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У Східному Тиморі, який у 2002 р. нарешті здобув незалежність і став суверенною державою Тимор-Лешті, все ще існують гуманітарні проблеми, пов'язані з порушеннями прав людини. Про це заявляють колишні учасники боротьби за незалежність Східного Тимору, які воювали в партизанських загонах під керівництвом Еуріко Гутерріша. Однак після переходу їх лідера на бік індонезійських урядових військ і приєднання в 1976 р. Східного Тимору за Декларацією Балібо до Індонезії, в результаті чого він став її 27-ю провінцією, вони знайшли притулок у провінції Східний Нуса Тенгара (НТТ).Мета статті – з'ясувати статус громадянства колишніх борців за незалежність Східного Тимору в НТТ і відповідальність уряду Індонезії за порушення їх прав. При цьому автор використовував нормативно-правовий і прецедентно-правовий методи дослідження прав людини, засновані на якісному аналізі. У результаті зроблено висновок, що в системі сучасного права в галузі прав людини, яка практикується Організацією Об'єднаних Націй, уряд Індонезії, як носій зобов'язань у галузі прав людини, має виконати 5 зобов'язань, а саме зобов'язання поважати, захищати, дотримуватися прав людини, забезпечувати їх реалізацію і карати всіх, хто порушує права людини. З огляду на те, що колишні борці за незалежність Східного Тимору колись виступали на боці Індонезії, уряд має виконувати свої зобов'язання щодо прав людини, надавши їм можливість отримати статус індонезійського громадянства. Індонезія також повинна вибачитися перед Тимор-Лешті та спільно звернутися до Організації Об'єднаних Націй з проханням виключити 403 імені колишніх борців за незалежність Східного Тимору з списку серйозних злочинів проти людства. Очікується також, що уряд Індонезії негайно виплатить компенсацію 13000 колишніх борців за незалежність Східного Тимору і дозволить їх дітям стати військовослужбовцями, поліцейськими та державними службовцями в Індонезії. ; В Восточном Тиморе, который в 2002 г. наконец обрел независимость и стал суверенным государством Тимор-Лешти, все еще существуют гуманитарные проблемы, связанные с нарушениями прав человека. Об этом заявляют бывшие участники борьбы за независимость Восточного Тимора, сражавшиеся в партизанских отрядах под руководством Эурико Гутерриша. Однако после перехода их лидера на сторону индонезийских правительственных войск и присоединения в 1976 г. Восточного Тимора по Декларации Балибо к Индонезии, в результате чего он стал ее 27-й провинцией, они нашли убежище в провинции Восточная Нуса Тенгара (НТТ). Цель статьи – выяснение статуса гражданства бывших борцов за независимость Восточного Тимора в НТТ и ответственности правительства Индонезии за нарушение их прав. При этом автор использовал нормативно-правовой и прецедентно-правовой методы исследования прав человека, основанные на качественном анализе. Сделан вывод, что в системе современного права в области прав человека, которая практикуется Организацией Объединенных Наций, правительство Индонезии как носитель обязательств и обязанностей в области прав человека имеет 5 обязательств, а именно обязательства уважать, защищать, соблюдать права человека, обеспечивать их осуществление и наказывать всех, кто нарушает права человека. Учитывая, что бывшие участники борьбы за независимость Восточного Тимора когда-то выступали на стороне Индонезии, правительство должно выполнять свои обязательства в области прав человека, предоставив бывшим борцам за независимость Восточного Тимора возможность получить статус индонезийского гражданства. Индонезия также должна извиниться перед Тимор-Лешти и совместно обратиться в Организацию Объединенных Наций с просьбой исключить 403 имени бывших борцов за независимость Восточного Тимора из списка серьезных преступлений против человечества. Ожидается также, что правительство Индонезии немедленно выплатит компенсацию 13000 бывших борцов за независимость Восточного Тимора и позволит их детям стать военнослужащими, полицейскими и государственными служащими в Индонезии. ; East Timor which has now become an independent and sovereign State of Timor Leste in 2002 still leaves humanitarian problems namely human rights violations related to the claims of former East Timor independence fighters who still become refugees at East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) after helping the Indonesian government fight under their leader, Eurico Guterres since integrated with Indonesia by means of Balibo Declaration in 1976 and hence Indonesia succeeded to make the East Timor region as the 27th Indonesian province. The issue that arises now is about the status of former East Timor independence fighters at NTT and the responsibility of the Indonesian government according to human rights law. This paper aims to find out the citizenship status of former East Timor independence fighters at NTT and what should be the responsibility of the Indonesian government toward their claims. The research method used is normative juridical with case and human rights law approaches based on qualitative analysis.Based on the results of the discussion, it was concluded that in the system of modern human rights law that has been practiced by the United Nations, the Indonesian government as the duties bearer has 5 (five) obligations, namely the obligation to respect, protect, fulfill the human rights of the people, promote human rights and punish everyone who violates human rights. Having that former East Timor independence fighters had ever given advantage to Indonesia, the government should fulfill their human rights claims by means of providing facilities for the former East Timor independence fighters to obtain Indonesian citizenship status. Indonesia should also asked apologize to Timor Leste and work together to ask United Nations Organization to abolish the 403 names of former East Timor independence fighters from the black list of human rights serious crimes. The Indonesian government is also expected to immediately give compensation to 13.000 of the former East Timor independence fighters and let their children to become members of army, police and civil servant in Indonesia.

Asylum seekers and refugees continue to face serious obstacles in their efforts to access asylum. Some of these obstacles are inherent to irregular migration, including dangerous border crossings and the risk of exploitation. Yet, refugees also face state-made obstacles in the form of sophisticated migration control measures. As a result, refugees are routinely denied access to asylum as developed states close their borders in the hope of shifting the flow of asylum seekers to neighboring countries.Restrictive migration control policies are today the primary, some might say only, response of the developed world to rising numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. This has produced a distorted refugee regime both in Europe and globally — a regime fundamentally based on the principle of deterrence rather than human rights protection. While the vast majority of European states still formally laud the international legal framework to protect refugees, most of these countries simultaneously do everything in their power to exclude those fleeing international protection and offer only a minimalist engagement to assist those countries hosting the largest number of refugees. By deterring or blocking onward movement for refugees, an even larger burden is placed upon these host countries. Today, 86 percent of the world's refugees reside in a low- or middle-income country, against 70 percent 20 years ago (Edwards 2016; UNHCR 2015, 15).The humanitarian consequences of this approach are becoming increasingly clear. Last year more than 5,000 migrants and refugees were registered dead or missing in the Mediterranean (IOM 2016). A record number, this makes the Mediterranean account for more than two-thirds of all registered migrant fatalities worldwide (IOM 2016). Many more asylum seekers are subjected to various forms of violence and abuse during the migratory process as a result of their inherently vulnerable and clandestine position. As the industry facilitating irregular migration grows, unfortunately so too do attempts to exploit migrants and refugees by smugglers, criminal networks, governments, or members of local communities (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013).The "deterrence paradigm" can be understood as a particular instantiation of the global refugee protection regime. It shows how deterrence policies have come to dominate responses to asylum seekers arriving in developed states, and how such policies have continued to develop in response to changes in migration patterns as well as legal impositions. The dominance of the deterrence paradigm also explains the continued reliance on deterrence as a response to the most recent "crisis," despite continued calls from scholars and civil society for a more protection-oriented and sustainable response.The paper argues that the current "crisis," more than a crisis in terms of refugee numbers and global protection capacity, should be seen a crisis in terms of the institutionalized responses so far pursued by states. Deterrence policies are being increasingly challenged, both by developments in international law and by less wealthy states left to shoulder the vast majority of the world's refugees. At the same time, recent events suggest that deterrence policies may not remain an effective tool to prevent secondary movement of refugees in the face of rising global protection needs, while deterrence involves increasing direct and indirect costs for the states involved.The present situation may thus be characterized as, or at least approaching, a period of paradigm crisis, and we may be seeing the beginning of the end for deterrence as a dominant policy paradigm in regard to global refugee policy. In its place, a range of more or less developed alternative policy frameworks are currently competing, though so far none of them appear to have gained sufficient traction to initiate an actual paradigm shift in terms of global refugee policy. Nonetheless, recognizing this as a case of possible paradigm change may help guide and structure this process. In particular, any successful new policy approach would have to address the fundamental challenges facing the old paradigm.The paper proceeds in four parts. Firstly, it traces the rise of the deterrence paradigm following the end of the Cold War and the demise of ideologically driven refugee protection on the part of states in the Global North. The past 30 years have seen the introduction and dynamic development of manifold deterrence policies to stymie the irregular arrival of asylum seekers and migrants. This array of measures is explored in the second part of the paper through a typology of five current practices that today make up "normal policymaking" within the deterrence regime. Third, the paper argues that the current paradigm is under threat, facing challenges to its legality from within refugee and human rights law; to its sustainability due to the increasing unhappiness of refugee-hosting states with current levels of "burden-sharing"; and to its effectiveness as direct and indirect costs of maintaining the regime mount. Finally, the paper puts forward three core principles that can lay the groundwork in the event of a paradigm shift: respect for international refugee law; meaningful burden-sharing; and a broader notion of refugee protection that encompasses livelihoods and increased preparedness in anticipation of future refugee flows.

In a previous note on these same pages, we made reference to Obama's unpredictable use of executive power and his tendency to overuse it for certain domestic policies, while deferring to the military and foreign policy establishmenton issues he is ambivalent about, such as the international use of force. We also alluded to his tendency to isolate himself and rely excessively on his own judgment in shaping policy, to the detriment of his relations with staff, cabinet and other leaders. The long-drawn decision to seek Congressional approval before striking Syria is a case study of these proclivities.After resisting calls for intervention in Syria by Senate Republican "hawks"and foreign policy specialists since 2011, a year ago Obama conceded that, in spite of his aversion to intervene in "sectarian struggles",certain actions such as the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against the opposition would constitute a "red line" which, once crossed, would automatically bring about an armed response by the United States. This week he had to face the consequences of his own words.Whenrobust evidence of the use of sarin gas by Bashar Al Assad's forces in rebel occupied territory was produced, the President had no choice but to spendthelast week of the month of Augustfrantically building a case for immediate intervention. Acting simultaneously as Chief Executive, policy shaper and his own spokesman, he used several venues, including an NPR interview, to announce to the American people that the time had come to act.But while Secretary of State John Kerry made a compelling speech on the need to act swiftly to punish the "moral obscenity" committed by the Assad regime, Obama appeared much more circumspect in his appeals to the American people. His early words conveyed both his outrage at the disproportionate actions by Assad as well as his empathy with the war-weary American citizens. In private, he confided he had qualms both about the legality and the political legitimacy of military action. In public, his argument focused on the violation of an international convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and the absolutely unavoidable duty to enforce it. But the fact that UN inspectors had not completed their field report on the attack, coupled with the refusal of the UN Security Council to consider armed action, gave him pause and forced him to confront his own doubts once again.In the meantime, momentum was building in the United States where, according to press reports, it was all but certain there would be a military strike to "punish and deter" the Syrian regime, by Labor Day weekend. GOP Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham were vocal in their support of intervention but demanded more than just a punitive strike and showed some impatience towards the President's pondering an action that should have been decided long ago.Abroad, Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia were in favor of the US action. As it is widely known, Russia was against it and that is why the US had to bypass the UN Security Council where Russia has veto power. While NATO allies all offered strong support (indeed, both France and Britain were the first to insist on support for the rebels a year ago), Prime Minister David Cameron was delivered a strong blow when he lost a vote in the House of Commons, with some of his own backbenchers voting against intervention. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, facing a coming election and against the perennial background of German Basic Law constraints, had already told the President that Germany would stand in the sidelines, while offering moral support. The long shadow cast by the Iraqi war around the world once again became evident. But the French President, not required by the Fifth Republic Constitution to consult the legislature, and encouraged by France's recent successful actions in Mali and Libya, remained firm.By Friday, Obama's tortured deliberations came to an end as he abruptly changed courses. Against the advice of his National Security and political advisors team, he made a dramatic announcement from the Rose Garden: his decision on the need for a narrow punitive action against Syria had been made, he said, but he had decided to ask for Congressional authorization first. As Commander in Chief, and in spite of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, he is not obligated to do this. He thus appears to be shifting responsibility onto the legislature while simultaneouslybuying some time to explore diplomatic solutions in the upcoming G-20 summer.The cerebral constitutional law professor and the risk- taking politician in him have made a Faustian bargain. If Congress authorizes the use of force, he will have both legal and political cover for his action while at the same time fulfilling his moral duty of punishing a violator of the Chemical Weapons Convention and of Humanitarian law. If they vote No, he can just blame them for his own lack of action and use all the power of the Presidency on his domestic agenda.It is, in any case, a big gamble, one that has the potential of weakening him and turning him into a lame duck for the rest of his Presidency. The GOP is internally divided on many issues, among them foreign policy, where conservative ideologies run the gamut from minimalist /isolationist to neo-cons/regime- change interventionists and all the shades in-between. And the far left in Obama's own party is against intervention. So there is no guarantee he will get Congressional approval. The cost of losing this vote is enormous: it may set a strong precedent in diminishing Presidential prerogatives.To be fair to the President and his vacillating stance, this is not an easy decision. None of the world leaders have made a compelling public case for a strategic need of intervention in Syria. The proposed limited "punitive" strike will most likely be inconclusive: it will not deter further extreme actions by Assad, who has now been given time to disperse his military assets and capabilities. The strike will not significantly degrade his capacity to fight, and there will be little change in his main goal, namely, to destroy the opposition and regain total control of the country.This is a fight to the end by both sides. If overthrown, Assad and his Alawite supporters (as well as the Christians who have traditionally been under his protection) will be massacred. There are no desirable outcomes in this conflict. The rebels are divided and the biggest group is that ofthe jihadists with strong support of Al Qaeda. While Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel are on the side of the United States and want a moderate alternative to the Assad regime, Iran, to an extent Iraq, and Hezbollah in Lebanon are on the dictator's side (as, incongruously, is Venezuela). The Palestinian group Hamas, previously favoring Assad has now changed sides and is supporting the rebels. So in many ways this is a war by proxy that could become a generalized regional war. There is no indication that the President or anyone else has a political plan or a diplomatic effort in mind for the post-strike scenario.However, US inaction at this time undermines the security of its allies, especially Israel. Even though Netanyahu has adopted a "no comment" stance and hasn't, accordingly, said a word on this issue, other Israeli politicians are worrying out loud about the implications the US lack of resolve will have on other "red lines": Will the United States act when Iran crosses the nuclear threshold? Or will Israel find itself facing Iran alone?They bitterly remind themselves of Obama's speech in Jerusalem, in March this year, when he said in Hebrew: "Atem lo levad" ("You are not alone"). They are very skeptical, now more than ever, that the President will match his lofty rhetoric with action.In the United States the momentum is gone, Congress won't reconvene until September 9, and the President is using the last week of summer to energetically lobby House and Senate leaders and persuade skeptics through intelligence briefings. Urgent issues in the domestic agenda will thus have to be postponed.What no one, either at home or abroad denies, is that the credibility of the Presidency and with it, that of the United States, is at stake. International support for the operation is unlikely to improve. A negative vote by Congress will further weaken the President and may complicate the White House legislative agenda, where he will have to spend all his political capital and still,perhaps, fall short.In a keynote speech to the National Defense University earlier this year, Obama expressed the need to chart a new way in American foreign policy, one that would end the "perpetual wartime footing" that characterized the post 9-11 era, after G.W. Bush got a virtual blank check from Congress in the use of military force and intelligence gathering. So far, Obama has ended two protracted unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is clear he will not engage in regime change. But a new foreign policy strategy has not crystallized yet. There is no Obama doctrine, no overall framework to guide his decisions and give predictability to his actions.His whole approach to the Middle East, the most explosive region in the planet today, is misconceived. His tepid reaction to the Egyptian situation had already given some approximation of how reluctant he is about taking sides in conflicts in the region. Syrian use of chemical weapons has confirmed his ambivalence and exposed his indecision. At the same time, it has provoked a collapse of American credibility abroad, anduncertainty about its reliability as an ally. Regardless of what follows after this week, his hesitancy will have dire consequences for American foreign policy into the future.The larger problem that looms over the heads of world leaders and that few seem to acknowledge is that this is not about Syria or Egypt or Libya or Yemen or Tunisia as separate conflicts; it is a regional conflagration that has to be addressedcomprehensively, within the larger regional and international context. All major actors, whether it is Europe, Russia, or China and of course the United States, have a stake in the region and it is in their interest to define the rules of the game and together find an overall solution to this predicament.

학위논문(석사)--서울대학교 대학원 :공과대학 협동과정 기술경영·경제·정책전공,2019. 8. 황준석. ; Human insurgency is one of the prevalent, incessant, and threatening events happening worldwide. Among many topics of developmental studies, one of the seminal research focuses is to understand and model armed conflicts, which have been suspected to be linked to the capacity of a country in various ways, such as food security, child nutrition, economic welfare, and even environmental issues. Mapping human insurgencies is, therefore, imperative. To cope with the atrocities, there have been previous attempts to uncover the latent patterns of human insurgent incidents. The salient behavior of these insurgencies follows the 'power-law' distribution, which exhibits a heavy-tail. This feature implies that events far from the norm are nontrivial when compared with the normal distribution, where essentially no weight is far from the mean. This pattern indicates that the insurgencies are the few incidents happening with relentless severity, while the majority of the events occur with mere severity. To fully exploit the latent behavior of human insurgencies, this research focuses on the "anomalies" — the events that have a great number of fatalities but little probability of occurrence, lying on the heavy tail—. To detect such anomalies, a novel approach, variational autoencoder, is used. The seminal essence of this model lies in processing high-volume data and capturing their non-linearity, which makes data-driven detection possible. The results show that the trained model successfully detects anomalies when given test data, showing no false negatives (Type III error) or false positives (Type I error). This predictive model, if well deployed, can provide humanitarian aid agencies and governments the ability to efficiently allocate resources, reducing wastes and mitigating the level of conflict through targeted preventive policies ; 무력 충돌, 급진적인 테러 등을 포함하는 인간 폭등 (Human Insurgency)은 지금껏 만연하고 끊임없이 전 세계적으로 위협을 주는 현상이다. 세계 개발 분야의 여러 주제 중 기관 및 조직의 주요한 관심은 이러한 충돌을 이해하고 모델 하는 것이었다. 이러한 현상은 한 체제의 식량 안보, 아동 영양, 경제적, 그리고 환경적 문제와도 연관이 되는 것으로 간주되고 있다. 따라서 무력 충돌을 포함한 인간 폭등 현상을 매핑하는 것은 필수적으로 요구되고 있다. 기존의 연구들에서는 이런 현상들의 숨어 있는 패턴을 분석하고자 하는 시도들이 있었다. 그중 두드러진 특징은 '멱법칙 (power law)' 분포를 따른다는 것이다. 멱법칙 분포는 꼬리가 긴 형태를 가지고 있다. 기존 정규분포와는 달리, 멱법칙 분포는 중심에서 멀리 위치하고 있는 현상이 더 이상 간소히 존재하는 것이 아니라, 상당히 존재한다고 볼 수 있다. 이러한 급증 규칙은 소수의 사건들이 작은 확률로 큰 규모로 발생하는 반면, 다수의 사건들은 작은 규모로 발생한다는 것을 암시하고 있다. 이러한 규칙들을 활용하여, 본 연구에서는 폭등을 매핑하기 위해 '비이상적 사건'들에 초점을 맞춘다. 비이상적 사건들은 멱법칙의 꼬리에 위치하는, 규모가 크지만 작은 확률로 발생하는 사건들을 일컫는다. 이러한 비이상적 사건들을 판별하기 위해, Variational Autoencoder (VAE)라는 새로운 방법론을 도입하였다. 이 모델의 장점은 많은 량의 데이터를 처리하고, 비 선형적인 관계들을 포착할 수 있다는 것이다. 이러한 방법으로 data-driven 판별을 할 수 있게 한다. 이러한 모델로 훈련한 결과, False Negative (Type III error)와 False Positive (Type I error)이 발생하지 않았고, 비이상적인 사건들을 성공적으로 판별할 수 있었다. 본 연구에서는 이러한 모델을 제시함으로 실제 인도주의 단체나 정부에 적용되었을 경우, 제한된 자원을 효율적으로 배치하여 향후 폭등 규모를 완화할 수 있다고 본다. ; Abstract i Contents iii List of Tables v List of Figures vi Chapter 1. Introduction 1 Chapter 2. Literature Review 5 2.1 Human Insurgency 5 2.1.1 Definition of Human Insurgency 7 2.2 Predictive Models of Human Insurgency 8 2.2.1 The limitation of previous literature 10 2.3 Latent Behavior of Human Insurgency 10 2.4 Anomaly Detection 12 2.4.1 Anomaly Detection Methods 13 Chapter 3. Methodology and Data 15 3.1 Model 15 3.1.1 Variational Inference 15 3.1.2 Autoencoder 17 3.1.3 Variational Autoencoder (VAE) 18 3.2 VAE Anomaly detection 23 3.3 Analysis Sequence 25 3.4 Data Description 26 Chapter 4. Result 31 4.1 Reconstruction Error 31 4.2 Performance Analysis 33 4.2.1 Accuracy 34 4.2.2 ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) 35 4.2.3 Precision 36 4.2.4 Recall (Sensitivity) 37 4.2.5 Precision vs Recall 38 Chapter 5. Discussion and Conclusion 40 5.1 Implication 40 5.2 Limitations 41 5.3 Further Research 42 Bibliography 43 Abstract (Korean) 51 ; Master

La globalización, las crisis económicas, las guerras, los cambios demográficos, las crisis humanitarias, los desastres naturales, entre otros muchos factores, constituyen elementos decisivos para dinamizar en gran escala, los flujos de personas a través de los Estados. Es así que los seres humanos nos movemos por las fronteras de los países buscando seguridad, salud, empleo, y en general una mejor vida. Un fenómeno de semejantes dimensiones, genera complejidades desafiantes para los ordenamientos jurídicos de los Estados, que desde su propia perspectiva, costumbres y principios buscan mantener organizadas las migraciones de trabajadores, para garantizar el derecho al trabajo y a la seguridad social. Pero la diversidad propia de cada país, genera un conjunto de situaciones que convierten a los migrantes en población vulnerable. El idioma, el clima, las costumbres, la moneda, los horarios, etc., son factores que convierten a los migrantes en población vulnerable, en una mayor o menor medida según su condición migratoria regular o irregular. De esta manera, la protección de los trabajadores migrantes, los directos vínculos entre la migración laboral y el desarrollo, así como necesidad de fortalecer la cooperación internacional, han cobrado una importancia inusitada al hacerle frente a este fenómeno. Claros ejemplos de este tipo de esfuerzos, se ven planteados en la Unión Europea y la Comunidad Andina de Naciones. La respuesta que desde lo jurídico se ha planteado para amparar a los migrantes, de los riesgos propios del trabajo y en su tránsito por los sistemas de derecho, redunda en la aplicación de principios mínimos globales que generen una migración equitativa con perspectivas de protección para un trabajo decente, donde la condición migratoria no sea un obstáculo. En Colombia, han sido las migraciones regulares aquellas que cuentan con una normatividad amplia que las rige en materia de riesgos laborales. Pero el fenómeno jurídico se comporta de manera diferente, para los migrantes irregulares, ya que en este caso el conjunto de circunstancias que hacen a los migrantes proclives a la vulnerabilidad, se ve agudizada por la falta de regulación de esta materia. Por lo descrito, la hipótesis que pretendo validar, refiere que la ausencia de regulación del Estado sobre los trabajadores migrantes y el sistema general de riesgos laborales, agudiza su vulnerabilidad y los expone a una violación de derechos constitucionales laborales. (texto tomado de la fuente) ; Globalization, economic crises, wars, demographic changes, humanitarian crises, natural disasters, among many other factors are decisive, to the flow of people through the states. Thus human beings are moving across borders of countries for safety, health, employment, and overall a better life. A phenomenon of such dimensions, generates challenging complexities to the legal systems of the States, that from their perspective, tradition and principles seek to keep organized labor migration, to ensure the right to work and social security. But the diversity of each country, generates a range of situations that make migrants vulnerable. Language, climate, customs, currency, times, etc., are factors that make migrants vulnerable, to a greater or lesser extent by regular or irregular immigration status. Therefor, the protection of migrant workers, direct links between labor migration and development and the need to strengthen international cooperation, have gained unusual importance to cope with this phenomenon. Clear examples of such efforts are outlined in the European Union and the Andean Community of Nations. The response from the law has been raised to protect migrants, of the risks inherent in their work and transit systems of law, result in the application of global minimum standards that create an equitable migration prospects for protection of decent work, where immigration status is not a barrier. In Colombia, regular migration have extensive regulations that governs occupational hazards. But the legal phenomenon behaves differently, for irregular migrants, because in this case the set of circumstances that make migrants prone to vulnerability, is increased by the lack of regulation of this matter. As described, I intend to validate the hypothesis relates to the absence of state regulation on migrant workers and the general system of occupational hazards, increased their vulnerability and exposes them to a violation of their constitutional labour rights. ; Maestría ; Derecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social

Temporary protection programs can provide haven to endangered persons while states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) work to create durable solutions in sending, host and third countries.1 They have the potential to further the interests of forced migrants in protection, states in effective and coordinated migration management, and the international community in solidarity. US temporary protection programs rest primarily on executive discretion and have not been substantially revisited for nearly 25 years. "Parole" represents the primary vehicle for temporarily admitting noncitizens for emergency and humanitarian reasons.2 Prior to 1980, the United States used parole to admit large refugee and refugee-like populations to whom (in most cases) it later extended lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. The 1980 Refugee Act made the US refugee resettlement program the primary vehicle for refugee admissions, limited the use of parole to individuals (not groups), and created a presumption against granting parole to refugees. The United States provides immigrant (permanent) visas to abused, neglected and abandoned children, as well as to certain Iraqis and Afghanis who worked for the US military or for military contractors. It can also award up to 5,000 nonimmigrant (temporary) "T" visas each year to victims of human trafficking and up to 10,000 nonimmigrant "U" visas to survivors of crime who assist law enforcement officials in investigating and prosecuting crimes. However, since 1980, the United States has lacked a dedicated legal vehicle for admitting other refugee-like populations. Temporary protected status (TPS) applies to noncitizens from states experiencing armed conflict, the aftermath of natural disaster, or other extraordinary, temporary conditions that make it unsafe to return. The TPS statute allows the secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to designate states or regions within states for TPS, although the United States has never limited TPS to substate groups. TPS does not cover persons from designated states who arrive following the effective date of the designation, even those who fled great peril. TPS recipients cannot petition for the admission of close family members. In addition, TPS cannot be granted to persons in substantial need of protection from undesignated states. Like refugees and asylees, TPS recipients receive work authorization. Unlike refugees or asylees, they are not eligible for resettlement benefits or deemed "qualified" for most federal public benefit programs. They can apply for political asylum and immigration benefits. However, TPS does not, in itself, lead to permanent status or other durable solutions. Beyond TPS, the executive branch can exercise its discretion not to remove persons who fall outside its law enforcement priorities, including persons who might otherwise suffer violence, extraordinary hardship, or death at home. This paper outlines international standards for the design and operation of temporary protection programs, describes the US refugee protection program writ large, and identifies gaps in protection. It recommends that Congress create a nonimmigrant "protection" visa for noncitizens who are at substantial risk of persecution, danger, or harm in their home or host countries, and that DHS expand its use of parole for de facto refugees and individuals in refugee-like situations. It also argues that the United States should prioritize the reconstruction and development of TPS-designated states and work to establish regional migration and development agreements covering North America, Central America and the Caribbean. Congress should also pass legislation to extend LPR status to long-term recipients of temporary protection. In particular, it should advance the "registry" date to January 1, 1999 (which would provide LPR status to most noncitizens in the country since that date) and it should automatically move up the registry cut-off date each year thereafter by one year. It should also pass broad immigration reform legislation, including a legalization program that would credit years in receipt of temporary protection toward the time required to "earn" legalization. And it should allow temporary protection recipients to apply affirmatively for "cancellation of removal" (which brings LPR status) after 10 years. DHS should also create a more inclusive TPS determination process by hosting quarterly public hearings on conditions in TPS-designated and TPS-eligible nations. It should also re-designate more states for TPS in order to allow persons from designated states who have fled dangerous conditions and entered the United States between the initial designation and re-designation periods to qualify for TPS.

Vorerst hat Präsident Maduro den Machtkampf in Venezuela gewonnen. Aber die Lage bleibt katastrophal, sie spiegelt strukturelle Probleme ganz Lateinamerikas. (IP)

Currently grappling with the complicated task of state and nation building, Papua New Guinea represents what, at times, seems like an insurmountable obstacle to development theory. Despite the vast resource pool at the disposal of the state, one of which is a substantial volume of foreign ODA, with particularly high input from Australia, the nation has failed to prosper. The symptoms of PNG's poor development record are manifest in a profusion of measures. The nation exhibits a number of poor socio-economic indicators, such as insufficient economic growth relative to the pace of population growth, growing law and order problems, endemic corruption, poor service delivery, high poverty rates, low education levels and short life expectancy. The causes are deep-seated, complex and overlapping. They are consequently extremely difficult to penetrate and address. Incompetent governance is widely seen as lying at their core. The intricate torrent of issues underlying ineffectual governance in PNG, however, is embedded in a cycle that infiltrates every level of the society. The extraordinarily linguistically, geographically and culturally diverse population lacks a sense of nationhood. Traditional clan based social obligations precede loyalty to the state. A weak government produces an abysmal level of service delivery, which provides the population with very few of the services on which to base a recognition of the state as a source of welfare and social regulation. The people's commitment to the state is therefore weak; further eroding the government's capacity; resulting in persistently poor service delivery; and consequently, a further reduction of the standing of the Government in the eyes of the population. Finding a link in the chain of this cycle from which to catalyse an improvement of PNG's development trajectory has proven extremely difficult. Enhancing service delivery depends upon improving the capacity of the Government. To make the Government more powerful, the population needs to identify more with the state as a resource provider, which will increase their demand for it to be more effective and accountable. To generate such demand, requires less institutional alteration than a fundamental sea change in the patterns of socio-political behaviour at play in PNG The missing ingredient in achieving such reform has not been a lack of effort. Confronting impediments to development has been an abiding imperative on the part of PNG and various interested stakeholders since PNG attained independence in 1975. Geographic proximity and the corresponding trans-national strategic and security interests it encourages, as well as economic, historical, humanitarian and personal links, have inspired an enduring interest in the well-being of PNG as a high priority Australian foreign policy challenge. Australia is the chief contributor to the base of Official Development Aid (ODA) supporting PNG, and has invested considerable time, capital, and technical support into helping the country develop. To date, Australia has contributed nearly $16 billion dollars to assist PNG's socio-economic progress. This significant commitment, coupled with foreign aid from other sources, indicates that PNG has not suffered from a dearth of financial assistance or expertise. Yet, PNG's development aspirations have lingered out of reach. Aid has not fostered the outcomes it was intended to produce. It has been 'ineffective' in the eyes of many, sparking widespread debate about its potential to influence positive change. On review, ODA can be seen to have contributed to keeping PNG's collapsing systems functional, yet it has not generated substantial improvements in shifting the underlying impediments which keep the cycle of poor development in motion. The root causes of instability and poor progress in PNG persist undeterred. The fundamental point detracting from the capacity of ODA in PNG is that it finds it difficult to permeate the deeper levels of the problems constraining development therein. The lack of incentive for institutional reform within PNG is a primary consideration in addressing this issue. Furthermore, aid has produced some destructive by-products in PNG. The various deductions that have been drawn regarding what this entails about the effectiveness of aid and the future of Australia's commitment to PNG are in stark contrast. On one hand, critics point to the persistently poor and only incrementally, if at all, improving socio-economic indicators PNG exhibits. Based on a strictly economic rationalist perspective, these commentators conclude that 'aid has failed' in PNG. Opponents to this viewpoint acknowledge that the aid program has been imperfect, yet contend that it has produced positive impacts when one assesses poverty alleviation from a more comprehensive matrix. Furthermore, the value of preventing considerable decline in PNG should not be discounted. Supporters of the notion that 'aid has failed', suggest that aid should be withdrawn to enhance PNG's development. Supporters of the second perspective, with whom this report concurs, conclude that aid should be continued, with improvements to enhance its effectiveness.

The article briefly presents the historical facts of the use of private military companies in the world: in the times of Rome and Carthage; times of decline of the Roman Empire; in the Middle Ages; conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia; The Great French Revolution; in the XIX century; in the period 1940-1970 of the XX century. The preconditions for the emergence and development of private military companies in the world in the twentieth century are determined. The experience of the USA concerning normative – legal regulation of activity of private military companies is described. The factors which have strengthened activity of development of private – military companies are characterized. The list of functions that can be performed by private military companies is outlined, namely: paramilitary protection of people and facilities, including embassies or oil pipelines; protection of humanitarian missions, participation in peacekeeping purposes, including under the auspices of the UN; demining; intelligence activities and assessment of the security situation in the region; maintenance and use of combat complexes and equipment; fight against piracy; evacuation of the population from the territories where armed conflicts take place; professional training of local police or military forces; performing police functions where law enforcement agencies do not work; detention and escorting of detainees or prisoners; preparation of civilians for work in an emergency situation; full participation in combat operations – together with personnel units or separately. Emphasis is placed on the wide range of uses of private military companies in different regions of the world. The legal base of activity of private military companies in the USA, South Africa, Switzerland, China is analyzed. The list of foreign private military companies that take the most active part in international conflicts today is provided. The facts of the Russian Federation's participation in conflicts in which it has to actively use private military companies are covered. ; У статті коротко надаються історичні факти використання приватних військових компаній у світі: за часів Риму і Карфагену; часів занепаду Римської імперії; в епоху Середньовіччя; укладання Вестфальського миру; Великої Французської революції; в ХІХ столітті; в період 1940-1970 років ХХ століття. Визначаються передумови виникнення і розвитку приватних військових компаній у світі в ХХстолітті. Описується досвід США щодо нормативно – правового регулювання діяльності приватних військових компаній. Характеризуються фактори, які посилили активність розвитку приватно – військових компаній. Окреслюється перелік функцій, які можуть виконувати приватні військові компанії, а саме: воєнізована охорона людей і об'єктів, зокрема посольств або нафтопроводів; охорона гуманітарних місій; участь у миротворчих цілях, в т.ч., під егідою ООН; розмінування; розвідувальна діяльність і оцінка ситуації безпеки в регіоні; технічне обслуговування та використання бойових комплексів і техніки; боротьба з піратством; евакуація населення з територій, де точаться збройні конфлікти; професійна підготовка сил місцевої поліції або військових; здійснення функцій поліції там, де не працюють правоохоронні органи; утримання під вартою і конвоювання затриманих або ув'язнених; підготовка цивільних осіб до роботи в надзвичайній обстановці; повноцінну участь в бойових операціях – спільно з кадровими частинами або окремо. Наголошується на широкому спектрі використання приватних військових компаній у різних регіонах світу. Аналізується правова база діяльності приватних військових компаній у США, Південно – Африканській республіці, Швейцарії, Китаї. Надається перелік іноземних приватних військових компаній, які приймають найбільш активну участь сьогодні в міжнародних конфліктах. Висвітлюються факти участі Російської Федерації у конфліктах, в яких їй доводиться активно використовувати приватні військові компанії.

The Australian Government has issued various policies to deal with refugees. One of the policies is the Pacific Solution and it is considered as a manifestation of national security principles. On one hand, the policy against the non-refoulement principle, which is the central principle of the refugee convention and Australia is one of the states that ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention. Obviously, Australia should not violate the non-refoulement principle. On the other hand, Australia has experienced a dilemma between prioritizing its interests and fulfilling international obligation to protect refugees who entering its territory. This article discusses whether the national security principle is contrary to the non-refoulement principle; and how Australia can accommodate both principles without neglecting the rights of refugees and still be able to maintain their interests. This article also reviews how Australia can implement policies based on national security principle when it has to face international obligations–in this case, the non-refoulement principle. This research concludes that the national security and the non-refoulement principle are basically contradictory. However, Australia can accommodate these two principles by counterbalancing actions, such as the establishment of national laws that still highly consider humanitarian standards contained in the non-refoulement principle. Australia has the right to implement number of policies based on its national law, while that the same time Australia cannot ignore their international obligation to protect refugees in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention that they have ratified. Reflecting on some previous policies, this study concludes that Australia has not been able to accommodate both principles.Dilema "Australian Pacific Solution": Prinsip Non-Refoulement berhadapan dengan Keamanan Nasional AbstrakPemerintah Australia telah mengeluarkan berbagai macam kebijakan untuk menangani kasus pengungsi. Salah satu kebijakannya adalah pacific solution. Kebijakan ini merupakan salah satu bentuk penerapan prinsip national security Australia. Di sisi lain, kebijakan ini dianggap melanggar prinsip non-refoulement, yang merupakan prinsip utama dalam konvensi pengungsi. Australia merupakan salah satu negara yang meratifikasi Konvensi Pengungsi 1951. Oleh karena itu, Australia seharusnya tidak melanggar prinsip Non-Refoulement tersebut. Dalam menanggapi permasalahan tersebut, selama ini Australia mengalami dilema di antara mengutamakan negaranya atau menunaikan kewajiban internasional untuk melindungi pengungsi yang memasuki batas lautnya. Artikel ini mendiskusikan apakah prinsip national security tersebut bertentangan dengan prinsip non-refoulement; dan bagaimana Australia bisa mengakomodasi kedua prinsip tersebut agar tidak menelantarkan hak-hak para pengungsi internasional dan tetap dapat melindungi kepentingan negaranya. Artikel ini juga akan mengulas bagaimana Australia dapat menerapkan kebijakan berdasarkan prinsip national security ketika harus menghadapi kewajiban internasional–dalam hal ini prinsip non-refoulement. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa prinsip national security dan prinsip non-refoulement pada dasarnya bertentangan. Akan tetapi, Australia dapat mengakomodasi kedua prinsip tersebut melalui tindakan penyeimbang, seperti pembentukan hukum nasional yang tetap memperhatikan standar kemanusiaan yang terkandung dalam prinsip non-refoulement. Australia berhak melaksanakan beberapa kebijakan yang tertuang dalam hukum nasional. Di sisi lain, Australia juga tidak dapat mengabaikan kewajiban internasional untuk melindungi pengungsi sesuai dengan Konvensi Pengungsi 1951 yang telah mereka ratifikasi. Berkaca pada beberapa kebijakan sebelumnya, kajian ini menyimpulkan bahwa Australia belum dapat mengakomodir kedua prinsip tersebut.Kata Kunci: Keamanan Nasional, Non-Refoulement, Pacific SolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.22304/pjih.v6n2.a7