Search results

The realization requirement is the income tax's original sin. Although long-standing, it is widely considered the main source of tax complexity, inequity, and economic distortion. Despite these problems, realization is also considered a fundamental element of modern income tax regimes. It is explained early in most federal income tax courses as necessitated by problems of asset valuation and taxpayer liquidity. To the dismay of certain professors, this explanation usually generates little class discussion. More worrisome, it is also widely accepted outside the classroom—prompting few political objections or normative academic inquiries. The goal of this article is to provide a normative framework that allows policymakers to better understand the role of the realization requirement. It makes two related arguments. First, with respect to certain emotionally non-fungible (personal) assets, the realization requirement is normatively justified because the market price is not a good indication of the assets' value to their owners. Second, contrary to the traditional view of realization as a regressive element, taxing only these personal assets upon realization would promote income tax progressivity. This article's normative approach provides a basis for developing a more effective and coherent redistributive income tax policy. This analysis contributes to the broader tax reform debate and opens a novel theoretical inquiry with respect to the distributive impact of different types of errors.

What shapes the optimal degree of progressivity of the tax and transfer system? On the one hand, a progressive tax system can counteract inequality in initial conditions and substitute for imperfect private insurance against idiosyncratic earnings risk. At the same time, progressivity reduces incentives to work and to invest in skills, and aggravates the externality associated with valued public expenditures. We develop a tractable equilibrium model that features all of these trade-offs. The analytical expressions we derive for social welfare deliver a transparent understanding of how preferences, technology, and market structure parameters influence the optimal degree of progressivity. A calibration for the U.S. economy indicates that endogenous skill investment, flexible labor supply, and the externality linked to valued government purchases play quantitatively similar roles in limiting desired progressivity.

This book assembles nine papers on tax progressivity and its relationship to income inequality, written by leading public finance economists. The papers document the changes during the 1980s in progressivity at the federal, state, and local level in the US. One chapter investigates the extent to which the declining progressivity contributed to the well-documented increase in income inequality over the past two decades, while others investigate the economic impact and cost of progressive tax systems. Special attention is given to the behavioral response to taxation of high-income individuals, portfolio behavior, and the taxation of capital gains. The concluding set of essays addresses the contentious issue of what constitutes a 'fair' tax system, contrasting public attitudes towards alternative tax systems to economists' notions of fairness. Each essay is followed by remarks of a commentator plus a summary of the discussion among contributors

Abstract
How much does the current social security system redistribute from rich to poor? We propose alternative concepts of well-being that can be used to classify individuals from rich to poor, and we show how social security redistributes differently under each concept. We use the PSID to estimate lifetime wage profiles and actual earnings each year for a sample of 1778 individuals, and we use mortality probabilities to calculate expected payroll taxes and social security benefits. For a given set of "facts" about the net flows experienced each year by each individual, measured progressivity depends on many assumptions. This paper attempts to capture and to quantify all of the data and characteristics relevant to determine each individual's "income" under several definitions. We then use each definition of income to classify individuals from rich to poor and to calculate the progressivity of social security.
We proceed in seven steps. First, we classify individuals by annual income and use Gini coefficients to find that social security is highly progressive. Second, we reclassify individuals on the basis of lifetime income and find that social security is less progressive. Third, we remove the cap on measured earnings and find that social security is even less progressive. Fourth, we switch from actual to potential lifetime earnings (the present value of the wage rate times 4000 hours each year). This measure captures the value of leisure and home production, so those out of the labor force are less poor, and net payments to them are less progressive. Fifth, we assign to each married individual half of the couple's income. The low-wage spouse is then not so poor, and social security becomes even less progressive. Sixth, we incorporate mortality probabilities that differ by potential lifetime income. Since the rich live longer and collect benefits longer, social security is no longer progressive. Finally, we increase the discount rate from 2% to 4%, which puts relatively more weight on the earlier-but-regressive payroll tax and less weight on the later-but-progressive benefit schedule.
Depending on the definition of income used to classify people, the overall social security system could be deemed progressive, only mildly progressive, or neutral. With an even-higher discount rate, it could even be deemed regressive.

The Article 31.1 of the Spanish Constitution includes the principle of progressivity as a characteristic of the tax system. This paper studies the content of the principle and its relation to other constitutional principles, as well as the limited control function developed by the case-law of the Constitutional Court. It also analyses the historical evolution of the application of this principle, evidencing the links between Spanish legislation and the European/Western context. Finally, it proposes potential future evolution trends towards a strengthening of the principle of progressivity. ; El artículo 31.1 de la Constitución española recoge el principio de progresividad como característica del sistema tributario. Este trabajo estudia el contenido del principio y su interacción con otros principios constitucionales, así como la limitada función de control desarrollada por la jurisprudencia constitucional. Analiza también la evolución histórica de la aplicación del principio, mostrando las conexiones entre la normativa española y el contexto europeo/occidental. Finaliza planteando posibles vías de evolución futura del sistema para un fortalecimiento del principio de progresividad.