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The concept of group standards (pressures toward uniformities in action and attitude) functions to control behavior. Prediction of behavior requires the employment of variables whose definitions are outside the individual. Numerous studies demonstrate the effects of group standards on individual behavior. These show that actual social phenomena of everyday social life can be studied systematically. Details of an experiment in gift giving as an example of the effect of group decisions on behavior regulation are presented, in addition to summaries of similar studies. The next stage is not replicative studies but development of a comprehensive theory concerning the relationship between membership in the small face-to-face group and the behavior of the individual. E. Scott.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of figures -- List of tables -- Acknowledgments -- List of abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- Research questions and arguments in brief -- Social standards in international trade -- Review of existing literature -- Contributions to existing literature -- So what? -- Book outline -- 2 The EU and U.S. approaches to social standards in trade An overview -- The evolution of social standards in U.S. PTAs -- The evolution of social standards in EU PTAs -- Who has stricter social standards? -- 3 Theory and methodology -- Theoretical framework -- The politics of social standards in PTAs: traditional vs. new trade issues -- Social standards and actors' preferences -- The causes: a principal-agent theory -- The effects: fear of sanctions vs. learning -- Alternative explanations -- Methodology -- Variables -- Case selection -- Data -- 4 The causes of social standards in EU PTAs -- The EU's trade policy approach -- Social standards in EU PTAs with Chile, South Korea, and Colombia -- EU actors' preferences -- Societal actors -- Legislators -- Executives -- Agreement design -- The principal-agent dynamic in the EU -- The logic of delegation -- Societal actors' behavior -- Principals' behavior -- Agent's behavior -- Bargaining power -- Conclusion -- 5 The causes of social standards in U.S. PTAs -- The U.S. trade policy approach -- Social standards in U.S. PTAs with Chile, Colombia, and South Korea -- U.S. actors' preferences -- Societal actors -- Legislators -- Executives -- Agreement design -- Principal-agent dynamic in the U.S. -- The logic of delegation -- Societal actors' behavior -- Principals' behavior -- Agent's behavior -- Bargaining power -- Conclusion -- 6 The effects of social standards in EU and U.S. PTAs -- The effects of social standards in Chile.

The article explores some of the theoretical & political issues that underpin the current conflict over the accountability of the global economic order. The article develops in five parts, starting with an initial section on the changing nature & form of globalization & ending with an account of how markets & business activities can be reframed. The focus is on the emergence of a number of cosmopolitan social standards that are embedded in human rights regimes & other international legal instruments. These standards are explicated, elaborated, & defended. The article argues that these standards need to be clarified further & developed in order to create the basis for global economic accountability & social justice. 70 References. Adapted from the source document.