholars and includes a more complex circle of questions than the Committee studied. As a result of such an understanding of the English School, three periods in the work of the British Committee can be distinguished: 1. Late 1950s-1960s, when the agenda and main issues of the British Committee had formed. H. Butterfield and M. Wight were the leading figures. 2. 19721980, when the Committee worked under the leadership of Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. In this period, the conception of international society was formed. 3. 1980-1985, a turn to the problems of human rights and to justice in international relations. The concept of international society was the uniting idea of the English School. It was developed in the Committee, although its genesis traces back to the London School of Economics. The independent states form an international order which consists of norms and institutes, like balance of power, diplomacy, international law and other. This approach to international relations becomes a foundation for the English School international theory in general, although it was formed by a congenial group of experts. The end of the work of the British Committee after Headley Bull died in 1985 was not the end of the English School of International Relations; it exists now, and the number of its adepts is increasing. International institutes and world society, historical sociology and methods of international relations study, humanitarian intervention and international justice are the main aspects of agenda in the English School now.
Статья посвящена проблемам государства в учении евразийцев, одного из наиболее оригинальных и значимых течений русской общесоциологической и политико-философской мысли Русского Зарубежья в 1920-1930-е годы. Проблемы государства, поставленные евразийцами, актуально звучат в нынешнюю эпоху строительства новой российской государственности и в определенной степени обрели свое воплощение в современной политической практике. Согласно классическому евразийскому учению, все народы «России-Евразии» объединены общим «месторазвитием» и представляют собой единый исторический и социокультурный мир, органически соединивший элементы Востока и Запада. В евразийском учении о государстве провозглашается идея сильной власти и могучего государства, которое представляет интересы народа и сохраняет с ним непосредственную связь, сочетая в себе право, справедливость и закон с нормами нравственности, блага и совести. В статье анализируется ключевой евразийский концепт «идеократическое государство», а также сущностные характеристики евразийской концепции государственного устройства, такие, как идеократия, автаркия, идея-правительница, правящий отбор. Структурирующим концептом государства является «общеевразийский национализм», который трактуется евразийцами как архетип идеологии, основа национальной идеи. Анализируются основные принципы социально-экономического устройства евразийского государства, в том числе активное участие государства в хозяйственной жизни страны, сосуществование государственной и частной форм собственности. Согласно евразийской концепции, плановое хозяйство и государственная регулировка культуры это основы автаркического государства, которые защищают страну от экономической и гуманитарной интервенции. Делается вывод, что евразийская концепция государства может быть использована для обогащения современной научной теории, а также для решения задач модернизации российского общества на современном этапе его развития, так как она учитывает специфические национальные, геополитические, исторические и культурные особенности нашего государства и позволяет сохранить самобытность и многообразие евразийского мира. ; The article considers the role of the state in the Eurasian doctrine, one of the most distinctive and significant movements of the Russian sociological and political-philosophical thought abroad in the 1920-1930's. The issues addressed by the Eurasians are still relevant under the current epoch of the new Russian statehood construction and to a certain extent are implemented in the contemporary political practice. According to the classical Eurasian doctrine, all nations of "Russia-Eurasia" are united by the "place of development" and constitute a single historical and socio-cultural world, which organically combines elements of the East and the West. The Eurasian doctrine of the state proclaims the idea of strong government and powerful state, which represents the interests of the people and maintains direct connections with its citizens by combining the law and justice principles with the norms of morality, welfare and conscience. The article examines the key Eurasian concept "ideocratic state" and the essential characteristics of the Eurasian concept of the state system, such as ideocracy, autarchy, idea-ruler, and ruling selection. The key state-forming concept is "Pan-Eurasian nationalism" interpreted by the Eurasians as an archetype of ideology, a basis of the national idea. The authors consider basic principles of the socio-economic structure of the Eurasian state, including active participation of the state in the economic life of the country, the coexistence of public and private properties. According to the Eurasian doctrine, the state-planned economy and the state regulation of culture form the foundations of autarchic states that protect the country from economic and humanitarian intervention. The authors come to the conclusion that Eurasian theory of the state can significantly enrich nowadays scientific theory and help to solve the tasks of modernization of the Russian society at the present stage for it takes into account specific national, geopolitical, historical, and cultural characteristics of our state and allows to preserve the identity and diversity of the Eurasian world.
This research report examines Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the issues surrounding its possible revision in light of the nation's changing security policy. Article 9 stipulates that Japan permanently renounces the right to war and also prohibits the nation from maintaining military forces. For this reason, Japan's highest law is commonly referred to as the 'peace constitution'. Nevertheless, Japan has a sizable and well-equipped Self-Defence Force (SDF) which is increasingly taking part in overseas operations by way of peacekeeping, support and reconstruction for the purposes of maintaining international security. The apparent inconsistencies between the constitutional prohibitions contained in Article 9 and the reality of Japan's SDF have attracted inquiry and have ultimately led to calls for constitutional revision. The change in Japan's foreign and defence policy is due to a number of factors. Of most importance is Japan's security relationship with the United States of America (US) which has placed pressure on successive administrations to engage in conflict situations abroad. Over the past couple of decades, Japan has also been faced with a changed global security environment that is less predictable, especially in regard to the recent upsurge in international terrorism. The change in Japan's security policy has been marked by SDF engagement in non-military support operations, peacekeeping, nation building programs and humanitarian assistance in a range of countries since 1991. While the Constitution has remained unaltered, legislative enactments by the Japanese Diet have allowed for the SDF to assist in operations in the Persian Gulf. Cambodia,Mozambique, Golan Heights, Rwanda, Honduras, East Timor, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq. The Japanese government's willingness to use the SDF in operations abroad has led to serious debate about Article 9 and questions as to whether the Constitution should be revised. Last year, Japan's governing party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP), released a draft constitution that gave Japan the right to maintain military forces for the specific purpose of self-defence. It also provided for the participation of Japanese SDF in overseas operations. Despite this, there is still no agreement between Japan's major political parties and its population on the exact type of constitutional revision that should be implemented. To reach consensus on the specific wording that an amendment will take more public debate is needed. Article 96 of the Constitution requires two thirds majority support in both houses of the Diet as well as a simple majority in a national referendum for an amendment to pass. Japan's recent proactivity in its defence policy appears to indicate a shift in its overall security posture. However, questions still remain with respect to the extent of Japan's strategic aspirations. Although a reversion to old style militarism seems unlikely, there are some Chinese and Korean commentators who are sceptical of Japan's steadily increasing military capacity and its growing willingness to use the SDF in support of its defence interests abroad. The more likely scenario is that constitutional reform will simply lead to circumstances that allow for limited participation of the SDF in global exercises as a responsible member of the international community. Nevertheless, the LDP's insistence on constitutional reform coupled with Japan's growing foreign policy assertiveness has led to anxieties in neighbouring countries. North Korea and China in particular are weary of a resurgence of militarism in Japan. On the other hand, Australia and the US are supportive of Japan's aspirations to play a more active role within the region and its efforts to acquire greater military capabilities. The challenge for Japan will be to find a balance in its defence and foreign policy so that it may enhance its own security without amplifying the existing regional tensions.
В статье анализируется деятельность Бразилии по содействию развитию, которое подразумевает, наряду с гуманитарной помощью и участием в операциях по поддержанию мира, научно-техническое сотрудничество. Научно-техническое сотрудничество включает в себя содействие развитию образования, здравоохранения, сельского хозяйства, применению новых технологий в производстве, ликвидации голода и нищеты в развивающихся странах. Бразильская политика содействия развитию прошла ряд этапов, начиная с поддержки национально-освободительного движения в Африке и Азии, поддержки Движения неприсоединения, расширения своего участия в рамках диалога Север Юг, предложений по формированию НМЭП. Бразильское содействие развитию становится важным инструментом внешней политики страны, которая строится на принципах равноправного сотрудничества, соблюдения норм международного права, невмешательства во внутренние дела других стран.Совершенствование механизмов сотрудничества в целях развития включает в себя прозрачность процессов оказания помощи, расширение партнерства в содействии развитию, внимание к потребностям развивающихся стран, стремление уходить от прямой передачи денег, привлечение и подготовку кадров страны-реципиента. В процесс международного сотрудничества в Бразилии вовлечены более 100 институтов федерального правительства, что отражает диверсификацию внешнеполитического курса страны. Бразильское агентство по сотрудничеству (АВС) при министерстве иностранных дел страны играет большую роль в систематизации процесса сотрудничества, определении концепции и реализации проектов в рамках двустороннего, трехстороннего, многостороннего сотрудничества и помощи странам мира, прежде всего в Латинской Америке и Африке. Бразилия рассматривает содействие развитию не только как обмен опытом в реализации программ, которые оказались успешными в стране, но и разрабатывает новые модели научно-технического сотрудничества, где основой становятся комплексные проекты инновационного характера, расширяющие возможности для национального роста, транснационализации бразильского бизнеса, роста объема внешней торговли. Новая стратегия сотрудничества, которую реализует АВС с 2008 г., позволяет выстроить логическую матрицу каждого проекта, оценить эффективность бразильской модели содействия развитию. Следует отметить тенденцию изменения роли Бразилии в оказании содействия развитию и ее переходе от донора к посреднику в этом процессе. ; This article analyses Brazil's development assistance, which includes scientific and technical cooperation as well as, along with humanitarian aid and participation in peacekeeping operations. Scientific and technical cooperation involves promoting education, health and agriculture, applying new technologies in production and eliminating hunger and poverty in the developing countries. Brazil's policy began with a series of steps, starting with supporting national liberation movements in Africa and Asia, supporting the Non-Aligned Movement, increasing its participation in the North-South dialogue, and contributing to the formation of a new international economic order. Brazil promotes becoming an important instrument of foreign policy, which is based on principles of equal cooperation, respect for international law and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Improving the mechanisms for development cooperation includes making sure aid is transparent, expanding partnerships in promoting development, attending to the needs of developing countries, moving away from direct transfers of money, and attracting and training the population of the recipient country. There are more than 100 federal government institutions in Brazil involved in international cooperation, which reflects the diversification of the country's foreign policy. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays an important role in systematizing the process of cooperation, defining the concept and implementing projects in the framework of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral cooperation and assistance to the countries of the world, especially in Latin America and Africa. For Brazil, promoting development is not limited to exchanging experiences in successful programme implementation , but also includes developing new models for scientific and technical cooperation that are the basis for innovative, complex projects that expand opportunities for national growth, the transnationalization of Brazilian business and increased foreign trade. ABC has been pursuing a new cooperation strategy since 2008 that involves a logical matrix for each project to evaluate the effectiveness of the Brazilian model of development assistance. Brazil's role in promoting development and its transition from donor to mediator is notable.
In its preamble, The Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism (WA) commits the state to becoming: "A society in which respect for mutual difference is accompanied by equality of opportunity within a framework of democratic citizenship". One of the principles of multiculturalism, as enunciated in the Charter, is "equality of opportunity for all members of society to achieve their full potential in a free and democratic society where every individual is equal before and under the law". An important element of this principle is the "equality of opportunity . to achieve . full potential". The implication here is that those who start from a position of disadvantage when it comes to achieving that potential deserve more than 'equal' treatment. Implicitly, equality can be achieved only through the recognition of and response to differential needs and according to the likelihood of achieving full potential. This is encapsulated in Kymlicka's argument that neutrality is "hopelessly inadequate once we look at the diversity of cultural membership which exists in contemporary liberal democracies" (903). Yet such a potential commitment to differential support might seem unequal to some, where equality is constructed as the same or equal treatment regardless of differing circumstances. Until the past half-century or more, this problematic has been a hotly-contested element of the struggle for Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States, especially as these rights related to educational opportunity during the years of racial segregation. For some, providing resources to achieve equal outcomes (rather than be committed to equal inputs) may appear to undermine the very ethos of liberal democracy. In Australia, this perspective has been the central argument of Pauline Hanson and her supporters who denounce programs designed as measures to achieve equality for specific disadvantaged groups; including Indigenous Australians and humanitarian refugees. Nevertheless, equality for all on all grounds of legally-accepted difference: gender, race, age, family status, sexual orientation, political conviction, to name a few; is often held as the hallmark of progressive liberal societies such as Australia. In the matter of religious freedoms the situation seems much less complex. All that is required for religious equality, it seems, is to define religion as a private matter– carried out, as it were, between consenting parties away from the public sphere. This necessitates, effectively, the separation of state and religion. This separation of religious belief from the apparatus of the state is referred to as 'secularism' and it tends to be regarded as a cornerstone of a liberal democracy, given the general assumption that secularism is a necessary precursor to equal treatment of and respect for different religious beliefs, and the association of secularism with the Western project of the Enlightenment when liberty, equality and science replaced religion and superstition. By this token, western nations committed to equality are also committed to being liberal, democratic and secular in nature; and it is a matter of state indifference as to which religious faith a citizen embraces – Wiccan, Christian, Judaism, etc – if any. Historically, and arguably more so in the past decade, the terms 'democratic', 'secular', 'liberal' and 'equal' have all been used to inscribe characteristics of the collective 'West'. Individuals and states whom the West ascribe as 'other' are therefore either or all of: not democratic; not liberal; or not secular – and failing any one of these characteristics (for any country other than Britain, with its parliamentary-established Church of England, headed by the Queen as Supreme Governor) means that that country certainly does not espouse equality.
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In an outcome that appeared unlikely just weeks ago, the Senate passed the $95 billion national security supplemental on Tuesday morning, by a vote of 70-29. Whether the bill will eventually become law remains an open question.The legislation — which included $60 billion in aid for Ukraine, approximately $14 billion in security assistance for Israel, $9.2 billion in humanitarian aid for Gazans and people in other war zones, and almost $5 billion in aid for partners in the Indo-Pacific — received support from 22 Republicans and 48 Democratic senators. Two Democrats, along with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), voted against the package in opposition to the money being sent to Israel as it conducts its retaliatory war in Gaza which has so far resulted in over 28,000 deaths, according to the Gazan health ministry. Among Republicans, support slowly grew during a series of procedural votes, but ultimately less than half of the caucus voted for a bill that was supported by most of party leadership in the Senate. For months, the next tranche of Ukraine aid has been hanging in the balance. After a tumultuous few days, there now appears to be the chance of passage, though the road ahead is murky. Earlier in February, the Senate —which has largely been more supportive of continued aid for Ukraine than has the House — had devised to include border security measures as a way to convince skeptical Republicans to support aid for Ukraine.But the bill was dead essentially as soon as it landed, with a large group of Republicans opposing the border language, which had been negotiated by Sens. Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Kyrsten Sinema (I-Ariz.), and James Lankford (R-Okla.) . Within two days Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, (R-Ky.), who had earlier championed the legislation, acknowledged that "we have no chance to make a law" from the current proposal. Instead, the Senate returned to the Biden administration's plan A, by bringing his sprawling foreign aid package to the floor. A group of Republicans, led by Sens. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), J.D. Vance (R-Okla.), and Mike Lee (R-Utah) used procedural tools to drag the process out, opposing the quick passage of the bill and what they see as a misguided push to keep funding Kyiv's war effort. "It was the bipartisan foreign policy consensus, the experts, that got us into a 20 year war in Afghanistan, where American taxpayers, for two decades, funded things like how to turn Afghanistan into a flowering democracy, or how to ensure that the Afghans had proper American thoughts about gender in the 21st century. Well, maybe that was a waste of money, and maybe the experts were wrong," Vance said during a floor speech on Monday. ""Now, those experts have a new crusade. Now those experts have a new thing that American taxpayers must fund and must fund indefinitely. And it is called the conflict in Ukraine." Following an overnight filibuster, the Senate eventually passed the bill. McConnell declared victory on Tuesday morning. "Today, we faced a clear test of that resolve. Our adversaries want America to decide that reinforcing allies and partners is not in our interest, and that investing in strategic competition is not worth it. They want us to take hard-earned credibility and light it on fire," the minority leader said in a statement. "History settles every account. And today, on the value of American leadership and strength, history will record that the Senate did not blink."Getting this legislation through the House, however, presents another, likely even more difficult, test. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson (R-La.) said late on Monday in a statement that the House will "work its own will on these important matters," and that "America deserves better than the Senate's status quo." Johnson has maintained that the supplemental should include border security provisions, but he has also said that he does want to support Kyiv.If the legislation is ever brought to a vote, it is likely to have enough votes, but Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.), an opponent of Ukraine aid, has pledged to use a "motion to vacate" to remove Johnson from the speakership if he allows a vote on funding Kyiv. Accusations that he had made a "secret deal" with Biden to send more aid to Ukraine was partially responsible for ending Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) term as Speaker last year.To get around this roadblock, congressional Democrats have floated voting to keep Johnson in power if he allows a vote on the national security spending package to proceed. Alternatively, strong supporters of Ukraine in the House could use a discharge petition to overcome opponents of the legislation — a process that can allow a House majority to bypass leadership and force floor action on a bill that has been stuck in committee (RS explained in more detail how this process could work last year).
The aim of this study is the reconsideration of Turkey's geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention.Turkey has signed the 1951 Geneva Convention for the Status of Refugees, by making use of its right to sign the Convention with 'the geographical limitation' due to its unique geographical position. Turkey has declared that it will not grant 'refugee status' to those coming from outside of Europe albeit hosting millions of migrants under 'guest' status for humanitarian reasons. The lifting of the geographical limitation of the 1951 Geneva Convention has been brought to the negotiation table during Turkey's still ongoing attempt to become a member to the European Union. Discussions on the legal status of the Syrians in Turkey during the Syrian Civil War, which started in 2011 and continues in 2017, as a result of the 'open door policy' followed by Turkey, are frequently debated in the EU negotiations regarding the geographical limitation annotated in the Geneva Convention. In the scope of the study, asylum policy of Turkey and geographical limitation are discussed again in the last point reached. Key Words geographical limitation, refugee, asylum seeker, temprorary protection, Syrian asylum seekers, EU Common Immigration and Asylum Policy, 1951 Geneva Convention, Readmission Agreement ; TABLE OF CONTENTS ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL i DECLARATION ii PUBLISHING AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.iii ETHICAL STATEMENT iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v ABSTRACT vi ÖZET. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS….………………………………….viii ABBREVIATIONS .……………………………………………….xi TABLES.……………………………………………….xiii FIGURES .…………………………………………………….xiv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS IN ASYLUM AND IMMIGRATION LAW.8 1.1.INITIAL REGULATIONS ABOUT THE REFUGEE RIGHTS DURING INTERWAR PERIOD 8 1.2.POST SECOND WORLD WAR ERA: PROTECTING REFUGEE RIGHTS, GENEVA CONVENTION AND OTHER LEGAL REGULATIONS. 15 1.3.CONCLUSION 25 CHAPTER 2: ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN UNION COMMON ASYLUM AND MIGRATION POLICIES .27 2.1.WHY MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION NEEDED A COMMON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY? 28 2.2.SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT (1985), SCHENGEN AGREEMENT (1985) AND SCHENGEN CONVENTION (1990) 33 2.3.IRREGULAR MIGRATION: AS A SECURITY THREATENING ISSUE (1990-1999) 40 2.4.INCREASING SECURITY IN THE BORDERS OF EU AND FRONTEX .50 2.5.IMMIGRATION AS A SECURITY ISSUE: LIBERAL AND REALIST PARADIGMS TO THE CASE OF MIGRATION 55 2.6.CONCLUSION 66 CHAPTER 3: TURKEY'S LEGISLATIVE REGULATIONS ON MIGRATION AND ASYLUM AND THE DEBATE REGARDING THE LIFTING OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATION APPLIED BY THE 1951 GENEVA CONVENTION 69 3.1.TURKEY'S MIGRATION HISTORY 75 3.1.1.Turkey as an Emigrant Country 75 3.1.2.Turkey as an Migrant Receiving and Transit Country 79 3.1.3.Encountering Different Immigrant Societies: Iranian and Iraqi Immigrants (1970-1990).82 3.2.LEGAL REGULATIONS IN THE MIGRATION LEGISLATION OF TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS 88 3.2.1.The First Legal Arrangement in Legislation: The 1994 Regulation 88 3.3.EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS: FIRST PROGRESS REPORT AND ASYLUM AND MIGRATION NATIONAL ACTION PLAN INTERIM PERIOD (1998-2005) 91 3.3.1.A Brief History of Turkey-EU Relations 92 3.3.2.First Progress Report and Asylum and Migration National Action Plan Interim (1998-2005) 95 3.3.3.Period Between Asylum and Immigration National Action Plan-Signing of Readmission Agreement (2005-2012) 102 3.3.4.Target Country for Different Migrant Groups: Turkey 109 3.4.TURKEY-EU READMISSION AGREEMENT AND CRISIS OF SYRIANS IN THE TEMPORARY PROTECTION STATUS 116 3.4.1.Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection 117 3.4.2.Turkey-EU Visa Liberalisation Process and Readmission Agreement .119 3.4.3.Crisis of Syrians under Temporary Protection Status and Latest Discussions Related to Lifting of Geographical Limitation 126 3.4.4.Changing Political Conditions (2015-2016) 129 3.4.5.Paris Attack and Return to Fortress Europe Policies 132 3.4.6.Migration Wave of 9 February 2016 and Safe Country-Safe Third Country Discussions 135 3.4.7.Is the Geographic Limitation Attached by Turkey in 1951 Geneva Convention Still Valid? 138 CONCLUSION .…143 BIBLIOGRAPHY .147 APPENDIX 1: ORIGINALITY REPORTS……….…………….177 APPENDIX 2: ETHICS BOARD WAIVER FORMS FOR THESIS WORK.179 ; Çalışmanın amacı 1951 Cenevre Konvansiyonu'na koyulan coğrafi çekincenin yeniden tartışılmasıdır. Türkiye, Mültecilerin Hukuki Durumuna İlişkin 1951 Cenevre Konvansiyonu'nu, bulunduğu coğrafya sebebiyle Konvansiyon'da tanınan 'coğrafi çekince' koyma hakkını kullanarak imzalamıştır. Türkiye, Konvansiyona coğrafi çekince koyarak Avrupa kıtası dışından gelen göçmenleri 'mülteci' statüsü ile kabul etmeyeceğini beyan etmiş ancak insani nedenlerle milyonlarca göçmeni 'misafir' statüsünde sınırları içerisine kabul etmiştir. 1951 Cenevre Konvansiyonu'na koyulan coğrafi çekincenin kaldırılması Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği müzakereleri süresince gündem maddesi olmuştur. 2011 yılında başlayan ve 2017 yılı itibariyle devam eden Suriye İç Savaşı ile birlikte Türkiye'nin izlediği 'açık kapı politikası' neticesinde sınırlarından giren Suriyelilerin Türkiye'de bulundukları süre içerisindeki yasal statüleriyle ilgili tartışmalar, Cenevre Konvansiyonu'na koyulan coğrafi çekinceyi AB müzakerelerinde sıklıkla tartışılan bir konu haline getirmiştir. Çalışma kapsamında, gelinen son noktada Türkiye'nin göç ve sığınma politikası ve coğrafi çekince maddesi yeniden ele alınmıştır. Anahtar Sözcükler coğrafi çekince, mülteci, sığınmacı, geçici koruma, Suriyeli sığınmacılar, AB Ortak Göç ve İltica Politikası, Türkiye'nin Sığınma Politikası,1951 Cenevre Konvansiyonu, Geri Kabul Anlaşma
Abstract: Although philosophy has historically been a constant reference in the debate about human rights, it is noteworthy that it has been little emphasis in the debate on the refugee crisis. Philosophical thinking has resources to offer and can contribute to this important and urgent situation of our time. French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) was concerned about the 21st century migration problem, in particular, the Boat People refugee case, which unfortunately is increasingly confirmed. In this sense, the concept of biopolitics developed by Foucault presents an interesting perspective when analyzing how biopower technologies and the governmentality of risk management are fundamental aspects of the current refugee crisis. Method: The applied methodology follows the basis of philosophical research, with the explanation and articulation of concepts that support the argument of this article. The argument is contextualized with the description of the 1978 Indochina Boat People case and the 2018 Mediterranean Boat People case, observing the Mare Nostrum and Triton operations. The aim is not to make a comparison between both Boat People cases, but to point out that besides the 40 years that separate each event, it is possible to identify aspects of biopolitical governmentality involving national sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. By proposing a reflection on the context presented, the argument seeks to develop what may be called the 'Foucault's triangle'. Thus, it is important to consider that the Foucault's triangle has less claim to be a methodology of scientific work, to be more a heuristic set of research instructions. Thereby, interdisciplinarity plays a fundamental role in the understanding of the argument, counting on studies in the field of law, anthropology, history, international relations, and the emerging paradigm Security Studies. Discussion: This paper aims to propose a philosophical reflection on the current refugee crisis. To this end, Foucault's thought is chosen for two reasons: first, for Foucault's performance in favor of the 1978 Boat People; second, by the theoretical instruments offered by the biopolitical perspective developed by the French author. The discussion considers the articulations between government practices of rescue, protection, securitization, as much as political discourses of national sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, risk management. Therefore, it seeks to reflect on how the presage announced by Foucault can become a way of diagnosing the current refugee crisis. Results: There may be a contribution of philosophy to the current refugee crisis, as philosophical reflection can provide efforts in favor of interdisciplinarity. The biopolitical perspective puts the question of life, of the human being as a species, at the core of the debate on government practices. This does not mean denying the guarantee system or neglecting all acquired rights over time; however, it is necessary to reflect that perhaps it is no coincidence that the growing exacerbation of the refugee crisis is a sign and a challenge for our time. ; Resumo: Embora historicamente a filosofia seja uma referência constante no debate acerca dos direitos humanos, nota-se o pouco destaque que ela tem ocupado em relação à crise dos refugiados. Certamente, o pensamento filosófico tem recursos a oferecer e pode contribuir com essa importante e urgente situação de nosso tempo. O filósofo francês Michel Foucault (1926-1984) preocupava-se com o problema migratório do século XXI, em especial com o caso dos refugiados Boat People, algo que infelizmente se confirma cada vez mais. Nesse sentido, o conceito de biopolítica desenvolvido por Foucault apresenta uma interessante perspectiva ao analisar como as tecnologias de biopoder e a governamentalidade da gestão de riscos constituem aspectos fundamentais da atual crise dos refugiados. Método: A metodologia aplicada segue a base da pesquisa filosófica, com a exposição e articulação de conceitos que embasam o argumento desse artigo. A contextualização do argumento é feita com a descrição do caso Boat People da Indochina (1978) e do caso Boat People do Mediterrâneo (2018), observando as operações Mare Nostrum e Triton. O objetivo não é realizar uma comparação entre os casos Boat People, mas destacar que além dos 40 anos que separam cada evento, é possível identificar aspectos de uma governamentalidade biopolítica envolvendo a soberania nacional e a intervenção humanitária. Ao propor uma reflexão acerca do contexto apresentado, o argumento busca desenvolver o que pode ser chamado de 'triângulo de Foucault'. Com isso, é importante considerar que o triângulo de Foucault tem menos pretensão de ser uma metodologia do trabalho científico, para ser mais um conjunto heurístico de instruções para pesquisas. Desse modo, a interdisciplinaridade desempenha uma função fundamental para a compreensão do argumento, contando com estudos do âmbito do direito, da antropologia, da história, das relações internacionais e do paradigma emergente Security Studies. Discussão: O objetivo desse artigo é propor uma reflexão filosófica acerca da atual crise dos refugiados. Para tanto, o pensamento de Foucault é escolhido por dois motivos: primeiro, pela atuação de Foucault em favor do Boat People de 1978; segundo, pelos instrumentos teóricos oferecidos pela perspectiva biopolítica desenvolvida pelo autor francês. A discussão considera as articulações entre práticas governamentais de resgate, de proteção e de securitização, tanto quanto discursos políticos de soberania nacional, de intervenção humanitária, de gestão de riscos. Portanto, busca-se refletir como o presságio anunciado por Foucault pode se tornar um modo de diagnosticar a atual crise dos refugiados. Resultados: Pode haver uma contribuição da filosofia em relação à atual crise dos refugiados, à medida que a reflexão filosófica pode prover esforços que privilegiam a interdisciplinaridade. A perspectiva biopolítica coloca a questão da vida, do ser humano enquanto espécie, no centro do debate sobre as práticas governamentais. Isso não significa negar o sistema de garantias ou negligenciar todas as responsabilidades atribuídas ao longo do tempo; contudo, é preciso refletir que talvez não seja por acaso que o crescente agravamento da crise dos refugiados seja signo e desafio para nosso tempo.
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Eyal Weizman on the Architectural-Image Complex, Forensic Archeology and Policing across the Desertification Line
Incidents in global politics are usually apprehended as the patterned interaction of macro-actors such as states. Eyal Weizman takes a different tack—an architect by training, Weizman tackles incidents through detailed readings of heterogeneous materials—digital images, debris, reforestation, blast patterns in ruins—to piece together concrete positions of engagement in specific legal, political, or activist controversies in global politics. In this Talk, Weizman—among others—elaborates on methods across scales and material territories, discusses the interactions of environment and politics, and traces his trajectory in forensic architecture.
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
What is—or should be—according to you, the biggest challenge, central focus or principal debate in critical social sciences?
We live in an age in which there is both a great storm of information and a progressive form of activism seeking to generate transparency in relation to government institutions, corporations or secret services. These forms of exposure exponentially increase the number of primary sources on corporations and state and provide also rare media from war zones, but this by itself does not add more clarity. It could increase confusion and increasingly be used disseminate false information and propaganda. The challenge is to start another process to carefully piece together and compose this information.
I'm concerned with research about armed conflict. Contemporary conflict tends to take place in urban environments saturated with media of varicose sorts, whenever violence is brought into a city, it provokes an enormous production of images, clips, sounds, text, etc.
As conflict in Iraq, Syria, Missouri and the Ukraine demonstrate, one of the most important potential sources for conflict investigations is produced by the very people living in the war zones and made available in social networks almost instantly. The citizens recording events in conflict zones are conscious of producing testimonies and evidence, and importantly so, they do so on their own terms. The emergence of citizen journalists/witness has already restructured the fields of journalism with most footage composing Al Jazeera broadcasts, for example, being produced by non-professional media. The addition of a huge multiplicity of primary sources, live testimonies and filmed records of events, challenge research methods and evidentiary practices. There is much locational and spatial information that can be harvested from within these blurry, shaky and unedited images/clips and architectural methodologies are essential in reconstructing incidents in space. Architecture is a good framework to understand the world, alongside others.
Whereas debates around the 'politics of the image' in the field of photography and visual cultures tended to concentrate on the decoding of single images and photojournalistic trophy shots we now need to study the creation of extensive 'image-complexes' and inhabit this field reconstruct events from images taken at different perspective and at different times. The relation between images is architectural, best composed and represented within 3D models. Architectural analysis is useful in locating other bits of evidence—recorded testimonies, films and photos—from multiple perspectives in relation to one other bits of evidence and cross referring these in space.
But 'image complexes' are about interrogating the field of visibility it is also about absence, failures of representation, blockages or destruction of images.
How did you arrive at where you currently are in your thinking about global politics?
I'm an architect, and my intellectual upbringing is in architectural theory and spatial theory. I tend to hold on to this particular approach when I'm entering a geopolitical context or areas that would otherwise be the domain of journalists and human rights people, traditional jurists, etc. Architecture taught me to pay attention to details, to materiality, to media, and to make very close observations about the way built structures might embody political relations.
When I study political situations, I study them as an architect: I look at the way politics turns into a material—spatial practice—the materialization, and at the spatialization, of political forces. Architectural form—as I explained many times—is slowed-down force. My thinking is structured around a relation between force and form. And form, for an architect, is an entry point from which to read politics. So when I look at matter and material reality—like a building, a destroyed building, a piece of infrastructure, a road or bridge, a settlement or suburb or city—I look at it as a product of a political force field. But it is never static. A city always grows, expands or contracts recording the multiple political relations that shaped it.
Buildings continuously record their environment. So one can read political force on buildings. In taking this approach, I am influenced by building surveyors, and insurance people going into a building to look at a scratch in a wall to piece together what might have happened, and what might still happen. So I feel like a kind of property surveyor on the scale of a city at times of war. But in practicing this forensic architecture I also work like an archaeologist: archaeology is about looking at material remains and trying to piece together the cultural, political, military, or social spheres. But I'm an archaeologist of very recent past or of the present. While some of my investigations will always retain a haptic dimension based on material examination, much of it is an analysis of material captured and registered by various medias. Verify, locate, compose and cross-reference a spatial reality from images of architecture.
What would a student need to become a specialist in your field or understand the world in a global way?
The institutes I run do not recruit only architects. We need to open up the disciplinary bounds of education. We work with filmmakers and architects and with artists.
It embodies a desire to understand architecture as a field of inquiry, with which you can interrogate reality as it is effectively registering material transformation. I see architecture as a way of augmenting our way of seeing things in the world, but it's not for me a kind of sacred field that should not be touched or changed.
But I'm also using architecture across the entire spectrum of its relation to politics, from the very dystopian—with forensic architecture, a kind of architectural pathology—to the utopian. I have a studio in Palestine with Palestinian partners of mine, and internationals. Alessandro Petty and Sandi Hilal are in this group, which is called Decolonizing Architure. It's this group that is engaged in very utopian projects for the West Bank and Palestine and the return of refugees and so on. So I use architecture across the entire spectrum, from the very dystopian to the very utopian. Architecture is simply a way of engaging the world and its politics. Space is the way of establishing relations between things. And actually space is not static, it is both a means of establishing relations between people and objects and things. Just as material itself is always an event, always under transformation. So that is something I have taken from architecture and try to bring into politics, but not only in analyzing crimes, but in producing the reality yet to come.
So what we need from people is the desire to understand aesthetics as a field of inquiry, not simply as a pleasurable play of beauty and pleasing kind of effect, but as a kind of very sensorial field, sensorium, in which you can interrogate reality as it is effectively registering material transformation. So I would look simply for that kind of sensorial intensity and high critical approach and understanding and speculating of how it is we know what we think we know. Of course, you cannot see, or you do not know what you see, you do not have the language to interpret or question what it is you 'see' without abstract constructs. This means I don't necessarily look for theoretical capacities in people: I see theory as a way of augmenting our way of seeing things in the world, of registering them, of decoding them, but it's not for me a kind of sacred field to which I submit in any way.
So what is it you work on now?
I'm mostly trying to establish forensic architecture as a critical field of practice and as an agency that produce and disseminate evidence about war crimes in urban context. Recent forensic investigations in Guatemala and in the Israeli Negev involved the intersection of violence and environmental transformations, even climate change. For trials and truth commissions, we analyze the extent to which environmental transformation intersect with conflict.
The imaging of this previously invisible types of violence—'environmental violence' such as land degradation, the destruction of fields and forests (in the tropics), pollution and water diversion, and also long term processes of desertification—we use as new type of evidence of processes dispersed across time and space. There are other conflicts that unfold in relation to climatic and environmental transformations and in particular in relation to environmental scarcity.
Conflict has reciprocal interaction with environment transformation: environmental change could aggravate conflict, while conflict tends to generate further environmental damage. This has been apparent in Darfur, Sudan where the conflict was aggravated by increased competition over arable due to local land erosion and desertification. War and insurgency have occurred along Sahel—Arabic for 'shoreline'—on the southern threshold of the Sahara Desert, which is only ebbing as million of hectares of former arable land turn to desert. In past decades, conflicts have broken out in most countries from East to West Africa, along this shoreline: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. In 2011 in the city of Daraa, farmers' protests, borne out of an extended cycle of droughts, marked the beginning of the Syrian civil war. Similar processes took place in the eastern outskirts of Damascus, Homs, al-Raqqah and along the threshold of the great Syrian and Northern Iraqi Deserts. These transformations impact upon cities, themselves a set of entangled natural/man-made environments. The conflict and hardships along desertification bands compel dispossessed farmers to embark upon increasingly perilous paths of migrations, leading to fast urbanization at the growing outskirts of the cities and slams.
I'm trying to understand these processes across desert thresholds. There has been a very long colonial debate about what is the line beyond which the desert begins. Most commonly it was defined as 200 mm rain per annum. Cartographers were trying to draw it, as it represented, to a certain extent, the limit of imperial control. From this line on, most policing was done through bombing of tribal areas from the air. Since the beginning, the emergence of the use of air power in policing in the post World War I period—aerial control, aerial government—took form in places that were perceived, at the time, as lying beyond the thresholds or edges of the law. The British policing of Iraq, the French in Syria, and Algeria, the Italians in Libya are examples where control would hover in air.
Up to now I was writing about borders that were physical and manmade: walls in the West Bank or Gaza and the siege around it—most notably in Hollow Land (2007, read the introduction here). Now I started to write about borders that are made by the interaction of people and the environment—like the desert line—which is not less violent and brutal. The colonial history of Palestine has been an attempt to push the line of the desert south, trying to make it green or bloom—this is in Ben Gurion's terms—but the origins of this statement are earlier and making the desert green and pushing the line of the desert was also Mussolini's stated aim. On the other hand, climate change is now pushing that line north.
Following not geopolitical but meteorological borders, helps me cut across a big epistemological problem that confines the writing in international relations or geopolitics within the borders organize your writing. Braudel is an inspiration but, for him, the environment of the Mediterranean is basically cyclically fixed. The problem with geographical determinism is that it takes nature as a given, cyclical, milieu which then affects politics—but I think we are now in a period where politics affects nature in the same way in which nature affects politics. The climate is changing in the same speed as human history.
What does your background in architecture add to understanding the global political controversies you engage in?
We are a forensic agency that provides services to prosecution teams around the world. With our amazing members we ran 20-odd cases around the world from the Amazon to Atacama, for the UN, for Amnesty, for Palestinian NGOs, in Gaza of course, West Bank, issues of killings, individual killings in the West Bank that we do now, and much more drastic destructions.
Forensic Architecture is unique in using architectural research methodologies to analyze violations of human rights and international humanitarian law as they bear upon the built environment—on buildings, cities and territories, and this is why we get many commissions. We produced architectural evidence for numerous investigations and presented them in a number of cases in national and international courts and tribunals. We were commissioned by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights to study single destroyed buildings, as well as patterns of destruction, resulting from drone warfare in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Gaza. This study was presented at the UN General Assembly in New York. We developed techniques to locate the remains of buildings and villages overgrown by thick rain forests and presented this material as evidence in the genocide trial of former president Efraín Ríos Montt in the National Court of Guatemala and the Inter-American Court. We quantified and analyzed levels of architectural destruction in Gaza after the 2014 conflict for Amnesty International. We provided architectural models and animations to support a petition against the wall in Battir submitted to the Israeli High Court, helping to win the case.
Recently, we use and deal with the reconstruction of human testimony. Witnesses to war give account of the worst moment of their lives; times when their dear ones have died or hurt. Their memory is disturbed, and tends to be blurred. We have developed a way of very carefully interviewing and discussing with witnesses. Together with them, we build digital models of their own homes. So we can see a very slow process of reconstruction of the relation between memory space and architecture. And events start coming back, through the process of building.
In order to develop this, we needed to explore the historical use of memory and architecture, such as Frances Yates' The Art of Memory (read it here), as well as different accounts on the use of trauma, and bring them into the digital age, bring an understanding of the relation of testimony and evidence into contemporary thinking. Single incidents tend to be argued away as aberrations of 'standard operating procedures'. To bring charges against government and military leaderships, it is necessary to demonstrate 'gross and systematic' violations. This means finding consistent and repeated patterns of violations. Architectural analysis, undertaken on the level of the city is able to demonstrate repetition and transformations in patterns of violation/destruction in space and time—within the battle zone along the duration of the conflict. Architectural analysis is useful not only in dealing with architectural evidence—i.e with destroyed buildings—but also helpful in locating other bits of evidence—testimony films or photos—in relation to one other bits of evidence, and cross referring these in space.
Urban violence unfolds at different intensities, speeds and spatial scales: it is made of patterns of multiple instantaneous events as well as slower incremental processes of 'environmental violence' that affects the transformation of larger territories. We aims to analyze and present the relation between forms of violence that occur at different space and time scales. From eruptive kinetic violence of the instantaneous/human incident through patterns of destruction mapped across and along the duration of urban conflict, to what Rob Nixon calls the 'slow violence' of environmental transformation (read the introduction of the eponymous book here, pdf).
Last question. How does your approach to research relate to, or differ from, approaches to international politics?
To study conflict as a reality that unfolds across multiple scales, we use the microphysical approach—dealing with details, fragments and ruins—as an entry-point from which we will unpack the larger dynamics of a conflict. We reconstruct singular incidents, locate them in space and time to look for and identify patterns, then study these patterns in relation to long terms and wide-scale environmental transformations. This approach seeks to make connections between, what Marc Bloch of the Annales School called 'micro- and macro-history, between close-ups and extreme long shots' in his thesis on historical method. This topological approach is distinct from a traditional scalar one: the macro (political/strategic/territorial) situation will not be seen a root cause for a myriad set of local human right violations (incidents/tactics). In the complex reality of conflict, singularities are equally the result of 'framing conditions' and also contributing factors to phase transitions that might affect, or 'de-frame' as Latour has put it, changes occurring in wider areas. Instead of nesting smaller scales within larger ones, our analysis will seek to fluidly shift from macro to micro, from political conditions to individual cases, from buildings to environments and this along multiple threads, connection and feedback loops.
While in relation to the single incident it might still be possible to establish a direct, liner connection between the two limit figures of the perpetrator and the victim along the model of (international) criminal law, evidence for environmental violence is more scattered and diffused. Instead, it requires the examination of what we call 'field causalities'—causal ecologies that are non-linear, diffused, simultaneous, and that involve multiple agencies and feedback loops, challenging the immediacy of 'evidence'.
Establishing field causalities requires the examination of force fields and causal ecologies, that are non-linear, diffused, simultaneous and involve multiple agencies and feedback loops. Whereas linear causality entails a focus on sequences of causal events on the model of criminal law that seeks to trace a direct line between the two limit figures of victim and perpetrator field causality involves the spatial arrangement of simultaneous sites, actions and causes. It is inherently relational and thus a spatial concept. By treating space as the medium of relation between separate elements of evidence brought together, we aim to expand the analytical scope of forensic architecture. It is inherently relational and thus a spatial concept. By treating space as the medium of relation between separate elements of evidence brought together, field causalities expands the analytical scope of forensic architecture.
Let me illustrate this a bit. Forms of violence are crucially convertible one to another. Drying fields along the Sahel or the Great Syrian Desert, for example, reach a point in which they can no longer support their farmers, contributing to impoverishment, migration to cities, slumnization and waves of protest that might contribute to the eruption of armed conflict. These layers call for a form of architectural analysis able to shift and synthesize information at different scales—from single incidents as they are registered in the immediate spatial setting, through patterns of violations across the entire urban terrain to 'environmental violence' articulated in the transformation of large territories.
Eyal Weizman is an architect, Professor of Visual Cultures and director of the Centre for Research Architecture at Goldsmiths, University of London. Since 2011 he also directs the European Research Council funded project, Forensic Architecture - on the place of architecture in international humanitarian law. Since 2007 he is a founding member of the architectural collective DAAR in Beit Sahour/Palestine. Weizman has been a professor of architecture at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna and has also taught at the Bartlett (UCL) in London at the Stadel School in Frankfurt and is a Professeur invité at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. He lectured, curated and organised conferences in many institutions worldwide. His books include Mengele's Skull (with Thomas Keenan at Sterenberg Press 2012), ForensicArchitecture (dOCUMENTA13 notebook, 2012), The Least of all Possible Evils (Nottetempo 2009, Verso 2011), Hollow Land (Verso, 2007), A Civilian Occupation (Verso, 2003), the series Territories 1,2 and 3, Yellow Rhythms and many articles in journals, magazines and edited books.
Related links
Facultyprofile at Goldsmith Forensic Architecture homepage Read Weizman's introduction to Forensis (2014) here (pdf) Read Weizman's Forensic Architecture: Notes from Fields and Forums (dOCUMENTA 2012) here (pdf) Read Weizman's Lethal Theory (2009) here (pdf) Read the introduction to Weizman's Hollow Land (2007) here (pdf)
Print version of this Talk (pdf)
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