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Intro -- PLEASURE ANDTHE GOOD LIFE -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter One. Two Paradigms : Plato and Aristotle -- I. Plato: The 'Replenishment Theory' -- 1. From the Protagoras to the Republic -- 2. The Philebus -- 2.1. The Definition of Pleasure -- 2.2. Plato's Critique of Hedonism -- 3. An Evaluation of Plato's Theory -- 3.1. A Positive Doctrine? -- 3.2. The Physiological Presuppositions of the Definition -- 3.3. The Identity of Pleasure and Replenishment -- 3.4. Plato's Merits -- II. Aristotle: The 'Theory of the Perfect Activity' -- 1. Aristotle's Rejection of the Platonic Definition -- 1.1. The 'Platonic' Definition of Pleasure -- 1.2. Aristotle's Criticism -- 2. A New Model -- 2.1. Aristotle's Definition of Pleasure -- 2.2. Pleasure as a 'Supervenient Element' -- 2.3. The 'Proper Pleasure' -- 3. Consequences of Aristotle's New Model -- 3.1. Pleasure is not a Movement -- 3.2. Pleasure is not Excessive per se -- 3.3. 'Pure' Pleasure -- 4. An Evaluation of the Aristotelian Account -- Chapter Two. The Standard Neoplatonic Theory: Plotinus and Proclus -- I. Plotinus -- 1. Plotinus' Definition of Pleasure -- 2. Plotinus' Refutation of Hedonism -- 3. 'Pleasure' in the Good Life -- 4. Conclusion -- II. Proclus -- 1. Proclus' Definition of Pleasure -- 2. 'Pleasure' in the Good Life -- 3. Conclusion -- Excursus. Epicureans and Stoics -- I. Epicurus -- II. The Stoics -- Chapter Three. A Different View: Damascius' Commentary on the Philebus -- 1. Introduction -- 1.1. Identifying the Author -- 1.2. Method -- 2. The Central Theme (σκoπóς) of the Dialogue -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. Damascius' Own View -- 3. Damascius' Account of the Soul as a Basis of his Theory of Pleasure -- 4. Darnascius' Interpretation of the 'Mixture of Pleasure and Intellect' -- 4.1. Desire and Cognition in Sense-perception and Intellect.

AbstractFor brands to succeed, they often need consumers to trust them. This has prompted marketing and consumer behaviour researchers to examine what makes certain brands more trusted and how brands can identify themselves as trustworthy. For over 25 years, experimental economists, behavioural scientists and others have examined interpersonal trust using an exercise—the trust game—where participants put money at risk based on how trustworthy they think other people are. This research has remained largely separate from work on brand trust, but this critical review aims to identify findings and concepts from trust game‐based research that are relevant to brand trust, and starts to develop an integrated research agenda for the future. In particular, it looks at how brand trust is measured, how brand trust might (or might not) be distinguished from transactional risk, and the heuristics and biases behind brand trust judgements and how these relate to brands' attempts to signal their trustworthiness.

AbstractIn this paper, I argue for two claims, (i) that on a common conception of the second order property of being a mental disorder, some facts about mental disorders are the result of social constructions, and (ii) that the way facts about mental disorders are constructed differs from the received view on social construction. The difference is examined, a novel type of social construction is identified, and it is suggested that there are numerous other types of social facts that are constructed in a similar way.