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AbstractNegotiations with organized crime groups occur more often than realized, and raise complex questions of ethics, practice and policy. Currently, law provides few incentives for States to choose the path of negotiation, and thus the political costs and moral hazards remain very high and a mano dura ("firm hand") approach prevails. This paper examines some of the challenges faced by those who in good faith might initiate or participate in negotiations with such groups, offering an assessment of how those challenges can be mitigated and an inquiry, in particular, into how law and policy might be improved or reimagined to make such negotiation more feasible and effective in contexts of armed conflict or other situations of violence.

Abstract
Risk assessment methods are used to map the threat posed by organized crime and assist in the prioritization of policing resources. Within policing, risk assessment methods are currently in use that either focus on the attributes of organized crime groups or the types of harm posed. Statistical analysis was undertaken of risk assessment data produced using one attribute-focused and one harm-focused method. The study was based on a non-random sample of 113 attribute-focused and 77 harm-focused risk assessments of the same 17 OCGs, and a sub-sample of 36 pairs of risk assessments of 16 of the OCGs. A moderate correlation was found between the two methods, despite differences in their risk assessment processes. Lower levels of agreement tended to be associated with OCGs posing high levels of harm, particularly financial and psychological. Using the two risk assessment methods in combination is proposed as a way of building consensus that draws on their alternative perspectives. The techniques applied in this analysis could be used to inform revisions to the methods and their supporting materials, identify outlying risk assessments, and potentially incorporate other information sources such as harm indices.

Gang and organized crime history and foundations -- Los Angeles area street gangs -- Chicago area street gangs -- Outlaw motorcycle gangs -- Prison gangs -- Females in the gang world -- Gangs and violence -- Gangs and the military -- Asian, East Asian, and African organized crime -- Italian organized crime -- Russian and other European organized crime -- Drug and other trafficking organizations in the Americas -- Investigation and prosecution of gangs and organized crime groups

This innovative book investigates the paradoxical situation whereby organized crime groups, authoritarian in nature and anti-democratic in practice, perform at their best in democratic countries.

This study examines strategic crackdown policies on organized crime between states or nations. In particular, we consider how organized crimes in different regions can affect optimal sanctions for local governments, which face the problem of coordination failure. We demonstrate how the strategic relation between organized crime groups (i.e., complementarity or substitution) affects the strategic relationship between local governments with respect to crackdowns on organized crime. We also demonstrate that if organized crime groups' activities complement each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is lower than the first-best sanction level with coordination and that if organized crime groups' activities substitute each other, the equilibrium sanction level without coordination is higher than the first-best sanction level with coordination.

Organized crime groups in the region are retreating, but the question remains whether the government onslaught will succeed in eliminating their influence.

Afghanistan has been demolished by more than three decades of the ongoing war since the war against the Soviet Union started in 1979. The Afghanistan-Pakistan region provides a geographically secure location and a space of opportunity for organized crime and terrorist groups. This paper aims at exploring the Taliban nexus with organized crime groups in Afghanistan and the region through Makarenko's crime-terror continuum theory. The method of this study is qualitative through the descriptive-analytical approach. The growing connection between insurgents and organized crime poses essential challenges to the region. Each group has developed both criminal and terrorist elements while not relinquishing its original organizing principle. Afghanistan is a war-torn country and weak governance, terrorism, narcotics, illegal mining, poor border control, and widespread corruption provide the perfect opportunity for convergence of the Taliban with organized criminal and insurgent groups in the region. The Taliban and organized crime groups are involved in kidnapping for ransom, drug trade, extortion, and exploitation of natural resources. The finding indicates that, although the objectives of the insurgent and organized crime organizations differ widely, these enabling variables are also suitable for organized crime organizations. The primary objective of organized crime is to gain profit, and the objective of the insurgent is to contest the state power and promote political change through violence. The economic sources are the primary main reason why the two organizations converge.