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AbstractThis article makes a case for weak class reductionism. In particular, we advance a theoretical account that largely "reduces" a social construct called race to another social construct called class. Once you acknowledge that race is not itself a prime mover, but rather something to be explained, class as an explanans turns out to be a strong candidate. Before making this case, we distinguish our account from three alternative forms of class reductionism, which we reject: the notions that (1) class is a more fundamental form of identity than race; (2) class is of greater normative importance than race; and (3) race is an epiphenomenon of class, without independent effects. We then argue for one form of class reduction that establishes race as causally dependent on class. In particular, we provide a general defense of functional explanations, argue that capitalist class relations can functionally explain the persistence of race, and finally, delineate the limits of that explanation. Because the nature of functional explanation requires the explanandum to have important effects in the world, this argument puts race at the center of any discussion of capitalist class relations in racialized societies and explains it on the basis of its effects rather than its causes. Nonetheless, as we show in our conclusion, none of these arguments imply that race or racism is inherent to capitalist class relations. Racism may be explained by capitalism, even if it is not necessary for it.

Responses to a mailed questionnaire indicate that experience with the World Bank, the IMF and the WHO does not necessarily result in attitudes more favorable to those agencies or to international cooperation. Attitudes tend to be multidimensional, and increased experience is associated with favorable attitudes along some dimensions but not others. Despite functionalist assumptions to the contrary, attitudinal responses to participation in the work of functional agencies do not differ significantly from responses to participation in the more "political" United Nations. Rather, attitudes seem contingent upon the rewardingness of the experience. This, in turn, is affected by the respondent's personal values, his domestic organizational milieu, the nature of the international organization, and the specifics of the respondent's experience. These findings are not totally at odds with functionalist theorizing, but suggest additional variables that functionalism should take into account.

This paper traces developments in Jeffrey Alexander's cultural sociology. The aim is to introduce the reader to the key components of this theory as it developed from a functionalist focus on societal values through semiotics and linguistic structuralism to a theory of cultural trauma and collective performance.

This paper traces developments in Jeffrey Alexander's cultural sociology. The aim is to introduce the reader to the key components of this theory as it developed from a functionalist focus on societal values through semiotics & linguistic structuralism to a theory of cultural trauma & collective performance. 5 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications and Thesis Eleven Co-op Ltd, copyright 2004.]

This paper analyzes the contemporary emergence of neo-formalist and neo-functionalist approaches to law-making at a time when the state is seeking to reassert, reformulate and reconceptualize its regulatory competence, both domestically and transnationally. While the earlier turn to alternative regulation modes, conceptualized under the heading of "legal pluralism,ʺ "responsive law,ʺ or "reflexive lawʺ in the 1970s and 1980s, had aimed at a more socially responsive, contextualized, and ultimately learning mode of legal intervention, the contemporary revival of functionalist jurisprudence and its reliance on "social normsʺ embraces a limitation model of legal regulation. After revisiting the Legal Realist critique of Formalism and the formulation of functionalist regulation as a progressive agenda, this paper reflects on both the American and German justifications of market regulation and the Welfare State in order to trace the different evolution towards "responsive law" and legal pluralism in the U.S. and "post-interventionist" and "reflexive" law in Germany. This comparison allows for an identification of the emerging transnational qualities of legal normativity in the face of a declining welfare state paradigm, which - at the beginning of the 21st century - appears to provide the stage for turning the progressive gains of the former era into a set of market-oriented justifications of private autonomy and de-regulation.

In its earlier phases, S. N. Eisenstadt's work revised functionalist theory by focusing on institutions and group interests and on the contingent nature of historical change. In the last decade, as his work has moved from social system to civilizational analysis, Eisenstadt has focused increasingly on the independent role of cultural codes and intellectual carrier groups as instigators of broad social change. In place of institutional strains it is now tensions internal to the cultural maps of diverse civilizations that initially instigate resistance and social movements. There has been a corresponding shift in Eisenstadt's view of modernity, which he now describes as an inherently fragile social order whose very premises stipulate explosive and endemic efforts to supersede the institutional and cultural frameworks of contemporary social life.

Foreword -- Table of Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- Part I: Introduction: Constitutional Values and Interpretation -- 1. Functionalism and Australian Constitutional Values -- I. The Role of Values in Australian Constitutional Law -- II. Continued Formalism and the Call for a Functionalist Turn -- III. The Content of the Functionalist Constitution -- IV. The Collection and the Functionalist Constitution -- V. Limits to the Collection and Functionalism -- 2. The Justification of Judicial Review: Text, Structure, History and Principle -- I. Introduction -- II. Textual Provisions -- III. Structural Principles -- IV. Enactment History -- V. Conclusions -- 3. Functions, Purposes and Values in Constitutional Interpretation -- I. Introduction -- II. The Nature and Source of Constitutional Values -- III. The Use of Purposes/Functions and Values -- IV. Interpretation and Construction -- V. Construction as Rectification -- VI. Fabricated Implications -- VII. The Limits of Purpose -- VIII. Conclusion -- 4. Functions, Context and Constitutional Values -- I. Introduction -- II. The Concept of a Function -- III. Functions and Intentions -- IV. The Problem with Originalism -- V. Constitutional Narratives -- VI. Constitutional Implications -- VII. Functions and Context -- Part II: Legality and Constitutionalism -- 5. The Rule of Law -- I. What is the Rule of Law? -- II. Textual and Structural Support for the Rule of Law -- III. The Rule of Law and Constitutional Interpretation -- IV. Conclusion -- 6. Government Accountability as a 'Constitutional Value' -- I. Introduction -- II. Defining Government Accountability -- III. Constitutional Guarantees of Accountability -- IV. High Court Recognition of Accountability as a 'Value' -- V. Accountability under a Functionalist Approach -- VI. Conclusion -- 7. Impartial Justice -- I. Introduction

It is no longer fashionable to work out typologies of pill al systems based on party systems. Systennitic studies are interested in parties onle from the point of view of their 'functioning;.' in the pol'al sYstem as a whole. It is probable impossible to decide whether the parties & the part\ system' are independent variables or variables dependent on the pol'al system. More & more. although it is impossible to den a relation of interdependence, these 2 terms display a certain independence & are not in a relation of co-variation. Thus. the pol'al system is to some extent defined by contrast to the parties, which. in turn, are subject to 3 other types of determinants. However, the problem of specifying the functions of parties remains central. although there is much confusion ill the use of the 'functionalist' terminology. If the pol'al system is defined as the sum total of processes & mechanisms aimed at harmonizing or neutralizing irrepressible soc pturalisms without destroying their equilibrium. it is possible to distinguish 3 functional imperatives: (1) the function of legitiniation & stabilization; (2) the tribune function (integration or neutralization of centrifugal forces); (3) the replacement of pol'al personnel. While there is interaction between the parties R the pol'al systems. a certain non-dependence between the terms can also be observed. because the parties (& not only the anti-system parties) are defined apart from the po1'al slstem. which. in turn. has a certain freedom of movement even re the anti-system parties. IPSA 'I'r be A. Pesk-in.

A functionalist framework is used to synthesize well‐known ideas about societal integration and, conversely, disintegration. If the underlying Darwinian metaphor in functional analysis is retained, and supplemented by dialectical metaphors, then functional theorizing can insightfully address the forces of societal disintegration. The emerging theory revolves around, on the structural side, the dynamics of segmentation, differentiation, interdependence and exchange, structural overlap, structural embeddedness, mobility, segregation, and domination whereas on the cultural side, the theory emphasizes the dynamics inhering in systems of evaluational, regulatory, and legitimating symbols as well as generalized symbolic media.

Durkheim's The Rules of Sociological Method has never enjoyed the same reputation as his major books, in part because the book is uncongenial to standard interpretations of Durkheim. In particular, its attacks on teleology do not fit his reputation as a functionalist The papers in this special issue address the work historically. Both Porter and Stedman Jones deal with aspects of the context in which Durkheim worked and transformed. Schmaus and Nemedi deal with problems of interpreting Durkheim's development, and Platt discusses the reception of The Rules. The papers shed light on such important questions as the meaning of Durkheim's slogan "society is made of representations." Durkheim, it appears, was not only what would now be called a constructionist, he went on to ask whether the fact that constructions are real in their consequences did not imply the reality causal reality of constructions and, therefore, a specific kind of "social realism." The problem The Rules poses, of what is the fundamental stuff of society, is "classic" in significance, and Durkheim's answer is classically radical

On retaliation : conceptual plurality, transdisciplinary research, rifts, blurrings -- And translations / Bertram Turner -- Revenge and retaliation : a social-functionalist approach / Mario Gollwitzer and Arne Sjostrom -- In the heart of the moment : the influence of visceral factors on retaliation / Robert J. Bies and Thomas M. Tripp -- A criminal is a victim is a criminal? : an economist's view on the victim-offender overlap / Horst Entorf -- Laypeople's reactions to deviancy as determined by retributive motives / Margit E. Oswald -- Violent crimes and retaliation in the European criminal justice system between the seventeenth and nineteen centuries / Karl Harter -- Crime in motion : predation, retaliation and the spread of urban violence / Richard Wright, Volkan Topalli and Scott Jacques -- Crime and punishment : intentionality and diya in Algeria and Sudan / Yazid Ben Hounet -- 'Bewitched people and bad luck everywhere!' : disputing and magical retaliation in siSwati-speaking Southern Africa / Severin Lenart -- Forum shopping as retaliation in disguise : how nomadic Fulbe condemn retaliation and forum shopping, but practise them anyway / Albert K. Drent -- Customary law and the joys of statelessness : Somali realities beyond libertarian -- Fantasies / Gunther Schlee -- Retaliation in postwar times : an analysis of the rhetoric and practices of retaliation in Bamyan, Afghanistan, 2009 / Friederike Stahlmann -- The International Criminal Court reparation system : punishment, retaliation, restoration / Pietro Sullo -- Conclusion : retaliation in specific spheres of effectiveness / Bertram Turner.

Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism (1983) is placed in the context of his modernization theory, which is then critiqued. Gellner's functionalist argument links nationalism to industrialization & urbanization by way of the political needs for stability that he argued can only be met in a culturally homogeneous context. The application of this theory to European cases undermines this functionalist logic with historical examples of cultural differentiation at the heart of the nations that developed. Gellner's position is reminiscent of the position of those involved in the modernizing project within Europe around the turn of the 20th century, when the question of homogeneity was a troubling one. 52 References. H. von Rautenfeld

Legal positivism's conception of legal knowledge sets up a tight bond between law and language. According to this perspective, law is the discourse of the legislator and legal science is nothing but a discourse on a discourse: a meta-language descriptive of the prescriptive language of the legislator. This conception of law and this model of legal science have been in crisis for some decades. In my paper I present four arguments serving to underline the limits of this approach to law: the epistemological argument, the argument of epistemological pluralism, the argument of the interpretative turn, and lastly the functionalist argument. These arguments are not all on the same plane and do not all have the same strength. Some only furnish an explanation of why analytical law orthodoxy on legal science is under attack. Others claim to identify some structural and conceptual limits of this model. ; La ciencia jurídica de matriz iuspositivista establece un ligamen preciso entre el derecho y el lenguaje. Según esta perspectiva, el derecho es el discurso del legislador y la ciencia jurídica no es otra cosa que un discurso sobre un discurso: un metalenguaje descriptivo del lenguaje prescriptivo del legislador. Esta concepción del derecho y este modelo de ciencia jurídica están en crisis desde hace algunas décadas. En mi artículo presento cuatro argumentos dirigidos a señalar los límites de esta aproximación al derecho: el argumento epistemológico, el argumento del pluralismo epistemológico, el argumento del giro interpretativo y, finalmente, el argumento funcionalista. Estos argumentos no están todos al mismo nivel y no tienen todos la misma fuerza. Algunos proporcionan sólo una explicación de por qué la ortodoxia iusanalítica sobre la ciencia jurídica esté siendo atacada. Otros tienen la pretensión de identificar algunos límites estructurales y conceptuales de este modelo.

La ciencia jurídica de matriz iuspositivista establece un ligamen preciso entre el derecho y el lenguaje. Según esta perspectiva, el derecho es el discurso del legislador y la ciencia jurídica no es otra cosa que un discurso sobre un discurso: un metalenguaje descriptivo del lenguaje prescriptivo del legislador. Esta concepción del derecho y este modelo de ciencia jurídica están en crisis desde hace algunas décadas. En mi artículo presento cuatro argumentos dirigidos a señalar los límites de esta aproximación al derecho: el argumento epistemológico, el argumento del pluralismo epistemológico, el argumento del giro interpretativo y, finalmente, el argumento funcionalista. Estos argumentos no están todos al mismo nivel y no tienen todos la misma fuerza. Algunos proporcionan sólo una explicación de por qué la ortodoxia iusanalítica sobre la ciencia jurídica esté siendo atacada. Otros tienen la pretensión de identificar algunos límites estructurales y conceptuales de este modelo. ; Legal positivism's conception of legal knowledge sets up a tight bond between law and language. According to this perspective, law is the discourse of the legislator and legal science is nothing but a discourse on a discourse: a meta-language descriptive of the prescriptive language of the legislator. This conception of law and this model of legal science have been in crisis for some decades. In my paper I present four arguments serving to underline the limits of this approach to law: the epistemological argument, the argument of epistemological pluralism, the argument of the interpretative turn, and lastly the functionalist argument. These arguments are not all on the same plane and do not all have the same strength. Some only furnish an explanation of why analytical law orthodoxy on legal science is under attack. Others claim to identify some structural and conceptual limits of this model.