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AbstractUsing an equilibrium model of interlinked frictional labor and marriage markets where men are regarded as "breadwinners," we establish the existence of male marriage premium within a given productivity group, as well as a clear ranking of premia across different groups. We find supporting evidence using Chinese data.

It is well-known that married men earn more than comparable single men, with typical estimates of the male marriage premium in the range of 10 to 20 percent. Some research also finds that cohabiting men earn more than men not living with a female partner. This study uses data from the General Social Survey and the National Health and Social Life Survey to examine whether a similar premium accrues to gay men who live with a male partner and whether cohabiting gay men have different observable characteristics than non-cohabiting gay men. Controlling for observable characteristics, cohabiting gay men do not earn significantly more than other gay men or more than unmarried heterosexual men. Cohabiting heterosexual men also do not earn more than non-cohabiting heterosexual men. -- Male marriage premium ; gay ; heterosexual

AbstractObjectiveThis paper empirically tests the three theories put forward to explain the male marriage premium.BackgroundMarried men continue to earn more than single across the Western world, despite significant changes to family life. Three theories are put forward to explain this phenomenon: (a) Marriage makes men more productive; (b) more productive men select into marriage; (c) employers prefer married men and therefore offer them higher wages.MethodWe use a multi‐pronged strategy to test all three theories. First, we analyze a Swiss national panel survey using fixed‐effects regressions with observations matched using entropy balancing, as well as fixed‐effects individual slopes (FEIS) models to isolate the selection effect. Second, we use a factorial survey experiment of over 500 recruiters in Switzerland to study the preferences of employers.ResultsPooled ordinary least squares regressions showed a marriage premium of 11%, which is reduced to approximately 3.5% when accounting for selection and 2.5–3% when introducing controls related to in‐work productivity. The results of the survey experiment showed that employers assign wages 2% higher to married men, with large differences between occupations. They are also more likely to invite married men to a job interview.ConclusionWhile selection is found to be the largest contributor to the male marriage premium, it does not explain it fully. Both employer preferences and productivity changes also play a small role.

Married men's wage premium is often attributed to within-household specialization: men can devote more effort to wage-earning when their wives assume responsibility for household labor. We provide a comprehensive evaluation of the specialization hypothesis, arguing that, if specialization causes the male marriage premium, married women should experience wage losses. Furthermore, specialization by married parents should augment the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium for married as compared to unmarried parents. Using fixed-effects models and data from the NLSY79, we estimate within-gender differences in wages according to marital status and between-gender differences in the associations between marital status and wages. We then test whether specialization on time use, job traits, and tenure accounts for the observed associations. Results for women do not support the specialization hypothesis. Childless men and women both receive a marriage premium. Marriage augments the fatherhood premium but not the motherhood penalty. Changes in own and spousal employment hours, job traits, and tenure appear to benefit both married men and women, although men benefit more. Marriage changes men's labor market behavior in ways that augment wages, but these changes do not appear to occur at the expense of women's wages.

AbstractRecent research has shown that men's wages rise more rapidly than expected prior to marriage, but interpretations diverge on whether this indicates selection or a causal effect of anticipating marriage. We seek to adjudicate this debate by bringing together literatures on (1) the male marriage wage premium; (2) selection into marriage based on men's economic circumstances; and (3) the transition to adulthood, during which both union formation and unusually rapid improvements in work outcomes often occur. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, we evaluate these perspectives. We show that wage declines predate rather than follow divorce, indicating no evidence that staying married benefits men's wages. We find that older grooms experience no unusual wage patterns at marriage, suggesting that the observed marriage premium may simply reflect co-occurrence with the transition to adulthood for younger grooms. We show that men entering shotgun marriages experience similar premarital wage gains as other grooms, casting doubt on the claim that anticipation of marriage drives wage increases. We conclude that the observed wage patterns are most consistent with men marrying when their wages are already rising more rapidly than expected and divorcing when their wages are already falling, with no additional causal effect of marriage on wages.