The creation of a single European railway area is the overall policy objective of the European Union for the railway industry. Rail infrastructure management is seen as a natural monopoly to be operated at a national scale. Competition is possible downstream in the provision of rail transport services. A European-wide market of rail transport services would benefit from larger economies of scale, and competition would ensure such efficiencies are passed down to European citizens and businesses. However, the reform process has been set back by Member States that disagree with the full vertical separation of infrastructure management and transport service provision, as well as by Member States that want to delay the full liberalization of the industry. As a consequence, inconsistent national models are emerging and non-sustainable asymmetries between Member States are creating tensions. The Fourth Railway Package is the opportunity to conclude the European railway reform process, both for commercial services and for public contract services. Imaginative solutions are necessary to reach a workable consensus.
Considers (87) S. 3097. ; Considers S. 3097, to amend the Clayton Act to impose a temporary moratorium on large railroad mergers to allow Federal evaluation of economic and regulatory impact of various proposed mergers. ; Record is based on bibliographic data in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index. Reuse except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; Indexed in CIS US Congressional Committee Hearings Index Part VII ; Considers (87) S. 3097. ; Considers S. 3097, to amend the Clayton Act to impose a temporary moratorium on large railroad mergers to allow Federal evaluation of economic and regulatory impact of various proposed mergers. ; Mode of access: Internet.
The privatisation programme pursued by successive Conservative administrations in the 1979–97 period was based on neoliberal values, and was aimed at the reduction of public sector involvement in industry by the promotion of a competitive 'free' market. However, despite this ideological objective, several large utility companies were privatised as regulated monopolies. Against this background, in a notable reorientation of privatisation policy, the Major administration attempted to secure a genuine movement towards market liberalisation when it divested British Rail (BR). An elaborate methodology was used to break BR's monopoly and establish a competitive market for the provision of passenger rail services. The authors argue that, notwithstanding the complexity of the rail sell-off, competition has not materialised and BR's monopoly has to ail intents and purposes been reconstituted in the private sector.
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to make an empirical-based conceptualization of the contemporary domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as domestic institutional market actors (IMAs) in the marketization of public service delivery.
Design/methodology/approach The paper is based on a qualitative comparative case study of the SOEs in passenger rail in Denmark and Sweden from 1990 to 2015.
Findings The paper shows how marketization results in a layered institutional set-up of public service delivery based on both competition and monopoly where the SOE becomes what we call an IMA bridging sectorial challenges. In Sweden, this role has a new public governance form as the monopoly over time is fully dismantled. In Denmark, over time marketization is put on hold due to problems with the SOE as a market actor, but the SOE is nevertheless safeguarded in a new Weberian model as a sector coordinator.
Originality/value The paper contributes to the recent literature on SOEs and marketization with an original and novel conceptualization of contemporary SOEs in public governance.
Workshop 5 - The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments and Operators ; The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger traffic reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In sum, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former monopoly holder, the incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.
Workshop 5 - The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments and Operators ; The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger traffic reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In sum, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former monopoly holder, the incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.
Workshop 5 - The Roles and Responsibilities of Governments and Operators ; The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger traffic reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In sum, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former monopoly holder, the incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.
This thesis, which fits the general economic issues on the research tools of regulation of network industries, questions the appropriateness of regionalization of French railways. The latter, since the reform introduced by Law SRU associates maintain the monopoly to operate the railway service for Transport Express Regional (TER) with decentralization to the regions of a prerogative hitherto ensured bureaucratic and centralized. In this institutional environment, original in comparison with the European movement, the French regions have they managed to write and to govern the "system SNCF-TER" ? To answer these two questions, the author engages the neo-institutional theory, from which it offers an array of interpretive economic architecture conventions TER and a transposition of this method accounts surplus (MAS) for study the economic performance of these contracts. The results obtained on the sample of seven regions that have experienced the regionalization can only partially confirm the usual deductions made from the standard theory of monopoly and capture the regulator by the regulated firm. If the contracting SNCF / regions far removed from the model "net cost", expresses the acceptance by the legislature of a broad insurance cover industrial, commercial, and more on investments by the Community, regionalization resulted a variety of employment contracts. A detailed analysis shows the hybrid modes of governance that the author calls "fiduciaro-authoritarian". The MAS found that while the effect of monopoly is present and needed to Regions, it does little to benefit the railway operator, but rather to RFF. The trend, travelers have become "winners" of regionalization rail. ; Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans le questionnement économique général sur la recherche d'outils de régulation des industries de réseaux, questionne la pertinence du choix français de régionalisation ferroviaire. Ce dernier, depuis la réforme introduite par la loi SRU, associe le maintien du monopole d'exploitation de la SNCF pour le ...
There is still much progress to make concerning the French and the European railway networks, both from governance and competitiveness standpoints. This is the conclusion this work lead to. The results from the Enerdata-LET research consortium (2014) illustrate that, considering factor 4 for horizon 2050, the modal shift of demand in transport towards railway could be massive. Regarding this, the situation of Paris-Lyon high-speed line, already up to its saturation level, addresses the issue of the capacity a system possesses to bear new traffics. Two schools oppose there. On one side, the supporters of the SNIT suggest a quasi-doubling of the high-speed railway network, in order to cope with futures needs, whereas on the other side, the "Mobilité 21" commission gives priority to the search of increasing returns from the existing infrastructure. Without claiming to solve the issue, this work attempts to bring up comprehension elements on the interaction between demand and offer in the railway sector.Studying the accordance between an increase in railway demand and offer leads us to question performance. It means being able to define capacity of the railway infrastructure, first. But it also means questioning its limits, which addresses the phenomenon of saturation, also called congestion. Eventually, this all inevitably leads to put into perspective the relativeness of these limits and to question the ways to overcome them. The objective of this research is to apply this issue to the railway system, accounting its specificities. We consider its constitution as a network industry and as a natural monopoly, when considering the infrastructure (infrastructure manager). Without pretending to conclude the debate on governance, we consider that this particularity might influence actors and, thus, performance. We also consider the legal framework at the European scale. One can't question performance without framing the railway sector within its legal context. Then, the main purpose of the analysis stands in the study ...
This thesis, which fits the general economic issues on the research tools of regulation of network industries, questions the appropriateness of regionalization of French railways. The latter, since the reform introduced by Law SRU associates maintain the monopoly to operate the railway service for Transport Express Regional (TER) with decentralization to the regions of a prerogative hitherto ensured bureaucratic and centralized. In this institutional environment, original in comparison with the European movement, the French regions have they managed to write and to govern the "system SNCF-TER" ? To answer these two questions, the author engages the neo-institutional theory, from which it offers an array of interpretive economic architecture conventions TER and a transposition of this method accounts surplus (MAS) for study the economic performance of these contracts. The results obtained on the sample of seven regions that have experienced the regionalization can only partially confirm the usual deductions made from the standard theory of monopoly and capture the regulator by the regulated firm. If the contracting SNCF / regions far removed from the model "net cost", expresses the acceptance by the legislature of a broad insurance cover industrial, commercial, and more on investments by the Community, regionalization resulted a variety of employment contracts. A detailed analysis shows the hybrid modes of governance that the author calls "fiduciaro-authoritarian". The MAS found that while the effect of monopoly is present and needed to Regions, it does little to benefit the railway operator, but rather to RFF. The trend, travelers have become "winners" of regionalization rail. ; Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans le questionnement économique général sur la recherche d'outils de régulation des industries de réseaux, questionne la pertinence du choix français de régionalisation ferroviaire. Ce dernier, depuis la réforme introduite par la loi SRU, associe le maintien du monopole d'exploitation de la SNCF pour le Transport Express Régional (TER) avec la décentralisation aux Régions d'une prérogative jusqu'alors assurée de manière bureaucratique et centralisée. Dans cet environnement institutionnel, original au regard du mouvement européen, les Régions françaises ont-elles réussi à écrire et à gouverner le "système SNCF-TER" ? Pour répondre à cette double interrogation, l'auteur mobilise la théorie néo-institutionnelle, à partir de laquelle il propose une matrice interprétative de l'architecture économique des conventions TER et présente une transposition de la méthode des comptes de surplus (MCS), pour l'étude de la performance économique de ces contrats. Les résultats obtenus, sur l'échantillon des sept régions qui ont expérimenté la régionalisation, ne confirment que partiellement les déductions habituelles obtenues à partir de la théorie standard du monopole et de la capture du réglementateur par la firme régulée. Si la contractualisation SNCF / Régions, très éloignée du modèle « net cost », exprime l'acceptation par le Législateur d'une large couverture des risques industriels, commerciaux, et plus encore sur investissements, par la Collectivité, la régionalisation s'est traduite par une grande diversité contractuelle. Une analyse fine montre le caractère hybride des modes de gouvernance que l'auteur qualifie de « fiduciaro-autoritaires ». La MCS révèle que si l'effet du monopole est bien présent et s'impose aux Régions, il ne profite guère à la SNCF, mais plutôt à RFF. Tendanciellement, les voyageurs sont devenus « gagnants » de la régionalisation ferroviaire.
This thesis, which fits the general economic issues on the research tools of regulation of network industries, questions the appropriateness of regionalization of French railways. The latter, since the reform introduced by Law SRU associates maintain the monopoly to operate the railway service for Transport Express Regional (TER) with decentralization to the regions of a prerogative hitherto ensured bureaucratic and centralized. In this institutional environment, original in comparison with the European movement, the French regions have they managed to write and to govern the "system SNCF-TER" ? To answer these two questions, the author engages the neo-institutional theory, from which it offers an array of interpretive economic architecture conventions TER and a transposition of this method accounts surplus (MAS) for study the economic performance of these contracts. The results obtained on the sample of seven regions that have experienced the regionalization can only partially confirm the usual deductions made from the standard theory of monopoly and capture the regulator by the regulated firm. If the contracting SNCF / regions far removed from the model "net cost", expresses the acceptance by the legislature of a broad insurance cover industrial, commercial, and more on investments by the Community, regionalization resulted a variety of employment contracts. A detailed analysis shows the hybrid modes of governance that the author calls "fiduciaro-authoritarian". The MAS found that while the effect of monopoly is present and needed to Regions, it does little to benefit the railway operator, but rather to RFF. The trend, travelers have become "winners" of regionalization rail. ; Cette thèse, qui s'inscrit dans le questionnement économique général sur la recherche d'outils de régulation des industries de réseaux, questionne la pertinence du choix français de régionalisation ferroviaire. Ce dernier, depuis la réforme introduite par la loi SRU, associe le maintien du monopole d'exploitation de la SNCF pour le Transport Express Régional (TER) avec la décentralisation aux Régions d'une prérogative jusqu'alors assurée de manière bureaucratique et centralisée. Dans cet environnement institutionnel, original au regard du mouvement européen, les Régions françaises ont-elles réussi à écrire et à gouverner le "système SNCF-TER" ? Pour répondre à cette double interrogation, l'auteur mobilise la théorie néo-institutionnelle, à partir de laquelle il propose une matrice interprétative de l'architecture économique des conventions TER et présente une transposition de la méthode des comptes de surplus (MCS), pour l'étude de la performance économique de ces contrats. Les résultats obtenus, sur l'échantillon des sept régions qui ont expérimenté la régionalisation, ne confirment que partiellement les déductions habituelles obtenues à partir de la théorie standard du monopole et de la capture du réglementateur par la firme régulée. Si la contractualisation SNCF / Régions, très éloignée du modèle « net cost », exprime l'acceptation par le Législateur d'une large couverture des risques industriels, commerciaux, et plus encore sur investissements, par la Collectivité, la régionalisation s'est traduite par une grande diversité contractuelle. Une analyse fine montre le caractère hybride des modes de gouvernance que l'auteur qualifie de « fiduciaro-autoritaires ». La MCS révèle que si l'effet du monopole est bien présent et s'impose aux Régions, il ne profite guère à la SNCF, mais plutôt à RFF. Tendanciellement, les voyageurs sont devenus « gagnants » de la régionalisation ferroviaire.
There is still much progress to make concerning the French and the European railway networks, both from governance and competitiveness standpoints. This is the conclusion this work lead to. The results from the Enerdata-LET research consortium (2014) illustrate that, considering factor 4 for horizon 2050, the modal shift of demand in transport towards railway could be massive. Regarding this, the situation of Paris-Lyon high-speed line, already up to its saturation level, addresses the issue of the capacity a system possesses to bear new traffics. Two schools oppose there. On one side, the supporters of the SNIT suggest a quasi-doubling of the high-speed railway network, in order to cope with futures needs, whereas on the other side, the "Mobilité 21" commission gives priority to the search of increasing returns from the existing infrastructure. Without claiming to solve the issue, this work attempts to bring up comprehension elements on the interaction between demand and offer in the railway sector.Studying the accordance between an increase in railway demand and offer leads us to question performance. It means being able to define capacity of the railway infrastructure, first. But it also means questioning its limits, which addresses the phenomenon of saturation, also called congestion. Eventually, this all inevitably leads to put into perspective the relativeness of these limits and to question the ways to overcome them. The objective of this research is to apply this issue to the railway system, accounting its specificities. We consider its constitution as a network industry and as a natural monopoly, when considering the infrastructure (infrastructure manager). Without pretending to conclude the debate on governance, we consider that this particularity might influence actors and, thus, performance. We also consider the legal framework at the European scale. One can't question performance without framing the railway sector within its legal context. Then, the main purpose of the analysis stands in the study of saturation of the Paris-Lyon high-speed line. We consider the line as representative of the expected performance level of the whole French railway network. It challenges both technical and economic capacities that are in the core of our rationale on performance, its requirements and the opportunities of the French network. ; Les marges de progression pour le système ferroviaire français et européen restent nombreuses tant du point de vue de la gouvernance que de la compétitivité. C'est la conclusion à laquelle tend ce travail. Les résultats du consortium de recherche Enerdata-LET (2014) montrent que dans le respect du facteur 4 à horizon 2050, le report de la demande en transport vers le ferroviaire pourrait être massif. Face à cela, la situation de la LGV Paris-Lyon, déjà à la limite de la saturation, interroge sur la capacité du système à accueillir de nouveaux trafics. Deux écoles s'affrontent sur cette question. D'un côté, les tenants du SNIT proposent un quasi doublement du réseau LGV pour répondre aux futurs besoins tandis que la commission « Mobilité 21 » privilégie la recherche de rendements croissants à partir de l'existant. Sans prétendre résoudre le débat, ce travail tente d'apporter des éléments de compréhension sur l'interaction entre demande et offre dans le ferroviaire.L'étude de la concordance entre augmentation de la demande et offre ferroviaire nous mène à poser la question de la performance. Elle sous-entend d'être en premier lieu capable de définir la capacité d'une infrastructure ferroviaire. En second lieu, la mise en évidence de limites conduit à interroger le phénomène de saturation ou congestion. Enfin, interroger la notion de saturation mène inévitablement à mettre en perspective la relativité des limites et à poser la question de leur dépassement.L'objectif de cette recherche est d'appliquer cette problématique au système ferroviaire en tenant compte de ses spécificités. On tient compte de sa constitution en tant qu'industrie de réseau et de monopole naturel dans le cas de l'infrastructure (gestionnaire d'infrastructure). Sans prétendre trancher le débat sur le mode de gouvernance, on considère que cette particularité peut influencer le comportement des acteurs et indirectement la performance du système. On considère également l'évolution législative du système au niveau européen. On ne peut aborder la question de la performance sans resituer le secteur dans son contexte juridique. Enfin, l'essentiel de l'analyse repose sur l'étude de la saturation de la LGV Paris-Lyon. On considère cette LGV représentative de la performance souhaitée pour le réseau ferroviaire français. Elle concentre à la fois les défis techniques et économiques de la capacité qui constituent le cœur de notre réflexion sur la performance, ses conditions et les marges de progression du réseau français.
