Back to the future? The domestic sources of transatlantic regulation

In: Review of international political economy, Band 18, Heft 4

Abstract

As each others' most important investment and trading partner, the European and U.S. American economies are closely interlinked. The growing intensity of economic interdependence has spurred the transatlantic coordination of rules and standards that could form non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce. But despite impressive government-to-government efforts to eliminate market barriers, the EU and the U.S. have frequently clashed over each other's regulatory policies. The aim of this special issue is to explore the domestic sources of cooperation or conflict in transatlantic regulation. The papers analyze the role of domestic factors through three theoretical lenses that are well-established in the study of multilevel systems: the principal-agent approach, the two-level game metaphor, and through a wider concept of institutionalism which emphasizes the interlinkages of societal interests and regulatory ideas with institutional frameworks. The papers reveal that domestic factors embody more obstacles to than opportunities for horizontal coordination. It is argued that transatlantic relations will likely undergo a 'double movement' of being simultaneously shifted upwards to become part of the global governance architecture, and downwards towards broader involvement of legislators in regulatory matters. Hence, transatlantic regulation might in the near future be more shaped by political leaders, rent-seeking interest groups and legislators than by networks of technocrats. Adapted from the source document.