Anti-access/Area denial: Washington's response

In: The military balance: the annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics, S. 29-31

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been able to deploy its considerable military capacity to operational theatres unopposed, and once in theatre has faced little if any opposition in key areas of its own asymmetric advantage, such as air and space power, and the ability to engage targets with precision weaponry at extended ranges. However, the Department of Defense (DoD) has recognised since the late 1990s that freedom of manoeuvre cannot be assumed indefinitely. An erosion of the previously overwhelming US technological edge compounds this challenge. Recent doctrinal and equipment developments demonstrate the Pentagon's focus on countering what it calls anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which threaten to restrict US and allied forces' movement to and within potential theatres. Anti-ship missiles, submarines, mines and cyber capabilities are high among US armed forces' concerns regarding the inventories of potential adversaries. The Pentagon has to address these issues, and adopt new strategies, while undergoing what Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has called three transitions: firstly, a move from a military 'generally focused on deploying for combat into one that can perform missions besides counterinsurgency'; secondly, a transition in personnel strength, with notable reductions in the US Army and Marine Corps; and thirdly, doing this within an increasingly tight fiscal environment. Adapted from the source document.